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Abstract 
Empathy is presented as a relation between persons and by 
analogy between persons and non-human entities in which case 
it is called quasi-empathy. The characteristics of empathy, 
the sufficient and necessary conditions for its creation and 
nurturance, and various types of empathy, both authentic and 
mistaken, are examined. The role of empathy in various types 
of knowing especially personal knowing are discussed leading 
to an attempt to classify interpersonal relations. In the 
course of this analysis different ways of construing human 
beings are presented and contrasted with particular interest 
in the extent to which empathy, quasi-empathy and other 
relations are involved. A variety of emotional bonds which 
have some bearing on or similarity to empathy are compared 
with empathy. The dissertation concludes with a review of a 
selection from the empathy literature in which contrasts are 
made with the outline theory of empathy developed in this 
dissertation. 
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PROLOGUE 
Reading the literature on empathy can prove to be a disappointing 
experience. Few psychologists appear to have thought it necessary to 
probe the phenomenon they were investigating preferring perhaps the 
excitement of empirical research. Unfortunately this practice has 
left our understanding of "empathy" in a rather unsatisfactory state 
since, as I shall try to show in Chapter 3, there is little agree- 
ment about what "empathy" refers to, how it comes into existence and 
develops over time, indeed how best to conceptualise empathy at all. 
I shall here concentrate on two consequences of this neglect. The 
first of these is reification. 
Reification and naming 
The human sciences are-replete with abstract nouns: class, role, in- 
telligence, attitude, personality, creativity, motivation, rights, 
empathy ... The list is endless. Naming phenomena has far more 
profound effects than is generally understood, greater perhaps than 
is even admitted. Initially theorists may quite firmly keep in mind 
that when they subsume a piece of observed conduct under a named 
category they are only resorting to a convenient form of shorthand. 
It allows them, they might say, to think and talk easily about ob- 
served complex human tendencies to act consistently in a variety of 
different situations. Too easily, however, what this shorthand 
stands for tends to fade from the forefront of memory. Theorists 
soon drift, seemingly unawares, into the habit of describing people 
in terms of a particular class name thinking thatýit accurately 
labels the specific conduct they are observing, measuring, etc. For 
example, it appears reasonable to describe a person as of average, 
or below or above average intelligence according to whatever crit- 
eria the observer employs for evaluating the relation between var- 
iety of contexts (e. g. intelligence test items) and the appropriate- 
ness of an individual's response in each situation (as prescribed by 
the theorist's definition of intelligence). I feel that this short- 
hand device may be dangerous and may lead to a rather dismissive 
approach to the phenomenon under observation. 
1 
Apart from the circularity of this type of reasoning (e. g. intellig- 
ence is whatever intelligence tests measure) the attribution of abs- 
tract psychological or sociological properties to human beings may 
have distasteful consequences. Are theorists saying, for example, 
that a person will tend to display the measured amount of intellig- 
ence on all occasions and in all possible contexts? Obviously the 
-I way in which the theorist construes intelligence is crucial here. If 
the notion of intelligence is restricted to purely intellectual act- 
ivities: reasoning, problem-solving, performing number and word 
tasks, and so forth, then a theorist might not invoke the concept of 
intelligence when evaluating the same person's social competence, or 
psychomotor skills, performance of kinaesthetic tasks, or producing 
imaginative artifacts. 
Such a bias on-the partrof theorists may not-matter much provided 
that everyone else agrees with, them; kbut there are many definitions. - 
of intelligence and-allrmay, be suspect. -'The failure of, psychologists 
of individual differences to: agree about--the status and usefulness 
of attributing toipersons qualities'such_as intelligence may be 
enough to raise doubts about the value of, _such an enterprise. =The 
"discovery of, -psychologicaliattributes, and the naming-of them have 
reduced theFrichness, 'diversity'and uniqueness of human beings 
through a kind of scientific stereotyping. Flesh and blood persons'. 
are not stereotypes. ' The natural way. of talking about persons is to 
describe, their actions or, _more, generally, 
their-agency in and on 
the world. To describe a. person's action=as, csay, intelligent is 
vastly different from-attributing the-. quality, xintelligence, to- 
that=person. The latter_amounts to-a generalisation from a number of 
observed instances which themselves may have-been construed in terms 
of ad, hoc theorising. r' » .ý-1,: - 
The process just described shifts attention from human action or 
agency (the proper subject of psychology some would say(1)) to hypo- 
thesised, abstract, perhaps fictional, qualities of the person. It 
is one thing to say, for example: "George acted very intelligently 
(or wisely, imaginatively, etc) considering the difficult choice 
forced upon him" but quite another to say: "George shows a lot of 
intelligence (or wisdom, imagination, etc) in whatever task he un- 
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dertakes. " The first statement only requires that we be clear about 
the kind of actions which George might have performed in order for 
us to thus express ourselves correctly and accurately. The second 
assertion, in contrast, is global and actually untenable. We simply 
do not, and cannot, know enough about George to support such a 
sweeping statement. Even if we observed him over a lengthy period of 
time we might not sample the full range of George's repertoire of 
actions to permit us to endow George with (an undefined amount of) 
intelligence, wisdom or imagination (depending on whatever theory we 
entertain about the phenomenon behind the chosen label). Our observ- 
ations might only cover the manipulation of objects, the use of 
tools and the making of things. (George is a craftsman, let us sup- 
pose. ) We might know very little about how he copes with other prac- 
tical tasks, or how he handles the cognitive or social demands 
thrust upon him although we could, of course, observe all these be- 
haviours if we wished. Moreover, we might be unable to guage the ex- 
tent of George's willingness to display the full range of his action 
potentialities, either in general or to us in particular. 
The problem, however, is much worse because the abstract noun is 
soon transformed into adjectival form which is then applied to indi- 
viduals and even to whole groups, the type of stereotyping all too 
familiar in our society. The English language is rich in adjectives 
and most of us tend to be extravagant users of them. Insult is added 
to injury by introducing "always" or "never" into the epithet. 
"You're always so miserable (selfish, negative, etc)" or "You're 
never cheerful (considerate, positive, etc). " Perhaps among fallible 
human beings immersed in the normal hurly-burly of getting on with 
one another in the relatively crowded conditions of industrialised 
societies this type of crude stereotyping is inevitable. It is cert- 
ainly understandable. We should not, however, remain complacent 
about this tendency (if true) for-it indicates'that something is 
wrong with our accepted way of life. But among practioners in the: 
human sciences the practice is inexcusable. The creation of a 
system of assessment procedures which not only assigns descriptors 
to individuals but also evaluates persons in terms of them has be- 
come the apparently respectable equivalent (scientifically speaking) 
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of labelling. As well say the stills outside the cinema are equival- 
ent to the full-length feature film within, the luridly illustrated 
dust jacket the contents of the novel, the title of a poem the poem 
itself. All, at best, offer no more than a hint of the contents; it 
is the whole story we want: its drift, its ins and outs, its flavour 
as a dramatic sequence. We must watch or read the whole. 
From "George acted intelligently (wisely, imaginatively)" we have 
moved to "George is intelligent (wise, imaginative)". The first may 
be true; it all depends on the criteria we use. In any case we can 
always ask George. We can discuss with him what else he might have 
done, what he thinks of these possible options, his views about what 
he actually did. We can, in short, explore with him the entire situ- 
ation including ourselves, our criteria, our individual perceptions 
of the event, and so forth. Part of the discussion may focus on our 
right to observe and comment an his conduct, our reasons for doing 
so, his attitude to the whole affair. All of this would prove ex- 
tremely useful in corning to an understanding about George's conduct. 
His statement might not agree with ours but at least we would be 
able to discover how our divergent viewpoints arose and the implicit 
personal values and perspectives which-they represent or express. 
As the exploratory and conversational approach which I am alluding 
to resembles some forms of psychotherapy or counselling procedure I 
must make it clear that I am not here obliquely referring to the 
well-known conflict between scientific and clinical methods of in- 
vestigation, though I shall return to this theme shortly. What I am 
drawing attention to is firstly, the inherent tendency for reificat- 
ion to occur, perhaps encouraged by the use of abstract nouns; and 
secondly, to the probably unintended consequence of reification: the 
inevitable depersonalisation which attends the use of descriptors as 
a result of reifying psychological and sociological concepts. 
Sir Frederick Bartlett long ago warned us of the dangers of express- 
ing our ideas about psychological functions in the form of ordinary 
nouns. His own preference was for verbal nouns such as remembering, 
thinking, perceiving instead of memory, thought, perception. In us- 
ing the present participles of verbs (action words) he may have 
wanted to acknowledge two pressures: the necessity of naming abst- 
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ract qualities in order to make them more accessible in discussion; 
and his wish to redirect psychologists towards the study of human 
conduct (purposeful, intended action) which alone offers an observ- 
able, verifiable set of events from which to gain insights into our 
nature. In the context of this dissertation the distinction I am em- 
phasising is that between the person that each of us is (in our own 
eyes at least) and its lesser substitute, the psychophysical indivi- 
dual, the creation of tough-minded, empiricist psychologists. Though 
Bartlett would not have adopted my language he seems to have had 
some such notion in mind. 
Naturally we cannot abolish nouiis'from our scientific discourse but 
we can translate noun-orientated propositions into a form which'exp- 
resses a human being in action. Instead of talking about intellig- 
ence, for example, we can describe a person acting intelligently or 
alternatively a person performing an intelligent action. To assert 
that a person acted intelligently is'to make a strong, positive 
statement. Positive accounts of human physical, mental and social 
activities reflect life as it is lived and experienced by humankind 
everywhere. Weak verbs such as "seem", "become", "be", and so forth 
are best avoided as is the passive voice. "He trod on my foot" is 
closer to my experience (and not merely a more vivid way of writing) 
than "My foot-. was trodden on (by him)". 
Adverbs qualify verbs. Just as we'choose the verb to match the act- 
ion so we select the adverb to express its particular character. In 
short we must know what counts as an action so qualified as in the 
example of George acting intelligently. As I have said already our 
criteria are overt and potentially verifiable. Adjectives may be ap- 
plied to actions for the same reason. An intelligent move in a game 
of chess is similarly open to"observation and verification through 
discussion, analysis of famous games,; and so on. - Gurwitsch expresses 
the view I am presenting here much more clearly: 
Both dispositions(2) and qualities(3) designate constants, i. e. 
regularities of experience, action, reaction behaviour, etc., 
rather than mental facts which themselves fall under direct ex- 
perience. The logical status of these concepts is much the same 
as that of physical constants such as index of refraction, 
electrical and thermal conductivity specific gravity, etc. Both classes of concepts denote systematic unifications and ex- 
perienced facts rather than these facts themselves; the unity 
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in both cases is causal not phenomenological. Concepts of both 
classes express systemizations and causal unifications of ex- 
perienced facts through certain mental processes, and it is to 
these processes and procedures of mind that one must look for 
an ultimate clarification of the concepts in question. In the last analysis we are led back to the facts given in immediate 
experience as materials to be unified and systematized. (4) 
In the metaphor I have used up to this point we are led back to hu- 
man action, the occasion and inspiration for our systematic unific- 
ations, and to our experience of human action, as agents ourselves 
and observers of other human beings. 
Turning now to my own topic, empathy, the reification tendency per- 
sists here as energetically as with other psychological phenomena. 
People are assumed to have or lack empathy and to an ascertainable 
degree. Most studies of empathy depend on the researcher's belief 
that empathy can be measured with the help of a standardised proce- 
dure such as the Truax Accurate Empathy Scale(s). Predictably they 
tend to describe people as empathic (or empathetic) or not as the 
test results indicate. In contrast I talk of empathising or of act- 
ing empathically or of entering into an empathic relation. Occasion- 
ally I use the word "empathy" when I mean it to stand for the pro- 
cess of empathising, of acting empathically, of entering into an 
empathic relation. This practice alone distinguishes my approach 
from that of other workers in this field with very few exceptions. 
Before moving on to my second reason why empathy seems to hover in a 
kind of psychological limbo I first want to add two footnotes to the 
foregoing. My obsession with active verbs, etc., and the rejection 
of nouns, even verbal ones, stems from-my view of persons as agents 
(following Macmurray(6)) and from the importance I attach to inter- 
personal relations especially to one in which persons strive to know 
and understand one another, discover how alike they are and yet how 
different, all without hint of judgement, manipulation, or exploit- 
ation of one by the other. I shall have more to say about persons 
and relations later in this prologue. 
Abilities, skills and achievement 
Now to the other cause of empathy's sorry state. It is entirely nat- 
ural within the process of reification that the doctrine of abilit- 
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ies should take root. Intelligence, for example, is much too large 
in its scope to grasp all at once so to speak; it must'be analysed 
into separate abilities and much of the research in this field has 
centred on deciding the number and type of abilities which comprise 
intelligence but also on establishing the appropriate procedural and 
statistical techniques for isolating them. Some psychologists cons- 
true human beings as rather more than possessors of abilities; hum- 
ans also possess traits. The investigation of both is the 'special 
concern of personality theory and research. Theorists cannot always 
agree whether a particular phenomenon such as empathy is best viewed 
as a trait or as an ability. For my purposes this dilemma is unim- 
portant since I construe empathy as-a special kind of interpersonal' 
relation but it is relevant to one of the main thrusts of research 
in this area. Many regard empathy as an ability or skill (some us- 
ing these two terms as though they were equivalent and interchange- 
able) which can be learned and hence taught. I'have no doubt that 
the empathic process depends on a range of skills for its fulfilment 
but is. not itself a skill. Rather I associate the achievement or, 
outcome. -of the combined efforts of those, engaged in getting to know 
and understand one another as, persons-(or personal. knowing for 
short) with the empathic relation and, with a particular. kind of 
interpersonal harmony, a , state in., which, the members of the relation 
are at one with each; -other 
despite their now explored differences 
some of which may as yet rema}n, unresolved, perhaps even. unresol- 
vable, forever part of the irreducible foreignness of, the other. 
That is to say, achievement of an empathic relation, however imper- 
fect, is signalled by achievement of some kind of interpersonal har- 
mony. Here is another way in which my approach to the study of em- 
pathy differs from that of most other theorists. 
Ryle's distinction between striving and achievement(7) is relevant 
here. We may all strive to enter into empathic relations with others 
(i. e. strive to know and understand one another) and cultivate the 
necessary stance of, openness towards them. Striving, however, does, 
not guarantee success and achievement of the empathic relation and 
interpersonal harmony may be short-lived, infrequent, in constant 
need of repair and sustenance. I shall try to show in the following 
pages how we may move into and out of the empathic relation and, 
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even within it, move back and forth through its various stages as we 
alternate between success and failure in our endeavour. For me it is 
the striving that matters. As Stewart points out (from his personal 
experience of helping alcoholics to help each other) empathy has to 
be worked at(8). I would add "unremittingly". This is the third way 
in which my treatment of empathy, both as a concept and as a phenom- 
enon, differs from that of most. workers in this area. 
Interpersonal harmony*- 
A brief note about interpersonal harmony, as I understand it may pre- 
pare the reader for my special viewpoint. Interpersonal harmony is 
achieved-when two or more persons have learned to recognise and 
accept unconditionally how alike yet how different they are; who 
have discovered how to work together on a shared project despite 
their differences and even their disagreements; and who can move 
about at peace with one another within this relationship. 
Interpersonal harmony is not inconsistent with divergent points of 
view, ''dissimilar "personalities" (observed stylistic consistencies 
in a person's approach to life's tasks-and difficulties), and long- 
standing, even fundamental, disagreements. Respect, eventually love, 
enables members of an empathic relation to sustain their self- and 
other-enhancing modes of living` regardless of what after all are 
merely contingent properties of'the'individuals entering into it. 
Persons are able, with effort, to transcend, ''go beyond, contingent 
characteristics. 
This view raises the question of how substantial differences have to 
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be before the possibility of, entering into, let alone sustaining, an 
empathic relation approaches zero. First, we have to adopt and main- 
tain the stance of non-manipulative, non-judgemental, non-exploitat- 
ive openness towards the other no matter how, in the eyes of society 
(and perhaps, therefore, in our own eyes despite our efforts to re- 
act otherwise) revolting, repellent, vicious the other's actions 
are. It is extremely'difficult to view a brutal child torturer or 
sadistic rapist non-judgementally. Similarly, rabid racists, violent 
political extremists and other dangerously aggressive people excite 
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fear and loathing regardless of how we might wish to maintain an 
openness towards them as persons despite their conduct. 
Secondly, to promote the empathic relation we have to explore our 
differences and similarities, again in a spirit of goodwill, and 
learn that "acceptance of others involves respect for differences 
from oneself, though they may be foreign to one's own personality 
and even inimical to it. "(9) In the examples I have chosen this 
seems most unlikely. Finally, we must engage in a joint project 
(perhaps in these cases,. to, overcome extreme, forms of anti-social 
behaviour) when at last we discover interpersonal harmony which in 
turn builds or reinforces our mutual respect and so helps to perpet- 
uate the empathic relation. Such a possibility seems to me to be so 
remote that it, scarcely merits the small amount of space I have de- 
voted to it. Yet surely it is precisely in these extreme cases that 
empathy as I picture it. is most needed. Whilst we, may reject the 
crime and the criminal we have no right to reject the person trapped 
within the individual's own, often self-chosen, self-erected prison. 
Unless at least one person is willing and able to make the effort to 
forge an empathic relation with stich unfortunates what hope is there 
for them? 
Summary 
To summarise the distinctions-1 have made so far: 
(1) I avoid reification of empathy by discarding the abstract 
noun, returning to the more solid ground of human conduct 
which I express in one of three ways:, to empathise; to act 
empathically; to strive towards an empathic relation. ' 
(2) I focus on two elements of the empathic process: persons 
and relations. , 
In the latter case I pay special attention 
to one particular kind of interpersonal relation the main 
aim of which is to know and understand another and to 
achieve some measure. of interpersonal harmony. 
(3) I reject the view of empathy as ability, trait or skill. 
The forging of an empathic relation is a process which re- 
quires unrelenting effort and is attended by many failures 
and some small victories. However, it is the constant 
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striving that matters. Many skills are doubtless called 
upon to achieve an empathic relation. 
Persons 
I am indebted to Macmurray(8) for my approach to persons and relat- 
ions.. "Person", as I use the term, presents me with a problem which 
I must try to explain here. 
I have chosen to exploit Weber's notion of the Ideal Type(10) as an 
analytical device. I think it is a useful tool provided one remem- 
bers that it refers to an idealised version of the real world in 
which a phenomenon is shorn of random perturbations, distracting 
detail, and so on. Physicists could scarcely begin theorising about 
the natural order but for useful abstractions such as frictionless 
bodies, perfect vacua and absolute zero. One branch of mathematics 
would disappear if the idea of infinitely small increments was inad- 
missible. And without the calculus huge areas of technology could 
hardly have got under way. 
"Ideal" in the common language of ordinary folk means perfect; flaw- 
less; model worthy of emulation, especially in moral conduct. Neith- 
er my nor Weber's use of ideal type implies this popular, everyday, 
moral connotation but it is easy to see how, because these usages 
are based on similar ideas, e. g. that of perfection, we may inadver- 
tently slide from one usage into the other without realising it. 
This may seem to be the case in my own treatment of the discontinu- 
ities between having and being, between person-and its defective 
opposite. 
What I wish to convey is the notion that in striving to reach per- 
sonhood we have in practice to settle for something less than that 
represented by the ideal type but which is nevertheless a consider- 
able achievement if we succeed. This lesser goal is attainable. The 
lives of the saints provide many examples of different approaches to 
achieving a closeness to God despite backslidings, surrenders to 
sins of the flesh, feelings of irritation, hopelessness, frustration 
and privation. The striving counted for more than the failings; over 
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time they discovered how to reduce the incidence of what they regar- 
ded as their imperfections and barriers to union with God. Those 
with similar aspirations but who do not seek comfort from a deity 
would claim to have had similar experiences. 
The ideal type is an abstraction, a convenient model to assist theo- 
rising but which nevertheless dramatically illustrates the goal we 
seek: personhood, for example, and the being way of life. Since we 
are prone to the usual human weaknesses we aim at something less. In 
our attempts to lead a more being-orientated way of life we do not 
totally abandon a having mode. In fact we cannot so, long as we re- 
main full members of our society as it exists around us. Still, we 
can pay more attention, perhaps far more, than we do now to the 
alternative. We may strive to achieve a more self- and other-enhanc- 
ing disposition towards others while yet falling into self- and 
other-limiting ways. The closer we approach the near-perfect and 
attainable goals the more rewarding for us since it is our striving 
towards a being made of life, towards personhood, which can mean so 
much to us. Life may thus be seen as a series of minor successes 
whose number and quality may, with constant striving, increase. My 
approach may remind readers of the aims and practices of Zen Buddh- 
ism but shorn of all mysticism, ritualistic practices and mythology. 
Thus we might envisage the poles of the "mode of living" dimension 
to be set at a distance from a continuous line, one such pole rep- 
resenting "having" as one ideal type (in the Weberian sense) and the 
other representing "being" as the opposite ideal type. Both are 
hypothetical constructs, products of rational thought about this 
particullar*dimension. In contrast, the ends of the line represent 
actual, attainable goals, near-perfect examples of "having" and 
"being" respectively. All possible conditions lie between these 
near-perfect examples. It may seem strange to speak of near-perfect 
instances of "having" since they include such characters as misers, 
ruthless capitalistic individuals, people dominated by the lust for 
possessions (including the ownership of human beings), and so 
forth. As I pointed out earlier near-perfect does not imply a high 
moral tone. It simply means that these examples typify the kind of 
individuals who fall at this extreme. The ideal type is perhaps best 
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represented by Satan (since I started with a theological example) to 
whom it is customary to attribute an insatiable lust for the posses- 
sion of our souls. The having-being dimension is shown below. 
Satan miserly conduct, poets Christ? 




mode of o ----------------------- ------ o mode of 
living Buddhists living 
Similarly for the "person" dimension. This is linked to the idea of 
self- and other-enhancement and its opposite, self- and other-limit- 
ation. The examples of almost totally defective persons typify this 
end of the dimension. 
Satan? Stalin, Krishnamurti, Christ? 
Mengele, saints of the 
totally Hitler, church 
defective a ------------------ ------- o perfect 
person person 
Hence when I use the terms "person" and "personhood" the reader is 
to understand that I intend the notion of the attainable, near- 
perfect rather than the Weberian ideal type. Similarly when I cont- 
rast the being and having modes of existence I have the realisable, 
near-perfect examples of each in mind. The Weberian extremes serve 
as reference points for the phenomenon which each of these dimen- 
sions represents,: stripped of the paraphenalia of the real world. 
Relations 
Relations strike me as the natural term to use when describing a 
human being's commerce with the world, assuming that we equate "hum- 
an being" with "person". As I shall explain later human beings may 
also be construed as biological mechanisms, organisms, and psycho- 
physical individuals as well as persons. Action is accompanied by 
not only consciousness of being (even if only at the margin of cons- 
ciousness as Gurwitsch(11) would say) but also by a sense of being 
in the world. Action confirms and reaffirms to ourselves our exist- 
ential reality; we know we are because we are inseparably linked 
with, immersed in, our doing. Action also confirms and reaffirms the 
here-and-now quality of our existence; consciousness of our abiding- 
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ness is inseparable from our experience of the here-and-now since 
each experience of the here-and-now is woven into the fabric of pre- 
vious experiences, moment by moment. 
Persons are constantly moving into and out of relations with people, 
things, ideas. We adopt a position, a point of view, a perspective 
(sometimes literally)-on this or that.,. issue,. object, individual, 
theory or principle. We are not-always fully aware of the relations 
we enter into; even less. often do we immediately, grasp"the signific- 
ance or meaning or potential of those relations we are aware of. 
Consciousness-raising is a prominent feature of modern life but the 
second stage of spontaneous conceptual fulfilment, let alone a poss- 
ible third stage of analysis and perhaps synthesis, is not so com- 
monplace. All but the most. insensitive, individuals must. nowadays beý 
aware that women are no longer willing to, endureýbelittlement at the 
hands of men. Not all men, however, who are aware of women's pro- 
tests have arrived ata concept of women as persons which accommo- 
dates this awareness to the greater advantage of women. Fewer still 
have discovered the implications of this new concept, a discovery 
which must inevitably lead to a revised concept of men as persons as 
well as of women. These two stages also apply to women's new concep- 
tion of themselves and of men; we are entitled to ask whether some 
feminists are any nearer completion of stages two and three than 
men. This example suggests that, though relations constitute the 
principal social mechanism through which persons operate and though 
their sense of being-in-the-world springs from their actions, the 
full import of relations and of being-in-the-world may remain at a 
primitive level of development. 
While I do not in these pages show specifically how ordinary folk 
might progress to a richer awareness of their being-in-the-world and 
towards a competence in forming empathic relations and, in general, 
towards fostering amore sensitive alertness to themselves and their 
existential world, my account does point, I think, to ways in which 
thoughtful readers might design programmes of self-development in 
interpersonal relations. 
Although I rate the empathic relation highly I do not hold that all 
interpersonal relations must ideally be empathic nor that we should 
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strive to develop empathic relations with everyone nor that, with 
any one person, we should try to establish an empathic relation on 
every occasion we meet. The critical factor is the reason for enter- 
ing into a relation with someone in the first place. The pursuit of 
objective knowledge is hardly likely to inspire a wish to join an- 
other in anything more than a temporary and relatively superficial 
relation. If I am a student of geography I should probably be satis- 
fied with a friendly but knowledgeable teacher. I would not feel the 
need to empathise with him or her though on occasion I might in 
which case the impetus for doing'so would arise out of the occasion 
itself. Given the choice between'a friendly but incompetent teacher 
and an unfriendly but competent; one, (in terms of knowledge of the 
subject and power put it over to me effectively so that I do 
learn) I should probably choose the latter. 
In contrast, if a close relation already exists between persons, say 
between husband and wife or between two lovers or between parent and 
child, one member of the dyad may well seek objective knowledge of a 
kind which might best be sought within an empathic relation. For ex- 
ample the satisfaction of the sexual wishes of two people who are 
already close may depend on the sensitive and intimate ambience of 
an empathic relation for the exploration to proceed without embar- 
rassment, guilt or fear. It may not succeed but such a taboo area of 
conduct is not likely to be revealed. through a coldly clinical 
questioning of each other, at least not without affront to the sens- 
ibilities of. one or both partners. The safety and security of a 
relationship which emerges from discovering, through the pursuit of 
a shared goal (in this case, sexual fulfilment for both partners), 
how alike yet how different they'are, does hold some chance of suc- 
cess since, by the nature of the empathic relation, the partners 
interact in a non-judgemental, non-manipulative, non-exploitative 
spirit. Fear which afflicts many people in sexual matters may yet 
prevail. Even so in the empathic relation the search for the source 
and nature of this fear may become the shared task. All is not lost 
so long as they continue to strive to know and understand one an- 
other concerning these fears in an unfettered non-judgemental, non- 
manipulative, non-exploitative way. 
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Any significant "object" may prompt one or other individual to 
strive towards achieving an empathic relation though inspiration 
tends to flow from significant events or situations or contexts. 
(For the sake of simplicity I do not consider larger groups. ) Only 
the member or members can decide what is or is not significant. It 
will frequently stem from difficulties encountered in an individ- 
ual's commerce with the world but as often be located within the 
self, a poor self-image, for example, or persistent feelings of 
hopelessness. Psychological problems cover a wide band of human ex- 
perience. What troubles one, person may leave another unmoved. The 
only sound judge of what is significant is the person with the 
problem. 
Science and the study of persons 
The scientific method is one of the most powerful tools available 
to scientists, one which they will use whenever possible. The prob- 
lem in'the human sciences is that, if the proper task of psychology 
is the study of the person, the scientific method is difficult to 
apply since the observer and the observed are mutually dependent as 
they must be to some extent in any enterprise which involves them 
both as partners. (I remind readers that I differentiate "person" 
from other-ways of construing human-beings. ) Objectivity is always 
relative; the best we can aim for is a kind of controlled subjectiv- 
ity. We try to eliminate as much bias as possible by carefully 
choosing our variables, controls, and so forth. Where the observed 
is inanimate this procedure works well enough though it may not 
always be value-free. Personal feelings may pose problems and so may 
deep-seated attitudes and beliefs, and high levels of commitment to 
particular theoretical positions. In the study of persons the diffi- 
culties are that much greater. If the uniqueness of persons becomes 
the centre of our interest generalisations about humankind interfere 
with our enquiry. To know a person is entirely different from know- 
ing a psychophysical individual. The latter is but a type, an ins- 
tance of the general case which traditional paper and pencil tech- 
niques and other devices attempt to define usually in pursuit of a 
specific objective. Matching people to jobs, educational experien- 
ces, careers has become a major task of modern psychology. So also 
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has the evaluation of outcomes, e. g. the measurement of the effects 
of experiences of all kinds an different categories of human beings. 
Similar aims influence the treatment of mental disorders. One of the 
dilemmas in clinical psychology is posed by the clinician's concern 
over the unique individual seeking his or her help and the pressure 
to show that treatment conforms to scientifically validated princip- 
les. Clinicians try to resolve this difficulty in a variety of ways 
but the present state of psychotherapy (for example, that there are 
at least a dozen different theories of therapy on offer) may not be 
very reassuring to patients who, even if knowledgeable, may not be 
sure how to decide which therapy is best able to help them. 
Researchers and students who give pride of place to the uniqeness of 
individual persons must eschew the full rigour of the scientific 
method but that does not entail the abandonment of a scientific ap- 
proach. In any case we always have at our-disposal the foundation of 
all scientific activity: observation and description. At this level 
the investigator devises a range of observation methods and record- 
ing techniques suitable for his or her purposes. These are familiar 
enough in clinical and educational settings. They are increasingly 
finding a place in occupational and organisational investigations 
and some systems approaches to the study of complex human groups 
rely on descriptive methodologies(25). 
As will become apparent in the main text I value the idea that per- 
sons can grasp the givenness of "things", including other persons, 
if they will only divest themselves of most of what they know and 
believe about the "things", allowing the latter to speak for them- 
selves. Undoubtedly there are obstacles. We cannot unknow that which 
we know but we can learn to hold our knowledge in suspense. Success 
in phenomenological research depends on acquiring this competence. 
We can also learn about our preferred modes of thinking, feeling, 
perceiving, imagining, and so on, by the careful analysis of our 
descriptions of "things". We are unlikely to perceive the world in 
all its pristine originary character but we can try to approach this 
ideal as closely as we wish depending on our preparedness which it- 
self depends on the amount of effort we invest in developing an att- 
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itude of openness to experience. This I discuss in the main text. I 
know of no alternative. I see no place here for operationalism which 
properly, belongs to the scientific study of human beings construed 
as psychophysical individuals. It does not strike me-as at all rel- 
evant to the scientific study of persons unless in the very weak 
form of operationalism: the set of propositions which formally exp- 
ress the specific processes of consciousness-raising which I have` 
referred to above. 
These comments apply to'procesäes as much as to things. To'know a 
person as a person is first of all to perceive that person as he or 
she is at a particular moment'regärdless of the knower's experience 
of the other~at'earlier meetings . and`the knower's previous knowledge 
about the person. The knower's openness and hence experience of the 
other's givenness is crucial therefore for personal knowing. But 
equally important for the knower is-experiencing the act of personal 
knowing. The'"knower in his or her responsiveness-to the other may 
adopt either a manipulative stance or an enhancing one. The stance 
will depend on the knower''s prevailing predisposition towards the 
other. This experience of the prevailing mode of living: one in 
which the knower is primarily concerned with'`his'or her own'purpos- 
es; and one in which the knower perceives the other as 'a person 
whose own purposes are valued, is what I have in"mind when contrast- 
ing the having and'being mödes respectively. 
Preference for being accompanies, indeed reflects, respect-for the 
other's uniqueness. Preference for, having to a greater or lesser 
degree diverts concern for-the other for his or her own sake to the 
other's usefulness to the knower. Consciousness of one's preferred 
mode of living, or actual mode at a particular moment, is thus im- 
portant if the knower seeks genuine personal knowledge of another. 
The givenness of experience and of things yields descriptions which 
form the bedrock of both theory and subsequent empirical research. 
In emphasising the, difference between scientific studies of the per- 
son and of the psychophysical individual I am, not claiming or defen- 
ding the supremacy of the former over the latter. Each member of the 
four categories of "human being" has its own metaphor which theor- 
ists and researchers may exploit for their specific purposes as 
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scientists. The validity of ends and means must be determined within 
the boundaries of the metaphor. The categories are essentially dif- 
ferent; studies conducted within their different rubrics will there- 
fore call on different concepts and treatments. They must not be 
confused nor intermingled. 
A comment on my approach 
I have shown how my approach to the study of empathy differs in a 
number of ways. from that of other theorists but as yet I have not 
shown-why I have adopted my particular point of view. Stewart is the 
only theorist I have come across who based his account of empathy on 
his experience of real-world relationships, in his case among alco- 
holics. They helped each other towards sobriety but his observations 
of the way in which they struggled towards "freedom from thirst" 
guided his theorising over a period of some fifteen years or so(13). 
He had been influenced by Macmuray(b) whose Gifford lectures he 
attended-, in the early '50s. He was also impressed by Scheler's "The 
Nature of Sympathy"(14). It seemed to me that the model of empathy 
he elaborated out of these three materials: his. awn experience, the 
Gifford lectures, and Scheler's study of a related fellow-feeling, 
provided a sound starting point for my own project. I have extended 
his notions of respect, love and good-will; moved towards Scheler's 
rather than Freud's view of identification;, expanded the idea of 
different ways of knowing to contrast with personal knowing (one of 
the aims of the empathic relation); more clearly established the 
concept of empathy as a relation; and set the whole empathic process 
in a wider context by comparing it with pseudo-empathy, quasi- 
empathy, other forms of fellow-feeling and other types of emotional 
bond. 
It seemed to me that a theory rooted in experience, even if not my 
own, -and centred on persons and relations had some face validity 
which other theories lacked. It also struck me that my own approach 
was closer to life as lived. Human beings see themselves as persons, 
at least in the culture with which I am familiar(26), even if they 
might be hard put to explain exactly what this means. And their 
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natural way in the world is through relations. So no other route 
seemed so logical to me. 
An overview 
My conviction has grown throughout this study that the proper task 
of psychology is the study of persons or rather of personal being 
and that therefore there is a pressing need to re-examine the onto- 
logical and epistemological foundations of psychology. I have avoid- 
ed confusing my own modest investigation with this much more import- 
ant and grander venture but inevitably the latter has influenced not 
only my orientation but also my theorising. For this reason my first 
chapter is well-called An Outline Theory of Empathy. Although I 
would be the first to acknowledge my own limitations as a thinker 
and theorist, an outline theory, it must be because, as my argument 
evolves, issues confront me, which, belong to the greater enterprise. 
The works of those steeped-in the hermeneutics tradition (Ricouer 
(15), Gauld and Shotter(16)),, or in phenomenology (Stein(17), Schutz 
(18), Scheler(14), Thines(19), the, Dusquenes group(12)), or in the 
nature of personal being (Macmurray(6), Fromm(20),, Harre(21)), rpro- 
vide ample proof of the complexity of these issues. I-indicate, 
either in the text or in the footnotes at the end of each chapter, 
where I have had to lay aside further discussion of important mat- 
ters because they would have taken me beyond the closer boundaries 
of my chosen domain. 
My' dissertation seeks to describe the empathic process as accuratly 
as possible within the spirit of phenomenology though without alleg- 
iance, to one particular phenomenological viewpoint. The first chap- 
ter establishes my view of empathy as a relation. I explore in some 
detail not, only the characteristics of this relation but, also the 
sufficient and necessary conditions for its creation and continued 
nurturance. I examine a number of different types of empathic relat- 
ion as well as instances of a misplaced attribution of empathy. In 
the second chapter I examine other interpersonal relations but from 
the specific standpoint of knowing. Since-I-interpret the empathic 
relation as: one route to personal knowing it sems essential to con- 
sider other kinds of knowing and to explore their relationship both 
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to the empathic process and to personal knowing. As part of this 
analysis I introduce alternative conceptualisations of the human 
being: biological mechanism, organism, psychophysical individual as 
well as person. Chapter 2 concludes with a brief study of emotional 
bonds; because the empathic, relation is a union with another colour- 
ed by, and, perhaps founded on, emotion it seemed necessary to com- 
pare it with other similar or apparently related bonds. Between them 
chapters 1 and 2 present and elaborate the concept and phenomenon 
lurking behind the label "empathy" without launching into the deeper 
waters ofa psychology of personal being. On the other hand I feel 
that these two_chapters make a tentative start, in this direction. 
The three strands of my argument: the empathic relation, other in- 
terpersonal relations and emotional bonds, reinforced each other and 
led to-constant revision of my ideas about the nature of the empa- 
thic--process. In broad outline Vagree with Stein(17) that it has 
properties reminiscent of perception but "a kind of perceptual act" 
for what? What prompts this quasi-perceptual-experience? Can anyone 
empathise? What part does the empathic relation play in everyday- 
life? 'It was questions such'as these that I kept in mind while work- 
ing on this` dissertation. 
Scheler(14), despite his beautiful analysis of fellow-feeling, 
failed to see in this particular fellow-feelinga genuine human ex- 
perience, an authentic way of personal knowing. Yet his phenomeno- 
logical analysis of the forms of sympathy and his comparison of 
genuine sympathy with look-alike phenomena proved invaluable when I 
attempted'to'disentangle the various kinds of empathic relation and 
to show how it differed from other kinds of'fellow-feeling. Stewart 
(22) demonstrated the important part played by imitation and delib- 
erate identification°`in the continuously forming and reforming act- 
ivity which constitutes the'dynamic character of the empathic pro- 
cess. He also demonstrated the pivotal position of a shared common 
goal or ideal in providing the mainspring for joint action within 
the fully-fledged empathic relation. As he said, empathy has to be 
worked for. Not for him the prevailing notion of a moment of spon- 
taneous enlightenment which belongs if anywhere to a romantic and 
gothic past. 
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Chapter 3 reviews a selection of the empathy literature which, though 
only a relatively small part of the total, highlights the main theo- 
retical thrusts discernible in this field. My selection also includ- 
es the major seminal thinkers who have contributed to the study of 
empathy since the turn of the century. Most of this material is 
post-40s but very little of it seems seriously to explore either the 
concept or the phenomenon. I have also deliberately tried to illus- 
trate the diversity of ideas which have been explored and the vari- 
ety of labels which have been used. I have not attempted to evaluate 
the research methods or instruments used. Unless and until an inves- 
tigator has delineated a phenomenon any attempt to measure it seems 
premature. Neither have I attempted to isolate the cognitive and 
productive resources which might underlie the empathic process nor 
do I offer criteria for deciding the competence of a particular per- 
former or the quality of a particular performance in forming or sus- 
taining an empathic relation. - 
Some limitations 
This work has a number of limitations one of which is an omission 
which I can justify. Although, as I have already said, I think it 
necessary to know what empathy is before plunging into experimental 
investigations, now that I have made some suggestions concerning the 
first might it not also be a good idea to speculate about the sec- 
and? For example, an outline research programme might encourage my- 
self and others to go out and observe the empathic process in act- 
ion. Had I rested content with the kind of conceptual exploration 
which is far too often met in the empathy literature then some emp- 
irical work might have been possible; an examination of some of this 
literature will show that the customary clarification of terms and 
so forth barely fills an introductory section in most journal artic- 
les. My study tries to clarify the concept but especially the phen- 
omenon itself and in some detail. 
This points to another possible shortcoming, that the account pres- 
ented here is not really a phenomenological analysis. It is perfect- 
ly true that I did not sit down. and consciously adopt a Husserlian 
phenomenological stance (as did Edith Stein), nor alternatively one 
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in emulation of Scheler. Insofar as I have taken account of Stein 
and Scheler and, in general, worked in the spirit of phenomenology 
(which, whatever the peculiar attitude of a particular phenomenolog- 
ist, is essentially to let phenomena speak for themselves) I consid- 
er I have acqitted myself well enough for my purposes. 
My preference for the phenomenological tradition rather than the 
newer hermeneutical is partly because the former seems closer to my 
leaning towards Stewart's study of the empathic process. It also 
seems to me to be more obviously relevant to psychology though, as 
Gauld and Shotter(16), show in their use of the hermeneutical app- 
roach, this is really a matter of interpretation. However, psycho- 
logy as a scientific study of the person must, it seems to me, take 
a new direction. The choice seems to lie between the phenomenologic- 
al andAhe hermeneutical perspective. For my limited purposes I have 
opted to take the former path. This decision does not indicate my 
judgement about the alternative. The likelihood is that psychology 
will gain immeasurably from both. 
I have eschewed all theories about the nature of humankind, about 
the nature of experience, of perception and motivation, and so on; 
I have relied solely on what I take to be self-evident "facts" 
(which is not to say that they may never be questioned nor that they 
may never be found wanting) which ultimately rest on everyday exper- 
ience. In any event everyday experience is a potent source of knowl- 
edge whether or not it expresses some universal truth. In the appen- 
dices I have included a note on phenomenology and subjectivity to 
make clearer my own position (which is still evolving). 
The present work, despite references here and elsewhere, is not a 
philosophical analysis, a discipline in which I have little compet- 
ence. Nor is it a psychological study although many of my sources 
are to be found in the psychological literature. Rather I have drawn 
on whatever material seemed relevant to my enquiry including Zen 
Euddhism(23), the works of Krishnamurti(24), world literature and 
the arts, as well as psychology, sociology, anthropology and those 
philosophers who have shown a special interest in the person such as 
Macmurray(6) and Harre(21). I have tended to be very selective and 
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have doubtless incurred some penalties in so doing. My own bias is 
to stay close to ordinary human experience and to respect folk wis- 
dom despite its obvious limitations. To describe the empathic relat- 
ion is my task and all is grist-to my mill that serves that purpose. 
Before launching into the st'üdy proper two' observations might prep- 
are the reader for what lies ahead. The presentation of complex 
ideas poses problems for both writer and reader 'alike. The story 
cannot be told all at once so some structure has'to be created with- 
in which both of us can move about freely and purposefully. Unfor- 
tunately no framework can'cope with the range and diversity of 
interdependencies among concepts which characterise complex subject 
matters. The reader has to take a great deal'on trust in the expect- 
ation that the author will eventually'clärify outstanding doubts, 
misgivings, uncertainties and the like. 'Chapter 1 contains most that 
is new; at'any rate-'it is likely to be the least familiar to a read- 
er approaching a study of empathy for the first time. My style tends 
to be stark and assertive in 'the belief 'that' unqual if ied 'proposit- 
ions are not only easier to grasp than more cautiously expressed 
ones but they areaalso'more readily put to the test. Hence some 
readers might prefer to read the work fröm start to finish ` and' then 
re-read chapter 1. Alternatively the reader` might first read chapter 
3 and then go through the whole work'from beginning to end. 
The second point concerns the general focus of the study. For exam- 
ple, I have tended to contrast the open, non-manipulative, non- 
judgemental approach to the world with its opposite:,. the manipulat- 
ive, -instrumental approach. In the empathic relation, Iargue, the 
preference is for. the former way of life in contrast to, the latter 
which in essence lies at the heart of the power relation. Empathy 
and power I. envisage as opposing modes of relating to the world 
especially to other people. The reader might be led to think, there- 
fore, that the instrumental, exploitative approach was the only, 
interpersonal pathology of interest to social psychologists especi- 
ally as I have linked it with the prevalent having mode of existence 
which. seems to me to be typical of modern industrialized societies. 
Other pathologies exist, however. For instance, one which has been 
intensively investigated centres on the concept of rigidity. The 
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work of Rokeach and the many studies of prejudice from that of Ador- 
no and his colleagues onwards draw attention to the central part 
played by rigidity in creating specific other-limiting (and self- 
limiting) dispositions. Rigidities'rest on a legalistic attitude; 
rigid people construe the world-in highly moralistic terms. Crime 
and punishment $. conformity to rules, obedience, stress on discip- 
line and orderliness enforced if necessary (but justly). are promin- 
ent features in their psychological, landscape. Particular rigid 
individuals may on occasion be manipulative but this fact does not 
necessarily, flow from their rigidity. On_the contrary; (unless one 
adopts a_Freudian perspective) it might be shown that where the 
manipulator-favours a Machiavellian and subtile approach the rigid 
dogmatist typically does not. From personal observation at close 
quarters of a number of rigid dogmatists over a long period of time 
their preferred interpersonal style tends to be one-of barely con- 
tained righteous indignatipn., Undiluted positive moral statements 
and no-nonsense uncompromising stands. on every issue that interests 
the rigid individual seem to be typical. The fact that_I have not in 
general discussed this particular interpersonal . pathology. means only 
that in making a choice of conduct at odds with. the empathic relat- 
ion I chose what I felt was its natural, opposite. A more detailed 
analysis of empathy would, have to take rigid individuals also into 
account. 
Conclusion -1 rr 
In this dissertation I aim to trace the importance of the empathic 
relation in promoting the acquisition of personhood (which is relat- 
ed to interpersonal harmony and the'being mode of existence) but at 
the same''time-I want to'discover whether and how it might be poss- 
ible to 'improve our ordinary, - everyday lives though they tend to be 
rooted, whether we like itror' nat, in a having mode"of existence. My 
approach contrasts with Krishnamurti's(24), whose ideas have helped 
to form my owm. He feels, with some justification, that you cannot 
aspire to the way of being and, at the same time, try to better your 
lot within the way of having. The latter gets in the way of the 
former; in fact the energy expended in enhancing one's material 
existence or improving that of others, however virtuously, leaves 
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little for the more important task of achieving interpersonal har- 
mony. I feel that his approach is too uncompromising for ordinary 
mortals. Creating a jester, fairer society is a desirable aim since 
there is so much injustice and harshness and suffering in our soci- 
ety which no exhortation-to adopt the way of being is going to 
remedy. But it does matter how remedial action is determined and 
carried out. Hence my empasis`on striving to become a person (the 
centre of self- and other-enhancement) or rather a near-person, its 
potentially attainable alternative. 
Finally, in taking the title of my thesis from David Stewart's 1965 
paper I not only accurately describe the nature of my study; I also 
acknowledge my debt to him. 
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AN OUTLINE THEORY OF EMPATHY 
1.1 Introduction 
Empathy refers to a particular kind of relation between a self and 
an other-than-self. (1) In the following sections I shall try to show 
what is peculiar about the empathic relation, what characteristics 
distinguish it from other relations into which people enter. (In the 
next chapter I shall compare empathy with some of these other rela- 
tions. ) Then follows a detailed study of these characteristics and 
an analysis of different types of empathic relation beginning with 
the ideal (mutual empathy) and ending with the apparently least pro- 
mising in which a person, not at his or her best, is confronted by a 
hostile individual. The chapter concludes with an examination of 
some doubtful cases of empathy: with non-humans, including inanimate 
objects; with one's own self; with entertainers, 'generalised' and 
historical others. In short I consider the boundaries of the empath- 
ic relation: with whom or what may a self join in empathy and under 
what conditions? 
For the sake of clarity of exposition in this chapter I shall make 
two simplifying assumptions: in the human case the other is another 
self, and the relation is between two members only. 
1.11 A summary of the argument 
Human beings exhibit an urge to know and understand other human 
beings. This urge is part of a general urge towards activity, 
the striving to grow, to exercise their cognitive and produc- 
tive resources and to develop into whatever human beings are 
capable of becoming. 
2 Striving and achievement are not necessarily causally related, 
nor even correlated. However, achievement without effort is not 
possible, at least not in the natural world. 
3 To strive to know and understand another human being is differ- 
ent from striving to know and understand non-human objects. 
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4 To strive to know and understand another human being is to try 
to know and understand the person beneath mere surface charact- 
istics, to penetrate the accidents of specific spatio-temporal 
occasions and events, to know someone as he or she really is. 
Other interpretations of "human being" are biological mechan- 
ism, organism and psychophysical individual. 
(a) A biological mechanism is that irreducible entity that can 
be called a living creature. A malformed, diseased, ailing 
or incomplete living creature is a malformed, etc., biol- 
ogical mechanism. 
(b) An organism is a biological mechanism in its natural hab- 
itat. Habitats can be constructed. In the case of human 
beings artifactual environments are typical, extensive, 
ubiquitous and in most societies dominant. 
(c) A psychophysical individual is an organism characterised 
as possessing mind. Mind implies consciousness but the 
reverse may not be true. The relationship between mind and 
consciousness is problematical. 
(d) A person is a psychophysical individual construed as init- 
iator of action. Action is viewed as the outcome of purp- 
ose or intention, as the result of conscious, deliberate 
choice and therefore carried out in at least partial know- 
ledge of its possible effects on others. -Action is thus a 
social and not just an individual-centred phenomenon. Act- 
ion, therefore, implies accountability though not neces- 
sarily the acceptance of responsibility. Nevertheless per- 
sons are held to be responsible for their actions. 
5 The striving to know and understand another human being cons- 
trued as person I call personal knowing. 
6 To seek personal knowledge of a person is to try to enter into 
and sustain a particular kind of relation with that person. 
7I call this relation empathic and distinguish it from other 
relations which do not centre on personal knowing. 
8 Personal knowing takes precedence over other forms of knowing 
human beings because the quality of interpersonal relations 
28 
exerts such a powerful and potentially beneficial or harmful 
influence on the quality of human existence. 
9 Experience of the quality of human existence suggests that it 
is directly related to modes of living: either the having or 
the being mode. 
10 'The being mode of living stresses essence rather than appear- 
ance. It focusses on the aliveness of, others,, on_authentic; 
relatedness with others and with the world at large. It 
respects the true (esssential) nature of all entities in the 
world. It recognises the urgency and purity of dynamic becom- 
ing, of the necessity for things to be what they are and no 
other and to become what is in their nature to become. It ack- 
nowledges the striving of living things in particular. It is 
timeless in the sense that it resides in the here and now; past 
and future play no part in the experience of the beingness of 
the world. 
11 The having mode of existence is marked by its characteristic 
concern with possessions and possessing both in the narrow 
sense of outright ownership but also in the more general sense 
of mastery and domination of all that is other-than-self. In 
the having mode the metaphor of ownership affects thoughts 
about and attitudes towards the world. It distances self from 
experience; it alienates self from the authentic experiencing 
person each of us is. Having is profoundly rooted in a spatio- 
temporal world, or rather the world tends to be construed sole- 
ly in spatio-temporal terms. The having mode thus predisposes 
its adherents to manipulative, exploitative approaches to the 
world, including other human beings. 
12 Persons may-range from near-perfect exponents of the having 
mode to near-perfect seekers after the being mode of living. 
13 This means, 'in effect, that persons may try to create a power 
relation with others or attempt to forge an empathic relation 
according to their choice of preferred mode of living. 
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14 Since in the power relation one person attempts to manipulate 
or exploit the other in order to achieve his or her own purp- 
oses it follows that such a person will tend to adopt limiting 
rather than enhancing: strategies and conduct. 
15 There thus appears to be a relationship between modes of living 
and either limiting or enhancing strategies and conduct. The 
having mode is associated with limiting and the being mode with 
enhancing strategies and conduct. - - 
16 Whatever promotes the personal development of self: knowledge, 
understanding, self-confidence, self-esteem, extending one's 
capabilities, increasing one's competence in their use, accept- 
ing responsibility for one's actions, and so on, is described 
as self-enhancing. To the extent that effort expended in self- 
enhancement takes into account the needs and wishes of others I 
consider that it will also promote other-enhancement whenever 
the self and other establish interpersonal relations especially 
the empathic relation. Enhancing strategies and conduct find a 
more fertile soil in the being rather than the having mode of 
existence. 
17 Whatever obstructs, denies or diminishes the other in those 
aspects of personal development listed in the preceding para- 
graph I describe as other-limiting. The act of limiting the 
other tends also to limit the self since the energy required to 
carry out other-limiting strategies and conduct greatly exceeds 
that available for self-enhancement. Moreover the other-limit- 
ing approach directly conflicts with self-enhancement of the 
kind referred to in 16 above. Other-limiters seem to be locked 
in a power relation which they are forced to maintain. Every- 
thing has to be sacrificed to maintain their dominance. Other- 
and self-limiting conduct and strategies prosperýin a having 
mode of existence. 
IS Self- and-other-enhancing strategies and conduct I hold to be 
preferable to self- and other-limiting ones on the grounds that 
ordinary people favour the former if given the choice. Positive 
self-image, feelings of being valued, confidence in oneself, 
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and a sense of physical, mental, and spiritual wellbeing are 
outcomes commonly experienced within an environment character- 
ised by a self- and other-enhancing ambience. The formal body 
of knowledge drawn-from psychotherapy, counselling, good teach- 
ing. practice and the exercise of other caring-relationships 
support this folk view. Much of world literature tends to con- 
firm both folk and professional viewpoints. 
19 The contrast between having and being modes of existence is 
matched by a parallel contrast between the power and empathic 
relations. 
20' Within the power relation human beings are degraded as persons; 
they tend to be treated as non-persons, as mere things. 
21 I reserve the word "person" for one who tends to prefer the 
being end of the having-being dimension and whose strategies 
and conduct tend to be self- and other-enhancing. As I have 
already pointed out in the Prologue I have in mind near-perfect 
persons. Those at the other end of these two dimensions I call 
defective persons (or near-perfect examples of this ideal type 
(in the Weberian sense). 
22 I-do so in order to conform to"deep-seated attitudes and 
beliefs about-the value of psychotherapy, counselling, relig- 
ious teaching, and other helping practices. The aim in all of 
them is to promote those aspects of personal growth which I 
have listed in 16 and 18 above. 
23 Hence I argue that: 
(a) persons are created by persons through self- and other- 
enhancing strategies and conduct; 
(b) this is more likely to happen within a being mode of 
existence; 
(c) persons will favour that relation with another which 
fosters and sustains knowledge and understanmding of the 
other as 
.a 
person which depends on and flows from the 
preference for a being mode of existence and for self- and 
other-enhancing strategies and conduct. 
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24 The circularity implied by the above argument is unavoidable. 
Persons who act as described were themselves formed by the same 
process. Given that a person already exists (i. 'e. one who fav- 
ours a self- and other-enhancing approach towards others and 
who tends to prefer a being-mode of living) the rest follows. 
1.2 CHARACTERICS OF THE EMPATHIC RELATION 
I shall try to show that striving to know and understand another 
human being as a person, to draw as close to another as a person 
wishes and the other consents to, is possible if one or both try to 
forge and sustain a special kind of relation. This relation I call 
empathic. There are those who think that we can never really know or 
understand another. They may be right but we can try nevertheless 
and we can also, as a matter of conscious choice, aim for a lesser. 
target: to know and understand another as far as we can however 
slight that may be. The alternative is to remain overawed by the 
foreignness of the other, to regard the other as a schemer, a decei- 
ver, as someone to be feared or guarded against, or treated with 
distant politeness, or false warmth; all are interpersonal strateg- 
ies which must be familiar to moderately-alert and perceptive adults 
in our society and probably in most other societies. 
A number of characteristics distinguish the empathic from other 
kinds of relation: 
(a) at least one member of the relation must be a person; 
(b) at least one member is striving to know and understand the 
other as a person through direct contact with the other. 
In the ideal type (i. e. mutual empathy) both participants 
are thus engaged. (Typically the member in (a) and (b) is 
the same person. ) 
(c) the relation is non-manipulative; 
(d) the main outcome is the clarification and enhancement of 
the personhoods (personal identities, individual personal- 
ities) of both members of the relation; 
(e) another outcome is interpersonal harmony; 
(f) it fosters and emphasises the "being" mode of existence over the dominant "having" mode of our culture. 
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These six characteristics of the empathic relation must be present 
in order that it qualify. as empathic but because of its nature they 
cannot all emerge at once. It develops over time which may be con- 
siderable but, when it does finally evolve all these characteristics 
will be evident. Before we examine each of them in turn I must exp- 
lore some common uses of the term "person" to expand the remarks I 
have already made in the prologue. 
In ordinary- usage-"person" equates-with-mature, 'adult. human being. 
For example, when we say "So-and-so is an excellent person to con- 
sult if you want good advice"-or "So-and-so is a most inadequate 
individual, not at-. all the sort of person we'need" or. "That's the 
person from the-house across the street" we are referring to more 
than simply human being. Mature adulthood is almost invariably-un- 
derstood in every case. It is rare to hear babies or children refer- 
red to as persons. Other more diminutive terms-spring to our lips: 
kid, baby, -youngster, lass, lad, young fellow, teenager, youth. Even 
when we do use-expressions involving-the word "person", young person 
for example, we are explicitly drawing attention to immaturity, -a 
fledgling, someone approaching but still far from-adulthood. 
The increasing concern with human rights has, it is true, led to the 
idea that babies and other young people are persons in the sense in 
which I use the word. They merit respect just for themselves as they 
are at any one moment. This usage is very rare however. The bias in 
our understanding of the idea of person towards the notion of matur- 
ity, adulthood, autonomy, has some unfortunate consequences. For ex- 
ample, children of all ages tend to be regarded as miniature, incom- 
plete or even ill-formed adults. Wittingly or unwittingly we judge 
them by the criteria normally-applied to the evaluation of adult ' 
conduct--and achievement. One consequence of this tendency is to be- 
little or devalue childish ways and even childhood itself. In fact 
we often describe an adult as childish in order partially to explain 
his or her conduct which otherwise remains incomprehensible to us. 
The-individual has reverted to childish, i. e. immature, undisciplin- 
ed, irresponsible, egocentric ways, we say, and'perhaps even go-so 
far as to indulge in some "common-sense" psychological theorising. 
Another far more damaging consequence is the devaluation of the 
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child as a human being. "Children should be seen and not heard", 
"Spare the rod and spoil the child" and similar proverbs reflect- 
this deep-rooted, almost dismissive, attitude towards children which 
can be met in our society even in"the present climate of-so-called 
liberal sentiment. 
There is, then, in our ordinary social commerce a preference for em- 
ploying the word "person" when we mean to suggest or refer to mat- 
ure, responsible adulthood. This usage, however; does carry within 
it a shade-of-meaning which bypasses the potentially dysfunctional, 
implicit assumption of adult superiority. I am referring to the fact 
that person is neuter. It carries no sense of gender. If we say 
"Millie is a nice person" we visualise a different phenomenal object 
than when we say "Millie is a nice woman". The pleasing quality that 
Millie conveys to-us is different in the two cases because person- 
hood is felt to be different from womanhood. What persons have in 
common is not the same as what women have in common. Millie's appeal 
as a person owes nothing to her womanliness whereas her attraction, 
say, as a woman may though not necessarily in the narrow, modern 
sense of sexual attractiveness. This property-less character of per- 
son can be extended so as to exclude all contingent properties: age 
(though, as we have just seen, this is not typical; most of us think 
of persons as adults), social class, ethnic group membership, natio- 
nality (a special case of the preceding), state of health, marital 
status, religious or political allegiance, and so on. As we know 
only too well the attribution of certain properties to human beings 
in effect tends to label them as non-persons or inferior individuals 
in the eyes of those making the attributions. 
In the'popular imagination to be a person is to be mature, to be 
valued regardless of some properties, yet to be judged critically 
concerning some-other properties. This ambivalence in ordinary 
everyday speech need not matter much since at this level language 
has, as one of its prime functions, the maintenance of a social 
steady-state. Through linguistic conventions people seek comfortable 
social. adjustments with one another and strive to avoid contention 
and-stress., Different groups of people will thus establish a rappro- 
chement, internally with those whom they perceive as their own kind 
and externally with those whom they see as different in some import- 
ant way. Trouble may arise only if the various groups are-forced 
into close and sustained contact. Then the poverty of the popular 
view of "person" becomes apparent. In the conflict-between divergent 
religious orrpolitical or social or ethnic groups "person" simply 
means "someone like me"; the rest effectively become non-persons 
labelled with whatever term of abuse is popular at the time. 
This nuance of diminution behind the word "person" finds expression 
in other ways. For example, we frequently hear quantitative express- 
ions such as "Sexual deviants are only half-persons" or "To do that 
job well you've really got to be a whole person". It will become 
apparent as this thesis unfolds that attempting to qualify person 
poses problems. It introduces the notion of discontinuity between 
some unspecified ideal and actual, achievable degrees of personhood. 
I have tried to show in the prologue how, by using Weber's notion of 
Ideal Types, we-can accommodate the discontinuities between the un- 
attainable ideals or perfect types (of having and being, of person 
and non-person, of enhancement and limitation),, 7-on the one hand, and 
the continua between-these extremes which represent the achievable 
degrees of mastery in these three areas. By means of this device we 
can imagine individuals moving back and forth along these continua 
though typically demonstrating a tendency to express a fairly small 
range of possibilities for most of the time. We may strive towards 
enhancement, for instance, but occasionally slide back into self- 
and other-limiting ways; or perhaps we show a proneness to limiting 
conduct with occasional successes in enhancing others and self. 
Thus person conveys a number ofýideas within-it. It is property- 
less; at any moment we might imagine "person" to represent the con- 
figurations of meanings a human being has created out of his or her 
life experiences through which the present moment is interpreted and 
absorbed or not as the case may be. The configuration is complex, 
dynamic, fragile, and-doubtless subject to-distortion, fading and 
corruption but nevertheless amazingly robust in that normally per- 
sons maintain a secure grasp of their sense of identity (personhood) 
and its abidingness from momentýto moment. -In popular use "person" 
tends to be associated with maturity which is unfortunate but poss- 
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ibly reflects a profound belief in-the perfectibility of human be- 
ings with advancing age. I am suggesting that we use "person" to 
refer to human beings at"the positive ends of the three continua 
since they describe humans in action, making their way in the world 
in their own unique individual fashion, itself the outcome of their- 
experiences within many different'microcultures., The unique traject-. 
ory we call a human life is thus a combination of experiences and 
meanings dynamically configured and reconfigured moment by moment 
yielding a stable yet dynamic sense of identity. Which end of the 
three continua a particular person will be at a particular moment 
will depend substantially on the preferred mode of existence at the 
time. Thus "person" in this text refers to an individual human being 
who tends to operate at the being end of the having-being dimension 
and at the enhancement end of the enhancing-limiting dimension. 
To be a person in the near-perfect sense of the word is to strive to 
raise the quality of our day-to-day trading with the world that sur- 
rounds and includes us. A major thrust of this thesis is that, "if"we 
value harmony in, the world, we all need-to work hard and insight- 
fully at becoming persons, in the near-perfect sense as I'have 
described it. 
Other connotations of "person" will emerge as we proceed. 
1.21 Only persons can empathise 
)' 
For an empathic relation to develop between two (or more) 
people there must exist at least one person among them to 
initiate it. Other terms are used to refer to human beings: 
biological mechanism, organism, psychophysical, individual, as 
well as person. We might also include self, agent and actor. 
In this dissertation= self and person are used interchange- 
ably. The literature on the self is-vast, confusing and 
inconclusive. The justification for equating-self and person 
is purely. a matter of convenience; several writers use the 
two terms as though they refer to the same phenomenal obi 
ect(2). _Agent 
is less inclusive than person or self insofar 
as the former refers. to the active, volitional aspect of the 
latter. Persons are more than mere agents for they are also 
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the victims of happenings which befall them. Explanations of 
events and their consequences cannot draw solely on the not- 
ion of agents and, intentions. In my study of empathy I be- 
lieve that no confusion will result from the way I use, the 
three terms: person, self and agent; the context will make 
clear what I mean in each case. (3), 
The term actor I tend to eschew for'it savours of the drama- 
turgical approach to human action adopted by certain social 
psychologists within the sociological camp many of -whom work 
in the symbolic interactionist tradition. Some workers in 
social skills favour this viewpoint; "keeping the other in 
play" is a metaphor used explicitly`by Argyle but implicitly 
by many others, perhaps'unwittingly because of the predomin- 
ant use of a skills model of human interaction. It will be- 
come apparent as this study unfolds that the idea of human 
beings as actors', "playing" roles and following scripts is 
completely alien to my understanding'of persons, interperson- 
al interactions and the empathic relation. (4) 
In order that my own study may get under way I adopt the wor- 
king hypothesis that my chosen terms: mechanism, organism, 
psychophysical individual, and person are sufficient for my 
purposes and that all four are mutually exclusive in the 
sense that they belong to four different explanatory. or desc- 
riptive systems. Ideas and concepts which may be appropriate 
and proper in one framework, may not be so in the others. Each 
is unique and is related to a specific type of enquiry or 
point of view. Moreover, it is neither appropriate nor sens- 
ible for an observer to work in more than one framework at a 
time when dealing with a specific. question or perspective un- 
less he or she, explicitly gives reasons for so doing and in 
any event clearly distinguishes the different analytical sys- 
tems(5). Failure to observe this rule can only lead to con- 
fusion as so much of current behavioural and social science 
demonstrates, or so it seems to me. (6) 
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Other features of person are considered in the next section. 
The collective theory, practice and `justification of'the 
interpersonal professions point to an additional view of the` - 
person as one who 
(a) has a healthy self-image(7)9 i. e. is generally 
aware of his or her strengths and weaknesses and is 
reasonably well-adjusted to this knowledge; a per- 
son is able to cope with the vicissitudes of life 
without resorting to defensive or manipulative 
strategies; 
(b) tends to be well-disposed towards others; he or she 
approaches and deals with them non-manipulatively. 
and adopts a stance of openness and respect towards 
them (using the word "respect" in Fromm s sense of 
seeing again as though for the first time however 
familiar these others may have become); 
(c) is aware, of his or her own self-worth and so tends to act in ways which will foster the sense of self- 
worth in others; i. e. persons tend to nourish the 
individual personalities (personhoods) of others. 
Words such as "generally",.. "reasonably, ", "tends to" and so 
forth acknowledge, as I. think we must, the inherent fallib- 
ility of humankind. Persons strive, to, be self- and other- 
enhancing in non-manipulative ways. In this endeavour their 
performance can approach an ever-increasing competence though 
they will occasionally give way to normal human failings. As 
I shall try to show later-these three' qualities of persons 
may be acquired by anyone who is willing to make and sustain 
the necessary effort. However the acquisition process is only 
possible within the empathic relation since only one who is 
already a person (as I understand the term) can help another 
to attain his or her unique personhood. This, too, I shall 
try to demonstrate. I can imagine only two other possibili- 
ties: either personhood is generated spontaneously or it is 
facilitated through the empathic relation but'this is'not 
strictly necessary. I can and do imagine that 'the discovery 
of the separateness of self and other-than-self is an instan- 
taneous and spontaneously experienced event, a discriminatory 
act akin to a revelation. However, the emergence of self is 
an event whereas the acquisition of personhood is a long- 
drawn out evolutionary process in'which similarities and dif- 
ferences with non-self entities are accumulated, assimilated 
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into the fabric of the self's personal biography substant- 
ially through the self's own agency (as an existential being 
consciously interacting with the real world) though initially 
and primarily also through the agency of others especially of 
significant caring others such as parents as we shall see 
later. 
The possibility that the empathic relation may not be necess- 
ary for the acquisition of personhood though it may greatly 
facilitate the process must be examined again after we have 
had a closer look at empathising in action. () I ignore a 
third possibility: that persons are products of the natural 
order, i. e. personhood is an innate property of all human be- 
ings. Simple observation of the new-born infant's growth and 
most adult behaviour do not support such a hypothesis. In 
contrast biological mechanisms and organisms are unambiguous- 
ly products of nature, though greatly enhanced through subse- 
quent nurture. 
It might, of course, be argued that I am so construing per- 
sonal growth and the empathic relation that the latter logic- 
ally implies the former. In fact I also assert that personal 
growth implies the development of an empathic relation. In 
effect, therefore, I hold that the development of persons and 
the evolution of the empathic relation are identical process- 
es; the change of words merely indicates a change of perspec- 
tive, the point of view of the observer of the phenomenon. I 
shall try to make this clear as we proceed. 
1.22 Striving to know and understand the other 
The striving to know and understand another as a person through per- 
sonal contact lies at the heart of the empathic relation and is its 
prime distinguishing characteristic. We may know and understand 
another as a biological mechanism, as an organism, as a psychophys- 
ical individual; we have developed methods and constructed discip- 
lines for doing so: the life, behavioural and social sciences, but 
none of these reveals the person. A social psychology of the person 
is feasible but it would have a very different content and method- 
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ology from today's orthodox psychologies, social or otherwise. More- 
over, there are different ways of knowing: the personal, the aesth- 
etic, the scientific, the practical, the religious or spiritual, the 
social, each of which is valid in its own sphere. To know and under- 
stand another person (personal knowing) is thus a distinctive form 
of knowing which has a distinctive object: the person. 
A person is that entity which, through acting on the real world, is 
conscious of its doing and therefore of its existence. Because an 
action is a manifestation of an intention a person may be described 
as that which is conscious of the union between inner and outer 
worlds of experience, not analytically but purely existentially. (9) 
A person is a self-conscious, existential unity of intention and 
action. The experience of action in and on the real world is the 
focal point of personal consciousness. Thus do we acquire a sense of 
continuity, abidingness, self-direction, self-consciousness and aut- 
onomy that experientially defines for us our existence as per- 
sons. (10) 
A person is also a centre of self-worth. Human action is not blind; 
nor is the underlying intention. Both are functions of choice and 
therefore imply and express value. But the value relates to the self 
as the doer and the thinker. The self-referential character of act- 
ion (however altruistic) is emphasised in interpersonal interaction 
in which the greater part of human time and energy is spent and 
which offers the richest field for personal growth and satisfaction. 
Interpersonal relations can also impede personal development and 
create dissatisfaction. What is unique about interactions with oth- 
ers is their capacity to create and enhance, or diminish and destroy 
a person's sense of self-worth. A person is thus a socially depend- 
ent centre of self-worth, an entity created by others. In order that 
a self may achieve a healthy personhood these others. must themselves 
first be persons. 
Persons flourish in action, in community with others, in relations 
which establish and confirm self-worth. The highest value that can 
be conferred on them and that they can bestow on others is love. 
That is to say when one person loves another he or she non-manipul- 
atively recognizes and acknowledges the other's unique beingness, 
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grasps their givenness, responds sensitively to the other and fost- 
ers his or her growth as a person. It is these qualities of persons 
that one tries to discover and understand in personal knowing and 
which one strives through empathising to cultivate in the other. 
Personal knowing initially is direct and intuitive and depends on 
contact with the other. Moreover, the essence of persons is revealed 
in their expressiveness: in words, gestures, movements, and other 
body signs. (The expressiveness of "words" springs from the speak- 
er's choice of words and personal style with them, the emphasis, 
tone, idiosyncratic usage and pronunciation, and similar paralingui- 
stic indicators of the speaker's uniqueness. ) The whole of the per- 
son is in the expressiveness and hence the possibility of deception, 
though ever present, is reduced. The deceiver, the manipulator, the 
schemer: all-are betrayed by their expressiveness if only the obser- 
ver is skilled in 'reading' the signs. It is for this reason that 
facility in grasping the givenness of others (which is described in 
more detail in later sections) is essential for personal knowing 
(and, as we shall see, for other kinds of knowing as well) for its 
aim is to know and understand the person as a person, i. e. as he or 
she essentially is. (11) 
Personal knowing through direct contact with the other could stand 
further analysis. Physical4contact is essentialýto the infantile 
differentiation process in which a self emerges and becomes self- 
conscious and simultaneously conscious of an other-than-self. Direct 
contact, though not necessarily involving physical touching import- 
ant though this appears to be initially for personal growth and int- 
egrity, continues to be a prime source of personal knowing through- 
out childhood, adolescence and adulthood. As we mature, however, the 
nature of this contact extends beyond the purely sensory. For ex- 
ample, conversations with others convey meanings beyond the literal 
significance of the words. Configurations of expressive signs convey 
more than each individual sign. In both examples the pattern, or re- 
lations, or configurations are potent sources of information about 
the other and about the observer which can be lost if the observer 
is not sensitive to their existence. As we shall see one aspect of 
aesthetic knowing is the readiness or facility with which an observ- 
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er can grasp the quality of the relatedness of phenomena and per- 
ceive their significance beyond that conveyed by the surface charac- 
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teristics of the phenomenal objects. Herein, however, lies a danger. 
In the early phase of the empathic relation the aim is to know and 
understand another person through grasping his or her givenness dir- 
ectly, unadulterated by ideas, preconceptions, private theories, or 
recollections of past associations. The knowledge we seek is direct 
knowledge and not inference from past experience. In direct physical 
contact, provided we sustain an attitude of openness and our non- 
manipulative approach, this is possible because of the nature of the 
spontaneous experience of the other's givenness. Once we trade in 
images we are inevitably drawn to make inferences since the patterns 
we "grasp" may be our own inventions rather than genuine experiences 
rooted in the nature of the phenomenal object as it confronts us, 
here and now. We may be deceived then in two entirely different 
ways. The other may be highly skilled in producing convincing exp- 
ressive signs which convey a deliberately false impression to an 
observer (e. g. he does a good imitation of grief, or sickness, or 
incapacity, or sympathy in order to fool the observer); or the ob- 
server may be inept at "reading" the pattern of expressive signs 
even when they convey genuine messages and so falls back on infer- 
ence from-past experience. Thus the initial intuitive stage in per- 
sonal-knowing is clearly inadequate for getting to know and under- 
stand a person though equally clearly it is a necessary stage.. 
Later when we come to examine various kinds of empathic relations we 
shall tackle this theme again. (12),, 
Getting to know persons as persons then is radically different from 
getting to know them as biological machines, or as organisms, or as 
psychophysical individuals. The study of these human objects leaves 
out of account actual lived experience which individuals undergo 
sometimes with pleasure, sometimes with pain. The experience of fear 
or joy or hope may well have physical correlates but from the point 
of view of the experiencing person a knowledge and understanding of 
the physical substrate adds nothing at all to his or her actual exp- 
erience. Similarly scientific accounts of the psychological correl- 
ates of experience are remote from the livingness, the immediacy of 
experience. On the contrary such explanations tend to mystify most 
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people. and to strike them as irrelevant to their feelings and sense 
of being-in-the-experience (which is also difficult to explain or 
even to describe), 
Human beings in our society tend to resent being treated as objects 
as cogs in a machine, as a mere number among others, to be allocated 
to this or that position or task according to apparently arbitrary 
procedures. Most people feel that to be human is to be a centre of 
worth, of esteem, of autonomy, to be in charge of one's own affairs, 
in short to be a person. And what distinguishes one person from an- 
other is their personhood, that mark of personal identity, of ind- 
ividual personality which expresses moment by moment their own uni- 
que beingness. The beingness of persons-is what we seek when we 
strive to know and understand another human individual as a person. 
Their beingness resides in their essential nature which makes them 
a 
what they are and no other. Personal knowing is therefore not at- 
tainable by the methods used to study mechanisms, organisms, psycho- 
physical individuals. It is my assertion that only through the, emp- 
athic relation may one person know another as a person. What, I am 
asserting here is that striving, to know and understand another is to 
initiate-the. empathic, relation; to initiate, however, is not enough. 
The relation-must be-cemented and sustained to count-as empathic. 
Hence to strive for personal knowing is-a necessary though not suf- 
ficient condition-. for empathising. . How, the empathic relation is fin- 
ally achieved will become clearer as, -we proceed. . 
A discussion of alternative ways of knowing: scientific, aesthetic, 
practical, and so on, and their relation to personal knowing and 
hence to empathising must be deferred but here I must make it clear 
that I am not setting up a league table in which personal knowing 
always heads the list. All ways of knowing are valid as I have said 
but what will become clear in the sequel'is that personal knowing 
has properties which prove to be essential for all forms of know- 
ing. (13) 
There are many situations in real, life where two people enter a rel- 
ation in which one of them does so'unwillingly,. or at least grudging- 
ly. There areaalso relations in which one member isl or is felt to 
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be, an authority: parent-child, teacher-student, doctor-patient. In 
these types of relation it may happen that a one-sided empathic-rel- 
ation is coaxed into life by one member, perhaps the willing or dom- 
inant participant, against the resistance of the other. This some- 
times happens in psychotherapy and counselling despite the fact that 
the client has usually asked for the meeting. He or she may show 
hostility to, or resentment of, the therapist or counsellor initial- 
ly. In a one-sided relationship it, is not unusual for the hostile or 
resentful member to treat the other as an object, as a resource to 
be plundered,, or wheedled into giving the advice or comfort the 
helpee thinks he or she wants. Nevertheless my claim is that so long 
as the empathising member(14) continues to treat his or her client 
as a person (the implications of which we shall study later(15)) the 
other's resentment may eventually give way to trust and hence to a 
more friendly, open. approach to the empathising member. 
Why should one person want to know and understand another? Human be- 
ings are interdependent. In the early years of childhood we are ent- 
irely dependent on caring adults or adult surrogates. Moreover we 
appear to'be dependent on maternal love. Deprivation of either, but 
especially of love, has usually long-lasting, destructive effects. 
As the young child matures this dependency extends to others: peer 
group membership, teachers, friends. It is therefore a reasonable 
hypothesis that through a combination of nature and nurture other 
humans are essential for our sustained personal growth and that in 
normal healthy development we actually seek the company and reassur- 
ance of others. Such a hypothesis, however, does not suggest why we 
should want to know and understand others as persons rather than as 
mere providers of company and comfort. My claim is that in the pro- 
cess of differentiation of the infant into a self and other-than- 
self and, in the subsequent development of the self into a person 
(i. e. the acquisition of personhood) the child's mother or mother 
substitute plays an essential role through her unconditional love 
for the child. She gives the child its sense of self-worth by treat- 
ing it as an autonomous individual, by`loving it unconditionally, by 
recognising, accepting and respecting its uniqueness without blame 
or resentment, without-maudlin praise or fatuous adulation. Her love 
is honest and true as well as unconditional. In other words, the 
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mother or other caring adult creates the child's sense of person- 
hood; the child therefore learns a way of treating others and res- 
ponds-by treating others in the same fashion. 
Fromm. analysed love into the . four, elements, of respect, knowledge, 
responsibility and caring. Respect derives from the Latin "respi- 
cere" which means "to see, look at again". Respect therefore sug- 
gests a fresh vision of an object or person however familiar it may 
have become. It is thus the antithesis of stereotypy, of indiffer- 
ence bred of habit, of, the bored recognition of. the familiar. Knowl- 
edge refersto non-analytical cognition as well, as to objective 
knowledge of, the 
loved one. We strive to know whom we love, and to 
know and understand the loved one., in depth. Responsibility Fromm in- 
terprets literally as a willingness, and ability to respond appropri- 
ately to. the loved one's physical and psychical needs. Caring is the 
active component: we strive to, enhance the loved. one, to concern 
ourselves with, his, orý, her life and growth. Personal knowing is an 
aspect of love which the child recognises from its experience with 
its mother. The trust, and love engendered. in the child initiates the 
same process in the reverse direction. 
Two other, factors are, worth mentioning. -The first is 
that all human 
beings have limitations even in maturity. We, necessarily. depend on 
others to sustain us despite our. deficiencies. This, of course, can 
become a manipulative process, as we saw in the case of the client 
seeking, therapy, but it does not inevitably lead to exploitation of 
the other. Moreover, -it becomes important for us to know from whom 
to seek help. Seeking the aid of others in a non-manipulative way 
depends, therefore on trying to know and understand others, on forg- 
ing links with others whom one can trust. 
The second factor centres on the importance of action in affirming 
our existence. In action we become conscious of our existence in a 
real world because action involves contact with the real world which 
in turn creates for us our experience of its resistance. The resist- 
ance of things in the real world sets the limits of what is the. self 
and what. is the other-than-self. The most Important others are human 
beings who, of course, have their own intentions which frequently 
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differ greatly from our own. Thus resistance from human others (the 
only case we are considering just now), necessarily calls upon our 
skills in coping with other persons. Once again this can lead to 
manipulative behaviour but need not do so. Personal knowing is an 
alternative and the only one if we wish to know and understand these 
others as persons. 
1.23 Empathy is a non-manipulative relation 
_ 
In the preceding` section we met some instances of potentially manip- 
ulative behaviour within'a one-sided empathic relation. It seems ob- 
vious that empathising and manipulative behaviour cannot flourish in 
the same soil but'it is instructive to explore the reasons why this 
must be so. The empathic relation focusses on the knowing and under- 
standing of others 'as persons. Manipulative behaviour, on the other 
hand, treats others as'objects. To'manipulate or exploit another 
human being i's to attempt to deny'and even destroy"his or her per- 
sonhood. The other's"intentions, beingness, self-esteem are of no 
consequence or'interest to'the manipulator except negatively in that 
they may present obstacles to his plans. Empathising and manipulat- 
ive behaviour are thus mutually exclusive. 
It can be argued that the accomplished manipulator in fact goes to 
great lengths to know and understand another the better to exploit 
his victim. *This is an instance ofpseudo-empathy; it differs from 
the genuine variety in that'the manipulator does not respect the' 
other, i. e. does not'really perceive the person but only those at= 
tributes or qualities he wishes to exploit. He thus concerns him- 
self with aspects of a psychophysical individual-rather than the 
person; the former is an artifact of intellect and focusses on con- 
tingent properties of a person rather than on his or her essential 
nature. At best (or worst). the manipulator may achieve a limited 
personal knowledge and understanding sufficient for his purposes. 
There are pathological cases (sadism, for example)'in'which personal 
knowing and understanding may be as thorough and complete as in the 
empathic relation. This too must count as pseudo-empathy since not 
only is the other's personhood destroyed (literally in extreme cases 
with the victim's death) but the other is treated as a possession of 
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the sadist for his or her personal pleasure. The victim's beingness 
is_denied in order to satisfy the sadist's "having" approach to ex- 
istence. Possession of his victim is essential to the sadist's sus- 
tained psychological well-being. 
We might"also'consider the case of masochists who are apparently 
willing to enslave themselves in, order to secure gratification of 
their sexual desires. For them punishment and actual physical suf- 
fering-appear to be prized goals but from the perspective of this 
dissertation the important variable is the attendant craving'for 
subjugationyto the will of another. They could after all punish 
themselves but it is punishment by another that they seek. In this 
peculiar symbiotic relationship both partners appear to be at one. 
Each treats the other as a sexual object and in so doing tacitly 
agrees to be. similarly regarded themselves. Neither can grasp the 
beingness, of the other; both are blinded by the overpowering urge to 
have the other even at the expense of their own beingness. The sad- 
ist's destructive, power over his or her willing submissive partner 
is exactly complemented by the masochist's self-destructiveness. 
Hence the masochist repays the sadist by destroying him; the masoch- 
ist is an accomplice, in the sadist's act and thereby reduces him to 
a non-person, a creature to be used, just as the victim is being 
used. In effect both are victims of each other's preference for the 
having mode of existence. 
Finally we might mention. here the role of empathising in hate. To 
hate is not the opposite or negation of loving. It is a positive act 
and shares the same elements as love with the exception of caring 
which is replaced by injuring or some equivalent action. Personal 
knowing and understanding is as important in the service of hate as 
it is in the pursuit of love. It is obvious that hate cannot feature 
in genuine empathising for the same reasons as those mentioned for 
the sadist; the end result, and its main aim, is to destroy the per- 
sonal identity of the hated one, sometimes with the physical dest- 
ruction of the individual. 
Once again we see that personal knowing and understanding-whilst 




Psychogists use the term "personality" in such a way that we cannot 
apply it to the characteristics of persons without conjuring up the 
panoply of traits, abilities, dispositions and so on which form the 
content of textbook descriptions of personality. I use the, word_per- 
sonhood instead. It refers to the individual. personality or-personal 
identity of an individual, that which expresses his or her beingness 
or essential nature, that which marks a. person as himself-or herself. 
and no other.. 
Personhood is expressed in every action, movement and gesture that a 
person makes; in every word he or she utters. When we experience the 
givenness of persons it is in their expressiveness that they are 
given to us. The whole person is given in the gesture; we do not, so 
to speak, collect fragments and somehow construct the whole person 
out of the bits. When people change their mood, or their interper- 
sonal style, or their attitude, it is the whole person which chan 
ges. Persons come across to us all-of-a-piece. If they strike us as 
odd their oddness is in their whole being. A person perceived as 
disintegrated entity signifies sickness, either in the perceiver 
a 
or 
in the perceived. We might label someone as odd because he or she is 
afflicted with a mannerism or physical defect. In such an event we 
would be demonstrating our failure to grasp the other's givenness. 
The label is substituted for the person there before us. 
In the empathic relation personhood is established and enhanced. r1ow 
this comes about is explored in later sections. The point to note 
here is that even in the one-sided relatiön the empathising person 
is striving to know and understand the other and In acting with res- 
pect towards the other is also 
own personhood. Every time one 
differences with another he or 
confirming and enhancing his or her 
individual discovers similarities and 
she discovers some new facet of self. 
This is one of the meanings of resistance. I am not simply referring 
to Cooley's "looking glass" self which others reflect back to us. 
More importantly there is a confirmatory aspect to the delineation 
of self through the grasping of similarities-and differences with, 
others. The looking glass self is a passive entity compared with the 
self confirmed in the empathic relation. We can liken the empathic 
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relation to a proving ground where persons prove (i. e. test the val- 
idity of) their personhoods through the dynamic process of relating 
non-manipulatively to one another; i. e. through this process two 
selves may provide each other with similar opportunities for testing 
their personhoods in like manner, by empathising. 
Some might argue that we can establish our identity in other, non- 
personal, ways. For example, mountaineers, solo sailors, people. who 
build-their own boats, -those who perform bizarre deeds, are proving 
to themselves who they are, are establishing a convincing personal 
identity'intthe'very activity itself. They are certainly asserting 
their- individuality and-in many cases declaring their separateness 
as well. It is sometimes difficult to see these activities as. other 
than essentially self-centred concerns. Worthy though their enter- 
prises may be in themselves, if they are really done in order to 
discover a personal identity (and the fact that people cite this as 
Pý 
their main reason cannot be taken at face value; they may feel im- 
pelled to say something of the kind in self-justification; the truth 
maybe that they do not know their reasons), then I suspect that the 
performers are compensating for some personal inadequacy or are try- 
ing to cover one up. There is nothing wrong in so behaving except 
perhaps the self-deception may have unsuspected consequences. It is 
characteristic of societies which favour the having mode of exist- 
ence to provide the sort of climate in which the cult of individual- 
ism can prosper. The uninhibited dedication to self (even to the 
worship of self) is one of the attributes of a having mode of exist- 
ence. - Self is a possession tobe revered and-served like any other 
and who-better=to do this than the self aided, perhaps, by acolytes 
appointed by the self. This cosy self-contained world is a far cry 
from the creation and enhancement of personhood"through the shared 
experience of joint-action with another both of whom share-. a common 
goal or-ideal. Persons-are. creations and natural members of commun- 
ities"of*persons.,, Individuals "doing their., own'thing" have rejected 
community, at least for the time being, in favour of self. Whilst 
they may be-testing something about themselves it: is certainly not 
that personal-identity which is. established and enhanced in, and 
only in, the empathic relation. 
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1.25 Interpersonal harmony 
In the empathic relation two persons come to realise the extent of 
their individual personalities; that is to say they perceive the ex- 
tent to which they are alike yet different. What is genuinely for- 
eign in each and which earlier in the relationship may have occas- 
ioned fear or resentment or misgiving is, in mutual empathy at 
least, either understood and so no longer seen as justifying these 
negative feelings; or is perceived and accepted, at any rate for the 
moment, as one of the unfathomable aspects of life but not'on that 
account to be feared. Such are the irreducible differences which 
mark the separate individual personalities (personhoods) which char- 
acterise the beingness of each member of the relation. 
Outside the empathic relation, in contrast, irreducible differences 
(and differences in general) frequently lead to conflict. Much of 
the impetus behind social skills training and the human relations 
movement issues from the need to cope with conflict especially in 
conditions of rapid change where individuals often experience dis- 
stress of one kind or another which in turn leads to negative re- 
actions aimed at resisting or interfering with the proposed or act- 
ual change. Conflict is often inevitable because typically persons 
are treated as objects to be manipulated in order to satisfy the re- 
quirements of someone's new conception of things, e. g. a new method 
of production, a new work roster, a more efficient way of doing 
things. 
In human affairs differences are inevitable and so are disagree- 
ments. Both spring from differences in individual biographies. Some 
differences and disagreements are likely to be irreconcilable for 
the same reason. What is not inevitable is aggressive conflict. If 
differences and disagreements were accepted as part of life, without 
loss to the persons concerned, no aggression could arise. Therein- 
lies the difficulty. A competitive society that emphasises a having 
mode of existence virtually forces its members to adopt-this mode. 
In such a climate it is difficult (and would certainly, be, unusual) 
to foster empathic relations between, say, management and workers, 
or between leaders and subordinates. It is precisely in these com- 
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petitive dyadic groups, where differences and disagreements are 
likely to arise in a context which is essentially person destroying, 
that decisions are bound to lead to aggressive conflict. Yet there 
are societies where differences and disagreements do not lead to 
aggression; they are simply accepted as part of life. Respect for 
persons takes precedence over material or other gain. Alternative 
ways of achieving objectives are sought without.. ill-feeling or ill- 
will or condemnation of the dissenting others. Live and let live may 
sound trite to our sophisticated ears yet such is the essence of 
interpersonal harmony bred of the empathic relation. It is not a 
weak, indecisive,. peace-at-any-price state of affairs but a posit- 
ive, person-enhancing and group-enhancing outcome. 
Whilst interpersonal harmony cannot be said to be achievement- 
orientated neither does it preclude, hinder or denigrate achieve- 
ment. In the empathic relation cooperative action is the only poss- 
ible action; whatever the members of the empathic relation choose to 
do will be done just because they chose, in empathy, to do it. The 
chances of developing and sustaining an empathic relation in a com- 
petitive society like ours seem slim yet the alternative seems even 
worse. Confrontation cannot be manipulated out of existence, though 
specific aggressive conflicts can be doctored in an extemporising 
fashion; however, the facts of, modern industrial life must-speak for 
themselves. Quarrels simply breed other quarrels and so on ad infin- 
itum. This theme will be taken up again later when we consider the 
power relation(16) founded on divisiveness in contrast to the empa- 
thic relation founded on separateness within unity. Both recognise 
and respond to interpersonal variations but with totally different 
consequences. The power relation tends to destroy persons whereas 
the empathic relation tends to create them. 
Intergroup relations are not necessarily improved through intragroup 
empathising. Consider two neighbouring groups. In each the members 
enter into empathic relations with one another as a matter of 
choice. They shun all manipulative practices, engage in cooperative 
action and pursue common ideals. Both groups value personhood and 
actively faster person-enhancing strategies in normal everyday af- 
fairs and relationships. Both groups promote a being mode of exist- 
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ence; competition, materialism, status-consciousness are alien to 
their outlook and way of life. Let us'-imagine two such'groups; it is 
easy to imagine that the common ideals of-group A are in complete 
opposition to those of group B and that if the two groups meet, say, 
to negotiate over certain territorial claims or over an accidental 
injury inflicted on a'member, they might'react negatively towards 
one another. There is nothing'aboüt the empathic relation that auto- 
matically ensures that non-group members are treated as persons in 
the same way as group members. For individuals to be able'to tran- 
scend the powerful bonds of group sthlidarity'(all the stronger perh- 
aps for being forged in empathising) they must make ä special effort 
that may not be in their power to summon up. 
This particular issue shows up another aspect of'the empathic relat- 
ion-, 'it does not have a unique claim to virtue. What one group rev-- 
eres as a common ideal may be judged by another as immoral. 
1.26 Having and being 
A recent'and'detailed comparative study of having and being is to be 
found in Fromm's "To Have or To Be". For my purposes I wish only to 
draw attention to the relationship between modes of existence and 
predispositions towards experience and the objects of experience. 
Fromm's spirited and strongly indidualistic socialist beliefs tend 
on the whole to enhance rather'than detract from his critical 
analysis. 
Fromm expresses his view of having thus: 
The nature of the having mode-of existence follows from the 
-nature of private property. In this mode of existence all that 
matters is myy acquisition of property and my unlimited right to 
keep what I have acquired. The having mode excludes others; it 
does not require any further effort on my part to keep my prop- 
erty or to make productive use of it. The Buddha has described 
this mode of life as craving, the Jewish and Christian relig- 
ions as coveting; _it. 
transforms everybody into something dead 
and subject to another's power. (33) 
In the having mode there is no live relation between me'and 
what I have. It and I have become things and I. have it, be- 
cause I have the force to make it mine. ýut there is also a 
reverse relationshi : it has 'e, because my sense-of identity, i. e. of sanity, rests upon my having it (and as many things as 
possible) ... The. having mode of existence... makes things of both object and subject. The relationship is one of deadness, not 
aliveness. (34) 
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Those who favour or prefer or cling to the having mode of existence 
tend towards exclusiveness, possessiveness, and therefore, either by 
deliberate act or by default, deprive others of that which the form- 
er crave or want. Worse, perhaps, is_the seemingly inevitable con- 
sequence, of the separateness implicit in the having mode: the dis- 
tancing of the living self from both the phenomenal world and the 
self's experience of it. 
This'state of'affairs is not at all the same as the objective stance 
advocated by the scientific approach to knowledge acquisition. To 
adopt 'an over-against stance does-not-imply that the scientist aban- 
dons'or forgets his or her-aliveness but rather temporarily suppres- 
ses the impact of this quality in order to arrive at objective 
knowledge and' understanding of phenomena as objects per se regard- 
less'of the scientist's own personal feelings about them. On the 
other hand if, knowledge and understanding thus acquired are used to 
control some aspects or elements'of`the world (especially other 
human beings) scientists may well drift into or positively-adopt a 
having mode of existence` insofar as their quest for knowledge over- 
rides any concern they'may have felt for the consequences of their 
activities. Here I am asserting that the'over-against'stance of 
science does not of itself imply 
.a 
search for or a deliberate use of 
control to, the detriment of the other whether the latter be human or 
non-human. The "how"- of science cannot be divorced from the "why" of 
scientists as human beings. The "how" resides in the world of proce- 
dures, methods, rules for observing, classifying, and so on. The 
"why". is only intelligible in terms of human motives. Motives, how- 
ever, include reasons which might be construed as intellectual just- 
ifications for action. The problem is that these mental gymnastics 
do not always coincide with deeper, sometimes less creditable, mot- 
ives. The quest for knowledge springs from human motives but motives 
are not "neutral". Working an problems of nuclear defence, for exam- 
ple, may quite easily confuse in a-particular scientist's mind his 
or her intellectual-reasons and such deeper-motives as he or she is 
aware of or might reasonably guess at. This line of argument raises 
the question: does knowledge ever diminish the seeker irrespective 
of its possible effect on the quality of life of others? Some might 
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justifiably ask whether pursuit of knowledge for its own sake is 
always a good thing though this raises at least one other question: 
what does good mean here? It seems to me that to want to own knowl- 
edge is inseparable from the desire to control it and hence to exer- 
cise power over others who lack this knowledge and to the extent 
that they lack it. Control over others diminishes human potential 
and both controller and controlled are thereby inhibited in terms of 
personal growth. Stewart(35) expresses much the same anxiety in his 
comparison of having with being had. To be in the-grip of the kind 
of having I am referring to here is also to be had. There can be no 
let-up in the effort expended to maintain control over the other re- 
gardless of the particular. form that control may take. The scientist 
who seeks knowledge and understanding in order to have power over 
some aspect of the world is surely adopting a having mode of exist- 
ence. If it be objected that control over disease or physical obst- 
acles to human happiness cannot be equated with ill-will towards 
human beings or other living creatures I would readily agree but 
would nevertheless question the scientist's motives in order to test 
the implied altruism of his or her actions. A thorough-going analy- 
sis of the relationship between control and having would be worth- 
while but cannot be pursued here. 
Being is a rather more complex notion since in English the verb "to 
be" performs a number of distinctly different functions. Hence the 
word "being" in questions such as "What is being? " leads to a philo- 
sophical debate which is as old and as contentious and unresolved as 
the problem of time. For my purposes I concentrate on the notion of 
being which contains within it notions of process, activity, move- 
ment. The being mode of existence is one in which the person is'at 
one, so to speak, with his or her own experience for its own sake. 
It acknowledges the value of the intentional object of experience 
but it also recognises the intrinsic worth of the experience itself. 
To be in one's experience requires a degree of selflessness. That is 
to say we have-temporarily to-forget ourselves, to lay aside concern 
with our desires, interests, even our knowledge about the world. -In- 
stead we seek union with the world as it fills our consciousness 
moment by moment. The intentional object giving rise to our experi- 
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ence is valued for itself and so is allowed to be itself, not 
through a gracious act of condescension but through a positive act 
of love (or 'respect as Fromm would say, at least initially). Where 
the having stance reduces both haver and had to objects the being 
mode enhances through the gift of love (or minimally, respect) the 
worth of both-self and other. Fromm quotes Hunzinger: 
A blue glass appears to be blue when light shines through it 
because it absorbs all other colours and thus does not let them 
pass. That is to say, we call a glass "blue" precisely because 
it does not retain the blue waves. It is named not for what it 
possesses but for what it gives out. (36) 
Thus for Fromm having is, by definition self- and other-limiting; 
being in contrast is self- and other-enhancing. The image here is 
one of selfless giving or love which enhances both the recipient and 
the donor by strengthening the bond between them. Being refers to 
"the mode of existence in which one neither has anything nor craves 
to have something, but is joyous, employs one's faculties product- 
ively, "is oned to the world. "(37) 
,=3_ 
Fromm. makes an interesting comparison between change in language use 
and the emphasis on having and being. 
A certain change in the emphasis on having and being is appar- 
ent in the growing use of nouns and the decreasing use of verbs 
in western languages in the past few centuries. 
A noun is the proper denotation for a thing I can say that I 
have things: for instance that I have a table, a house, a book, 
a car. The proper denotation for an activity, a process is a 
verb: for instance I am, I love, I desire, I hate, etc. Yet 
evermore frequently an activity is expressed in terms of 
having; that is, a noun is-used instead of a verb. But to 
express an activity by to have in connection with a noun is an 
erroneaous use of language because processes and activities 
cannot be possessed; they can only be experienced. (38) 
As I hold that personal knowing is a central feature of the empathic 
relation'Fromm's comments on language use are especially interest- 
ing. In the prologue, I have clearly borrowed his 'ideas in my discus- 
sion of the, prevalence of nouns in the social sciences. Later on he 
adds: '"Optimum knowledge in the being mode is-td know more deeply. 
In the having mode it is'to have more knowledge. "(39) 
For Fromm this change in language use indicates a high, degree of 
alienation. Feelings of anxiety, stress or, on the positive side, 
happiness, excitement are transformed into possessions. "I have a 
problem" replaces "I worry over V. One cannot possess an abstract- 
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ion. On the contrary one might say with-greater truth that the prob- 
lem has me in. its grip. It. owns me. '-Thus I am not only distanced 
from my experience; I am also alienated from my experiencing self. 
Genuine authentic feelings have given way to an-obscure sense of 
loss, of almost pathological detachment. In extremis, fortunately 
rare even in our frenetic, having-dominated society, psychopathology 
takes over.,, 
1.27 The exploration in empathy of similarities and differences 
In the spontaneous experience of the other's givenness we grasp how 
alike yet how different from the other we are. In this initial, in- 
tuitive perceptual act our grasping of the other's foreignness can 
be disturbing; in contrast, our apprehension of similarities pro- 
vides the impetus to move towards the other. In what senses are we 
to understand similarity and difference? 
The referent is the person or rather the individual personality (the 
personhood) which expresses the unique beingness of each of the par- 
ticipants. Insofar as physical characteristics are deeply embedded 
in the self-image they will impinge upon our sense of personhood. If 
I have a wart on the end of my nose I may spontaneously identify 
with another who is cross-eyed, because in grasping the unfortun- 
ate's givenness I sense in him or-her perhaps the same lack of con- 
fidence, or feeling of rejection, or belittling by insensitive 
others, that I myself have experienced on account of my own deform- 
ity. The similarity lies-not in the presence of a physical blemish 
but in its effect on our self-image; we suffer similarly in our dim- 
inished sense of self-worth. Physical characteristics in and for 
themselves are hardly ever important elements in our experience of 
similarity with another.. There is some evidence, however, to suggest 
that physical differences may make interpersonal exchange difficult. 
For example, the healthy do not always know how to cope with the 
sick (who sometimes resent the healthy), the whole with the crip- 
pled, the robust and physically large with the weak and physically 
puny, the capable (adept) with the incapable (clumsy), the members 
of one ethnic group with those of another. 
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It is never easy to isolate the perception of purely physical dif- 
ferences from the perception of feelings attributable to them as the 
phenomena of prejudice and stereotypy demonstrate. There appears to 
be a tendency for people to feel. more relaxed with each other just 
because they resemble each other in some important respect, perhaps 
for-no better. reason (nor worse for that matter) than that., they 
share a set of coping strategies which are more readily, available to 
them than might be the case with those different from themselves. 
Age differences offer an'abvious example. "The young tend to see the 
older generation as out of touch, square, addicted to rules, con- 
formist, authoritarian, and afflicted with delusions of superior 
knowledge, understanding and wisdom. The members of older age groups 
tend to regard the young-as feckless, ill-disciplined, short-sighted 
hedonistic, and easily seduced by the rhetoric of every tub-thumping 
demagogue-who comes their-way.. (This collection of stereotypes 
merely serves to, indicate a range-of attitudes actually encountered 
in the world; fortunately many-, individuals cope with age differences 
without resorting, to such generalisations. ) 
Sex differences appear to'present*'a difficulty for the account of 
empathising presented-in this dissertation. The majority of men and 
women tend to seek the company of others of the same-sex just as 
much as those of the opposite sex. However in the matter of choice 
of partner for sexual relationships what counts is not our response 
as an organism (heterosexual choice is the biologically natural one) 
but our spontaneous feeling of attraction (or its opposite) for an- 
other. The other may arouse physical desire, possibly unknowingly. 
Sexual desire is part of our physical nature but its arousal owes 
more to social conditioning than to in-built mechanisms such as 
hypothesised instincts. Some modern societies provide a surfeit of 
titillation, at least for men, and much advertising reflects the 
current standards of male and female beauty, elegance and desirabil- 
ity. Indeed the media as a whole repeatedly and variously establish 
the criteria for masculinity and femininity and the socially accept- 
able implications of the meeting of the sexes. However, once we have 
disposed of desire the reasons for two people being attracted to one 
another will centre an similarity in other, less evanescent, qualit- 
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ies. Within an empathic relation mere physical characteristics. play 




What are the elements of individual personalities which are likely 
to inspire in a'person the intuitive recognition"of similarity with 
another? We might rephrase the question to'include"the expressive- 
ness of'another for it'is the other's expressiveness which is given 
to us in the spontaneous perceptual act. The other's feelings, atti- 
tudes,, emotions, habits, coping, strategies, persistent tendencies of 
character, are among the phenomena which we-might discover in the 
other's givenness., The detailed study of these would amount to a re- 
view of current psychological thought and research on individual 
differences but here 
,I 
shall concentrate on, a, few issues important 
to the understanding of the empathic relation. 
Feelings and emotions are obviously easier tä-recognise than any of 
the others; they make a 'direct impact'and are virtually independent" 
of time and space'. We do not need contextual clues to=tell Us*of 
another's pain or pleasure, nor of'the emotions behind the feelings. 
Joy, grief, happiness, anguish, anger, contentment are immediately 
identifiable even if we cannot. percive their source, their immediate 
cause. Neither do we need time to be sure of the correctness of our 
perception. The other's display of emotion, or expression of pain or 
pleasure, is, immediate and instantly grasped at the moment of its 
occurrence. Of course we may be deceived if the other is highly 
skilled in dissembling and convincingly expresses a 
, 
false emotion, 
or if the observer is unskilled in reading the other's expressive 
ness. There are many ways of giving vent to feelings and emotions 
and sometimes perhaps only the context can help us to discriminate 
between signs which look similar. For example, we might mistake a 
person's anger for fear or even hatred if we relied solely on the 
physical expression of his or her emotion; a pensitive perception of 
the context would help-to obviate error. This is particularly true 
when experiencing the givenness of, persons whose cultural origins 
and traditions are greatly different from our own. 
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Similarity in the case of feelings and emotions may refer either to 
the emotions and feelings themselves (even if stimulated by differ- 
ent objects), or to the expressive signs which betray their pres- 
ence, or. any combination of these. We might therefore infer that the 
greater our experience of life the greater the range of potential 
similarities betwen self and other which the empathiser might per- 
ceive in the other's givenness. The ability to read the expressive- 
ness of others, whilst innate, is greatly aided by learning. (17) 
To the extent that attitudes have an affective component the spon- 
taneous experience of the givenness of the other's emotions-and 
feelings give pointers-to the other's attitudes. The full flavour of 
an attitude'and an accurate knowledge and understanding of another's 
attitude systems are acquired over a period'of time and in a variety 
of contexts. Though we may sense an attitude in our first encounter 
with the other we have to be on our guard against too hasty a judge- 
ment. In the empathic relation the spirit of openness, respect and 
goodwill and the non-manipulative, non-attributive interaction with 
the other-help to-prevent or inhibit this tendency. The interesting 
feature of attitudes from the point of view of the empathic relation 
is not so'much°the beliefs, - feelings-and action tendencies which, as 
it were, collectively express the attitude, but rather the social 
object to which they refer. The object of an attitude may be any- 
thing at all: a political party, a particular food, a human being, a 
domain'of knowledge, an abstract idea, a generalised other. Since in 
empathising we strive to know and Understand another as a person we 
will inevitably find ourselves exploring the other's social objects 
and the ways in which the other construes them to yield the attitude 
sytems which accommodate his or her construals and which we may 
eventually come to know and understand. The range of possible simil- 
arities in the case of attitudes is extensive. It includes the soc- 
ial object itself, its functional or other relevance in our lives, 
the ways of construing the object as well as the beliefs, values, 
feelings and dispositions to act which we attach to it. All require 
time and contextual variety for their proper and adequate appreciat- 
ion. 
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Habits are automatic routines which we unconsciously bring into act- 
ion more or less independently of context but which nevertheless 
appear to fulfill an essential function. The problem with habits is 
discovering what function they serve. Sometimes they are useful as 
in skilled performance where actions are executed without, or with 
only the minimum, conscious control. The performer is thus able to 
attend to a wider perceptual field which may, for many skills, be 
vital for safety as well as for efficiency. Many habits appear to 
serve no purpose that-one can readily see; they may even be dysfunc- 
tional; we feel that the individual would be better off without 
them. Examples include the resort to linguistic, cliches and form- 
ulae, addictive behaviour, stereotyped responses to specific objects 
or classes of objects, obsessive or compulsive behaviour, dismissive 
coping strategies and,, in general, "useless" repetitive responses. 
In the empathic relation we may perceive similarities with-the 
other's specific habit (e. g. chain smoking) or with the addiction 
which it signifies (e. g. I am dependent on smoking, he on alcohol); 
with stereotypy towards an object or class of objects (we both dis- 
like dogs) or with a general inclination towards stereotypy (he 
hates foreigners whereas I detest ideologies). Or the empathiser 
perceives-that his or her own habits serve a similar function to 
the other's habits, perhaps despite their different character. In, 
the case of attitudes, the initial intuitive grasping of the other's 
givenness may suggest that a particular expressiveness indicates a 
habitual response but only time and contextual variety will enable 
us to confirm this. And only time and contextual variety will allow 
the empathiser to know and understand the significance of the 
other's habits as elements of his or-her individual personality. 
Emotions, feelings, attitudes, habits are indicators of a person's 
beingness and may reflect something of the quality of his or her 
life style. In studying the other's coping strategies and persistent' 
predispositions of character we approach closer to the essence of 
the person. It is doubtful whether any human being could, over a 
lengthy period of time, suppress all signs of feeling or emotion, 
root out all redundant habits, and control attitudes at least to the 
extent of concealing them as much as possible. Over a short period 
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of time, however, such self-discipline may be within the capability 
of a reasonably well-adjusted and very determined person. With 
coping strategies and persistent predispositions of character no 
such whittling away is possible nor can be imagined. Every action is 
the-fulfilment of an-intention and involves choice and therefore 
value. If-the action involves other people then conflict may arise 
either because the purposes of the self are at variance with those 
of others and a power struggle ensues; or the individual may give 
way thus shifting the conflict to within himself or herself with 
possible damage. to the person's self-esteem. Therefore by the nature 
of action itself-a person develops coping strategies, not conscious- 
ly (at least not in the beginning) but unconsciously or perhaps pre- 
consciously, by discovering or inventing on the spur of the moment a 
modus vivendi which maintains-as far as possible a stable order as 
seen from his or her point of view. -One view of racial prejudice, 
for example, describes-the prejudiced individual as someone who off- 
loads his or her-frustrations, feelings of inadequacy, negative . 
self-image, -on to another-(Jew, black, communist, -capitalist, etc. ) 
in order to create a tangible external object to hate-and attack and 
thus establish some'kind of internal equilibrium. Such an individual 
will-tend to use this coping strategy in a'wide variety of-situat- 
ions-and with many diferent social objects. This example also shows 
how an; individual's-persistent predipositions of character might 
become obvious to an-observer. It may be that individuals who feel 
threatened by-change in the outside-world will reveal an abiding 
predisposition to act in rigid, black-and-white ways towards any 
deviations in their self-limiting, regimented world. Or it might 
show that prejudiced people tend to have fewer categories than 
others for distinguishing elements in their world (e. g. all foreign- 
ers are shifty). The relation between persistent predispositions of 
character and coping strategies appears to be very close and both 
appear to form psychodynamic elements in individual life histories. 
I have taken prejudice as an example but I could as easily have used 
a more intellectual element as my starting paint. People whose major 
interests in"life'centre on-intellectual activity, or on the aesth- 
etic response to the real world, or an a particular world view, are 
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as likely to be drawn to one another as are those whose particular 
hang-ups induce them to seek soul-mates by joining the same hate- 
clubs. 
It is interesting to speculate why any kind of association appeals 
so strongly to humankind regardless of`the specific grounds for its 
formation. There are various explanations for this phenomenon. We 
all have limited capabilities and we depend on others for, much of 
our well-being. Some argue that parental upbringing guarantees cont- 
inued dependency throughout life but some societies who treat their 
children with as much consideration as they give their adult members 
appear not to produce this dependency relation in their offspring. 
Dependency is certainly learned but so is independence. The depend- 
ence-independence dimension does not offer as strong a leverage for 
our ideas on mutual attraction as the normal process of child care. 
The loving relation between child and caring adult where it exists 
(as it seems to do in the majority of families) creates a warmth and 
a sense of personal identity that we naturally seek in later life. 
The ideal ambience for child growth is the empathic relation, espec- 
ially with the mother but increasingly nowadays with other caring 
adults, in which unity and separateness are experienced simultane- 
ously. Thus do we discover our personhood. The combination of love 
and personhood, both products of a community of persons (the child 
and caring adult), provides the irresistible standard for all. relat- 
ions in later life and against which all but the empathic relation 
pale into comparative insignificance. 
Nevertheless, we cannot deny that we are all dependent an others for 
a variety of reasons. We all have weaknesses; we all have limitat- 
ions. Whilst I might not wish to go so far as to say that we need 
others, I do think that we severely limit our personal growth by 
confusing concern over our autonomy with a healthy and often necess- 
ary dependency relation (the positive aspect of dominance), and a 
consequent tendency to avoid or fear it. 






is a particular kind of relation beween a self and an 
other-than-self in which the members experience a sense of unity but 
without loss of their separate identities. It is an active relation 
(and not merely a state of being) in which the members strive to 
know and understand one another, perceive each other's existential 
nature, respect each other and join in an action which centres on 
the pursuit of a shared goal or common ideal. The relation is non- 
manipulative and leads, to self- and other-enhancement, interpersonal 
harmony and a preference for a being rather than a havingmode of 
existence. 
The six characteristics reviewed briefly in the preceding sections 
distinguish the empathic from all other relations between a self and 
an other-than-self. It will be apparent from the account so far that 
only persons can. initiate an empathic relation and that therefore 
only persons can create persons. Both observations will be studied 
more closely in section 1.4. 
1.3 SOME POPULAR VIEWS OF EMPATHY 
Some see empathy as a kind of telepathic cornmuncation in which one 
individual somehow knows what another is thinking and feeling even 
when the other is not physically present; monozygotic twins seem es- 
pecially prone to this experience. Whether or not telepathy is a 
genuine phenomenon is still open to doubt though that does not just- 
ify excluding it from proper investigation. However, telepathy and 
kindred mystical phenomena do, not feature in this enquiry. The pot- 
entially more freely accessible empathic relation provides a more 
easily verifiable process and a less contentious explanation of some 
of the peculiarities of those who claim to be particularly sensitive 
perceivers of others. - 
Another popular view of empathy likens it to an emotional tuning 
device. It seems that those who possess this gift are able to estab- 
lish a wordless rapport with another in which both partners feel 
that they share the same "wavelength". This differs from telepathy 
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firstly because each must be physically present to the other and 
secondly because the experience is not usually felt to be mystical 
though some regard it as a throwback to our primitive past. The view 
of the empathic relation presented here can certainly accommodate 
this sensitive rapport but without employing the jargon of emotional 
subliminal perception. I shall also suggest that its rarity is due 
to the atrophying effect of our chosen life style; it can be rescued 
and revived with a little effort. 
Yet another popular. view-sees empathy as a rare gift like artistic 
or musical talent. I say more about this in Chapter 3 where I con- 
sider the appropriateness of the ability approach to understanding 
the empathic relation. My view of this relation does not preclude 
the virtual certainty that it will prosper if the participants bring 
to it, among other qualities which I shall explore in due course, 
some cognitive and productive resources (which we call abilities, 
capacities or competencies) and some minimum level of performance. 
The systematic analysis of these abilities and skills goes far be- 
yond the scope of this dissertation. Once again the feeling of rar- 
ity and preciousness is more descriptive of our way of life than of 
ourselves as persons, as the sequel will try to show. 
Contrary to the opinion of some professional commentators empathy is 
not another word for sympathy; the two are conceptually and phenom- 
enologically different. In the next chapter I will examine some of 
the many ways in which one human being may forge a bond with an- 
other. Sympathy, empathy, identification, community of feeling, emo- 
tional contagion, emotional unity are just a few which have caught 
the imagination of philosophers, social and developmental psycholog- 
ists, sociologists, and social anthropologists. As Chapter 3 shows 
not all students of "empathy" use this particular label or, if they 
do, understand by it the same phenomenon. 
It is not to be confused with what one might call an "aesthetic" re- 
sponse. We may thrill to a gorgeous sunset, or to a particularly 
brilliant performance of a musical work, or enjoy a moment of great 
personal peace and contentment in the presence of an awesome work of 
nature but these moving aesthetic experiences are not necessarily a 
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function of an empathic or quasi-empathic relation. On the other 
hand they may be but if so will be experienced differently, more 
positively, less in the sense of wallowing in an emotional bath. 
This last condition is superficial and lacks many of the most impor- 
tant attributes of genuine empathy. These and similar matters will 
be dealt with in Chapter 2. 
1.4 TYPES OF EMPATHIC RELATION 
In the cases considered so far, we have assumed that two members 
formed the empathic relation. Is there a maximum number? If we imag- 
ine that all members simultaneously enter such a relation clearly 
there must be a limit since sustained face-to-face contact soon 
breaks down once the group reaches a certain size. Small group re- 
search into the properties of so-called "psychological" groups whose 
members pursue a common goal or task and maintain face-to-face con- 
tact) suggests that, though task and other variables affect the max- 
imum group size, "the latter seems to vary between five and eight. We 
might assume a similar maximum for the empathic-relation.,, 
There is no need, however, to require simultaneous or even sustained 
membership of an empathic relation. Members can move into and out of 
the relation at will. As I have suggested above and will explore 
more fully later the empathic relation is the natural one between 
persons. A community of persons conducts its business through the 
empathic relation which implies that members of the community will 
in the normal course of daily life associate spontaneously in many 
different groups which will vary in size, purpose, duration and so 
on. 
1.41 The idea. of defect and limitation 
The central feature of the empathic relation is the creation of per- 
sons. At least one must exist to initiate the relation. In any group 
of individuals in our kind of society there will be some who prefer 
the having mode of life and who tend towards manipulative, exploit- 
ative and judgemental conduct in their dealings with others. They 
may have learned their self- and other-limiting ways from their par- 
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ents, from members of one or more of the many microcultures they 
move about in, or they may seldom have been treated as persons them- 
selves during their early upbringing., Yet there will also be others 
in the group who have experienced some aspects of the being mode of 
existence and have therefore enjoyed the benefits it confers, chief 
among which is their recognition by others as persons. Many members 
of this hypothetical group will have experienced both modes, perhaps 
the majority. 
When a person tries to initiate the empathic relation with another 
individual the response is unpredictable. At best it would be wise 
to expect little better than a neutral disposition towards the emp- 
athises. By neutral I do not mean indifferent which implies a negat- 
ive attitude but rather, a state which is neither well-disposed nor 
ill-disposed, a genuinely uncommitted attitude towards the person 
initiating the empathic relation. 
The question of limiting conduct and, more generally, of a limiting 
approach to the world including the self is problematical. Defective 
conduct is sometimes obvious. The alcoholic, the drug addict,: the 
pathological-gambler or liar or thief, may be well aware of'his or 
her problem and desperately want to do something about it but for a 
variety of reasons cannot do so. At a more prosaic level many people 
feel able to own up to their inadequacies (or some of them) and to 
do so quite objectively; an inability to deal with certain kinds of 
people, or to_cope with certain kinds of task or situation are 
commonplace. The problem is overcoming the handicap. Their own 
efforts may fail,. to achieve results despite, and possibly because 
of, the exhortations and "good" advice so freely available and often, 
so generously given. If such individuals should chance to meet some- 
one who is able to enter into an empathic relation with them they 
might find the kind of help they apparently need to start them on ' 
their own journey of personal growth and so overcome their self- 
limiting ways of living. How the empathic relation can promote this 
self-enhancement non-manipulatively is the purpose of the next few 
sections but first we must consider other cases of defect, those in 
which the individual appears to be unable or unwilling to admit to 
conduct which not only hinders his own personal development but may 
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also limit others in some way. A teacher may notice that a student 
is making poor progress because of faulty study-methods. In such a 
case the'teacher might suggest other'ways of studying and even train 
the student in their use. If the student is highly motivated to 
learn whatever task the'"teacher presents-he'-or she will probably 
give these new methods a try. They may work or they may not. Either 
way both teacher and-student feel able to explore willingly better 
study methods (i. e. more-effective--ways for this particular stud- 
ent). An empathic relation need play no part in this-process though 
it would certainly facilitate-the development of teacher-student 
relations-in-other directions beyond the specific problem'of study 
habits. However, suppose the student does not'want to learn. 'The 
teacher-might rightly feel that this attitude-is self-limiting but- 
the student may-not share'this view or even care about it. A subst- 
antial minority of students in secondary education, and nowadays 
increasingly in post=compulsory education, `appear to have acquired 
unhelpful approaches to"learning. Here the problem''is not so much 
overcoming the'inadequacy, as convincing the student that a-problem 
exists-or, ''perhaps more'precisely, what the problem is. In this 'case 
it matters who defines the problem and who decides the criteria by 
which it is defined. ' At one'extreme, for example, the student might 
with justice say that there is no point in learning what the teacher 
offers because it will not be of any practical use either for get- 
ting a job (there are. none to be had and to further dramatise the 
situation imagine the student to be black, female and a political 
activist) or for filling his or her (enforced) leisure time. This 
bleak and somewhat contrived picture does in fact correspond, with 
suitable variations, to the reality of many of those who are usually 
described,, as'oür less academically able'students. In such circum- 
stances does the teacher accept the student's criteria? To do other- 
wise is to impose his'or°her own view of learning , education, per- 
sonal growth on the student. Or does the teacher try to convince the 
student of the self-limitingcharacter'of his or her negative app- 
roach? If so, how is the teacher to do this in the context of a 
curriculum over which he or she may have 'no control? - 
There are many dilemmas of this kind where one individual not only 
feels that another is acting in self-limiting ways but he or she is 
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unwilling to stand by and do nothing to remedy what-appears, to-the 
observer as an addiction to "defective" conduct (and equally-"defec- 
tive" attitudes) all the worse perhaps for being self-imposed. -. In 
such cases "defect" is synonymous with self-limiting-conduct-or 
rather what is felt to constitute a self-imposed-limit"on-the: poten 
tial for personal growth of the individual observed.. The dilemma is, 
partly a moral one. What right has anyone, however well-meaning, to 
interfere in the choices of another? On what grounds may one. justly 
and with propriety intervene in-another's life-even when it. _appears 
to be for the other's good? Not all interference or, intervention is 
manipulative or-exploitative. Indeed I maintain that in an empathic, 
relation, intervention can be other- and self-enhancing; that is to 
say it is possible to enhance the other's personhood as well as 
one's own by intervening provided it is done within the security and. 
warmth of the empathic relation. However, the problem of deciding 
what is or. is not self-limiting remains, but this too is sufficient 
justification for trying to enter-into an empathic-relation with-a 
"defective" person quite apart from intervening, that is doing some- 
thing concrete--about it. Since. the, empathic relation-, is non-manipul- 
ative there is no question of "doing, good even if it hurts". 
Let us leave this question and look at the empathic relation under 
different conditions. As and when necessary we can return to this 
theme and reappraise the position we have reached. We can arrange a 
hierarchy of empathic relations ranging from the ideal (mutual em- 
pathy) to the least promising. Typical members include: 
(a) two or more people all of whom are well-disposed to each 
other (the ideal case); -, 
(b) two or more-people one of whom. (the initiator) is at least 
well-disposed towards the other(s) and none is hostile; 
(they may be only neutral towards other members); 
(c) two or-more people at-least one of whom (the initiator) is 
well-disposed towards the other(s) and at least one is 
hostile; 
(d) two or more people all of whom-are neutral to each other, 
(i. e. none is either well- or ill-disposed to the 
other(s); I 
(e) two or more people one of whom is neutral and at least one is hostile. 
The groups in types (d) and (e) may never generate an empathic rela- 
tion. By definition persons cannot be neutral; they are well-dispos- 
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ed to others including hostiles. The neutral cases are included here 
to raise the question as , 
to whether a person not at his or her best 
can in, certain circumstances initiate the empathic relation. With 
the possible exception of pathological cases all individuals, even 
in our having-dominated society, have experienced, however fleeting- 
ly, the nurturance, and enhancement of their personhood., especially in 
childhood. at the hands of their mothers or other caring adults. We 
might further conjecture that all human beings actively seek or at 
least yearn for, the fostering of their individual personality, for 
fulfilment in a community. of, persons, and that,, despite the pres- 
sures of industrialised societies, individuals will,, given half a 
chance, discover ways of reaching these goals or strive to do so. 
Trying is the cornerstone of the empathic relation; I good trying or 
goodwill. Another way of looking at this hierarchy of actual or 
potential' empathic relations is to construe-them as demonstrations 
of äctual'or potential goodwill contending with increasing illwill 
as we move down the list. Crudely, the sum of goodwill diminishes 
from (a) to-(e) buts never entirely absent at least in potentia 
(e. g. in those whose feelings towards others are neutral). In the 
following sections I shall, examine types (a), (c), and (e)., I shall 
assume only two members in each case. - 
1.42 Mutual empathy 
The empathic. relation does not come into, existence fully-fledged nor 
does it instantly, produce its effects. It involves a process in 
which the members interact over a period of time which can be con- 
siderable.., In the ideal case where the participants are well-dispos- 
ed, towards each other the conditions are, at their most favourable 
and the time span of, development of the empathic relation may be 
short. .AY 
A precursor of empathy is an'-attitude of openness to the beingness 
of the other, a state of preparedness for the other's givenness, a 
sensitivity to, and a willingness to grasp, the existential nature 
of the other. The stance of openness is a necessary condition for 
the evolution of the empathic relation. From it stem two of-the 
active elements of the relation: respect for the other and goodwill. 
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1.421 Openness 
Openness refers to a receptivity to the beingness of things. It 
therefore' implies a laying aside of existing knowledge, preconceived 
ideas, perceptual set, vested interest, conceptual categories and 
the attendant labelling, and similar cognitive and affective 
material of everyday life. This is not easy to do but can be 
encouraged with the help of techniques used to activate creative 
thinking. It is not a matter of trying to grasp the essence of 
whatever confronts'us: too much effort is likely to induce the very 
intrusions that we want to hold at bay. Rather it is a case of 
relaxing our perceptual grip on phenomena in order to allow them to 
speak for themselves. Contemplation and meditation are similarly 
unlikely, to be effective because they tend to be too directive and 
in any case they are often contaminated with mystery, mysticism or 
magic. If we could recapture the innocent curious wonder which we 
brought to the phenornenal, world, in our infancy and early childhood 
we would be in the right frame of mind. 
A major obstacle to rediscovering our lost attitude of openness is 
the depth and nature of our personal commitment to our perceptual 
habits. The familiar is safe; accumulated experience and knowledge 
have served us well. To perceive anew is threatening; it exposes us 
to the risk of confronting our limitations. It poses problems of 
perhaps having to reorganise and reassess what we already know. We 
may even have to reappraise whole areas of our lives. In any case 
the new can itself be threatening not merely because it upsets the 
established order of our lives but because we may not know how to 
handle it or be sure where it will lead. Doubt and uncertainty are 
uncomfortable experiences for many, perhaps most of us. Sö our own 
defensive strategies may oppose any attempt to adopt a stance of 
openness; they may even inhibit it altogether. It seems important 
therefore to pay as much attention to discovering and dealing with 
our defensiveness as we do to applying specific techniques to free- 
ing our perceptual "style" from its stanglehold. It may sometimes be 
necessary to seek help but not from psychotherapists unless they 
have an established reputation for empathising. Better choices would 
include those whose perceptual gifts are well developed: artists, 
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poets and those known to enter readily into empathic relations with 
others. Carl Rogers' idea of psychological safety is relevant here. 
In the empathic relation the empathiser offers psychological safety 
by the very fact of trying to know and understand another non-manip- 
ulatively. The empathising person never ridicules or threatens or 
lays any blame on the other in the latter's efforts to learn new 
coping strategies or to acquire the attitude of openness (perhaps, 
for example, 'by experimenting with some of the creative thinking 
techniques)' in the course of which the other"may make "mistakes", 
look or feel foolish, or become defensively aggressive. 
1.422 The non-manipulative attitude 
The nan-manipulative attitude refers to a person's unconditional 
recognition and acceptance of the human, nan-human, or'non-living 
being in front of'him or her. All things are held to have a right to 
their'independent existence; nothing, with the possible exception of 
human artifacts, is thought to exist solely for its possible contri- 
bution to human well-being. The non-manipulative attitude rejects 
the-exploitative, instrumental, egocentric approach to the world. It 
encourages-a willingness to see other living and non-living things 
as rightfully there, owing nothing to the gracious-consent of human 
beings to continue existing. It acknowledges and freely accepts the 
right. of_all living things to continue to live; of the inanimate 
world to be used with consideration for the needs of other living 
things especially other human beings. It condemns unbridled spoli- 
ation of the environment merely to satisfy human wants; it rejects 
,, -- 
the abuse of, other living. things in order to supply human needs. 
Where'human'artifacts-are concerned the non-manipulative attitude 
has similAr'characteristics but other factors have to be considered. 
Crafts people have a high regard for their tools, their correct use 
and care. Skilled performance is universally admired as are the 
products of'skilled work. Human beings have developed an aesthetic 
of 'artifacts such as houses, instruments, machines, -cities, simple 
tools and other useful devices. -This aesthetic includes an appreci- 
ation of correct or appropriate use. On the other hand there are 
products of human hands which do not win universal approval: weapons 
of destruction, mechanisms designed to harm others. It is difficult 
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to adopt an unconditional recognition and acceptance of such arti- 
facts although it does seem to be an essential precondition for 
using them effectively. A man is unlikely to become a good marksman 
and so be able to guarantee killing his enemy if he is afraid of his 
rifle. To overcome his fear he must approach his weapon with that 
very attitude which it is designed to destroy in himself. 
The non-manipulative attitude does not inhibit the use of objects 
nor is it meant to. What it inhibits is the exploitation of objects, 
their misuse or abuse that affects, directly or indirectly, the 
well-being of others especially other humans. For example, it is a 
personal choice whether an individual eats meat or not. To do so 
does not necessarily imply the exploitation of animals. Battery 
farming methods, however, are exploitative just because the reason 
for this method of food production is. not to provide food but to 
produce for the sake of producing'in order to earn greater profits. 
A high rate of production and a continuing flow of profit are 
maintained by encouraging more consumption through--the usual 
channels of socialisation. I have chosen an emotive topic but the 
same remarks apply regardless of what is produced for consumption 
(which is practically everything).. 
. 
The non-manipulative attitude is clearly selective not to say discri- 
minatory. When dealing with people we are on fairly safe ground. An 
unconditional recognition and acceptance of the beingness (the per- 
sonhood) of a human being is unarguable even if the individual con- 
cerned is the vilest criminal we can think of. If this were not so, 
law and other stabilising institutions such as the family would 
never have survived for so long, nor perhaps have evolved at all. 
That some people strike us as beyond the pale of. normal human com- 
panionship is undoubtedly true yet few countries support the death 
penalty and most religions offer the hope of eventual salvation. One 
must distinguish between potential for growth and the defective 
manifestation before us here and now. Condemnation of the latter may 
be just but does not and should not entail the rejection of the 
former. 
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When dealing with non-human entities the idea of the non-manipulat- 
ive attitude becomes problematical. Again with animals there is no 
real problem until we come to human needs for food and health. Live 
and let live is a commonly met sentiment nowadays but the breeding 
of animals for food and the destruction of pests (e. g. rats, foxes, 
rabbits) presents us with decisions many of us would rather avoid. 
In one-sense we succeed-since the breeding, killing and butchering 
are done for us. Pest control, is likewise not usually our personal 
concern. The-exploitation-of the earth's resources arouses strong 
feelings on both sides: from those who support it-because they have 
become attached to a certain way of life which they would lose if 
the plunder ceased or eased up; and from those who reject it because 
it upholds the principle of one person's welfare is another being's 
deprivation. We have only to reflect on the fate of many Indian 
tribes in the Amazonian basin whose very existence is imperilled 
through the destruction of the forests; or the degradation of the 
Australian aborigine, the Eskimo, the nomadic peoples of Arabia and 
many parts of Africa; all provide examples of the nastier side of 
human greed, the manipulative attitude in full flower. 
Despite these and other difficulties the non-manipulative attitude 
is an essential prerequisite for the creation of the empathic rela- 
tion. Why this is so we must now turn to. 
1.423 Goodwill 
Living things have a natural urge to grow, to become whatever it is 
in their nature to become. The genetic code and normal biological 
processes guarantee 
_a 
constant striving, a reaching out. Provided 
the environment is conducive to growth the living thing will pros- 
per. Human beings will strive similarly and for similar reasons. 
Humans, and perhaps all animals equipped with a central nervous sys- 
tem (i. e. a brain and its peripherals rather than a mere ganglion of 
nerve cells), have, in addition, an urge to know, to understand, to 
make sense of their existential nature, which includes coping with 
their environment. Notions of consciousness and subjectivity meet in 
the idea of intensionality which is characteristic of such living 
entities. Perception, searching, feeling, all psychical life requ- 
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ires objects. The subjectivity, consciousness and directedness, in 
short the livingness of the subject resides in this "facing" of the 
objects of consciousness. Furthermore this intensionality seems to 
be an irreducible element of the nature of humans (and at least of 
some animals) which is not capable of explanation by simpler, more 
primitive elements. 
I contrast beings equipped with central nervous systems with simpler 
organisms because that particular line of evolution culminates in 
humankind, the most sophisticated example of this type of neural or- 
ganisation and because-the simpler organisms appear to be"merely re- 
active. For such organisms notions of consciousness, subjectivity, 
even self-directedness seem, " if not'-superfluous, -at least difficult 
to apply without many qualifications and reservations. 
Of course humans are historical whereas lower animals are not. We 
acquire cultural artifacts along with our genetic inheritance where- 
as other animals are ahistorical. Each generation must learn every- 
thing anew; there is no accumulation of culture in successive gener- 
ations (genetically speaking). 
The point of this diversion is to give substance to the claim that 
at least humans and probably other animals with central nervous sys- 
tems are born with a two-fold urge to strive, to reach out: the ef- 
fort to grow in the biological sense and the urge to grow in the 
sense of knowing and understanding the real world which features in 
their experience of their livingness. To be a dog is to experience 
the doggy world of scents, territorial markings, recognitions of 
other dogs and of non-dogs, and so on. The subjectivity of the dog's 
experience of its world is circumscribed by its potential for con- 
tacting, that world and making sense of it. And similarly for other 
animals including homo sapiens. The huge gap between humankind and 
the rest is due to the historical nature of human experience and the 
means we have developed for recording and preserving it, e. g. lang- 
uage, art, mathematics, thought systems, and so forth. In the human 
case effort or will can be enhanced by the spirit of openness and 
the non-manipulative attitude. Will becomes goodwill, the predispos- 
ition to be well-disposed towards others, both human and non-human. 
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Openness facilitates the perception of the phenomenal object as it 
actually is; the non-manipulative attitude cultivates the willing- 
ness to recognise and accept it unconditionally. Between them they 
help to*put the self into a state of readiness to experience the 
givenness of the phenomenal object. I-shall be returning later to 
the relation between-non-manipulative` openness and the spontaneous 
experience of the other's givenness but here I want to draw atten- 
tion to the more interesting relationship between non-manipulative 
openness and love. The model 'I use, following many predecessors"inc- 
luding'Scheler, is maternal love; amother's love for her child is 
unconditional. Elsewhere I devote a section to love. (18) For the 
present'I want to make justttwo points. ' Firstly, the spirit of open- 
ness and-the non-manipulative attitude are aspects of (maternal) 
love. Secondly, I agree with Scheler and Stewart that love underpins 
all fellow-feeling, especially empathising and sympathy. For Scheler 
love launches the*self into the unconscious identification with the 
other'(thus initiating sympathy: see 2.34). -For me it precipitates 
the spontaneous experience of .. the other's gi"venness, an event which 
just happens, which cannot be striven for'(and which initiates the 
empathic' relation). 'Love and-two of the progenitors of goodwill: the 
non-manipulative approach and the stance of openness towards the 
other's beingness, are in effect interchangeable. Goodwill is natur- 
al striving embellished with love: 
spirit of openness I= love ') 
non-manipulative approach) (in part) ) 
") = goodwill natural striving to grow, ) = effort to know and understand ) or will ") 
1.424 The other's givenness 
The first stage of empathy occurs in the self's experience of the 
other's givenness. This is a spontaneous event, something which 
cannot be striven for. The experience of givenness is therefore the 
object of awareness in passive consciousness. We may become aware of 
the real world because we are acting on the world in which case it 
is an object of awareness,, in active consciousness. Alternatively 
phenomena may be thrust upon us (and are, many times a day) in which 
case we become aware of them without active intervention on our 
part. This is the obvious difference between active and passive con- 
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sciousness. The first is a function of the self's actions; the sec- 
ond is a result of events which just happen to us. 
There are other differences between the two. Action is the behavi- 
oural manifestation of intention so that active consciousness also 
includes among its objects our thoughts and other cognitive phenom- 
ena. Thinking, like all mental activity,. is concerned-with the past 
(or the future which is a kind of anticipated past). Ideas, images, 
memories and the like refer to real world phenomena that are al- 
ready in the past. They are thus not only second-hand substitutes 
for the real thing; they are also out-of-date. -This is not to dis- 
parage the ideal world of mental activity, merely to note some of 
its characteristics. Returning to the experience of the other's 
givenness what is important for the self is-to perceive the other as 
he or she is and not as the self imagines, remembers, thinks the 
other is. (19) To try to interpret another's expressiveness is to, 
yield to a tendency to recall incidents from the past, to explore 
theories about the other's personality, to imagine oneself in the 
other's shoes, and so on. But why use this second-hand, out-of-date, 
possibly-inaccurate information when the other is there before us? 
How then can a self experience the givenness of the other in passive 
consciousness? (20) How can we, as it were, deliberately precipitate 
the event? The simple answer is that we cannot. All we can do is to 
cultivate the stance of openness, increase our sensitivity to the 
beingness of the phenomenal world in general and of other humans in 
particular. The other's expressiveness is then more likely to come 
to our notice in a spontaneous act of givenness. 
The uniqueness of this grasping of the givenness of phenomena res- 
ides in its immediacy and in its purity. The "perception" is uncon- 
taminated by our thoughts, memories, images, concepts and other cog- 
nitive material. We grasp directly, totally and purely the other as 
he, she or it really is at that moment. (21) This is why I think that 
the attitude of openness is so essential for empathising; without it 
the chances of spontaneously experiencing the other's givenness in 
passive consciousness are greatly reduced. Moreover this spontaneous 
experience in passive consciousness facilitates the process of per- 
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ceiving the other anew as though for the first time irrespective of 
how familiar the other may have become to the perceiving self. 
Part of the experience of the other's givenness is a recognition of 
similarities between the self and the other. As we saw in section 
1.27 and shall explore further in section, 2.35, perceived similarit- 
ies tend to draw people together. 
. 
It, is this "attractiveness", this 
tendency to seek others like ourselves, that provides part of the 
impetus to identify deliberately with the other. In mutual empathy 
the spirit of non-manipulative openness between the members of the 
relation already predisposes them to move towards each other but in 
other cases this attraction may be one-sided (initially) or missing 
altogether. This poses difficulties for the development of, the empa- 
thic relation since in these cases the lack of movement towards the 
other effectively bars deliberate identification without which the 
far more daunting task of exploring differences cannot begin. 
1.425 Respect 
This seeing afresh is what Fromm means by respect. Unfortunately the 
word has come to mean "to treat with deference", "to pay special 
regard to" and other similar expressions 
, 
which, suggest rather order- 
ed, distancing relations. Although the act of perception experient- 
ially implies distance"it-does not necessarily imply a hierarchical 
relation (e. g. superior-inferior) or a scientific'detachment (e. g. 
the over-against-relation of objective observation). In Fromm's use 
and mine respect means--literally'seeing afresh and therefore stress- 
es-separateness (the other, like the self, is a'unique being) with- 
out implying distance in the sense of detachment, or remoteness, 
still less of indifference. It appears to me that this openness- 
giveriness-respect sequence is very like what Bernard Lonergan(22) 
called "cognitive self-transcendence", in which a person may come to 
"know what is the case independently of his knowing it" (to quote' 
Meynell, his biographer). In order to see afresh we must somehow by- 
pass'or go beyond our existing knowledge of the phenomenon; the 
spontaneous experience of the other's givenness in passive cons- 
ciousness, the direct, intuitive grasping of the other's expressive- 
ness unadulterated by memories, images, past experiences of the 
other, is, as far as I can see, the only way this fresh perception 
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can come about. To bring Lonergan (and Meynell) closer to my posit- 
ion I must redefine cognitive self-transcendence as "the coming to 
refresh my knowledge intuitively of what is_the case independently 
of my already knowing it intellectually. " 
The perceptual act I have called respect (following Fromm) does not 
necessarily lead to empathising; that is, it does not follow that 
because I respect another, I will enter into, or try to establish, 
an empathic relation with that person nor, if I do make the attempt, 
that I shall succeed. What is certain is that empathising is imposs- 
ible without respect. The non-manipulative exploration of similarit- 
ies and differences in a spirit of goodwill is only possible just 
because at least one member of the relation grasps the givenness of 
the other as he or she is at that moment and is thus able to move 
towards genuine identification. (23) Once again we must remember-that' 
recognition of similarities serves to draw people together. In a 
mutual empathic relation both participants experience each other's 
givenness and so move towards deliberate identification. In 1.43 and 
1.44 we will explore the less promising cases where identification 
(as understood in this dissertation) will prove difficult or even 
impossible for one or both members. 
The openness-givenness-respect sequence cannot guarantee immunity 
from deception-but it can offer a bulwark against the fraudulent in- 
tentions and practices of others. Is the sequence or, any-part of it 
a safeguard against self-deception? We might ask whether ttIe stance 
of openness and the non-manipulative approach-to another is consist- 
ent with the idea of self-deception. In order to maintain the false 
view of ourselves that self-deception implies we need-the support of 
others either directly through our manipulation of them or indirect- 
ly through the image of ourselves which others provide. In the lat-" 
ter case we are forced to corrupt this reflected image if it dis- 
agrees with our own (distorted) self-image. The self-deceiver is 
thus unable either to maintain a non-manipulative approach to others- 
or to adopt the stance of openness which between them help to gener- 
ate the goodwill so essential for the empathic relation. 
78 
1.426 Deliberate identification 
I- 
Respect of the other is a perceptual., act in which the self recognis- 
es, -acknowledges and accepts the unique identity of the other. The 
sequence as a. whole also permits the self to grasp, the extent, to 
which self. and other are alike and different. It, is the occasion on 
which foreign elements in the other first-become apparent. These 
foreign elements may initially be disturbing . in, the way that. any 
strange phenomenon can provoke in us anxiety, fear, resentment, even 
hate. Some of the "foreignness" may have its source in ourselves in 
that we may project on to the other our own qualities; or we distort 
the other's nature in some way. In thus experiencing the (falsified) 
other we may perceive our own deficiencies and so turn the negative 
feelings on to ourselves. 
For example, suppose I. purchase a rare second-hand car which I 
treasure because. of its, rarity. A friend, who sees my joy in my new 
acquisition, points to some costly rust patches and observes that 
spare parts may be impossible to obtain. _J note, this as an instance 
of sour-grapes and resent his belittling attitude. The. truth of his 
remark: s. gradually, reveals itself to me. as I examine, the car more 
closely. I then become aware of my impulsive nature which not only 
led me to exaggerate the good qualities of my new possession but 
also blinded me to its now obvious defects. I experience shame at my 
irrational behaviour and. at the self-indulgence it betrays. Resent- 
ment of my friend now turns to condemnation of myself. 
It may be objected that what is foreign is not necessarily threaten- 
ing but, on the contrary, may arouse our curiosity and move us to 
enquire further into its nature. Among animals especially the prim- 
ates and in very young children this is certainly true but in them 
and in older children and adults the foreign also tends to stimulate 
negative feelings. (24) Is this always so? To say that something in 
another is foreign to us is to say that we have no ready-made categ- 
ory or concept or procedure for coping with it. If we have, then by 
definition it cannot be foreign. The question now becomes: are we 
always discomforted when we are made aware of our limitations? On 
inuitive_grounds I would say, yes;, but. I cannot by logical argument 
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defend my intuition without formulating a theory of human nature 
which I am unwilling to do. Research evidence from studies of con- 
formity, intolerance of ambiguity; decision-making under risky con- 
ditions suggest that perceived difference from others is discomfort- 
ing (though there are considerable individual variations in suscept- 
ibility) and where no such negative feelings are experienced there 
is evidence of distortion of perception -(presumably tö remove the 
offending percept). This is commonly found in studies of prejudice. 
9 
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It would be, sensible to bear in mind that perceived differences, 
whilst tending to be unwelcome, vary from the mildly off-putting to 
the extremely distressful. I find it difficult to imagine that the 
foreign, in other humans can actually-be welcomed, that a person 
would feel glad that he or she had no ready-made category or concept 
or coping procedure for dealing with the unknown element confronting 
him or her; even if the foreign' element were trivial I would expect 
no better than a mildly negative indifference. -Those who claim to be 
inspired by the foreign, to rise to the challenge of the unknown may 
well be speaking the truth but that does not imply that they have no 
negative response to it nevertheless. If they deny this then I sus- 
pect some self-deception. Rather than admit their negative feelings 
to themselves (if not to others) they-seem to me to be covering up 
their anxiety with a false bravado. In our'macho, individualistic 
society such-behaviour is more acceptable than displaying fear of 
the unknown; the latter is the more natural and understandable emo- 
tion in the circumstances. There isfone exception to this stric- 
ture: those who have never lost their child-like wonder at the world 
.z 
such as poets, artists, creative people generally., Whilst not all 
creative persons will be fearless in the face of the foreign, the 
fearless will not be found in any other group (except the foolish). 
Alternatively we may wonder whether what appears or is claimed to be 
foreign is really so after all. What may be foreign to me may not be 
so to you but from my perspective I am unable to understand how you 
cannot experience the foreignness that I do. 
The so-called curiosity drive and the evidence from'studies of sens- 
ory deprivation appear to contradict my argument. (25) To say that 
many animals (those with central nervous systems? ) need a minimum 
80 
degree of sensory stimulation in order to maintain a satisfactory 
level of psychological functioning is not to say that such stimulat- 
ion cannot be stressful. Too much is as distressing as too little. 
In any event there is always, in normal circumstances, a delicate 
balance between curiosity (the search for new stimulation) and tim- 
idity (the fear of the unknown or the unfamiliar). Close observation 
of animals, young children and adult humans repeatedly shows this 
tension at work. The outcomes in individual cases'dffer evidence of 
considerable variation among individuals*as to the way in which this 
tension is resolved. - 
In the empathic relation we learn the true nature of our fears and 
so the tension is dissipated either through discovering that our 
fears were groundless or through remedial action or the possibility 
of taking such action. Even, so the'genuinely foreign will remain. 
This we will perceive for what it is: the irreducible, frequently 
incomprehensible difference between the self and the other which 
marks our separate identities. They are not and need not be sources 
of fear or hate; rather they are'to be respected as an unalterable 
aspect-of life. -Its positive aspect is an affirmation of-the self's 
personhood as well as an acknowledgement of the other's. ' 
All that I have described in the last few paragraphs belongs to the 
second stage of empathy in which the self deliberately identifies 
with the other. In this conscious identification process the self 
tries to find a constructive outlet for those qualities he or she 
has in common with the other but at the same time to explore the 
nature and extent of their differences. The self perceives now that 
the two of them are linked by a common fate and realises and accepts 
that his or her incompleteness can be filled by union with the 
other. 
1.427 Joint action and a shared common goal or ideal 
This is best done through embarking on an action in which both pur- 
sue a shared common goal or ideal. In mutual empathy (the case we 
are considering) the other behaves towards the self in identical 
fashion with similar results. Each finds in the other the help need- 
ed to overcome their own deficiencies; each acts towards the other 
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cooperatively, willingly and non-manipulatively; each rediscovers 
and enhances not only the other's but also his or her own person- 
hoods. The result is a feeling of unity without-loss of separate- 
ness; a warmth and solidarity founded on respect and goodwill; a 
deep and abiding interpersonal harmony which is an active, positive 
relationship, constantly fuelled and supported by the empathic rela- 
tion. The circularity of the empathic relation is one of its most 
potent features. Strengthened personal identities enhance goodwill 
and respect which activate the deliberate phase of the relation. The 
profounder awareness of the nature of their differences not only 
facilitates their interpersonal relationship but it enhances the 
71 
spirit of openness which is the necessary precursor of the empathic 
relation. 
I have already referred to. the interdependent character. of human ex- 
istence. We necessarily depend on others because we are fallible and 
our own abilities and competencies are limited. -No one'is entirely 
self-sufficient. Of course, each of its is responsible for our own, 
actions. Each of us must summon up the effort to act; each of us' 
must make our own choices when decisions are called for and accept 
responsibility for them and for the ensuing action. 1t islin: this, 
context that I can understand the notion of freedom. It can mean the 
absence of coercion but I interpret freedom in the domain of human 
action as meaning being allowed to decide for oneself what one shall 
do. Choice is only possible if one is free to choose. If others in- 
tervene, make decisions for us, or curtail the range of decisions 
which we may make then we are not free or our freedom is restricted. 
Similarly if we are shackled by self-limiting desires, motives, at- 
titudes, habits; if we are hemmed in by conformism, ideology and 
other prescriptive coping mechanisms we are unable to choose for 
ourselves. Our own self-limiting dispositions, parents, peers, 
teachers, political leaders have us, as it were, in their grip. We 
therefore cannot justly be held responsible for our actions or at 
least for those which are not entirely of our own choosing. Yet we 
are held accountable for all our actions regardless of the degree of 
freedom available to us. 
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Personal limitations, loss of freedom and accountability for our 
actions constitute an amalgam which threatens our individual person- 
alities. In empathy we may overcome our deficiencies with the help 
of others with whom we can also share our strengths. We can together 
and separately accept resposibility for our joint action and achieve 
together what we set out to do. However this mutual dependency is 
non-manipulative, non-exploitative; the spirit of openness, respect 
and goodwill informs the enterprise twice over: in the joint action 
and in the quest forý'a shared common ideal or goal. Both of us 
choose the goal; both of us embark on the action. Because of the 
nature of the relationship between its, developed and centred in emp- 
athy, the unique individual identity of each of us is clarified and 
enhanced. We confirm our separateness but also our unity. In our 
mutual dependency we have found a genuine independence; in our sur- 
render of individualism we have discovered our unique'beingness (and 
that of the other); in the recognition and acceptance of our limit- 
ations we have found our strengths. Far from each using the other it 
is'through each other that both are discovering not only what they 
are but what they might become. 
In every interpersonal relation there is always one area-of potent- 
ially mutual. dependence: the uncertainty, surrounding the. basis and 
nature of the members' interrelationship. A child may experience a 
difficulty in adjusting to certain social demands which its parents 
think are desirable for the good of all., -To the. extent that . the 
child appears unwilling or unable to accept, let alone understand, 
the sanctions it feels are imposed upon it the parents are clearly 
experiencing. a difficulty along, with the child. Both the parents and 
the child are consciousiof their limitations, different in each 
case, of course,, but alike in being apparently beyond their separate 
powers to resolve.. The difficulties students experience in trying to 
cope with their. learning problems are matched by those of their 
teachers in trying to discover effective strategies for facilitating 
learning, So-in every helping relation both members experience inad- 
equacies which are made public to both in the interpersonal relation 
itself. We do not have to penetrate the grey world of alcoholism and 
drug addiction, of, sexual or, social inadequacy, for examples of pot- 
83 
ential mutual dependency which offer the prospect of fruitful, non- 
manipulative, self- and other-enhancing joint action in pursuit of a 
common goal or ideal. The common goal is solving the problem facing, 
each of the members; the joint action is exploration of possible 
solutions and. essential commitment to one of them. Expert knowledge 
may and often will have its place but more important are goodwill, 
mutual respect (at least) and open exploration on an equal footing 
of whatever concerns the members. The way of empathy is through free 
discussion among equals, through experiencing the givenness of each 
other in identification, in non-manipulative exploration, in public 
declarations without fear of ridicule or loss of self-respect; on 
the contrary, the way of empathy is through love and the psycholog- 
ical safety of love. The ideal parent-child relation is precisely of 
this kind and is the model for every mutually empathic relation 
throughout life. 
The whale'process is'graphically shown in Diagram 1. 
The empathiser (Person S) from a stance of Openness and a Non-manip- 
ulative attitude towards the other (Person 0) generates the Goodwill 
necessary to approach the other. The resulting Contact with the 
other in the presence of-opennness makes more likely`the empath-- 
iser's spontaneous experience of the Other's givenness in passive 
consciousness and in any event produces the parallel experience of 
Resistance which gives the self the first intimations of the other's 
Foreignness. The experienced givenness of the other, facilitated by 
the self's spirit of openness, provides the empathiser with a fresh 
view of (Respect towards) the other. The Perceived similarities per- 
mit the relationship to develop to the extent that the empathiser 
deliberately identifies with the other. In Identification with the 
other differences are explored and understood and lead to Personal' 
Knowing. The Identification process prompts the empathiser and, the 
other to embark on an Action together. The combined action and dev- 
eloping understanding create or enhance'the personhood of each part- 
icipant (represented here by the boxes labelled Person S and Person 
0). That is, in action and in self- and other-knowledge and under- 
standing each clarifies own and other's personal identity and be- 
comes aware of his or her ownýunique beingness, i. e. separateness, 
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while at the same time perceiving and enjoying a sense of unity. 
This creates Interpersonal harmony which confirms their mutual good- 
will and respect. Thus is the whole process sustained and re-iter- 
ated. 
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1.428 Givenness in active and passive consciousness 
Empathy is a three-stage process in which the first stage centres on 
the spontaneous experience of the other's givenness in passive cons- 
ciousness (precipitated by the empathiser's stance of openness and 
non-manipulative approach towards the other, the twin pillars of 
goodwill). The second stage focusses on deliberate identification 
in which differences are explored and resolved or at any rate fear- - 
lessly recognised and accepted. The final stage sees the particip- 
ants engaged in joint action in pursuit of a common goal or ideal. 
It must not be thought that the empathic relation proceeds in this 
linear and orderly fashion. In practice stage 1 may be repeated end- 
lessly as each member of the relation experiences the other afresh 
from some new perspective. There may be many to-ings and fro-ings, 
many false steps as well as secure ones, mishaps along with success- 
es. The three-stage process is rather a broad picture of what hap- 
pens over a period of time but at any particular momenti. the spon- 
taneous experience of the other's givenness may as often as.. not form 
the central feature of a participant's life-späce.. 
It is the first element of the empathic relation (or something'like 
it) that, in most accounts of empathy, receives the lion's share of 
attention. Even if, moment by moment, one person experiences anoth- 
er's givenness this (almost) continuous revelation could not provide 
the knowledge and understanding of the other because the conscious, 
i. e. deliberate, exploration of the contents of this accumulating 
givenness would not have been carried out. The experience of the 
other's givenness is but one point of departure for continued effort 
to form an empathic relation with the other. Without this conscious 
stage no sense of unity in separateness is possible. 
In active consciousness every experience is an event compounded of 
automatic, routine, habitual elements and contrived, intended feat- 
ures which produce not only unexpected outcomes (even skilled per- 
formers detect minor deviations from their intentions as they occur) 
but also create the "surprise" of successful achievement or rather a 
series of surprises. The habitual aspect of action is below cons- 
cious awareness but the deviations and the felt successes are events 
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in passive consciousness and form the content of the experience of 
givenness. It is as though in active consciousness one is aware of 
the general direction of one's action (perhaps by some kind of mat- 
ching of intention with actual achievement); one grasps the whole 
picture-without-attending to any particular part of-the whole. As 
action is always stretched out in time and space consciousness of 
detail-moment by moment resides in the spontaneous experience of 
givenness-in passive consciousness. To use a somewhat dangerous an- 
alogy let a cine. film correspond to the whole project run off in 
active consciousness..,. The. story can only be grasped frame by frame 
as it unfolds and therefore the spectator must experience the frames 
in-succession noting their. peculiarities as they, occur and recreat- 
ing. the whole as it happens. It may be objected that this is not how 
we experience life as we live it. The dominant characteristic of our 
day-to-day coping is a sense of more or less alert attentiveness to 
the world interspersed with more or less critical evaluation of the 
state of play. which may from time to time become deliberate intel- 
lectual activity: thinking, "problem-solving, imagining. We have, as 
Scheler is fond of reminding us, lost touch with our gift for intui- 
tive awareness of ourselves, moment by moment, or every now and 
again, as we act on and in the real world. Empathy is the relation 
(or at least quasi-empathy in the case of the non-human) in which 
personal knowing, the knowing and understanding of others as per- 
sons, takes place in an alternation between experiences given in 
passive consciousness and the mainstream or trend of living activ- 
ity in the real world (i. e. action) in active consciousness. 
These comments apply to both second and third stages; only the con- 
tent varies. It also follows that deliberate identification can alt- 
ernate, with joint action since the latter can reveal further differ- 
ences-formerly hidden from view which may become sources of-fear or 
anxiety and which therefore need to be explored.. 
The simple linear model of the empathic relation implied in the pre- 
ceding pages and in those which follow does not accurately reflect 
its dynamic and oscillating nature as we experience it (insofar as 
we do) in everyday life. 
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1.43 Initially one-sided empathy with a hostile other 
This is a more difficult case because although self (S) is well- 
disposed towards the other (0), 0 is hostile to S. Hostility may 
take many forms: resentment, fear, anxiety, hate. Nevertheless S's 
attitude of openness to 0's existential nature, his or her exper- 
ience of 0's givenness in passive consciousness and S's non-manipul- 
ative approach create the goodwill and respect towards 0 and thus 
lay the essential foundations upon which the empathic relation can 
grow. The difficulty is that 0's hostility works not only against 
the empathiser and his or her efforts to reach out and get to know 
and understand 0 but against 0 also. In this circumstance S can only 
persist in maintaining an attitude of openness and displaying good- 
will and respect towards 0. It is necessary to maintain the non- 
manipulative, non-judgemental approach because, one might surmise, 0 
is more accustomed to being manipulated, or preached at, or ridicul- 
ed, or in various ways rejected. Any attempt at intervening, even by 
making suggestions, would probably be counter-productive. 0 must 
make the first move of his or her own free will. 
In time S's persistence may lead 0 to regard the empathiser as some- 
one to trust. From 0's point of view the empathiser is offering 
something which 0 may never or seldom have experienced since child- 
hood if then: respect, which, as Fromm has suggested, is one of the 
essential elements of love. 0 is thus the beneficiary of the next 
best thing to unconditional maternal love. If, and only if, 0 does 
trust S can the latter try to engage 0 in some kind of shared act- 
ion. The resistance will very likely be fraught with negative feel- 
ings because of 0's defensiveness but the empathiser deals with 
this in the same way as in the ideal empathic relation discussed' 
in the previous section: by undiminished respect and goodwill to- 
wards 0 and a persistent adherence to the non-manipulative, non- 
judgemental approach. 
Be 
However, once again the initiative must come from 0 to join the 
empathiser in joint action and this is most likely to occur if 0 
feels that S can help redress some personal inadequacy. -0 must 
therefore 
(a) know his or her own inadequacies fairly well; 
(b), -perceive that S can offer help, to overcome them; 
,,, 
(cý be. willing to move towards S in a spirit of goodwill. 
By the nature of 0's difficulties none of this may seem likely yet 
if the two individuals can explore these'difficultes in a non- 
threatening, non-judgemental, person-enhacing way progress may be 
made. This is the tricky part of the relation for S's intervention 
may be the only way out of the impasse; but-intervention, especial- 
ly. if uninvited, borders on, the manipulative which has no place in 
the empathic relation. One solution is_; for S to offer, in his or her 
own life an example which will inspire 0 to adopt. Of course, S can 
only be what is in his or her nature to be; if, by living according 
to that nature, S offers O, a model all. well and good. But example 
can sometimes be off-putting. To the alcoholic sobriety in another 
often appears unattainable, however much the addict longs for it. 
Another alternative is to discuss 0's own aims, desires and needs 
and 0's methods for achieving them. If S does this in the spirit of 
openness, goodwill and respect 0 may experience S as a trustworthy 
and supportive person and may eventually respond in like fashion. 
The turning point is 0's discovery of the effort (the goodwill) to 
move towards S in the same spirit as S acts towards 0. Thus slowly, 
cautiously both will come to know their own inadequacies; non-manip- 
ulatively they explore their similarities and'differences more 
truly, with a less guilt-laden and less defensive attitude. 
Deliberate identification as the process in which one or both mem- 
bers of the (possibly growing) empathic relation find common grounds 
for. establishing unity with one another (without loss to their sep- 
arate identities) rests principally on the recognition by one or 
both of. them of what they share in common. This in turn depends on 
the quality of each participant's experience of, the other's given- 
ness. Since this experience is an event which cannot therefore be 
brought about deliberately I have suggested that an important pre- 
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disposing factor is the attitude of non-manipulative openness ad- 
opted by each member towards the other. At each step along the 
chain of dependencies there are opportunities for various patholog- 
ies to intrude and affect the outcome. I have stressed that human 
fallibility ensures that even in mutual empathy misunderstandings, 
personal limitations, temporary unhelpful emotional states and the 
like may interfere with the development and maintenance of the emp- 
athic relation. Given that goodwill is available in abundance to 
both participants these mishaps are reduced to a minimum and those 
that do surface are usually resolved without much difficulty or ill 
effect. 
In the case we are now considering (and in the one to follow) the 
scope for false identifications due to the pathologies just mention- 
ed is greatly increased. One member may misconstrue a trait in the 
other. For example, defective persons tend to perceive defects in 
others similar to their own even though the other is free of these 
particular self-limiting characteristics. For these and other rea- 
sons it may not be possible to move directly to the deliberate iden- 
tification stage; the transition may be too sharp and daunting. In a 
preliminary attempt to experience the empathiser 0 may simply spon- 
taneously copy S in some particular which seems important to O. (26) 
Or 0 may examine S in more depth consciously choosing parts of S's 
repertoire to emulate. The first kind of imitation is a rather path- 
etic mimicking, a relic of childhood, of social conditioning. It is 
obviously unsuccessful for it does not liberate 0 from his or her 
difficulty, merely disguising it with a surface gloss. Common examp- 
les of this type of imitation are the adoption of the model's speech 
habits or gestures or typical social acts such as methods of greet- 
ing others. Conscious imitation is rather better in that 0's explor- 
ation of S as an exemplar is, in effect, a first attempt at self- 
examination. In the warmth of S's support this experience, though 
often disturbing, can prove rewarding for both members. It also dem- 
onstrates to both of them the first overt sign of 0's goodwill. Now 
0 may deliberately identify with S (as S has already identified with 
0) and the empathic relation can proceed as in the case of mutual 
empathy. 
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Diagram 2: The evolution of empathy in a hostile other. This 
diagram is to be read from the perspective of the 
other who comes eventually to trust the empathiser 
and move towards him or her possibly through imitat- 
ion but ultimately through deliberate identification. 










In this initially one-sided case the empathic relation may take a 
long time to develop and it may suffer'many setbacks because of 0's 
attitudes and difficulties and possibly S's own problems in coping 
with them despite his or her openness, goodwill and respect towards 
0. The claim I make, however, is that if S maintains his or her side 
of the empathic relation there is a good chance that 0 will recipro- 
cate. There is little hope for 0, especially if his or her problems 
are serious, in any other'kind of relation. If the empathic relation 
cannot help 0 nothing can. 
Diagram 2 gives some idea of. how this relation works. 
As a result of the empathiser's openness and non-manipulative app- 
roach and consequent goodwill towards him or her the other learns to 
Trust the empathising self. This, Stimulates the other to, make the 
effort to move towards the empathiser who will in any event have 
precipitated the other', s experience of, Resistance, in which the 
Self's foreignness is grasped arousing negative, feelings in the 
other. The other may try to be like the empathiser perhaps first 
imitating some aspect of his or her behaviour. Imitation is always 
unsatisfactory so the other may-now be. encouraged to make .a 
deliber- 
ate Identification with the self. This eventually leads to joint 
action and to the other's greater-knowledge and understanding (Per- 
sonal knowing) of their similarities and differences. The outcomes 
are the other's emergent personhood and a movement by him or her 
towards'an open, non-manipulative approach towards the empathiser. 
The result is the other's blossoming goodwill. Once-this happens the 
cycle described in the previous section (mutual empathy) can begin. 
In practice progress through the stages represented in this diagram 
are likely to be far less tidy and systematic. With a patient empath- 
iser to initiate the other's development the latter may eventually 
attain a kind of personhood sufficient for starting the cycle lead- 
ing to mutual empathy and personal growth as shown in Diagram 1. 
1.44 Empathy between a neutral and a hostile. 
Earlier I said that persons cannot be neutral since it is character- 
istic of persons to be well-disposed to others even to those who are 
hostile as in the preceding example. 'Nevertheless humans are falli- 
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ble; we all have our off-days and most of us confess to shortcomings 
of one sort or another. However well-disposed we may be towards 
others either by nature or through self-discipline we cannot hope 
automatically to love all who come within our orbit. Perhaps this 
reflects on the kind of society we live in. Where the being mode of 
existence is endemic, where members see themselves as persons living 
in community and therefore, as a matter of course, respecting others 
and living in self- and other-enhancing ways (even if this way of 
life should be confined to the community itself) then presumably the 
conditions for being other than well-disposed towards others cannot 
or do not arise. Human fallibility, however, is still a factor to 
reckon with in such a society. 'The Yequäma tribe(27) live as a com- 
munity of persons and seem naturally to enter into empathic relat- 
ions as part of their daily lives. Young and old, healthy-and ail- 
ing, those who work and those who do not, all are accorded equal re- 
spect; the beingness of each is honoured; intervention is taboo or 
rather, simply does not feature in their world view. Yet Jean Lied- 
loff reports the case of the young father who in'a moment of rare 
anger struck his son who was irritating him. All who witnessed this 
act were horrified but none more so than the hapless father who wept 
as loudly as his son at what he had done. I imagine that in our 
acquisitive society persons are even more prone to lapses of this 
sort. 
The case I am now considering is therefore not so much a genuine 
neutral individual as a person who for one reason or another finds 
that he or she is not moved to reach out to a specific hostile or 
repellent individual in, the characteristic well-disposed manner of 
persons. The obvious response to this discovery is for individuals 
to confront their own feelings directly and experience their given- 
ness. Since it is the other who occasions the unwonted stance this 
could be combined with the deliberate adoption of the attitude of 
openness so that the neutral person (who might even be somewhat 
negative in his or her feelings to the other at that moment) may 
experience the givenness of the other along with his or her own 
feelings. We must remember that the-experience of givenness is an 
event and therefore not under the control of the potential empathis- 
er so there is no guarantee that it will happen. Analysis is of no 
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avail for that belongs . 
to the ideal world and brings us into contact 
with second-hand data. It may have value after we have experienced 
the other's givenness and our own feelings in passive consciousness 
. and grasped their identity directly, here and now. Then perhaps an- 
alysis may be of use but certainly not as a first step. The outcome 
in that case would most likely be a rationalisation of our feelings 
rather than a clarification of them. First we must "see" them as 
they really are. 
So even here the spirit of openness, the experience of the other's 
givenness and"respect, and goodwill towards the other must be sum- 
moned up ' from'somewhere, off-day or not. It seems to me that it is' 
the cultivation of openness and the adoption of'a non-manipulative 
approach which are most likely both to'safeguard us from the eventu- 
ality we are exploring and for coping with- it when it occurs. As 
they are necessary precursors ofgoodwill they must count as the 
principal necessary conditions for developing an empathic relation 
followed by their two outcomes: respect and goodwill. All are embod- 
ied in the nature of-, persons. 
But what of the spontaneous generation of the empathic relation in a 
truly neutral individual? -Is that likely? What is the likely react- 
ion of such a neutral individual? One possibility is that he or she 
would react defensively, clearly not very conducive to the formation 
of an empathic relation. Another possible response is to agree with 
or join forces with the hostile other either for the sake of peace 
and quiet (a manipulative approach and possibly defensive as well) 
or because the "neutral" individual-genuinely feels that the other's 
hostility is just. In the latter event it might conceivably happen 
that the two enter into a discussion which clarifies to both'of them 
the real nature-of the other's hostility and thus prepares the way 
for a possible change in the other's attitude towards goodwill to 
the unexpected ally. If now either partner in the relation can call 
upon such fragments of personhood that have survived the self-limit- 
ing strategies learned as part of the socialisation process (or 
other mechanism) and so move towards the other member in a more pos- 
itive, non-manipulative way then an empathic relation might just 
struggle into tentative existence despite the inauspicious start. 
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Whether or not the hostile's grievances were justified the fact that 
the other member has lent a sympathetic ear has encouraged him or 
her to became better disposed to the sympathiser. (28) Nevertheless 
neither member has yet adopted a whole-hearted stance of openness or 
a non-manipulative attitude. The spontaneous generation of these 
twin pillars of empathy in the conditions I have imagined seems very 
unlikely but is possible. The likelihood seems to me to depend on 
the neutral person's access to self- and other-enhancing strategies 
and the seriousness with which the hostile is seeking personhood. As 
I have said no human being is perfect; therefore all of us are per- 
sons in poterrtia. To the extent that we strive towards near-person- 
hood we are at least offering a model. worth emulating. With effort 
we can all approach personhood as closely as lies within our powers 
but not without the help of one who has already attained some suc- 
cess.. Some do make the, effort and persist throughout their lives. 
Many, I suspect, do not sustain the effort or do so. only half-heart- 
edly.. Some do not-even-make the effort at all and seem content to 
live at the level of sophisticated animals at best. 
Personhood (individual personality, unique personal identity) is not 
something mystical, available only to a few but-is freely available 
to anyone who can bring to the task the essential predispositions. 
If we are locked into self-limiting coping strategies, attitudes, 
and beliefs our freedom to choose is severely curtailed, so severely 
that we. may. never break out of our self-imposed prison without out- 
side help. Therefore when I say that only persons can create persons 
I am saying that only those who have journeyed on this route towards 
self-discovery and self-awareness, who have profited from the exper- 
ience and recognised the value of being over having, of love over 
manipulation, of goodwill over ill-will, of unconditional acceptance 
of others over attribution of. labels whether justified or not, only, 
such people can initiate the empathic. relation in which these qual- 
ities and states can come into existence and prosper. Only someone 
at the positive ends of the enhancement-limitation and being-having 
dimensions can create (help to bring into being) another more or 
less whole person. 
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1.45 The necessary and sufficient conditions for the empathic relation 
I construe the empathic relation as the route to personal knowing. I 
further claim that only those who approach others in a spirit of 
non-manipulative, non-judgemental, non-exploitative openness can 
experience the givenness of others which makes possible the quest 
for personal knowing. Only persons, i. e. those who live towards the 
near-perfect end of the three dimensions outlined above, satisfy 
this requirement. Therefore, for two people to form an empathic 
relation 
(a) at least one of them must be a person as defined above, 
i. e. one who has a healthy self-image, who is well- 
disposed towards others, who fosters self-worth in 
others. (29) 
Because of human fallibility even persons may sometimes fail to in- 
itiate an empathic relation but if they do succeed it is because the 
event which, I hold, cannot be striven for actually does happen, 
i. e. 
(b) at least one of them will spontaneously experience the 
other's givenness in passive consciousness. 
Only in this way may one individual grasp the nature of another as 
he or she really is at that moment, directly, here and now, without 
dilution or distortion by previous knowledge, personal theories 
about the other's nature, existing classificatory systems and simil- 
ar second-hand cognitive material. Once an empathic relation is 
initiated two deliberate acts are necessary to sustain it. The first 
permits the free and psychologically safe exploration of the mem- 
bers' similarities but especially their differences. Hence 
(c) at least one of them will deliberately identify with 
the other. 
In the spontaneous givenness of the other the self experiences the 
similarities between them (which tends to draw them together or at 
least to find each other attractive in some way) and obtains a first 
intimation of the differences which separate them. The foreign elem- 
ent in the other will tend to discomfort the perceiver. In deliber- 
ate identification these differences are explored non-manipulative- 
ly, non-judgementally; thus the nature of foreign elements is either 
clarified or accepted as an irreducible, unknowable fact of life but 
not on that account to be feared. Sometimes deliberate identificat- 
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ion is preceded by imitation in which the imitator first makes an 
effort to act like the other. This superficial behaviour fails to 
promote the personal identity sought; therefore the individual moves 
an to identification. The movement throughout is towards developing 
goodwill and respect towards the other and a knowledge and under- 
standing of their individual selves. 
The second deliberate act is for both members to discover a higher 
purpose which commits the two of them to a joint action. Each will 
find in the common task his or her unique fulfilment, discover 
interpersonal harmony and extend his or her feelings of mutual 
respect, eventually love, for the other. It is therefore necessary 
that 
(d) the participants discover a shared common goal or ideal 
in pursuit of which they engage in joint action. 
The discovery of a shared common ideal or goal centres on their 
(now) better understood deficiencies and strengths. In joining in 
action to pursue this ideal or goal the members not only further 
clarify and grasp their individual identities; they also enhance 
both their own and the other's personhoods. In this way they finally 
grasp their unique selves (their separate identities) whilst at the 
same time enjoying a sense of unity. They are simultaneously one and 
separate. This creation and enhancement of personhood reinforces the 
goodwill and respect they show towards each other (and so perpetu- 
ates the empathic relation) and establishes interpersonal harmony. 
1.5 SOME QUESTIONABLE CASES OF EMPATHY 
It is clearly possible for anyone to adopt and cultivate the spirit 
of openness towards anything whatsoever. All material things, both 
living and non-living, have an existential nature, a beingness which 
is as much open to our sensitive awareness as are our fellow human 
beings. If we are less concerned about the non-human even to the 
point of indifference or contempt the fault lies with ourselves and 
our world view. Cultures vary in the way in which their members 
order their phenomenal world in terms of value. Value systems change 
as a result of necessity, or the influence of alternative world 
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views, or the subtle changes in attitudes which can occur spontan- 
eously among a group of people. Within the great variety of cultural 
differences the two modes of existence, having and being, may be 
construed as the principal discriminators among the many cultures we 
know about. Addiction to material possessions, worship of conspic- 
uous excellence or glory, pride in successful achievement in the 
pursuit of either, are the hallmarks of a society or social group 
which favours the having mode of existence. In such a society or 
group anything, be it object or person, which is useful to these 
ends is accorded high value (with a value more or less proportional 
to its usefulness but only so long as it continues to be useful). 
That which does not serve these ends is accorded low or no value. 
The smaller or the more rigid the social group, the more of its mem- 
bers will share the resulting world view. It is possible to find 
societies which value aggressiveness or acquisitiveness or selfish- 
ness as the desired way of life. In more open societies a wider var- 
iety of value systems is met though the dominant having mode of ex- 
istence prevails. 
The end result of a preference for the having mode and the institu- 
tionalised ways in which it is handed on from one generation to an- 
other is that the attitude of openness is directed only to those 
aspects of the phenomenal world which will help perpetuate the cur- 
rent world view. This leads to the degradation of education (knowl- 
edge becomes a commodity, useful for getting on and hence ensuring 
that some knowledge is more useful than others). It may lead to con- 
frontation between different social groups (e. g. bosses and workers, 
"haves" and "have-nots"), and to many of the other ills which af- 
flict industrialised societies. It also means that members of such 
societies develop blind spots. There are parts of the phenomenal 
world which they simply do not register. It may be women, animals, 
the physical environment, the produce-consume cycle to name but a 
few. Little wonder that women's rights, children's rights, animal 
rights, ecology parties and the like are gaining ground though still 
the concerns of minorities; their stridency more than offsets their 
small following. 
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1.51 Empathy with non-humans 
Nourishing an attitude of openness towards any phenomenal object in 
our society is therefore not easy but it can be done and is done. 
Artists and creative people in any field (i. e. people who spend much 
of their time in creative activities) do so in varying degrees; un- 
less they did, their activities would not be creative since the es- 
sence of creativity is a readiness and skill to transcend the known, 
the familiar, to make new connections, to re-interpret accepted wis- 
dom. For the same reasons the experience of the givenness of the 
phenomenal world in passive consciousness is possible without limit- 
ation as to the nature of the object (except that imposed by the 
character of our perceptual apparatus). And just as with humans, so 
with non-humans, their givenness cannot be willed; it is an event 
which happens spontaneously no matter what the object is. Only by 
cultivating the spirit of openness and nurturing it by self-discipl- 
ine and approaching the world non-manipulatively are we able to inc- 
rease the likelihood of the spontaneous experience of givenness be- 
falling us. 
Clearly we can respect the phenomenal object in the sense of seeing 
it again afresh. And we can certainly be well-disposed towards it. 
Both follow from the goodwill generated by the stance of openness 
and the non-manipulative approach. What may be difficult, at least 
conceptually, is to grasp similarities and differences between our- 
selves and the object whose givenness we have experienced; it is the 
resistance encountered with the object which first acquaints us of 
our limitations by establishing the boundaries of the self and the 
other-than-self. In the human case we also discover something about 
our separate identities and first meet the foreign in the other. 
This can surely apply to all objects. Performers in the arts seem to 
go through some such process. Actors feel themselves into their 
parts; they live the characters they portray sometimes with devast- 
ating effects on their private lives. Painters "feel" the texture of 
their subject, enter into its form and structure; dancers transform 
themselves into princes, demons, beasts or mushrooms. To do any of 
these things calls for a perception of similarities and differences 
100 
(though it calls also for an imaginative translation which cuts 
through the normalcy of everyday life and which may be beyond the 
skill and possibly willingness of ordinary folk). But if artists can 
do it so can the rest of us with effort, at least to some degree. 
Arguing along the same lines we can now easily imagine the deliber- 
ate identification with non-human objects. Though they doubtless 
would not use this language the relation between a craftsman or 
craftswoman and his or her handiwork is of this kind. What some 
would call the instinctive feel for what is right for a given mater- 
ial to produce a given result with just the appropriate effort cor- 
responds to the deliberate identification of empathy. Thinkers often 
speak of getting inside the phenomenon they are investigating, imag- 
ining what it is like to be the object, to carry out the operation 
they are struggling to perfect or create. This strategy is nowadays 
offered as a, technique for prompting creative thinking. 
There are great differences between the empathic relation discussed 
in the preceding sections and what I am describing here. In trying 
to know and understand non-human entities we cannot say that we are 
trying to know and understand them as persons. Personal knowing has 
no place outside the human domain. Similarly in no sense can we say 
that one of the outcomes of this "empathic" relation is to establish 
the non-human object's personhood. Persons and personhobds are uni- 
quely human phenomena. However we can justly claim an analogous rel- 
ation with non-human objects by talking not of personhood or person- 
al identity but of beingness. By beingness I mean that existential 
nature through which a thing is what it is and no other. It is the 
essence of that thing. In humans we call it the person; we construe 
the person as the essence of the biological machine, the organism, 
the psychophysical individual. That which we approach in aspirit of 
openness, the givenness of which we experience in passive conscious- 
ness, which we respect and towards which we show our goodwill, with 
which we deliberately identify, in short which we try to know and 
understand as itself and no other thing, is in fact the essential 
nature or character of that thing. With humans it happens to be the 
person made manifest-in his or her personhood. So with things it is 
their "thinghood". 
101 
It is, of course, much easier to use such language to speak of our 
experience with say chimpanzees and doubtless cat and dog lovers 
would say the same of their pets. Indeed the danger of falling into 
anthropomorphism is very great and is to be found even in scientific 
accounts such as those of Jane Goodall and the Gardners. (30) Never- 
theless I believe the analogy I am using is permissible and valid; 
if people object I would still claim that it is right to speak of a 
quasi-empathic relation with non-human objects which in its essen- 
tials is identical with the empathic relation with humans described 
in the preceding pages. 
Two other differences are worth noting. The first is that in most 
cases the relation is one-sided. However, in the case of animals 
especially those most like ourselves, this is not always easy to 
assert. Conditioning cannot account for all the subtle responsive- 
ness some animals show towards their human partners. They often 
spontaneously express joy or affection towards humans (or what we 
take to be as such) which do not appear to be contingent on reward 
or reinforcement of any kind. Jane Goodall writes of the way her 
chimpanzees in the wild eventually greeted her as one of the troop 
using their own natural gesture, the touching of hands. Nevertheless 
in the majority of non-human cases the relation is one-sided. As I 
have said elsewhere the empathic relation exists so long as one mem- 
ber is striving non-manipulatively to know and understand an other- 
than-self as a person. Therefore we need only make the modification 
just suggested concerning the essential nature of the non-human obj- 
ect and we may speak of at least a one-sided quasi-empathic relation 
with it. 
The second difference is that interpersonal harmony is not an out- 
come of the quasi-empathic relation with non-humans. David Atten- 
borough reports spending contented moments with his gorillas, albeit 
briefly, and they with him as did Jane Goodall with her chimpanzees 
and they with her. Nevertheless we need to speak in analogous terms 
in these cases; animals are not persons. In general, therefore, 
interpersonal harmony cannot be an outcome of the quasi-empathic re- 
lation with non-human objects. The nearest conceptual equivalent 
which comes to mind is Schweitzer's "reverence for life". 
102 
Despite these differences it seems clear to me that the human empa- 
thiser in the quasi-empathic relation experiences an enhancement of 
his or her personhood and experiences a sense of harmony with the 
world which is nonetheless real even though he or she cannot share 
these experiences with the other (in most cases). Moreover the af- 
firmation and enhancement of his or her personhood (in the same way 
as in the human cases) enhances both the spirit of openness and the 
goodwill-the empathising person brings to the task of knowing and 
understanding-the non-human object; and the greater knowledge and 
understanding thus gained enhances his or her respect for the obj- 
ect. 
I therefore feel that the empathic relation between persons and the 
quasi-empathic relation between a person and a non-human object are 
identical in the processes that really matter. Empathy (and quasi- 
empathy) is a relation in which a human being strives non-manipulat- 
ively to know and understand the essential nature of anything 
through personal contact. 
1.52 Empathy with one's self 
Can we empathise with ourselves? A person can certainly look back at 
a former self and forward to a future self. We can accept without 
argument the existence of a here and now self, the one looking back- 
wards and forwards. The past and future selves are not real selves; 
they are images: memories of the past, phantasies of the future. 
However the past self was real once and we can vividly imagine this 
real self though perhaps not as convincingly as areal other; a 
friend, say. The one difference between our two imagined selves and 
another person is that there is a continuous existential thread 
linking all our three selves (past, present and future). Such a link 
is missing in our relation with another person. 
The continuity can be deceptive. We do not necessarily recall per- 
fectly; we tend to distort especially the less reputable or the most 
flattering incidents in our past. Nonetheless we do from time to 
time mentally relive our grief over an unhappy incident or recall 
our joy over a happy one. But can we empathise with this past per- 
son? Can we strive to know and understand him or her as a person? We 
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can but only in the form of images. In what sense can we bring a 
spirit of openness to images? How can we experience their givenness 
in passive consciousness? The truth is that we cannot for an image 
is insubstantial and in a sense has nothing to give. It does not 
have an existential nature like real world objects. Images slip and 
slide about and however hard we try (and perhaps because of it) we 
cannot really get to grips with them. There appear to be exceptions. 
Eidetic images (a category which is disputed by some psychologists) 
are held so vividly in mind that those gifted in this way can repro- 
duce them faithfully on paper. Artists are able to draw freely from 
memory so presumably they too must have some fairly stable and 
robust images to call upon. For most of us, however, imagery is 
fluid, indistinct and ephemeral. The odd thing is that we think we 
can recall a person or object or place to mind at will and do so ac- 
curately; we feel that we have got it right. The truth is soon re- 
vealed when we try to "look" at this image and describe it to some- 
one else. Even if we succeed are we describing the image or are we 
recalling stored conceptual knowledge which owes little or nothing 
to the image at all? We have similar experiences with auditory 
images. We may "hear" an orchestral work in our mind's ear or think 
we can, yet all attempts to hum it may prove in vain. Once again if 
we do succeed is it because we know the work or is it because we 
really are able to reproduce the internally "heard" sounds? 
It might be argued that we can empathise with our past self by pro- 
jecting ourselves into it, by standing in the shoes of the person 
we once were and grasping the source of our sadness or joy as we ex- 
perienced it then. Quite apart from the fact that seeing things from 
another's perspective is a mistaken view of empathy the idea, of pro- 
jection is, in any case, inappropriate for we can only project into 
the past either the person we now are which would not allow us to 
grasp the person we were then, or we imagine the person we were and 
project that in which case we are chasing one image with another. 
Similar arguments apply to future selves only with more force. The 
future is. a kind of imagined past, lived in an actual present. We 
see ourselves in situations as though they had already happened but 
we enact them now in our minds. The person we imagine is an inven- 
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tion,.. though of ourselves.. To empathise with such a person would be 
to try to grasp a ghost, though a creature of our-own making. It is 
twice removed from reality, once as a non-existent being and... the. 
second time as an image of this fictional character. -, 
How then are we to account for the very real experiences we go 
through when recalling our former selves or anticipating (or-inven- 
ting) our future selves? Is not my pity or my joy or my hope direct- 
ed-not at myself-as I once was (or might be) but at another? I am at 
once myself in recollection or imagination and yet not myself. My 
memory tells'me that the'child who is heart-broken over a damaged 
toy is myself yet the feelings I now experience are not about myself 
but another, perhaps about young distressed children in general of 
whom I, in memory, am an instance, a type case. I emotionally ident- 
ify with this'other; I not only grasp his feelings in recollection 
but I myself am temporarily filled with them. This is not at all the 
same thing as empathy where the essence of the relation is the disc- 
overy of unity with another without loss-of awareness of our separ- 
ate identities. Indeed the result-of empathy is an enhancement of 
our separate identities and a burgeoning of goodwill and respect 
(and ultimately love) towards the other and an enhancement of our, 
attitude of openness to the other's beingness. In chapter 2I shall 
revisit this theme and discuss how empathy differs from other relat- 
ions between a self and an other-than-self. 
1.53 Empathy with entertainers 
Is an empathic relation possible between an entertainer and his or 
her audience? It is often claimed by actors and other entertainers 
that they can sense the mood and feelings of their audiences. Some 
students of empathy have similarly claimed that spectators can and 
do empathise with actors and other performers. Theodor Lipps first 
advanced the idea of Einfuhlung by which he meant the projection by 
the spectator of self into the showman's action such that the former 
experiences the latter's movements as though he or she (the spectat- 
or) were actually executing them. The spectator, so to speak, steps 
into and enjoys the performer's act and thus feels at one with the 
actor. This idea of projection seems to haunt studies of empathy. 
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Scheler railed against it as a valid explanation of the phenomenon 
of fellow-feeling and doubted (quite rightly in my view) 
the propr- 
iety of empathy as presented by Lipps. Unfortunately he threw out 
the baby with the bath water as Edith Stein showed in her more pro- 
found study of empathy which, though it impressed Scheler, did not 
lead him to modify his view substantially. 
Nevertheless there does seem to be a striving to know and understand 
the other as a person both by the spectator and by the performer ex- 
cept that in the latter's case the effort seems directed at a gener- 
alised other, or at least a collective identity representing the 
audience as a whole. (I examine the problem of the generalised other 
in the next section. ) Clearly the openness, respect, goodwill and 
deliberate identification are potentially available to both sides 
though the object of the performer's empathic relation with the aud- 
ience must be of a generalised type. On the other hand the notion of 
deliberate identification has to be stretched to the limit to ac- 
count for a possible empathic relation. How can a performer (or a 
spectator) explore and understand the differences between them and 
which mark off their separate identities? Despite the difficulties 
of accounting for this and other phenomena it does seem just poss- 
ible that performers and their audiences can strive for mutual emp- 
athy or something very like it. Whilst it is also possible that 
emotional identificaton offers a readier explanation, empathy cannot 
decisively be ruled out. 
In the case of some performances we might also ask whether an audi- 
ence (or the performers) can establish an empathic relation with the 
original creator, the playwright or composer, for instance. Is it 
important that they should be able to do so or indeed should do so? 
In these and similar situations the relation between the self and 
the other centres on an expressive object% a play, a musical work, a 
ballet, a painting or piece of sculpture, a novel or poem, through 
the medium of which the spectator (and the interpreter in those 
works which need an interpreter) can, as it were, get in touch with 
the creator's intentions and feelings. Insofar as expressive obj- 
ects, like any other object, can represent the other we can say that 
anyone may establish at least a quasi-empathic relation with them. 
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However it does not follow that empathy can or need be involved in 
trying'to know and understand-the creator of these-objects. Spectat- 
ors may not find this knowledge-and understanding essential in order 
to appreciate the work and I suspect such a painstaking study'would 
be beyond the capabilities of the majority. One can enjoy a musical 
work or a poem or a painting without any knowledge of, or even int- 
erest in, its author. But'suppose-the spectator's enjoyment would be 
greatly increased by knowing and'understanding the author would this 
best be done through a study of his or her work or through reading a 
biography? And would empathy be involved in either case? (I will 
assume that even if the creator is living, personal knowing would be 
impossible for most people, though even here there is the interest- 
ing question as to whether personally knowing the creator and even 
enjoying an empathic relation with him or her which, to make the 
most favourable case-we will suppose to be mutual, would lead to a 
deeper understanding of any particular work. ) In either case the 
spectator/reader would be constructing a fictional character. The 
work itself being an expression of its creator carries his or her 
unique imprint (insofar as the work is an original an honest product 
and not a pastiche or copy of someone else's)", in the same way as 
handwriting distinguishes one person from another. It'is from these 
signs (if they can be read correctly) that the spectator might build 
a picture of the work's creator as a person. However, he or she is 
but an image and I have already suggested that images are not app- 
roachable in the same way as real objects. In the ideal world in 
which images exist there is no foothold on which to secure a purch- 
ase. Yet because they are creations we can identify with them in 
some way. We can perceive and explore differences and' similarities 
between., oursel. ves. and the author whom we have imagined. But then we 
would be acting as we did when we identified with our former (or 
future) selves which we examined in the previous section. Since the 
author., is our creation, even though built from his or her unique 
"handwriting", we project ourselves into the image so it is simul- 
taneously ourselves and not ourselves. That is to say we know (or 
believe) that the image refers to another but in effect it is subst- 
antially ourselves. As in the case of the imagined self, empathy 
cannot play any part in, efforts to know and understand either by the 
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route just described or by reading a biography where the same tend- 
encies can be observed though in this case aided or obscured by the 
efforts of the biographer. Intellectual knowledge is undoubtedly 
valuable but it is not personal knowledge even when we have personal 
acquaintance with the other through his or her work. The relation- 
ship between personal knowing (rooted in the spontaneous, intuitive 
act of grasping the-givenness of persons in passive consciousness 
and, by analogy, of things in general) and intellectual knowledge 
deserves separate treatment. (31) 
1.54 Empathy and the generalised other 
In discussing the possibility of empathising with our own selves 
(past or future) I suggested that, at least in the case of a remem- 
bered former self, we might identify with the person we once were 
by a process of abstraction and generalisation so that in effect we 
would be identifying with a generalised other, say a child in dist- 
ress, who is typical of all such children. We imagine, so to speak, 
that our former self is a representative of. the class. We tacitly 
accept our personal recollections assound. indicators of genuine ex- 
perience of that particular kind of phenomenal object; we-assume 
that we correctly claim special insight as to its feelings and so 
forth. This way, of reasoning can be-applied to all persons we do not 
actually know personally but of whom we know as members of society. 
There are innumerable categories of individual: -the poor, the 
lazy, 
the clever, religious believers, socialists, teachers, train driv- 
ers, punk, bovver boys, and so on. We may have met instances of 
these classes; we will certainly have heard about them. The question 
is can we empathise with them? 
If we meet a representative of one of them then, of course, our att- 
itude of openness and our experience of their givenness will lay the 
foundations of empathy as described earlier. Perhaps our goodwill 
and respect may lead us deliberately to identify with them and to 
explore and understand the differences between us. In the nature of 
the relationship between ourselves and this type of other (e. g. its 
accidental or instrumental character; we chance upon them or we meet 
them when we need their services) the other is likely to be at best 
neutral towards us. In some cases he or she will be hostile. Never- 
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theless an empathic relation is possible and we can initiate it even 
if we are unsuccessful in inspiring the minimal trust and effort in 
the--other for the relation to develop. 
Does it make sense to suggest that we can generalise from such 
single instances to all members of the class and say that we empath- 
ise with, say, disaffected youth, or with mods or rockers, or with 
policemen, and so on? Once again we would be referring to images. A 
generalisation is by definition an image, a concept, an idea, per- 
haps constructed from personal experience but not necessarily so and 
frequently founded only on hearsay. The concept stands for the phen- 
omenal object and is thus not approachable in empathy which is and 
must be rooted in personal experience as it happens. As in the last 
section we encounter a form of intellectual knowledge (behavioural 
and social scientists depend on it for their theory-building, res- 
earch effort and explanations) which may be useful but may also 
stand in the. -way of genuine understanding in empathy with a particu- 
lar individual representing the class. This is one of the main less- 
ons to be learned from Krishnamurti though he uses a somewhat diff- 
erent language to express what I regard as an identical idea. Genu- 
ine knowledge of phenomena isývitiated or obscured by what we know 
conceptually or conjure up in the form of images. What is corrupted 
is the intuitive, spontaneous awareness of the other which can only 
happen in the existential relation between observer and observed. 
Hence there can be no empathic relation between ourselves and a 
class of individuals even when we have personal experience of a rep- 
resentative of the class. The best we can hope for is an insight 
into the particular case which might illumine our views about the 
general class and which might-prompt new thought about its members 
as a whole. And that might be no mean achievement. 'Nevertheless, it 
would be foolish to pretend or claim that we understood, say, the 
punk movement, or the feelings of the unemployed, on the slender ev- 
idence provided by personal experience of some of their members, 
however valid and valuable it may have been. 
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1.55 Empathy and historical others 
Exactly the same argument applies to this case as to the generalised 
other. Famous people either living or dead are necessarily images 
constructed by us as a result of reading or hearing about them. In 
those rare instances in which we have enjoyed personal knowing of 
one of them we may have entered into an empathic relation with them 
but we cannot do so vicariously. Empathy is a first-hand not a 
second-hand or lower order experience. Whenever we rehearse in our 
minds or reflect on what we learn indirectly about others the out- 
come must of necessity lead at best to intellectual, conceptual 
knowledge, though that is not to say that insight may not result. In 
that event the intuitive act would centre on ideas or images (which 
may, of course, be of great significance); it would not be about the 
persons that these historical figures undoubtedly were or are. 
Similarly we cannot claim empathy with departed relatives or friends 
whom we once knew and perhaps loved. We can recall our empathic rel- 
ations with them (if we experienced such relations) and we can con- 
jure up as images their faces, moods, ways and so forth subject as 
always to the vagaries of-memory and the despoliation of time. More 
than this we cannot claim. 
1.6 GRADES OF EMPATHY 
Edith Stein in her theory of empathy proposed three stages or 
grades: 
(1) the emergence of the experience; 
(2) the fulfilling explication; 
(3) the objectification of the explained tendencies. 
In stage 1a self is faced by a foreign mental life, say a happy 
person who perhaps has just received good news concerning a hoped- 
for promotion. The perceiving self in stage 2 follows the course of 
the experience, perhaps by exploring the other's expressions of hap- 
piness and discovering the meaning of the promotion for the other. 
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Finally in stage 3 the other's happiness faces the self but now 
clarified and understood in all its richness. 
Stein makes the point that "people do not always go through all 
grades but are often satisfied with one'of the lower ones". In my 
own account, also, empathy has three stages: 
(1) the experience of the other's givenness in passive consc- 
iousness; 
(2) deliberate identification with the other; 
(3) joint action with the other in pursuit of a shared-common ideal or goal. 
The first stage is only possible if the self approaches the other 
non-manipulatively and in a spirit of openness (the twin pillars of 
goodwill). The second stage is a function of the perceived similari- 
ties grasped in the first stage and leads to the exploration of dif- 
ferences and either their resolution or their acceptance as irreduc- 
ible markers of the participants' separateness. The final stage 
moves towards the positive acceptance of each by the other in act- 
ion; they act together in the same direction and for the same rea- 
sons (which does not preclude other personal reasons as well). I 
have tried to show that these three stages are necessary because em- 
pathy is here defined as a relation between participants who want to 
know and understand each other as persons (although only one member 
need be so motivated for the relation to be counted as empathic) and 
in the course of which both establish (or maintain) their own indiv- 
idual identities and enhance that of the other. 
I agree with Edith Stein that it is very likely that some people will 
not go through all stages. In my theory the first stage is an event 
which cannot be. willed but can be facilitated by cultivating the 
spirit of openness and the non-manipulative approach not only to- 
wards other human beings but to other living and even non-living 
things. Not everyone will even get this far but of those who do, not 
all will want to identify deliberately with the other. If stage 1 
depends on love (the unconditional acceptance of someone in and for 
him or herself), stage 2 involves commitment. There are degrees of 
love and similarly of commitment. To enter stage 3 love and commit- 
ment are necessary but not sufficient. We also need staying power, 
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determination, even moral courage sometimes. It is therefore not at 
all difficult to imagine that different grades of empathic exper- 
ience might be encountered. 
In my account I have tended to assume that all three stages of emp- 
athy are experienced in the various conditions I have explored. This 
is because I cannot see how anyone claiming to be striving to know 
and understand another as a person can justify the claim unless he 
or she has attempted all three stages. I admit that there are deg- 
rees of knowing and understanding but even so the level of personal 
knowing attainable in less than the full cycle of empathy seems to 
me'unlikely to excite the hearts and imaginations of any but the 
most easily satisfied and the least concerned about their fellow 
humans. 
On the other hand since part of empathy is innate (again agreeing 
with Scheler) and part learned one must accept the fact that in any 
particular population the range of competence in entering into empa- 
thic relations (as in any other human activity) is likely to range 
over the full set of possibilities. In an industrialised society, as 
I have tried to show, the potential for growth of empathy is enor- 
mous but the chances of it happening are dismal. A start can be made 
by isolating the essential sub-skills and attitudes and discovering 
ways of promoting their development naturally and non-manipulative- 
ly. There are precedents; David Stewart's treatment of alcoholics 
and drug addicts described briefly in Preface 
, 
to Empathy and much 
more fully in Thirst for Freedom offer examples. Although Fromm did 
not concern himself with empathy he wrote of matters central to my 
theme and expressed his views forcefully and constructively. On the 
whole the research literature on empathy is disappointing and the 
social skills industry barely acknowledges the existence of persons 
let alone provides for their growth and development. 
To explore properly a possible curriculum for a "course" in how to 
establish empathic relations and that would build on our natural 
gifts is beyond the scope of this enquiry which only attempts to 
clarify the nature of_empathy. (32) The fact that there are grades of 
empathy and that I have focussed my attention on all three stages as 
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though their performance were the norm serves to highlight the im- 
portance of devising programmes aimed at helping people to develop 
empathic relations. 
1.7 SUMMARY 
I have examined the six characteristics which seem to distinguish 
the empathic relation from others. I have explored various forms 
which the empathic relation'may take and have suggested the suffici- 
ent and necessary conditions for its initiation and continued nurt- 
urance. I have discussed some popular misconceptions of empathy and 
a number of instances to which the notion of empathy is, in my view, 
mistakenly applied. In a number of asides, mostly in notes at the 
end of this chapter, I have pointed to conceptual and other difficu- 
lties which would have to be attended to if one were to go beyond 
this enquiry in order to-lay the foundations of a new psychology of 
personal being. I have deliberately avoided referring to the empathy 
literature so that my account may stand out the more starkly and, I 
hope, the more clearly. I make no apologies for its skeletal charac- 
ter since I believe a sharply drawn image is not only easier to per- 
ceive; -it is also easier to evaluate constructively. My purpose in 
this chapter and the next is to create a plausible plan for a struc- 
ture rather than to erect a finished building. 
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Notes to Chapter 1 
In this dissertation "self" refers to "human being" (as does "per- 
son", "individual", "agent", and many others). "Self" indicates that 
discrete entity which experientially is felt to be separate from the 
rest of the world, the other-than-self or, more simply, the other. 
Human others are thus selves also. To this extent "self" and "per- 
son" are virtually interchangeable terms. On the other hand there 
are good reasons for-rejecting their equivalence. (See note 10 be- 
low) Nevertheless if the reader will regard "self" as one member. of. ' 
the self-other pair and accept that no other meaning'is implied than 
the distinction-suggested by this usage no misunderstanding should 
arise. ' 
2 For example, Macmurray 1956,1961; Scheler, 1954; Gauld and Shutter, 
1977. 
3 As I have already indicated in the prologue a larger undertaking, 
e. g. an exploration of the proper task of a social psychology of the 
person, would demand a more convincing and rigorous analysis of the 
concepts employed. - 
4 Harre and Secord, 1972; Blumer, 1969; Goffman, 1969a, 1969b, 1972; 
come readily to mind. The uncritical and ubiquitous adoption of role 
theoretical language by experts and lay people alike offers further 
evidence of the obfuscating influence of the dramaturgical perspect- 
ive. 
5 Section 2.1 and its subsequent subsections suggest how this might 
be done. 
6 Several theorists have applied themselves to resolving the confus- 
ion. For example, Shotter, 1975, examined the concepts of person, 
agency and action and later with Gauld (Gauld and Shotter, 1977) 
developed a systematic critique of positivist psychological science 
introducing a subtler distinction between self and person and impor- 
ting ideas from hermeneutics and phenomenology such as intention, 
intentionality (and intentionality) and subjectivity. Thines, 1977, 
summarised the work of those who seek an authentic scientific psych- 
ology founded on the twin pillars of biology and phenomenology. Pur- 
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pose, action, agency, subjectivity are linked to the life of organ- 
isms moving about in (and constituting) their lived world, their 
natural habitat. For some reason these workers are found in contin- 
ental Europe: Holland, Belgium, Germany and France. Sherrington, 
1952, however, is a major source of inspiration. Harre, 1983, not 
only explores more, thoroughly than any other student of personal be- 
ing the difference between person and self but he also erects an an- 
alytical framework for construing the psychological properties of 
persons which at the same time clarifies the social character of 
personal being. He calls upon a process described in the child dev- 
elopment literature as psychological symbiosis to explain the gen- 
esis of personhood. I call it empathy but whereas Harre's notion 
includes a "moral order" mine does not. Thines and Harre remind us 
that notions such as person and self may be culturally determined. 
(Note 10 below). Paul Ricouer has done for hermeneutics what Schutz 
did--for phenomenology. Whilst he clarifies the problems-of hermen- 
eutics (which'Gauld and Shotter do not appear to consider) he also 
demonstrates the mutual dependency between hermeneutics and phenom- 
enology. His importance for us is that like Thines he is concerned 
with the ontology and epistemology of understanding human express- 
iveness, Ricouer in the study of human discourse, Thines In the 
study of human action. -Harre seems to occupy a midway position since 
his focal point is a conversation which for him is any form of sym- 
biotic interaction. 
7 Throughout this dissertation but perhaps especially in Chapter 1I 
frequently express myself positively, i. e. I assert that such-and- 
such is the case. In part this is due to atendency to use Weber's 
notion of "ideal types" in order to sharpen distinctions between 
phenomena which, in the real world, tend to be less clearly manifes- 
ted. In part it is due to a preference for clear, unambiguous state- 
ments; they may the more readily be shown to be wanting. Proposit- 
ions which are canstanly hedged round by qualifiers soon lose their 
import. The smoke-screen of justifications, exceptions and other 
limiting devices often defeats the point of the proposition. I am 
aware of the dangers of this tactic but I believe I have avoided 
them. 
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8 See section 1.4. 
9 Inner and outer worlds of experience refer neither to subjective and 
objective data nor to inner and outer (physical) perception. The 
dichotomy refers to the meaning of the world as it presents itself 
to our senses. All of us, I suspect, are naive realists in our ordi- 
nary, everyday experience of the world. Things do happen and exist 
"out there" and we know they do because we perceive them so. On the 
other hand we are also daily reminded that our own perceptions may 
differ from the reports others give us of the same phenomena. Hence 
we become aware of our meanings of phenomena as distinct from mean- 
ings attributed to them by others. It is our meanings which make our 
world ours. This argument seems to me close to Harre''s notion of 
private/individual vs. public/collective categories of psychological 
attributes. (See Harre, 1983, Chapter 3) 
10 Harre attempts in Personal Being to trace the origins and the unique 
character of "person" and "self". The former is the centrepiece of 
the fact of personal identity; the latter is the theoretical concept- 
relating to the sense of personal identity. Thus "while "person". is 
an empirical concept which distinguishes beings in a public-collect- 
ive realm, "..: "self"... is a theoretical concept acquired in the 
course of social interactions. "(p. 26) The former is "the socially 
defined, publicly visible embodied being, endowed with all kinds of 
powers and capacities for public, meaningful action. "(p. 26) This is 
in sharp contrast to the self, "the personal unity I take myself to 
be, my singular inner being, so to speak. "(p. 26) Since one of 
Harre's basic premisses is that the structures and forms of consc- 
iousness are culturally determined, he is at pains to demonstrate 
that different cultures evolve different senses of personal ident- 
ity. "Our personal being is created by our coming to believe a 
theory of self based on our society's working conception of a per- 
son. "(p. 26) In order to change one's personal being, therefore, 
"one must come to believe a theory of self derived from the concept 
of person current in another and different society. "(p. 26) 
Persons are locations of speech acts (though Harre extends "speech 
acts" to include "any flow of interactions brought about through the 
use of a public semiotic system such as that involved in the mean- 
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ingful flying of flags, the wearing of uniforms, ballroom dancing, 
gestures and grimaces, a concours d'elegarrce and so on. "(p. 65) The 
primary, social and psychological reality is thus an array of embod- 
ied persons and their conversations (indexed by grammatical forms, 
e. g. pronouns, establishing the here and now analogue of physical 
time and place). The secondary psychological realities are human 
minds by which Harre means "a semi-sytematic cluster of sets of be- 
liefs. "(p. 65) 
Each-of us is thus manifested in the two structures; grammatical 
devices (pronouns or their equivalents) locate us in both. In the 
primary structure they index speech acts in the array of persons 
(i. e.., they identify a person); in the secondary structure they refer 
to a theoretical (believed in) entity: the self. This theoretical 
entity centres: on the three unities of perspective,. action and cons- 
ciousness. "I" am at. the centre of my.. world; "I" am the. source of my 
actions; "I" am conscious of the continuity of my own history. The 
three "I"s are the same individual being: myself. 
These two realities - the primary and secondary - are intimately re- 
lated. To realize that one is a person is to learn a way of think- 
ing about and managing oneself. It is not to be prompted to make 
some kind of. empirical discovery. "(p. 22) Putting the matter some- 
what cryptically: personal being is some function of personhood and 
selfhood both ofawhich are indexed by grammatical structures. 
These brief excerpts must suffice to convey Harre's approach to de- 
lineating the two related concepts of person and self. I-recognise 
the merit of his analysis but feel that for my rather more restrict- 
ed purpose his distinction is not essential. For a psychology of 
personal being his kind of-. analysis obviously is. - 
it I have in mind here and elsewhere in this dissertation a total con- 
figuration as the Gestalt pychologists understood the term rather 
than Husserl's essence. A real world phenomenon exhibits an express- 
iveness that characterises its individuality (its "thingness" or be- 
ingness) regardless of the specific context in which an observer 
experiences it. For example, as every student of painting knows or 
soon discovers, there are no red objects. There is undoubtedly a 
117 
colour we call red (in fact a range of such colours within which we 
may become aware with training and experience of many gradations) 
and redness is undoubtedly an attribute of some objects. On closer 
inspection, however, reflections, shadows, lights, and even optical 
illusions create the colour we actually see. A real and meaningful 
challenge to an artist is to render a so-called red object without 
using red pigment at all. Similar arguments could be applied to our 
experiences in other sense modalities. We are capable of grasping 
real world phenomena as they essentially are but typically we see 
without looking, hear without listening, perceive without entering 
into the essence of the phenomenon before us. In effect we do not 
really perceive at all but call upon prior knowledge of the phenom- 
enon in question. What is true of inanimate objects is even truer°of 
the living because the expressiveness of living things is far subt- 
ler. Artists and poets have not lost this ability to grasp the ess- 
ence of phenomena but it is not a magical or mysterious gift denied 
to other mortals. One of the aims of this dissertation is to try to 
show how we might recover this facility. 
12 See especially section 1.4. 
13 See Chapter 2. 
14 An empathising person is one who is willing and able to nurture the 
empathic relation. Whether this calls for special abilities and 
competences I do not explore in this work in any depth. 
15 See section 1.43. 
16 See section 2.21. 
17 The findings of ethologists (e. g. Tinbergen, 1951; Hess, 1958,1972; 
Eibl-Eibesfelt, 1970,1972; Lorenz, 1966); developmental psycholog- 
ists (e. g. Spitz, 1965; Kaye, 1982); philosophers of psychology 
(Midgely, 1978); the group of phenomenological biologists discussed 
by Thines, 1977; and students of emotions and feelings (e. g. Magda 
Arnold, 1968,1970; Dunlop, 1983); all point to an innate ability, to 
"read" at least some expressive signs of other living beings. 
18 See section 2.37. 
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19 See note 11 above. What we know or imagine to be the case and a ten- 
dency to accord primacy to intellectual rather than intuitive knowl- 
edge are major-causes of our loss of perceptual innocence. 
20 I shall use the shorter expression henceforth to stand for awareness 
in passive (or active) consciousness where there is little chance of 
being misunderstood. 
21 See notes 11 and 19 above. 
22 Meynell, 1921; 
_p. 
16. 
23 See section 3.521 for distinctions between false and genuine identi- 
fication, an idea which Stewart developed following Freud. 
24 The relationship between curiosity and exploratory activity is-far 
from clear. So also is the relationship between anxiety and explora- 
tion. In their. review of the. current status of curiosity and explor- 
ation-Voss and Keller, 1983, find that curiosity tends to be viewed 
either as a motivational variable-or-as a personality characteristic 
-whereas, -they-.. suggest, it-should be accorded the status of a hypoth- 
etical construct mediating (in ways yet to be determined) explorat- 
ory behaviour.. which thus becomes-a, descriptive concept. Anxiety, 
theysuggest, should also be construed as a hypothetical construct; 
perhaps in this case psychological states. (subjects' reports of 
accompanying felt anxiety) may be correlated with physiological 
measures which then offer evidence of the hypothesised anxiety. 
Exploratory behaviour tends to be regarded as some function of hypo- 
thetical-. variables, e. g. neurophysiological, which activate the org- 
anism in some way; or cognitive variables such as schemata, hypoth- 
eses, etc., which somehow control an individual's information 
processing; or of stimulus variables, e. g. complexity, novelty, 
intensity. The authors wonder why investigators in this field have 
given scant attention to personality and cultural variables and to 
interactions between the various classes of hypothesised variables. 
119 
They review a number of models which attempt to show relations be- 
tween curiosity, anxiety and exploratory behaviour (variously cons- 
trued) and conclude that there are two main theoretical positions: 
1 anxiety and exploratory behaviour are two diametrically op- 
posed motivational systems, the sum of which influences the 
level of activation and thus serves to control behaviour; 
2 anxiety is taken to be the sole motivational basis for expl- 
oration. 
At present, they say, there is no way of deciding between them. One 
interesting distinction cited by Voss and Keller is that which 
Speilberger makes between diversive and specific exploration; the 
former tends to be associated with sensation-seeking, movement to- 
wards optimum level of arousal, etc., whereas the second is associ- 
ated with what we would call action, i. e. conduct in conscious purý 
suit of intentions and purposes. In Spielberger's model diversive 
exploration is acompanied by an increasing but mild anxiety and a 
rapidly increasing curiosity drive which at its maximum creates the 
optimum level of hedonic tone. Here subjects subjectively experience 
the most satisfactory balance between anxiety and curiosity. The 
phase of specific exploration, however, is marked by a sharp 
increase in anxiety and subjects rapidly reach the point beyond 
which they experience conflict between anxiety and curiosity. 
The point of this minor diversion is to justify my claim that fear 
of the foreign even if something called curiosity also functions may 
be universal. On the other hand the precise relationship between 
curiosity, anxiety and exploration has yet to be worked out and emp- 
irically supported. 
1. See Derlyne, 1960; Vernon, 1961; Heron, Doane and Scott, 1956; 
Solomon, 1961; for effects of sensory deprivation. Voss and Keller, 
1983 have reviewed the literature on curiosity and exploration. (See 
note 24 above. ) 
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26 Stewart's Thirst for Freedoz offers examples of imitation in action. 
His rather than Freud's illustrations are preferable because of 
their less theory-loaded character. Stewart worked with alcoholics 
and drug addicts within the ambience of empathic relations which 
despite his initial sympathy with Freudian theory actually owes very 
little to it. (See section 3.52) - 
27 Jean Liedloff, 1975. 
28 The relation between sympathy and empathy is examined in section 2.3 
29 Note the implied use of ideal types. See note 7 above. 
30 Goodall, 1983; Gardner and Gardner, 1969; Linden, 1976. This ten- 
dency is, if anything, even more prevalent in the artificial intel- 
ligence literature. See Boden, -1977; Weizenbaum, 1976; Dreyfus, . 
1977; for copious examples drawn from a wide range of this literat- 
ure. 
31 Chapter 2 explores this relationship. 
32 Such a task belongs to a psychology of personal being. Harre's exp- 
loitation of the concept of psychological symbiosis offers one 
illustration of how this might be done. Psychological-symbiosis is 
not empathy (as I understand it) but is sufficiently like it to 
stress-the point-I am making. The hermeneutical movement in contrast 
is less convincing, though Paul Ricouer's notions of distanciation 
and belonging and their hypothesised relationship in a genuine herm- 
eneutics-look interesting for their similarity to my notion (borrow- 
ed from Scheler and Stewart) of unity-in separateness. 
33 Fromm, 1978; p. 82 
34 ibid. pp. 82/83. 
35 Stewart, 1965. 
36 Fromm, 1978; p. 92. 
37 ibid. p. 28. 
38 ibid. p. 29. 
39 ibid. p. 48. 
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2 SOME OUTSTANDING ISSUES CONCERNING EMPATHY 
2.1 THE PROELEM OF CLASSIFYING PERSONAL RELATIONS 
As far as I can discover no one has attempted a comprehensive typol- 
ogy of personal relations. (1) What kind of personal relations are 
there? Freud was interested in the emotional ties people form with 
one another. Scheler analysed one class of emotional bonds to which 
he attached the generic label: fellow-feeling. He deliberately exc- 
luded empathy as a mistaken concept; he could find no place for what 
others called empathy in his schema. Freud himself mentioned empathy 
but only once though Jung treated it rather more generously. Both 
saw it as an emotional tie rooted in one of the ego defence mechan- 
isms: identification or, as it is sometimes called, introjection. 
One conjecture, therefore, might be to subsume all personal relat- 
ions under some such category, i. e. to assert that all are essent- 
ially emotional bonds grounded in ego defence mechanisms. Whilst 
this has some interesting possibilities (for example, all personal 
relations would be explicable within the theoretical framework of 
Freudian or Jungian psychoanalytic theory) it leaves out a wide 
range of personal relations which simply do not fit into these con- 
ceptual systems. Examples are to be found in chance encounters with 
others in bus queues, railway stations, shops and a hundred other 
places and situations. Fortuitous interpersonal relations are com- 
monplace, frequent, sometimes stressful and often lead to more sig- 
nificant relations such as friendship, marriage or hostility. Accid- 
ental interpersonal relations cannot therefore be ignored as trivial 
or inconsequential though often they may be. Formal relations, e. g. 
doctor-patient, are likewise difficult to incorporate into a psycho- 
analytic schema. 
Another way of classifying personal relations is to distinguish be- 
tween those involving other human beings and those which focus on 
non-human others. The first category include interpersonal relat- 
ions; let us call the second simply non- human relations. Personal 
relations thus consist of two non-overlapping sets each one uniquely 
labelled. In what ways may persons relate to non-humans, and simil- 
arly in what ways may they relate to one another? 
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Using my own analysis we could start with ways of knowing: personal, 
scientific, aesthetic, practical, etc., and further suppose that 
each is independent of the others insofar as each has a specific 
field of relevance unique to itself. I have also suggested that a 
particular human being may, on a particular occasion, be construed 
as a biological machine, or as an organism, or as a psychophysical 
individual, or as a person. In this dissertation "person" has a 
special meaning which does not allow us to interchange it with, say, 
"individual" or even "human being". However the words "interperson- 
al" and "personal" are often used in the psychological literature as 
descriptors of relations among human beings or human individuals 
understood in a general sense. Thus we could try to fill in the 
matrix formed by the two axes: forms of knowing, and ways of const- 
ruing members of the human species. Each cell constitutes a poten- 
tial category of interpersonal relation if we assume that both axes 
refer to the point of view of a specific knower. Exploring the cells 
of this matrix provides another opportunity to extend further our 
understanding of the empathic relation, 
Construal of human being 







2.11 Personal knowing 
To enquire into the nature of the contents of the first cell in 
the matrix we imagine that A strives to know B as a person (the 
way of personal knowing) and does so whilst construing B as a 
biological mechanism. This seems inconsistent with my previous 
argument. To try to know and understand someone as a person is 
not in keeping with an approach which reduces that human being 
to a biological machine. In the first the aim is to enhance, 
inter alia, the other's personal identity, to show goodwill and 
respect towards the other. In the second the aim appears to be 
to disregard the personal in favour of the objective study of 
the person's body viewed as a mechanism. In an earlier section 
I examined the possibility of entering into an empathic relat- 
ion with non-human entities. I concluded that within my concep- 
tion of empathy such a relation was impossible. However, by an- 
alogy I argued that a quasi-empathic relation was feasible 
because the essential processes were identical with those en- 
countered in empathy though some obvious features were missing. 
Striving to know and understand persons as persons has its ana- 
logy in trying to know and understand objects as objects; pers- 
onhood and beinghood are'similar. The attitude of openness, and 
the processes of experiencing their givenness and enhancing 
their individual and separate identities are the same. - 
It therefore seems reasonable to argue that one self may try to 
know another as a biological machine but in the spirit of, and 
by the methods associated with, personal knowing. In other 
words a self embarking on such an enterprise would be entering 
into a quasi-empathic relation with the other instead of, or 
rather alternating with, the authentic empathic relation. It 
might be objected at this point that I appear to be confusing 
a form of personal enquiry with scientific knowing, that to try 
to know and understand a human being as a biological machine is 
the proper task of science. As I will try to show later the two 
types of enquiry, personal knowing and scientific knowing, are 
entirely different. 
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Why should anyone want to know another human being as a biolog- 
ical mechanism in the spirit of personal knowing? One obvious 
answer is to say that for the empathising person the other's 
body must be more important at a particular moment than his or 
or her person but-not to the extent of denying the other the 
maximum respect and goodwill which are possible in the circum- 
stances. Consider two lovers. Suppose they enter into an empa- 
thic relation. Insofar as they explore, discover and enhance 
their own and their partner's separate identities while experi- 
encing a deep sense of unity between them they could be said to 
be transcending or going beyond their experience of merely phy- 
sical beingness, either their own or the other's. But in making 
love this cannot be so, or at least not entirely so, by the 
very nature of_the experience. It could well happen that, as 
part of the joy of love-making, each might, at a particular, 
moment,. delight in, the other's body as a pure mechanism. If 
they are to preserve their non-manipulative approach to one an- 
other they must of necessity, it seems to me, engage in a 
quasi-empathic relation with each other in which their bodies 
as mechanisms become objects of their stance of openness, of 
their spontaneous. experience of givenness and so on. In this, 
sense it seems to me quite proper to speak of a kind of person- 
al knowing of a person's body. The result is the alternation 
between the empathic and the quasi-empathic relation. I have 
already described the latter in section 1.51. 
Another example comes from a'personal experience of a medical 
examination required by law under the Factory Acts. I was 15 
years old starting my first job at an engineering works. I was 
given 7/6 (37.5p) for the doctor's fee. The examination was 
swift, rough and I suppose as thorough as the fee merited. A 
prize pig at a cattle market or a horse at the knacker's yard 
would probably have fared as well. My surviving impressions of 
this encounter are the alacrity with which the doctor pocketed 
the fee and his total indifference tome as a person. To him I 
was no more than a piece of meat on the hoof to be disposed of 
as quickly as possible. Nowadays the training of doctors, nur- 
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ses, physiotherapists, radiographers stresses the need to treat 
patients as persons, though with what results has yet to be 
established. Nevertheless patients must be examined and it is 
their machinery which is in for repair. While approaching pers- 
ons as persons we cannot at the same time be viewing them as 
defective mechanisms. The ideal solution is surely to alternate 
between the empathic and the quasi-empathic relation. Obviously 
in real life medical personnel may not attempt, or consider, or 
even know about empathic relations with their patients; if they 
do, then the quasi-empathic relation is a necessary one to en- 
ter into in order to carry out their professional tasks without 
harm either to their own personhoods (the doctor who dealt with 
me could hardly feel proud of himself) or to those of their 
patients. 
Similar arguments apply to the next two cells in the personal 
knowing raw. Organism differs from biological machine in that 
the former implies, indeed logically requires, acknowledgement 
and consideration of an environment. A biological mechanism 
differs from a non-living mechanism only in its livingness 
(which is not, of course, to imply that such a difference is 
trivial) but it is not necessary to go much beyond the boundar- 
ies of the living entity in order to study it as a machine. 
Since to study an organism is to study the entity as a whole, 
the idea of wholeness has little meaning in the absence of an 
environment in which the entity functions. A social worker may 
establish an empathic relation with the client yet feel the 
need to know this person as a functioning organism within a 
particular context or situation. The client's welfare as an or- 
ganism, that is to say, may be just as important to the social 
worker as an understanding of the other as a person especially 
if the social worker feels that some kind of remedial action is 
necessary in order to protect the client's well-being. In the 
case of physical or mental handicap this may be obvious but 
other situations are apparently less transparent as some recent 
and much publicised misadventures with vulnerable persons in 
the care of social workers have demonstrated. The fate of the 
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elderly living alone, children subject to abuse by parents or 
other adults, young girls in care are some examples where crit- 
ics have argued that environmental factors were not sufficient- 
ly taken into account by those responsible for their welfare. 
An architect designing a village may need to discover the move- 
ments, relations, the social habits and needs of clients. (2) 
Assuming that the architect has established an empathic relat- 
ion with at least some of the villagers he or she, like the 
social worker, might still'feel'the need to grasp the village 
as a set of interacting' organisms while pursuing the'personal 
form of knowing. In other words the social worker and the arch- 
itect in these examples would be striving to establish quasi- 
empathic relations with a specific human object: an organism, a 
biological machine functioning within an environment, viewed 
non-manipulatively and with respect and goodwill according to 
the organism's beingness. 
And so with psychophysical individuals which are organisms with 
minds. It would be interesting to speculate how far below the 
human level we might go before rejecting "psychophysical" as a 
valid descriptor for'an organism. I shall not attempt such an 
enquiry but suggest instead that, as humans are our prime con- 
cern, we had better concentrate on what personal knowing am- 
ounts to when its human object is regarded as an organism equip- 
ped with ä mind and therefore capable of enjoying a mental as 
well as a physical existence. The outcome is the same as in the 
two previous cases: a non-manipulative grasping of the being- 
ness of a particular human being as a psychophysical indivi- 
dual. A therapist might choose to examine the attitudes, or 
feelings, or motives of a client or patient, which seem func- 
tionally important in a particular environment in the sense 
that the therapist sees them as essential properties of the 
client's coping strategies within a specific context. In other 
words the therapist thinks that these psychophysical elements 
form a vital part of the phenomenal object: the patient. In 
these circumstances, if the therapist has already established 
an empathic relation with the client then he or she might also 
127 
feel the need to explore the client not as a person but as a 
psychophysical individual. The attitude system, or the set of 
feelings, or the motives may, for reasons best known to the 
therapist, seem to be important in their own right whilst yet 
belonging to this particular_individual organism and explicable 
only as construed-in this way. It is in this sense that I can 
understand and accept Carl Rogers' idea of moving about in the 
other's world as if, it were my own-"but never forgetting the 
, 
"as if" quality". He called this empathy; I call-it establish- 
ing a quasi-empathic relation with a psychophysical individual. 
This non-manipulative activity, like all the others we have 
discussed, is not at all the same as the scientific study of 
the same phenomena. This latter is, as we shall see, an over- 
against relation and totally suppresses the person as not mere- 
ly irrelevant-but as actively subversive of. the scientific en- 
terprise. 
To summarise, we may interpret personal knowing of one self by 
another construed as mechanism, organism or psychophysical ind- 
ividual by imagining the empathising self alternating between 
striving to know and understand the other as a person and try- 
ing to know and understand him or her as one or otherrof these 
different ways of construing human beings; i. e. alternating be- 
tween empathy and quasi-empathy. The choice of relation will 
obviously depend on the empathising self's interests and con- 
cerns but in every case the stance of non-manipulative openness 
towards the other, the spontaneous experience of the other's 
givenness and the enhancement of goodwill, respect and the 
other's beingness are characteristic. 
2.12 Personal knowing and empathy 
There is no need to discuss the last cell in the personal knowing 
row since Chapter 1 was devoted to it. Before moving on to the next 
row we might attempt to answer the question: does the effort for 
personal knowing inevitably lead to empathy? Clearly the, answer must 
be, no. However dedicated the empathiser may be, however skilled in 
cultivating the stance of openness to the real world, however filled 
with love for all things especially human beings, the empathising 
128 
self is fallible and will sometimes make mistakes, give way to en- 
nui, fall victim to upsets of one kind or another. Also the other 
will sometimes prove to be intractable: the bigot, the psychopath, 
the ideologically committed, the gangster and similar deeply negati- 
vely orientated individuals, who seem beyond the reach of empathis- 
ing persons. They appear to lack the resources on which to draw in 
order to match even remotely the goodwill and respect which the emp- 
athises accords'to them. The brutal, extremist, dismissive stance is 
a virtually impregnable defence though not entirely so. Recent exp- 
erience in dealing with terrorists who use innocent victims as barg- 
aining counters suggests that it is sometimes possible to find a 
chink in the armour of this kind of defensive individual. 
; L. 
Finally we may ask whether the empathic relation is necessary in the 
first three cells of the personal knöwing row (as a precursor to the 
quasi-empathic relation). The answer again must be, no. One can im- 
agine an observer attempting to establish a quasi-empathic relation 
with the. other as a biological machine, as an. organism, or as a psy- 
chophysical individual without trying to foster an authentic-empa- 
thic relation. I think it might be, odd but At is certainly possible. 
Such a person might, for instance, have emotional difficulties in 
relating to others as persons or may be less skilful in the empathic 
relation. Quasi-empathic relations are, after all, only one-sided 
whereas empathic relations are potentially mutual., In any event, 
interaction in the empathic relation is always two-way. This does 
lead to an important difficulty. In the one-sided quasi-empathic 
relation, in which the self adopts the (empathic) processes of open- 
ness, spontaneous experience of the other's givenness, showing res- 
pect and goodwill to the other viewed as a mechanism, organism or 
psychophysical individual,, the other will, of course,. frequently 
respond as a person. Thus the relation is interactive but if the ob- 
server is incompetent or for some other reason unable to cope with 
the other as a person the relation might easily become tense and, 
from the other's point of view, distasteful. The result may well be 
a dissolution of the relation leaving a residue of ill-feeling in 
its wake. 
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This state of affairs highlights one of the major differences be- 
tween empathy and quasi-empathy with human beings. Within the emp- 
athic relation the development of a quasi-empathic approach to the 
other, construed from one of the three perspectives just described, 
is unlikely to cause distress; on the contrary the outcome is enhan- 
cement for both partners of the relation. Outside the empathic rela- 
tion, however, quasi-empathy may inadvertently lead to a worsening 
of the observer's approach to others as persons with consequent loss 
for the other. It therefore seems to me that success in quasi- 
empathy outside the empathic relation will depend on the other's ab- 
ility and willingness to initiate empathy in order to save the rela- 
tion from dissolution. In the situations we have been exploring, in- 
volving doctors, social workers and therapists, the other may not be 
equipped to undertake such a task. My conclusion is that while any- 
one of goodwill and an attitude of openness may try to initiate a 
quasi-empathic relation with another human being from one of the 
non-personal perspectives we have studied, he or she is unlikely to 
be successful if the other is in any way problematical unless the 
observer has already established an empathic relation with the 
other. Persons do not fragment themselves into the categories I have 
used in this analysis; only observers do this and then only for spe- 
cific reasons. It therefore behoves anyone undertaking such an at- 
tempt first to ensure that they are capable of coping with human be- 
ings as persons and secondly to examine critically and justify their 
motives for engaging in the enterprise. I have argued that to cope 
with human beings as persons non-manipulatively is to try to enter 
into an empathic relation with them. Of course it is clearly pos- 
sible to learn how to cope with people through social skills train- 
ing but then, I suggest, the learner would be in danger of becoming 
a manipulator of others though possibly for the noblest of motives: 
to do them good. 
2.13 Aesthetic knowing 
An artist drawing a nude model may have a special interest in the 
body of his or her subject viewed as a mechanism. Artists want to 
know how the body is put together, how the muscles relate to' one an- 
other, how bone structure gives clues about muscle function and 
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movement in order to understand the character of the pose. But the 
artist is probably more interested in form and structure for their 
own sakes rather than as sources of answers to scientific quest- 
ions. (3) 
Because the aesthetic and scientific forms of knowing are similar 
in some respects though very different in others it might be useful 
to consider them together for a moment. In both there is an over- 
against relation between the observer and the observed in which 
their separateness takes the form of detachment. The artist-design- 
er's study of the relation between form and context is just as obj- 
ective as the scientist-technologist's study of the interaction be- 
tween selected variables. If artists are concerned with the "good- 
ness of fit" between the functions of the biological mechanism and 
the form which serves these functions, they may also want to enquire 
why this particular form evolved out of the infinite set of solu- 
tions which are possible. Even if they ignore this type of problem 
they will nevertheless concern themselves with questions centring on 
the character of the form-context relation. Scientist-technologists, 
however, are more interested in lawful relations between variables. 
Replication, prediction, control are their areas of interest. Both 
may, adopt a severely intellectualist approach and-both will depend 
necessarily on intuitive experience of the phenomenal object as a 
source of knowledge. In practice artists are, or. seem to be, more 
receptive to intuitive processes and to be more open in their app- 
roach to phenomena. than scientists (though, probably no less selec- 
tive in their choice of what they consider worth attending to) 
whereas scientist-technologists seem happier with more rational, an- 
alytical approaches which rely on formal logic, systematic proced- 
ures and repeatable, verifiable processes. Both the artist and the 
scientist can adopt the aesthetic and scientific ways of knowing 
(and, I suggest, the most creative do)-but in practice each chooses 
the one he or she feels more appropriate to their (deliberately) 
rather restricted view of their respective undertakings. 
Thus both can adopt an impersonal approach to human beings whether 
they regard the object of study as a biological machine, or organ- 
ism, or psychophysical individual. To the extent that they do so the 
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end product will always be an expression of an over-against relat- 
ion. Thus we may say of a particular artist's work that his port- 
raits or renderings of historical events are ironic or apt social 
comment yet they lack a sense of personal involvement. Guy de Maup- 
assant has often been criticised for his cool detachment from the 
characters and events. in his stories, superbly drawn though they un- 
doubtedly are. It is a continuing source of wonder that some scient- 
ist-technologists engage in work that ensures the greatest harm and 
suffering to other human beings. Impersonality here is taken to the 
extreme. Purely human considerations would undermine their work and 
therefore must not only be ignored; they must be actively suppres- 
sed. 
Aesthetic knowing is concerned with the'patterns observed among real 
world phenomena but always from the point of view that, in any part- 
icular case, the marriage between form and context represents the 
selection of one solution from a theoretically infinite set of pos- 
sibilities. Aesthetic knowing may therefore be construed as trying 
to know and understand the uniqueness of the particular goodness of 
fit which confronts the observer either as something to be achieved 
or as an actual product. It seems to me that the artist-designer may 
approach this uniqueness in three ways. The first is the impersonal 
approach I have just described which in most respects is indistin- 
guishable from that of the scientist-technologist. The major differ- 
ence is the centre of interest: the uniqueness of the particular 
form-context "fit" preoccupying the artist-designer. The human being 
in this case is personless; all that counts is the analysis of the 
phenomenal object, the recording of what is observed, the construc- 
tion of an expressive object (which may, of course, be functional 
such as a building or an instrument), in short the creation of a 
work which expresses the uniqueness thus observed. Medical illustra- 
tors, forensic photographers, designers of ergonomic artifacts, as 
well as painters working in this frame of mind offer visual examples 
of the genre. Leonardo da Vinci's notebooks are full of material in- 
spired by this objective approach. 
The second approach is to adopt a quasi-empathic relation with the 
human being under observation, in the manner and with the consequen- 
132 
ces I have already described in the preceding sections devoted to 
the personal knowing row of the matrix. In aesthetic knowing as with 
personal knowing the viewing of a human being from the perspectives 
of mechanism, organism and psychophysical individual is best conduc- 
ted within an alternation between empathy and quasi-empathy. Do the 
expressive products emerging from these three approaches differ sig- 
nificantly? The only one I can vouch for and indeed clearly imagine 
is the impersonal approach; as I have suggested products of artist- 
designers working in this mode tend to convey to others a feeling of 
aloofness, coldness, sometimes even indifference. It is frequently 
difficult to detect the human heart behind the work. In the case of 
quasi-empathy and the ills which attend it when separated from auth- 
entic empathy one might conjecture that its products would express a 
sense or confusion or unease or disorientation in the spectator if 
the artist-designer had difficulties with his or her model. This is 
entirely speculative but some artists are well-known for their inad- 
equacies in coping with personal relations so a study of their work 
from this perspective may prove worthwhile. The third approach, the 
quasi-empathic relation in conjunction with empathy, offers the ob- 
vious route to aesthetic knowing of the uniqueness of a particular 
form. Because the purposes and phenomenal objects of personal know- 
ing and aesthetic knowing are different the artist, like the archit- 
ect, the social worker, the therapist, would alternate between con- 
cern with the model as a person and interest in the model-as a body 
(that unique solution to the problem of finding the "best" fit of 
form and context) both conducted non-manipulatively and involving 
the processes I have discussed at length. 
I will not attempt to describe the next two cells in this row since 
the arguments I have already used will. apply in their cases also. 
The psychological complexity of the phenomenal object from the obs- 
erver's point of view increases as we move along the row because the 
range of elements and their interrelations which constitute the phe- 
nomenal object increases. This complexity also becomes more social 
and therefore aesthetic products are likely to express a greater 
range of understanding as the focus shifts in the direction of the 
person. The artist-designer's concern with human beings in their en- 
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vironment (the organismic perspective) or with the portrayal of 
their feelings and attitudes especially towards the living and spec- 
ifically human environment (the psychophysical) is likely to convey 
to the spectator a richer, more human sensitivity than is found in 
the treatment of the human being as a biological machine. (4) Commen- 
tary on the last cell in the row of aesthetic knowing is deferred 
until section 2.16. 
2.14 Scientific knowing and empathy 
In the cells associated with scientific knowing we meet the same im- 
personal, quasi-empathic and empathic relations (the last two alter- 
nating in the ideal case) that we have just explored in the analysis 
of aesthetic knowing. The focus of scientific knowing is the discov- 
ery and understanding of the lawful relations between elements in 
the real world. The aim is to control and predict the behaviour of 
real world phenomena., This, unlike the aesthetic case, is surely- 
necessarily manipulative. The artist-designer may manipulate the 
human subject of his or her, -enquiries 
in the quest for understanding 
the goodness-of fit, but he does not have to, whereas it seems to be 
in the nature of scientific knowing to manipulate. Can a scientist 
carry out an-experiment involving human beings without treating them 
as objects which are there solely to satisfy his_,, scientific. curios- 
ity? The answer seems to me to depend on the.. underlying attitude of 
the scientist. The number-of experiments is legion in which answers 
to questions have been sought with total disregard not only for the 
personhoods of the human subjects but in complete indifference to 
their beingness as biological mechanisms, as_organisms,, or as psych- 
ophysical individuals. In short, in scientific knowing the tradition 
is to reduce the interpersonal relation between a scientist and a 
human subject to an impersonal one between an observer and a non- 
human (though living) object. Thus a living human body may be-treat- 
ed no better (nor necessarily any worse) than cattle, say, in stud- 
ies of the effects of different foods; or the human organism may be- 
come an alternative (perhaps a more interesting one) to a rat in a 
Skinner box type of experiment; or a psychophysical individual may 
be regarded as no more than an essential ingredient in, say, a' study 
of individual differences in response latencies. Scientists in these 
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situations go to great lengths to minimise the effects of their sub- 
jects' personhoods. 
Nowadays a number of investigators especially in the social and soc- 
ial psychological sciences are suggesting that not only may this be 
wrong (morally and scientifically) but that it is quite often unnec- 
essary not-to say meaningless. Some questions are best answered by 
taking the human subject into the scientist's confidence; in any 
event human subjects who willingly take-part in certain kinds of 
investigation may contribute their own creative ideas and so, des- 
pite the efforts of the investigator, shift the study on to a more 
interesting, and possibly more profitable, path. In many areas such 
as education, or the study of small groups, or in the investigation 
of interactive processes between human beings the research project 
must allow for the activity of the human subjects as agents since 
this aspect cannot be eliminated or controlled (despite the beliefs 
of the scientific community to the contrary). Human agency is an 
ineradicable feature of these types of experimental situations. 
Action research is one method of conducting these kinds of studies. 
Quite apart from these and similar considerations there remains the 
fact which we have met before: that in the scientific study of the 
human being as mechanism, organism or psychophysical individual the 
investigator may adopt the same stance of openness, experience the 
same spontaneous givenness of the other, act with the same respect 
and goodwill towards the other and in general enhance the beingness 
of the mechanism, organism or individual as I have tried to show is 
possible in the cases of the personal and aesthetic knowing of these 
phenomenal objects. As in these instances so in scientific knowing 
the observer may alternate between quasi-empathy and empathy though 
the first is possible without the second even if fraught with dan- 
gers as we have seen. Scientific knowing of the person, the last 
cell in this row of the matrix, will be examined in 2.16. 
2.15 Practical knowing and empathy 
We now come to the practical form of knowing. This is the kind of 
knowing which resides in performance. Learning to ride a bicycle 
cannot be achieved by sheer intellectual effort. Psychomotor skills 
have to be learned by actually doing something, -however badly, until 
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the learner discovers intuitively, often after many errors, the 
knack of carrying out the correct movements or at least those move- 
ments which lead to the desired performance. Language and social 
skills have a similar character, though theorising may be of some 
value especially in the advanced stages of learning these skills. 
Practice does not guarantee improved performance but it is certain 
that increased competence is impossible without practice. What prac- 
tice does (and I mean informed practice) is to equip the performer 
with an ever-growing repertoire of appropriate responses limited 
only by the range of situations which the individual experiences or 
by the performer's achieved competences. I assume that the learner 
is willing and ready to learn. Similarly with cognitive tasks a 
learner must acquire a range of procedures and techniques relevant 
to the tasks he or she wishes to carry out. As with psychomotor, 
linguistic and social skills these become habitual with practice and 
in a similar way the performer's competence in their use increases. 
Practical knowing may be construed as the connective tissue binding 
the other forms of knowing since all forms of knowing are manifested 
in action; performance depends in part an what we might call relat- 
ively low order skills such as the use of language, writing, various 
operating techniques, the use of instruments and tools, and so on. 
Moreover a certain degree of automaticity is desirable. In a theor- 
etical discussion we would want to devote most of our attention to 
the essential ideas; we. would find it irksome and disruptive if 
words did not come readily to our lips on command, a common exper- 
ience if the debate is in a language other than our native tongue, 
or if the theme of the discussion is new to us and we lack an appro- 
priate conceptual framework or technical lexicon. 
The extensive range of practical knowledge we all need is best acqu- 
ired within the specific fields of their application. For example, 
we learn how to handle language in an "academic' way by writing es- 
says, parsing sentences, carrying out precis exercises or paraphras- 
ing. Nowadays this grammar-book approach is frowned upon because it 
breeds the idea that language is somehow glued on to other subjects. 
Obviously the rules and traditions of a language are important in 
their own right and constitute a proper subject matter to study but 
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linguistic skill resides in its everyday use; therefore it is the 
use of language in real world activities that needs to be cultivat- 
ed. Using words to describe an experiment in physics, to comment on 
a news item, to explain how something works, are ways of putting 
language to work in specific situations. The point I am stressing 
here is that practical knowledge becomes an arid and often meaning- 
less piece of mental equipment if divorced from its proper setting; 
nevertheless this knowledge is necessary if we are to cope with the 
demands society thrusts upon us as workers, parents, friends, vot- 
ers, thinkers, and so on. In the example of the theoretical discus- 
sion in a foreign language, for instance, competence is perhaps best 
achieved by engaging in frequent discussions of these self-same 
theoretical problems with the help of a skilled linguist who is also 
knowledgeable about the subject matter under discussion. Ready-to- 
hand, tacit knowledge is essential in every domain. 
What does itýmean to know another in the practical form of knowing 
described above? It means having at one's beck and call the ready- 
to-hand skills appropriate to the kind of knowing which concerns us 
in relation to a specific perspective of the human being under scru- 
tiny: mechanism, organism, individual or person, and within an im- 
personal, quasi-empathic or empathic relation. The bottom row of the 
matrix is of special interest to educators, teachers, instructors 
and self-improvers. The drawing up of sets of basic skills is now a 
major concern since forty years of compulsory state education have 
proved inadequate to equip our children with the basic necessities 
of adult citizenship. What counts as a basic skill and how basic is 
basic are no longer trivial matters. 
2.16 The person and various forms of knowing 
In the preceding sections I have ignored the final cell in each row 
apart from a reminder that personal knowing of the person was the 
theme of Chapter 1. Is it possible to know and understand another as 
a person from a scientific perspective? Trivially we might observe 
that we can approach anything from the scientific point of view but 
what does that mean when the person (in the special sense of this 
dissertation) is the focus of interest? My view is that such a study 
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represents the proper science of psychology in contrast to the deter- 
nistic (and commonly behaviouristic) orthodoxies of the present day. 
Whilst it is true that Kelly in his personal construct theory put the 
person at the centre of the stage and moreover produced a reflexive 
psychology (i. e. a psychological explanation of humankind which inc- 
ludes the theorist in its schema) he nevertheless produced a peculi- 
arly biassed view. According to Kelly all humans behave as scient- 
ists and adopt, however imperfectly, what amounts to a scientific 
attitude in their intercourse with the real world however humble a 
particular activity may be within the total panorama of their lives. 
It is implicit in his theory that humans are agents and not merely 
reactive mechanisms at the mercy of environmental stimuli or inter- 
nal drives. Rogers and Maslow in their very different ways have also 
attempted to perfect the notion of an active agent at work yet 
neither has succeeded in grasping the significance of the person- 
al. (5) They both stress, however, the role of experience in the dev- 
elopment of the person and both emphasise, as did Kelly, the central 
importance of personal growth within any theory claiming to be a 
human psychology. John Shatter has outlined a possible psychology of 
the person(6) inspired by the philosopher John Macmurray who in the 
early 50s presented a theoretical analysis of "the form of the per- 
sonal" as he called it. (7) John Rowan has elaborated a new approach 
to a study of persons in action which is scientific in the tradit- 
ional sense yet avoids the pernicious doctrine that humans as per- 
sons interfere with the "purity" of the investigation and hence 
muddy the data and diminish the likelihood that objective, valid and 
reliable conclusions can be drawn. (8) Harre's recent work offers one 
philosopher's view of personal psychology. (9) 
Sociology, anthropology, economics, political science, social psych- 
ology and educational science may all be directed at the person, at, 
the self as agent, despite the fact that any particular science may 
put other entities at the centre of the stage by reason of its own 
nature and scope. Some approaches in this direction include symbolic 
interactionism(10), which stresses action (an irportant property of 
persons), ethnomethodology which explores the trivia of everyday 
life as it happens(11), and the dramaturgical approach to social be- 
haviour(12). The fact that they also have serious shortcomings does 
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not detract from their refreshing "personal" slant. Areas of study 
where the person barely figures at all include management theory, 
the study of human relations and especially industrial relations. 
Is it possible to observe the triple division of approaches into im- 
personal, quasi-empathic and empathic in the scientific knowing of 
the person? The impersonal attitude to the person is the over- 
against relation of the observer to the person. In an authentic sci- 
ence of the person methods of enquiry would still need to maintain 
the over-against relation. What would be different would be the phe- 
nomenon under study. In itself the distance advocated and observed 
by scientists in their relations with the objects of their studies 
is not a "bad" thing. The false note is introduced (when it does oc- 
cur) by the assumption that in an over-against relation all forms of 
the personal must be eliminated, or reduced to a minimum, in order 
to preserve the correct objectivity and purity of the investigation. 
Thus in the conventional comparative evaluation of two ways of tea- 
ching, the feelings, wishes, attitudes, etcetera, of the particip- 
ants are often regarded as sources of random variation which clever 
experimental design tries to cancel out. In the person-centred para- 
digm, however, these features would be treated as important vari- 
ables and steps taken to evaluate them. These steps would necessar- 
ily express the over-against relation towards the hypothesised vari- 
ables insofar as the study were conceived as a scientific enter- 
prise. A psychology of the person is not a sloppy, anything goes af- 
fair. Its methods would be no less scientific than those practised 
within the current deterministic psychologies, Only the content, the 
subject matter, would be different. (The specific techniques employ- 
ed would'also be different but these differences in no way invalid- 
ate the points I am making here. ) The principal element of the sub- 
ject matter would be the person with all that that entails. 
The quasi-empathic approach to the person is redundant since the em- 
pathic relation is always potentially available. In any scientific 
study of the person, that is to say, the observer would alternate 
between the impersonal and the empathic relation. The point about 
the quasi-empathic relation in the case of the other three concep- 
tualisations of a human being is that it offers an alternative to 
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the impersonal in which the human being is reduced to an object. By 
adopting a quasi-empathic approach the investigator behaves towards 
his or her human subject: the biological mechanism, the organism, 
the psychophysical individual, with respect and goodwill. The main 
problem we explored in discussing these cases is that the investig- 
ator may find it difficult to sustain this attitude if the human 
subject behaves in ways which the investigator cannot cope with, 
that is, behaves like a person. That is why I suggested that the 
ideal arrangement in dealing with these three phenomenal objects is 
to alternate between the empathic and the quasi-empathic relations. 
In aesthetic knowing similar arguments apply. Aesthetic knowing of 
persons is concerned with the goodness of fit of form and context in 
which the person under study represents the form and the situation 
in which the person is operating the context. The total configurat- 
ion of person and situation is the object of concern but from the 
particular aesthetic point of view: the unique order that this en- 
semble of person and situation represents and expresses. The fields 
in which aesthetic knowing of the person plays a major role include 
psychotherapy and counselling, career guidance (especially for those 
contemplating a change of career), organisational design, job design 
and personnel selection, vocational planning, and management. I 
doubt whether in our society there is such likelihood of a shift 
from current practices in some of these areas towards an approach 
based on an appreciation of the person through aesthetic knowing, ' 
yet it would be a relatively simple matter to move in that direction 
for those willing to make the effort. 
In the practical knowing of the person the focus of effort is on 
knowing and understanding what in practice a person is and how he or 
she may be enhanced. It is concerned with personal growth, with the 
nurturance of personhood. It tries to answer questions such as: how 
does one strive to know and understand a person as a person? W`hat` 
skills are needed and how may they be acquired and perfected? How 
does one behave non-manipulatively towards anther? This is the dom- 
ain of a genuinely human pedagogy and one in which teaching and 
learning are most likely to be constructively and productively in 
harmony. (13) 
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2.2 A REVISED SCHEMA FOR CLASSIFYING PERSONAL RELATIONS 
We have examined a three-dimensional framework for distinguishing 
different kinds of personal relation though admittedly from a single 
point of view: that of knowing. All personal relations except chance 
encounters are'purposeful but it would be surprising if striving to 
know and understand were the only purpose underlying them. (14) This 
point we must take up again in a moment. One dimension of our con- 
ceptual framework refers to the membership of the relation, i. e. in- 
terpersonal or non-human. The matrix is concerned solely with the 
first of these. In the former the members are human beings; in the 
latter the other-than-self is non-human and may also be non-living. 
The. second dimension focusses on the ways of knowing and the third 
represents the four conceptualisations of human beings: biological 
mechanism, organism, psychophysical individual and person. We con- 
cluded that three relations are necessary to account for all the 
possible entries in the matrix which we considered: impersonal, 
quasi-empathic and genuinely empathic. Quasi-empathy is the equival- 
ent of empathy if beinghood replaces personhood as the focus of the 
Construal of human being 
Ways. of Biological Organism Psychophysical Person 
knowing mechanism individual 
Personal Empathy alternating with quasi-empathy Empathy 
Scientific') 
Impersonal;. or empathy alternating with quasi-empathy 
Aesthetic 
Practical , Basic skills 
knower's interest in the phenomenal object. Now non-human objects 
can be included in this schema provided we understand the four con- 
ceptualisations of human beings analogously in the case of non-human 
objects. That is to say, we can imagine that trying to know and un- 
derstand non-human objects in the four ways of knowing will produce 
the two categories: impersonal and quasi-empathic relations, regard- 
less of the nature of the object. Mechanisms, mechanisms in contexts 
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(environments), individual variations among mechanisms in contexts, 
and beings seem reasonably analogous categories; they even provide 
for the possibility of introducing mental components into the third 
and fourth categories where this is appropriatel. e. g. higher animals 
especially the primates and human artifacts such as cities, farms, 
buildings, organisations. Poets and writers especially have written 
of the individual character or spirit of a place and we might there- 
fore hypothesise that they have entered into a quasi-empathic relat- 
ion with a particular habitat. The analogy is stretched to distort- 
ion point when we deal with abstract ideas and "objects" such as 
feelings, emotions and other psychological property. 
Thus far we have four personal relations which are clearly disting- 
uishable: impersonal, quasi-empathic, empathic and fortuitous. What 
other purposes than knowing are important to human beings? What has 
become of the emotional bonds we form with others? Love, as we have 
seen, underlies empathy and in a later section devoted to emotional 
bonds we shall return to the role of love. Suffice it to say here 
that love is not a purpose but an act or movement towards another 
which imparts a distinctive character to the resulting (non-manipul- 
ative, non-judgemental, non-attributive) relation. (15) 
One alternative purpose we might suggest is to control, to exploit 
the phenomenal object (which, as we have seen, does not necessarily 
prevent an individual making some effort to know and understand it 
as well). The power relation appears to be more prevalent than the 
others except perhaps the fortuitous. Even here members may soon 
succumb to the power relation according to data from studies of 
leaderless groups. Another alternative centres on the deliberate 
introduction of distancing mechanisms which, unlike those used in 
the impersonal relation, are not concerned with knowing but with 
ordering the social world so as to reduce its latent ambiguity and 
uncertainty. Ownership, rights and rites are typical contents of 
what I shall call the formal relation. The formal relation includes 
the expert-client relationship which occurs in many fields; many ex- 
amples can be observed in our society. In addition we can find 
others such as contractual: employer-employee, husband-wife; domin- 
ance (in the sense of legitimate authority): parent-child, teacher- 
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student; and ritual: clergy-laity, priest-acolyte. Note that a domi- 
nance relation does not necessarily imply or lead to a power relat- 
ion but the danger of so doing is always present. Of course two peo- 
ple may enter into many different relations but not simultaneously; 
if they try to do so then some confusion of purposes usually re- 
sults. Marital and work relations often demonstrate this lack of 
clarity about which type of relation matters at any particular mom- 
ent. In contrast informal relations relax the rules and procedures 
sufficiently to allow the distancing requirement to be met but at 
the members' choosing. I, like you, will decide how far I will per- 
mit our tentative friendship to grow and in what direction. 
It may be useful to construe the personal life-space of an individ- 
ual as made up of three zones. The "free" zone is that which an 
individual admits to self and others as open to all knowers. The 
"negotiable" zone is that which is available to others only by nego- 
tiation. No one may presume to pry into this zone without permission 
which is to be considered wholly within the gift of the individual 
to dispense at will (though perhaps not, without explanation on any 
particular occasion especially if permission is refused. Arbitrari- 
ness is not allowed; with that exception the rule of exclusiveness 
applies). Finally there is the "forbidden" zone where transgressors 
will be prosecuted, and justly. The three zones are not fixed. They 
may vary from one situation to another, from one moment to the next 
because of mood, feelings, change of or in the other, and so on. The 
boundaries may also fluctuate. Thus not only may the contents of any 
zone change over time but existing contents may move from one zone 
to another. What one individual may permit a close friend or relat- 
ive to know may well be forbidden to a stranger or casual acquaint- 
ance. The same discrimination applies to action. In empathy we may 
learn to know all three zones, to be aware of the unpredictable 
changes that may occur in them, and to appreciate the importance of 
the contents of the zones for shared action with their owner. 
Informal relations may blossom into empathy if the members can find 
enough goodwill and bring to them or discover the stance of openness 
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and a non-manipulative approach in order to initiate the empathic 
relation; nevertheless they are much closer to the formal than to 
any of the other relations. They do not of themselves stem from a 
striving to know and understand others but rather from a desire on 
the part of participants to regulate their distance from others in 
an orderly way yet relaxed enough to be sensitive to changing circ- 
umstances, moods and inclinations. Formal and informal relations may 
be exploited in order to avoid the purer, loving and more demanding 
relation of empathy. People can hide behind them, find fulfilment in 
them but also pay a price in diminished emotional satisfaction, 
inhibited personal growth and limited enhancement of both the self 
and the other-than-self. 
We now have seven conceptually distinct types of personal relation, 
some of which may in practice overlap, especially the formal, imper- 





It could be argued that the first two are really variants of one re- 
lation; similarly the formal and informal could be construed as var- 
iants of a single type. As I am investigating the nature of empathy 
my concern with other personal relations is solely to appreciate the 
better the unique character of empathy. Other approaches to the an- 
alysis of personal relations might well lead to different and more 
useful sets of categories. I justify mine on the grounds of their 
relevance to empathy (which I regard as the peak experience for hum- 
an beings; my reasons form the content of Chapter 1), and because my 
set centre on ideas of involvement, respect for the beingness of 
things, emotional distance, commitment and above all on knowing and 
understanding in the widest sense. A deeper study of personal relat- 
ions is obviously worthwhile but is beyond the scope of this disser- 
tation. I now turn to the power relation which justifies a section 
on its awn. 
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2.21 The power relation and empathy 
When the other-than-self is another human being resistance may lead 
to conflict because the intentions of the two may differ. Accommod- 
ation always involves compromise in which both individuals gain 
something and lose something. The balance of gains-and losses may or 
may not favour one of the two individuals but irrespective of the 
final outcome there is always the risk that in any particular en- 
counter a power relation will emerge. One hypothesis worth exploring 
is that the power relation obtains when the perception of difference 
becomes transformed into a "perception" of division. Over time the 
self is able to discriminate between different other-than-selves and 
relate to each of them with greater and greater subtlety though 
there appears to be a limit. The degree of discriminability varies 
from one individual to another. Consideration of this limit (famil- 
iar-to students of person perception) leads us to the question: how 
is the experience of the givenness of difference, an event in pass- 
ive consciousness, related to the emergence of divisiveness, an 
action in active consciousness? Human action, the manifestation of 
intention, by its very nature is capable of converting perception of 
difference into "perception" of division. Division is the more or 
less deliberate categorisation of certain others according to what- 
ever attribute has special significance for the discriminator in 
more or less well-defined circumstances. The act of recognising and 
accepting another in the spirit of non-manipulative openness results 
in the direct perception of the other as he or she actually is; that 
is, the other's givenness is grasped non-attributively. The perceiv- 
er does not pigeon-hole the other by means of a covert category sys- 
tem or schema. In the absence of this openness, however, classifying 
others is likely and is fairly typical. Within the empathic relation 
a person seeking to know and understand another will tend not to 
classify him or her although ordinary human frailty will occasion- 
ally take its toll. Divisiveness refers to the belief that differ- 
ences provide the necessary and sufficient grounds for establishing 
and maintaining power relations between the entities perceived as 
different. Is it inevitable that perception of difference in the 
absence of the stance of non-manipulative openness should lead to 
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divisiveness? If so how does this come about? (In effect, how does 
the self come to equate difference with division)) Are all or any of 
these processes functions of action or do they have their origins 
elsewhere? 
The perception of similarities and differences and their relation- 
ship to empathy are discussed in several places In this dissertat- 
ion, e. g. 1.27,1.426,2.35. Differences are inevitable for genetic, 
environmental and developmental reasons. In themselves they are un- 
remarkable, a feature of our existential world; they indicate no 
more than the diversity of human biographies in all their richness 
including the variety of limitations from one individual to another,. 
which a healthy interdependence can substantially counteract in the 
ordinary everyday process of living. (16) I have tried to argue that 
healthy dependence on others in order to offset our own limitations 
is only possible within the empathic relation for only then are dif- 
ferences recognised for what they are, inspiring the members to en- 
gage in joint action in pursuit of a shared common ideal or goal 
(e. g. to support one another in their various inadequacies) non- 
manipulatively, non-judgementally, non-attributively. 
If my argument is sound then the prcblem of accounting for divisive 
manoeuvres becomes one of explaining how people come to consider 
differences as sufficiently psychologically threatening to induce 
them to behave exploitatively. Some explanations are cultural. Com- 
petitive societies encourage the exploitation of others; differences 
create advantages or disadvantages according to point of view. In 
the struggle to survive those with essential skills or knowledge, 
money or influence or special know-how (including contacts and priv- 
ileged information) have a head start over those who lack these qua- 
lities. Greed, envy and covetousness are also cultural artifacts 
which, though not perhaps peculiar to industrialised societies, are 
possibly more active among members of them and receive more nourish- 
ment there than in other kinds of social organisation. It appears to 
be more difficult to construe them as part of the human genetic en- 
dowment; socialisation offers a readier and more intelligible explan- 
ation. However, cultural determinism as an explanation would have to 
show how exploitation of differences becomes, and is sustained as, 
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the normal basis for. entering into interpersonal relations. There is 
no shortage of theories: operant conditioning, psychoanalysis, soc- 
ial exchange theory. 
The trouble with cultural determinism in its many forms is that it 
assumes an almost infinite degree of plasticity in the human being; 
people are'regarded as essentially infinitely malleable. Explanat- 
ions of this kind are virtually theories'about human nature. One of 
the benefits of the newer phenomenological and hermeneutical psycho- 
logies is their analysis of the active agency of the persons in 
their day-to-day existences. Humans are not simple (or complex) 
reactive organisms but agents generating intentions, to whom exist- 
ence is not only full of meaning but is wholly inexplicable without 
active recourse to searches for meaning as, part of the business of 
living,, in the world. (This suggests one of the routes for clarifying 
the notion of subjectivity. (17)) From this point of view conting- 
ency-based., explanations are inadequate. It is not enough to point to 
cultural determinants which move people to adopt divisive strateg- 
ies. Explanations must also show what their adoption does for the 
divisive individual. How does exploitation of others (on the basis 
of perceived differences) come. to have constructive or productive 
meaning for human agents? In short, how does divisiveness become 
part of the subjectivity of the human agent in his or her livingness 
in the world? 
To pursue this question (and others like it)'would take us too far 
afield but several points can be made. First, divisiveness is learn- 
ed and not innate. Secondly, the learning of divisive strategies is 
better explained with'the help of'the notion of human subjectivity 
(in the phenomenological sense) than by contingency-based theories 
such as operant conditioning, or by appealing to general theories 
about the nature of humankind. Thirdly, fear and anxiety, which are 
in part innate, may be potent factors. Although a few experiences 
appear to be naturally fear-arousing, e. g. sudden loud noises, the 
falling sensation, the visual cliff, most are learned. However, fear 
and anxiety seem essential to biological survival and are generally 
held to underpin the flight or fight response to threats. Again hum- 
ans behave differently from other animals who appear to know what to 
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do on the first occasion whereas humans do not. Nevertheless fear 
and anxiety appear to induce automatically a heightened state of 
readiness to act defensively in circumstances of threat or danger. 
Whether this on its own can or does lead to the adoption of divisive 
attitudes is a matter for further study but my own view is that, it 
is no more than a predisposing factor. The critical one is the soc- 
ialisation process which equips human beings not only with a ready- 
made repertoire of culturally acceptable actions in fear- or arsx- 
iety-arousing circumstances, but also defines what is fear- or 
anxiety-arousing. 
The striving, contact, resistance sequence may lead to conflict be- 
cause of the different purposes each individual will have. However, 
it does not follow that conflict rust lead to division. As l have 
tried to show earlier, aggresive conflict does not necessarily 
follow disagreement or difference of purposes, etc. lath persons may 
accept their differences or disagreements as an irreducible fact of 
life. Even if conflict does arise further exploration may point to 
ways of accepting the divergence of views without rescrting to dea- 
onstrations of ill-will of which the adoption of divisive strategies 
is one of the most Insidious. Each actor can choose whether to 
accommodate the other and to what degree. Negotiation is always an 
option. Whether the opportunity to negotiate will be taken up will 
depend an the attitudes of the participants to each other, to their 
enterprises, and to themselves. Finally, the persons can always 
admit that a particular conflict of intentions is beyond resolution 
and accept that state of affairs. It is always a matter of choice. 
It is one of my major premisses that the presence or absence of an 
empathic relationship between the individuals is what determines the 
final path: recognition and acceptance of difference or enforcement 
of division. 
One explanation of the failure to contain the effects of conflict 
possibly centres on the idea of value since all choices involve ev- 
aluation. The act of choosing rests on a sequence of steps (th-Du31 
this assertion itself rests on the assuspticn that all choices are 
considered, which is not to say rationally arrived at. First CC='-S 
discrimination: this is an X (and not a Y). It is a skill and, as 
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with any skill, is a function of informed practice. We need to know 
what attributes or properties are important and how to recognise 
them when they are present. Non-instances are as important as inst- 
ances during the acquisition process. Next comes judgement: X is 
good/bad for you because... It is a function of knowledge in action 
and involves the perception of relations as well as facts and prop- 
erties. Evaluation means putting a value on something: X is better 
than Y; Z is worth so much. It implies discrimination and judgement 
and a set of values which are dimensional and hierarchically arrang- 
ed. Preference includes all the above but in addition introduces the 
idea of satisfaction. That is preferred which to the preferrer seems 
most satisfactory at the time. It may not coincide with that which 
is most highly valued. Finally choice is an action whereas all the 
others are mental events. The sequence looks like this: 
discriminationý>judgement evaluation preferenceE>choicEj (=action) 
We do not necessarily choose that which we prefer nor that which we 
value most highly. Action has to adapt to the exigencies of the real 
world in which the choice is made. It is often argued that choice 
will focus on what the agent feels is the best, most appropriate, 
action in the circustances. 
We know that feelings are stimulated by, and hence become attached 
to, choices (and to the other steps in the value chain). In this way 
intentions, the mental substrate of action and therefore like action 
an outcome of the choice process, acquire differential value in the 
schemata of life-chances (a compound of past intentions, actions, 
and their experiential outcomes for the agent) which an individual 
accumulates through his or her evolving experience. This accumulated 
experience amounts to a personal history of active consciousness 
which will include memories of earlier gains and losses, balances 
and imbalances. This, it seems to me, is how we! might understand the 
notion of subjectivity. Thus a personal biography is not a passive 
affair, a repository so to speak of past events, their outcomes, and 
their attached feelings. It is an active process; the quality of the 
effort impelling' action is, an expression of the individual's living - 
ness which is coloured by his or her unique outlook or disposition, 
itself a function, in part, of past experience. The underlying psy- 
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chological and physiological elements will vary from one individual 
to another even if the object of experience (the focus of conflict) 
and the context of resistance are the same. It is easy to see that 
individual differences are likely to be found in all the elements 
constituting an act of choice. However, it is hypothesised that dif- 
ferences in the perceptions of value will tend to be the critical 
ones in determining the outcome (and the conduct) of conflict. 
The having mode of existence so typical of acquisitive societies is 
an obvious candidate for one of the formative influences in the 
evolution-of the power relation for the having mode may predispose 
individuals to adopt divisive strategies. The relationship between 
preference for the having mode of existence, the adoption of divis- 
ive strategies and the power relation needs further study. 
2.22 Summary bf the analysis of personal relations 
I suggest that personal relations may be classified in two different 
ways. The first crude distinction is that between interpersonal and 
non-human' relations. The finer-and more interesting classification 








Ey7independent I mean that if a self, for whatever reason, °is invol- 
ved with an other-than-self and is therefore relating to the other 
in one of these ways, there is nothing in the nature of the relation 
which will, of itself, cause a shift to one of the other six nor, 
should such a transition occur, is there any property of the first 
relation, of itself, which will determine the change which actually 
takes place. In other words the nature of the relation and the caus- 
es of a shift from one relation to another are to be found, in the 
intentions and-interests of the members of the relation and not in 
the nature of the relation itself. 
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By mutually exclusive I mean that it is not possible for the members 
simultaneously to enter into two different relations with each 
other. Here we need to be careful about whose point of view we are 
considering. As we have seen it frequently happens that an empathis- 
ing person (one who is trying to establish an empathic relation with 
another) strives to get to know and understand a hostile individual, 
one who might well adopt, or try to adopt, a power relation with 
the other. The two members, for a time at least, are in different 
relations; but neither participant can empathise with the other and 
at, the same'time maintain a power relation with him or her. In other 
words each type of relation has its own set of essential character- 
istics which uniquely distinguishes it from the others and which is 
antagonistic to, or at least out of kilter with, the characteristics 
of the other relations. 
To illustrate these observations consider a formal relation: 
manager-subordinate, leader-follower. Weber's study of leadership, 
often (mistakenly in my view) taken over lock, stock and barrel by 
management theorists, outlined some of the properties of the leader- 
follower relation. In Weber's analysis two distinctly different 
relations appear to be confused: a dominance relationship in which 
one member is superior to the other in certain important and stated 
ways, and one of the other types of relation. Which other type dep- 
ends on the category of leader Weber is considering. For example, 
the'traditional leader is the purest-instance of a formal relation. 
The dominance relation is what it is because it has always been so 
and the methods of choosing leaders in "traditional" societies (or 
sub-cultures) are likewise buried in ancient history. No other type 
of relation is or need be involved. The charismatic type of leader, 
in contrast, depends perhaps on an empathic or a quasi-empathic rel- 
ation from the follower's point of view and perhaps on a power rela- 
tion from the charismatic leader's perspective. In this case the 
particular formal type of relation (dominance in this example) is 
replaced by two other relations: the empathic or quasi-empathic and 
the power relations. In the legal-rational type of leadership the 
formal relation is replaced by the impersonal and is the purest 
example of this type. Perhaps for this reason management theorists 
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and practising managers have been eager to adopt it because it rep- 
resents in their view the stance of the ideal manager. There is no- 
thing in the nature of a formal relation (here represented by 
dominance) to suggest that a transition to, say, an empathic or 
quasi-empathic or a power or an impersonal relation is necessary or 
inevitable. Only the intentions, motives, interests of the members 
of the relation determine the nature of the actual relation (as seen 
from each participant's point of view) which exists between them. 
The sorry plight of industrial relations may be substantially due to 
the consequences of the participants adopting a type of relation 
more suited to their own (conflicting) motives than to the situation 
precipitating their confrontation. Similar arguments apply to legal 
or ritual relations which are other variants of the formal type. 
Neither has to become impersonal, for example, but frequently they. 
are made so; adoption of a particular formal relation can thus be- 
come a convenient defensive manoeuvre behind which to hide or from 
which to manipulate events; in the latter case the choice is for the 
power relation. 
Individuals may alter the basis of their relations with others at .. 
will in the ways described above. Moreover, as the analysis in these 
first two chapters suggests, individuals may change their ground 
within a relation according to their chosen form of knowing or their 
approach to the other (human being) as biological mechanism, organ- 
ism, psychophysical individual or person (and analogously for non- 
human others). The proposed classification system of personal relat-. 
ions seems to offer a new and dynamic approach to a theory of social 
relations which attempts to match closely their complexity as act- 
ually experienced in the real world. In addition it offers a basis 
for designing training programmes in social skills that are not con- 
ceived in manipulative terms or from the point of view of the expert 
helper in the manner, for example, of Carkhuff and his colleagues. 
2.3 FORMS OF EMOTIONAL EOND 
Empathy is an emotional bond in which at least one person approaches 
another in a spirit of openness, goodwill and respect (one of the 
152 
elements of love) and deliberately identifies at some stage with the 
other in order to discover the limits of their unique personal iden- 
tities (personhoods) to the enhancement of both. In mutual empathy 
(the ideal relation) mutual (non-sexual) love blossoms and prospers 
further encouraging the empathic relation and its associated open- 
ness and goodwill. There are other kinds of emotional tie and it 
might be instructive to examine some of these in order to see how 
they differ from empathy and also to deepen still further our grasp 
of the nature of the empathic relation. 
Every kind of emotional bond which one individual forges with anoth- 
er poses the question: what is the purpose of this tie? We need to 
know not only what it does for the initiator but also what he or she 
thinks it does for the other (if indeed such a question even crosses 
the initiator's mind). In the context of this dissertation another 
question presents itself: what determines the choice of the partic- 
ular bond being forged? Why sympathy rather than empathy? Or emot- 
ional identification rather than altruism? Or love rather than any 
other? We need to know how these various ways of forming emotional 
bonds with others differ and how they relate to one another. One 
approach to these tasks is to try and establish the essential char- 
acteristics and possibly the sufficient and necessary conditions for 
fostering and sustaining each of them. In this way a comparative 
study of the different types of emotional bond may help answer the 
questions posed above (and incidentally confirm that they are valid 
types of questions to ask). 
In approaching this task I do not claim any merit for my particular 
selection; as with personal relations I know of no systematic analy- 
sis of emotional bonds though Scheler's study of sympathy offers 
some useful pointers. In addition to empathy, already studied in 
Chapter 1, I shall here consider the following kinds: 
(a) sympathy (b) community of feeling 
(c) emotional contagion (d) emotional identification 
(e) (Freudian) identification (f) attraction (and repulsion) (and object cathexis) 




All the emotional ties in the above list are examples of fellow- 
feeling, "an overworked and consequently ambiguous term" as Mercer 
says. (18) Scheler's The Nature of Sympathy clarifies the concept 
considerably; he distinguishes four main types, (a) through (d) on 
my list above, all of which I shall be examining in this and the 
next three sections. We might have added empathy if Scheler had not 
rejected his (mistaken) understanding of this fellow-feeling. 
According to Scheler sympathy centres on two phenomenologically dif- 
ferent facts: the experience of the sympathiser (A) who rejoices or 
commiserates with the other (B), and the feelings of joy or grief 
experienced by B. In order that A may "participate" in B's feelings 
he or she must have understood or vicariously visualised them. These 
feelings will have been occasioned by an event but it is not neces- 
sary that A know what caused (i. e. precipitated) B's present state 
in order to grasp the givenness of B's feelings. In no sense are we 
to imagine that B's joy or grief somehow filters across to A who now 
experiences B's feelings in "sympathy"; "... in true unalloyed commis- 
eration and rejoicing there is no state of sorrow or joy in one- 
self. "(19) Phenomenologically the two sets of feelings are different 
and distinct; "... the two functions of vicariously visualised feel- 
ing, and participation in feeling are separately given and must be 
sharply distinguished. "(20) 
It was because Lipps, in his projective theory of empathy, confused 
these two that Scheler rejected such accounts. Lipps actually intro- 
duced three confusing ideas: imitation, emotional reproduction and 
projection. The spectator watching an acrobat internally imitates 
the performer's movements and so reproduces feelings which he or she 
has formerly experienced and which the spectator now projects on to 
the performer. Imitation obviously presupposes the givenness of the: 
phenomena it is invoked to explain and so adds nothing to the expl- 
anation. The spectator's (reproduced) feelings have no obvious con- 
nection with those of the performer thus leaving the status of the 
latter obscure in Lipps' theory. In any event they are now lost 
since they are distorted by the spectator's own (projected) feel- 
ings. 
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In Scheler's theory of sympathy the other's feelings are directly 
given in the other's expressiveness. All things, animate and inanim- 
ate, express their nature in their own beingness. For Scheler exp- 
ressive phenomena are given to us as 
a sort of primary "perception". It is in the blush that we per- 
ceive shame, in the laughter, joy... the same sense-data which 
go to make up the body for outward perception, can also cons- 
true, for the act of insight, the expressive phenomena which then appear, so to speak, as the "outcome" of experiences 
within. (21) 
The symbolic relation between the other's expressiveness and a 
self's experience derived from this "same sense-data" has 
a fundamental basis of connection, which is independent of our 
specifically human gestures of expression... a universal gram- 
mar, valid for all languages of expression. (22) 
Such a proposition is consistent with, and for Scheler a necessary 
1. consequence of, an organic conception of the world in which "all 
natural phenomena appear both as the undivided total life of a sin- 
gle world-organism and the universal fluid matrix in which it is 
expressed. "(23) He quotes approvingly Rodin's remark: "A thing is 
simply the shape and outline of the "flame" which gives it birth. " 
Thus to sympathise with another is inter alia to experience the 
other's givenness, that is, the other's expressiveness, and to be- 
come aware of the other's beingness, the "flame" which makes him, 
her or it, what each is and no other. Moreover, for Scheler the 
organic world view is a necessary precursor in contrast to a mechan- 
istic conception of the world which he associates with the post- 
Descartes era, the age of the new humanism. In relation to the 
theory of empathy presented here my distinction between having and 
being modes of existence roughly corresponds to Scheler's organic 
and mechanistic conceptions of the world especially as to their out- 
comes. Scheler's is the more erudite and encyclopaedic account yet 
he fails to stress clearly enough for me the important contrast 
between having and being which I feel is essential to-the study of 
any type of fellow-feeling. 
Several other points about Scheler's view of sympathy need to be 
made. First, 
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.. any kind of rejoicing or pity presupposes... some sort of knowledge of the fact... of experience in other people, just as 
the possibility of such knowledge presupposes as its condit- 
ion, the existence of other conscious beings. 
124) 
I shall not concern myself with the problem of establishing the ex- 
istence of other minds but we may agree that sympathy makes little 
sense unless we also imagine that conscious and sentient beings are 
its objects. Secondly, sympathy is intensional; that is, it is imp- 
licit in the idea of sympathy that we feel for someone about some- 
thing, e. g. A is glad far B about B's joy, commiserates with C about 
C's grief. Thirdly, sympathy involves knowledge, not necessarily an- 
alytical, intellectual knowledge; the sympathiser understands the 
other by grasping spontaneously and directly the other's expressive- 
ness (which Scheler seems to equate with undifferentiated identific- 
ation): 
The epistemological conclusion of this book will show us how, 
to be aware of any organism as alive, to distinguish even the 
simplest animate movement from an inanimate one, a minimum of 
undifferentiated identification is necessary; we shall see how 
the simplest vicarious emotion, the most elementary fellow- 
feeling, and over and above these the capacity for understand- 
ing be ween minds, are built up on the basis of this primitive 
givenness of "the other". (25) 
This process is unconscious and occurs 
. only when two spheres of man's consciousness which are by 
nature always present concurrently in him, are almost or wholly 
empty of particular content: the cognitive spiritual and 
rational sphere (which is personal in forma, and the sphere of 
physical and corporeal sensation and sensory feeling. Only in- 
as much and insofar as the acts and functions operative in 
these spheres are put out of action, does man become disposed to identification and capable of achieving it. (26) 
We must return to Scheler's notion of emotional unity (identificat- 
ion) in the appropriate section but the passage reproduced above 
brings to mind Krishnamurti's "quiet mind` and might find a kinship 
with the spirit of openness and the experience of the givenness of 
the world in passive consciousness which feature in my own theory of 
empathy. 
A fourth point focusses on the detachment inherent in sympathy. "For 
sympathy presupposes just that awareness of distance between selves 
... '(27) The sympathiser is always aware of his or her separateness 
from the other. According to Scheler in all other forms of fellow- 
feeling, including what he takes to be empathy, this separateness is 
lost. What is interesting in Scheler's account is his precondition 
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for sympathy: undifferentiated identification. This is characterised 
by a kind of fusion of the self with the other. How does a self move 
from a feeling of unity with the other in identification to the 
sense of detachment characteristic of sympathy? We must try to ans- 
wer this question in the proper place. 
Fifthly, sympathy is innate. 
Given the range of emotional qualities of which man is capable, 
and from which alone his own actual feelings are built up he has an equally innate capacity for comprehending the feelings 
of others, even though he may never on any occasion have en- 
countered such feelings (or their ingredients) in himself, as 
real unitary experiences. (28) 
Scheler is careful to point out that sensory feelings have to be ex- 
perienced in order that we may understand them in others but at the 
higher levels of vital, mental, and spiritual feelings this is not 
necessary. Scheler acknowledges wide variations in the exercise of 
sympathy attributable to racial, group and individual differences 
but he asserts that heredity plays a part the specific details of 
which are as yet unknown. He dismisses notions such as social ins- 
tinct (aiming his criticisms primarily at Darwin and Spenser). 
These and other writers, he feels, confuse social instinct with emo- 
tional infection, or with sexual instinct. In any event they have 
misunderstood the relationship between fellow-feeling and social- 
ity. Assimilating the experience of the livingness of others is not: 
.. a consequence, but a presupposition, of the possibility of any kind of sociality; for this as such must always be more than a mere spiritual proximity and purely causal efficacy of things upon each other. There is no such thing as a "society" 
of stones. Things are only "social" when they are in some sense 
present "for one another". (29) 
Thus for Scheler sympathy, a "positive unalloyed fellow-feeling, 
which is a genuine out-reaching and entry into the person and his 
individal situation, a true and authentic transcendence of one's 
self"(30), is preceded by undifferentiated identification that "is 
not only the separate process of feeling in another that is unconsc- 
iously taken as one's own, but his self (in all its basic attitudes) 
that is identified with one's own self"(31), and is an emotional 
bond in which the self experiences the "primitive givenness of "the 
other" ". This, incidentally, is not to be confused with specialised 
identification which I shall discuss in the section devoted to iden- 
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tification. It is this capacity for undifferentiated identification 
that is innate. Moreover it is the capacity to "read" the other's 
expressiveness that we are really talking about since it is through 
expressiveness that the beingness of phenomena become manifest. This 
is as true of the inanimate as the animate: 
Identification can extend to the cosmos only if the Ideas and 
Forms of Intuition which have pure and immediate application to 
the organic element in experience, are superimposed also on 
dead matter, its changes and motions doings and undoings, its 
coming-to-be and passing-away. Only 
then do all natural phenom- 
ena appear both as the undivided total life of a single world- 
organism and the universal fluid matrix in which it is express- 
ed... Once the expressed meaning is made out, the conative- 
affective self makes the immediate, non-inferential leap into 
the living heart of things, taking in their form and pattern 
and realizing that their perceptible attributes (colours, 
sounds, scents, tastes and so forth) are only the outward asp- 
ect and frontier of the inner life thus imparted. (32) 
Scheler appears to restrict the non-living to natural forms but I 
cannot see why human artifacts should be excluded. 
As we saw in an earlier excerpt(33) the activation of the innate 
tendency towards fellow-feeling is much easier in a society (or 
group or individual) that supports an organic conception of the 
world. It certainly requires a quiescent observer, one freed from 
mental and physical preoccupations which, of course, is not to say 
inactive or inattentive. 
The necessary and sufficient conditions that underpin A's sympathy 
for B thus appear to be: 
(1) that A and B are conscious and sentient beings; 
(2) that A vicariously reproduces B's feelings and understands them (or believes so); that is to say 
(a) A unconsciously identifies with B; and (b) A experiences the givenness of B. 
(3) A is conscious throughout of his or her separateness from 
Bi i. e. A "participates" in B's feelings without confusing 
his or her own feelings with those of B. 
In a recent study of sympathy Mercer introduces a number of ideas 
which seem to me either unnecessarily restrictive or irrelevant. (34) 
For example, he feels that sympathy essentially refers to another's 
suffering but not to pleasant feelings. This may be a matter of soc- 
ial custom but I do not see how pleasant feelings can be excluded 
from sympathy as a concept. On etymological grounds there is no 
basis for such a discrimination; and Scheler convinces us that 
neither is it justified on phenomenological grounds in relation to 
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sympathy itself. Secondly, Mercer feels that fellow-feeling must 
elicit an altruistic concern for the other in order to count as 
sympathy. If action is a consequence of fellow-feeling then I agree 
that it might ideally take the form of altruistic concern for the 
other; otherwise the sympathiser might intervene in the life of an- 
other unhelpfully or by imposition or, worse still, in order to exp- 
loit the other for his or her own ends. However, I do not think sym- 
pathy should be confused with its consequences and therefore I do 
not accept that the latter should form part of the set of conditions 
which must be fulfilled to claim that A sympathises with B. On the 
other hand a theory of sympathy which does assert a necessary altru- 
istic outcome must also show how this altruism necessarily follows 
from this particular fellow-feeling. Scheler himself shows that sym- 
pathy can lead to the kind of "charitable" action which leaves the 
recipient (the object of the donor's sympathy) resentful, humiliated 
and even more rejected than before experiencing the sympathiser's 
"good" work. Such an outcome does not accord with the usual meaning 
of altruism yet the sympathy and the "gift" may be, from the donor's 
point of view, genuine expressions of the sympathiser's feelings. 
The difference between empathy and sympathy can be expressed most 
simply by saying that sympathy may be an element of the empathic re- 
lation; or it may represent an empathic relation which has not 
reached fulfilment but has not degenerated into a lesser relation (a 
power relation, for example). Sympathy is essentially one way; mutu- 
al sympathy is possible but the qualities necessary for such a cond- 
ition are those which could lead to mutual empathy and I can think 
of few reasons why two people would choose to sympathise with one 
another rather than empathise. They might, of course, drift into 
mutual sympathy because they are ignorant of the more satisfying 
alternative. 
The sympathiser does not move towards the stage of deliberate ident- 
ification with the other; nor do they explore similarities and dif- 
ferences between them. Sympathy lacks that urge to, self- and other- 
enhancement' which is characteristic of empathy despite the attitude 
of openness, the spontaneous reaching out to the other and the exp- 
erience of the other's givenness all of which are common to both 
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sympathy and empathy. What appears to be lacking from sympathy is a 
positive move towards the other. We do not go out of our way to sym- 
pathise with someone. If the circumstances are right we may act sym- 
pathetically towards another but we do not enter into a sympathetic 
relation as we do into an empathic one. Indeed such an idea is odi- 
ous for it suggests a subtle contempt for the other. Genuine sym- 
pathy cannot be contrived; it can only be a fortuitous reaction to 
another's happiness or suffering. Once we actively engage in a rela- 
tion with the other, provided we do so non-manipulatively, we must, 
it seems to me, enter into an empathic relation (or in certain con- 
ditions, a quasi-empathic one). Empathy may blossom from the exper- 
ience we label sympathy though in most cases this is unlikely since 
sympathy occurs most commonly in passing encounters with others or 
even with those whom we have not met but have heard about. This is 
another major difference between the two; empathy is a relation be- 
tween a person and another human being both of whom are physically 
present to and for one another. Sympathy is possible for an absent 
other; every charitable organisation depends on it. In fact we are 
now probably talking about pity for a generalised other. 
Notwithstanding the obvious differences from empathy, sympathy, as 
Scheler construes it, is sufficiently similar in some important res- 
pects to accord it membership of the same family of interpersonal 
emotional bonds as empathy. 
2.32 Community of feeling 
This is Scheler's term (Miteinanderfuehlen) for that situation in 
which two or_more people together feel the same joy or sorrow be- 
cause "they feel and experience in common, not only the self-same 
value-situation, but also the same keenness of emotion in regard to 
it. "(35) To use Scheler's own illustration the sorrow of each parent 
at the loss of their-child (the value-content) and-the grief each 
experiences (the functional relation thereto) "are here one and 
identical. " This sharing of feeling through the similarity of each 
partner's inner and intimate grasp of the situation is quite dist- 
inct from sympathy as described above. Sympathy does not require 
that the participants shall share their personal biographies let 
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alone have that inner access to them so typical of married couples 
and long-standing friendships. 
Another explanation is possible, however. Each parent is nursing his 
or her own sorrow and giving vent to private grief. Assuming that at 
least one of them is well-disposed towards the other and maintains 
an attitude of openness then that parent may enter into an empathic 
relation with the other, grasping the other's givenness, recognising 
similarities and differences and moving towards the exploration of 
them with the other. They are well placed to carry out this mutual 
sharing through deliberate identification and to join in a common 
action to seek and achieve a'shared common goal: for example, to 
learn to bear their grief or perhaps to devote their lives to the 
alleviation of whatever caused the death of their child. In short 
their awareness of the unity and separateness"of their individual 
identities heightened through their shared grief could provide the 
occasion for a much more profound emotional bond than either symp- 
athy or community of feeling. Empathy need not follow from the situ- 
ation Scheler describes but if it does the community of feeling 
might, if it occurs, become one step in the process of mutual em- 
pathy. This seems to me to be a natural consequence of the common 
plight of these parents if the essential preconditions are present. 
Edith Stein argues along similar lines in her discussion of the re- 
lationship between empathy and the feeling of oneness with the 
other. (36) 
2.33 Emotional infection 
In a sense this is not a category of fellow-feeling at all since 
what we observe is a parody, a mere surface appearance of fellow- 
feeling. What happens is that a state of feeling in A somehow passes 
over to B who then behaves as though he or she had genuinely experi- 
enced the feeling. A's gaiety infects B who now becomes gay in turn 
but without knowing the source of A's jollity or realising that B's 
"happy" feelings are not his or her own and that their source lies 
in A. Children or adults can become infected with fits of the 
giggles because one of them is seized with uncontrollable laughter. 
This triggers a chain reaction in which the others spontaneously 
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burst into laughter "in sympathy". Other obvious examples are crowd 
behaviour among humans (e. g. lynch mobs, football vandalism, motor- 
way madness) and herd behaviour among animals. 
Spontaneous displays of grief at funerals by people not directly 
concerned with the deceased, particularly where the dead person was 
a loved public figure, is another good example of emotional infec- 
tion. So too are the often perplexing signs of euphoria at political 
gatherings and party conferences often in circumstances in which one 
would least expect it: after much bickering and rancour among mem- 
bers during the debating sessions, for example. It is a moot quest- 
ion whether some leader-follower relations are not better explained 
by the mechanism of emotional infection than that of emotional iden- 
tification. The guru-disciple relation in its many forms seems esp- 
ecially prone to this phenomenon. Disciples can be controlled not so 
much by the persona of the guru as by their own self-destructive 
tendencies which lead them to abandon themselves to the emotional 
bath which each member enjoys with others without recognising the 
source of his or her emotional surrender. The staging of the Nazi 
parades in the, '30s, of May Day parades in Moscow and other commun- 
ist countries, all kinds of marches and mass gatherings, offer fur- 
ther examples of, how this human tendency to wallow in highly charged 
fantasy is exploited. Fanatical sects and obsessional movements 
(e. g. nationalisms, fundamentalist revivals) also seem to rely far 
more on emotional infection than on ideological purity or tendencies 
for members to identify with either leaders or causes, for coalesc- 
ing the emotional energies of the masses. 
Scheler accounts for tradition in terms of emotional infection. 
In tradition... I believe that "A is B" because the other person 
does so, but without knowing that he does so; I simply share his opinions without distinguishing the act of understanding 
the sense of his belief from my own act of opining. Thus I may 
feel resentment, anger or love for a thing, or a cause because 
those about me do so or because my forbears did. But 
i take 
the emotions in question to be my emotions, engendered by the 
nature of the case (e. g. the cause itself), and have no suspic- 
ion of their origin. (37) 
Scheler attributes the great power of tradition to this conviction 
each of us has that such "acquired" emotions are genuinely our own 
and arrived at solely through consideration of the material (the 
cause, ideology, object of hate) to which they refer. 
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A final example is found in the way in which a setting may affect 
our mood. The "atmosphere" of a scene or location can and does af- 
fect people though some appear to be more vulnerable (or sensitive) 
to the "mood of place" than others. This phenomenon is also explic- 
able in terms of quasi-empathy as I have suggested elsewhere. 
What are the characteristics of emotional infection? First it is un- 
conscious. One is swept along on an emotional tide; one is possessed 
by its intensity. There is no conscious awareness of being infected; 
we just become gay, fearful, panic-stricken, violent or whatever the 
prevailing emotion determines but it is our own gaiety, fear, panic 
and so forth, that we experience. Moreover, we do not know why we 
feel as we do. There is no definable cause, though often this is 
manufactured on the spot. This is demonstrated in the well-known 
phenomenon of scape-goating. The apparent "cause" (the object of the 
prejudice) offers a substitute for the real one which is unknown to 
us and'often unknowable, beyond our reach. 
Secondly, it is spontaneous. It is not a function of deliberate in- 
tention. It is an event which takes over some part of our conscious 
life. This is a third characteristic: it is beyond our conscious 
control. Once possessed, only exhaustion or some act of completion 
(e. g. the actual' lynching) can bring the infection to an end. One of 
the causes of loss of self-control is the self-generating character 
of emotional infection through a positive feedback process. 
The emotion caused by infection reproduces itself again by 
means of expression and imitation so that the infectious emot- 
ion increases, again reproduces itself, and so an... it is above 
all this reciprocal effect of a self-generating infection which 
leads to the uprush of a common surge of emotion, and the char- 
acteristic feature of a crowd in action, that is so easily car- 
ried beyond the intentions of every one of its members and 
does things for which no one acknowledges either the will or 
the responsibility. (38) 
Emotional infection is clearly a most potent emotional bond but a 
relatively short-lived one. Hence organised religions, political 
parties, particularly the fundamentalist types of either, need to 
recharge the emotional batteries of their followers at frequent in- 
tervals with careful attention to the awe-inspiring paraphenalia of 
mass "hypnotism". 
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Emotional infection has little in common with sympathy and even less 
with empathy. In fact its right to be included in any discussion of 
fellow-feeling rests solely on its superficial resemblance to fel- 
low-feeling and the fact, as Scheler points out, that many disting- 
uished thinkers have confused the two, Spencer, Darwin and Nietzehe 
among them. 
2.34 Emotional identification 
Scheler equates identification with a "true sense of emotional 
unity" and is thus a limiting case of emotional infection. 
It represents a limit in that here it is not only the separate 
process of feeling in another that is unconsciously taken as 
one's own, but his self (in all its basic attitudes), that is 
identified with one's own self. (39) 
This is an involuntary and unconscious process and may take two 
forms. In the idiopathic type a self identifies "through the total 
eclipse and absorption of another self by one's own", a form of psy- 
chological murder. In the heteropathic type a self's "formal status 
as a subject is usurped by the other's personality, with all its 
characteristic aspects"; the self is totally overwhelmed by, surren- 
ders to, the other in a kind of submission, even to the point of 
psychological suicide. 
Scheler gives as examples the identification among some primitive 
tribes of individual members of a totem with individual members of, 
the totem species (e. g. red parrots in the case of the Earoso 
tribe); identification of tribe members with their ancestors (not 
the same as ancestor worship); mass-identification with the leader; 
the ecstatic identification of the votaries in the religious rites 
of antiquity in which they "became" gods or godesses; the relation 
between the hypnotist and his subject (which differs from the fore- 
going in that under hypnosis the subject takes on the character of 
the hypnotist whereas in the previous examples the identifier takes 
on the existence of the other). Other examples include children's 
make-believe, e. g. the little girl playing -mother" to her dolls; 
the "mutual coalescence" of truly loving sexual intercourse when the 
partners "in an impassioned suspension of their spiritual personal- 
ity (itself the seat of individual awareness), seem to relapse into 
a single life-stream in which nothing of individual selves remains 
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any longer distinct... "(40); the similar phenomenon in the unorgan- 
ised group in which under the leader ("the despotic idiopath") the 
individual members gradually merge "into a single stream of instinct 
and feeling, whose pulse thereafter governs the behaviour of all its 
members, so that ideas and schemes are driven before it... "(41); the 
mother-child relationship; "sympathetic" behaviour among many 
species of animals exemplified by Scheler in the relationship be- 
tween the ammophila (a species of wasp) and its living food store (a 
paralysed caterpillar) on which it lays its eggs. Most of these ill- 
ustrate the heteropathic type of identification. Mutual coalescence 
is neither one nor the other type. The wasp-caterpillar relationship 
allows'Scheler to explore the instinctual character of identifica- 
tion. 
As with infection so with identification there can be no genuine 
fellow-feeling since, the self is unable to distinguish between his 
or her own self and that of the other. The other and the self are 
totally merged into a single reality: the experiencing self. Since 
Scheler claims that fellow-feeling grows out of identification we 
have the problem, of showing how a self becomes conscious of separ- 
ateness from the other which, he asserts, is a necessary precondit- 
ion for genuine sympathy. This we shall return to in a moment. 
The instinctive character of identification he elaborates in a vari- 
ety of ways. According to Scheler young children, primitives and 
subjects under hypnosis show similar psychological characteristics: 
.. the faulty differentiation of perception and imager ; the ecstatic habit of surrendering in passively riveted attention 
to whatever is presented; the increasingly affective and inst- 
inctive properties of the content experienced...; the liability 
to faulty discrimination between "I" and "Thou" and the con- 
current tendency to identify with the other self'. (42) 
Although he shows that hypnosis has psychological features unique to 
itself the similarity between these three groups impressed him suf- 
ficiently to argue that undifferentiated identification is instinct- 
ive'and operates an the "vital centre of consciousness", that half- 
way point between the spiritual and sensory levels of being. I take 
this to be Scheler's attempt to deal with the elusive "I" at the 
centre of this experience of emotional unity. In his conception of 
humankind there are four levels of being each representing a level 
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in his value schema and a location for the experiencing "I" which is 
the focus of consciousness at each level of being. The location of 
the "vital centre of consciousness" is 
.. that climatic region of the soul to which belong the ener- gies of life and death, the passions, emotions, drives and 
instincts; (these are of three types: the instinctive appetites 
of hunger and thirst the erotic life-instincts and their deri- 
vatives, and the instinctive desire for power, dominance, inc- 
rease and reputation. ) It is impulses such as these which may 
lead, in their conscious manifestations, to the sense of unity 
and identification proper. (43) 
The similarity with Freud's notion of the Id is striking., Scheler 
offers few clues as to how these impulses lead to "identification 
proper", which is "... automatic, never a matter of choice or of 
mechanical association... " and which requires that the personal 
and physical levels of being "are almost or wholly empty of con- 
tent". He compares perception and instinctive behaviour: 
Parallel to this (i. e. the holistic character of perception) we 
find the same simple and unitary vital principle displa'ing it- 
self in a range of instinctive impulses, built hierarchically 
one upon another, and becoming ever more specific with every 
change in the structure and circumstances of the organism. 
These impulses are simply the more or less conscious correlates 
of what are, objectively speaking, the constituent acts of its 
vital activity as a whole... Wherever we have to postulate a 
more-than-reflex reaction in an organism, this is never intel- ligible as a direct outcome of the sum-total of individual 
chemical and physical stimuli impinging on the bodily struc- 
ture; it is intelligible only in terms of the individual object 
as an integral whole; this being itself understood only as part 
of a unitary situation within a total environment presenting, 
for each kind of organism, a typical structure determined in 
advance of any perceptual or sensory acquaintance with it. (44) 
In this passage Scheler not only further elaborates the instinctive 
character of identification and its location in his conceptualisa- 
tion of a living entity; he also points to another distinction, that 
between undifferentiated and specialized identification. The latter 
refers to the self's responsiveness to the character of a specific 
situation which "includes the self and the other, in their unique be- 
ingness in that situation, the integral whole within a typical 
structure as Scheler puts it. Specialized identification is built up 
out of undifferentiated identification; the accumulated experiences 
of the "primitive givenness of "the other" " provide the basis not 
only for fellow-feeling but also for "the capacity for a specialized 
identification with the particular dynamic, of another creature's 
1ifestream". 
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Humankind, says Scheler, has very largely lost this capacity due to 
the greater power of intellect, the burgeoning of rationalism and 
the growth of civilisation. He laments this atrophy though recognis- 
ing the value of progress. 
Only by identification at the organic level, and only by learn- 
ing, on the intellectual plane, to understand the form and pat- 
tern of other ways of life, can we hope for a gradual smoothing 
out of the private idiosyncracies and limitations besetting 
each of us like a horse in blinkers. (45) 
Both the intuitive primitive identification process and intellectual 
activity appear to be necessary for understanding "other ways of 
life". How are the two related and how does the awareness of the 
separateness of selves arise that is so essential for genuine sympa- 
thy? The answer, says Scheler, is to be found in 
the only place where identifications can take place... midway 
between bodily consciousness, which embraces in its own spec- 
ific fashion all organic sensations and localized feeling, and 
that intellectual-cum-spiritual personality which is the centre 
of activity for all the "higher" acts of intention. For it 
seems to me certain that neither the spiritual nucleus of our 
personality and its correlates, nor our body and the phenomena 
(such as organic sensations and sensory feelin s) whereby we 
apprehend the modification or restriction of its field are 
such as to allow of the identification or sense of unity invol- 
ved in each of the cases (of identification) cited. A man's 
bodily consciousness, like the individual essence of his 
personality, is his and his aIone. (46) 
Thus our sense of individual identity lies between the sensory and 
the mental-spiritual fields. Identification (sense of emotional uni- 
ty) can only occur when these two levels of experience are quiescent 
as we have already seen. (33) Moreover, if identification is a neces- 
sary condition for sympathy, it is certainly not sufficient. Our 
sense of self is ours alone providing the ground for developing our 
sense of separateness from others. 
We can appreciate the extent to which Scheler's account of identifi- 
cation differs from Freud's; in addition we can see how it underlies 
genuine sympathy (and empathy too but not as Scheler understood it). 
In both emotional bonds an understanding of another's feelings requ- 
ires that we enter into the beingness of the other and experience 
his or her primitive givenness. According to Scheler this we can do 
only through the identification process (compounded out of a history 
of undifferentiated identifications and the capacity for specialized 
identification) in which we come to "read" intuitively, directly, 
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the other's expressiveness. But we need also to be aware of our sep- 
arateness from the other. 
Some further difficulties need to be dealt with. First, how in rela- 
tion to a specific act of sympathy (or empathy in my case) is the 
identification process initiated? (According to Scheler this is 
spontaneous and unconscious; it cannot be contrived or actively 
sought. In my terms it is an event which just happens. ) Secondly, 
how is the "sympathiser" (or empathiser) made aware of the given- 
ness of his own feelings within the specific situation precipitat- 
ing the act of sympathy (or empathy)? Thirdly, what is the precise 
nature of the relation between any specific act of sympathy (or emp- 
athy) and (a) the sensory and mental-spiritual levels of being 
(where an individual is conscious of his or her unique beingness); 
and (b) the organic level. 
Scheler's answer to the first question is simply to appeal to the 
existence of an instinct for identification (which, he says, in civ- 
ilized man has virtually disappeared). Identification proper is 
.. due to a specific "vital causality" different in kind both from rational purposiveness and from (formal) mechanical effic- 
acy. Among other essential features of this basic causal relat- 
ion we may notice its automatic, vectorial and goal-seeking 
(not purposive) character; it is a concrete causality a tergo 
of the past as a whole (as distinct from immediately antecedent 
causes of the uniformly recurrent, qualitatively identical 
type). (47) 
If identification is not a matter of deliberate choice neither is it 
a function of simple association along S-R lines. It has direction 
and a functional end but has no specific implicit or explicit inten- 
tion. It has its roots in the accumulated experiences of an individ- 
ual (that amounts to his or her-or its personal history). 
Nevertheless a person can prepare for identification by elevating 
"himself "heroically" above the body and all its concerns, while be- 
coming at the same time "forgetful", or at least unmindful, of his 
spiritual individuality". (48) Apart from the questionable status of 
instinct and vital causality Scheler does not tell us how we set 
about these tasks nor does he enlarge on what actually happens. My 
answer for empathy is to rely on the idea of the stance of openness 
which anyone can cultivate and which is a natural property of some 
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primitive people, small children, women with young children and 
some neurotics, as Scheler says of the instinct for identification. 
Neuroses might, in my view, be a consequence of a predisposition to 
be especially sensitive to the beingness of the real world; height- 
ened perception might engender anxiety, or in extreme cases, ter- 
ror. 
Scheler has a similar notion to openness as we have already seen: 
the necessary emptiness of "the cognitive, spiritual and rational 
sphere... and the sphere of physical and corporeal sensation and 
sensory feeling". (49) He also suggests that love is a necessary 
condition. "Fellow-feeling depends entirely on the nature and depth 
of love involved". (50) We shall examine the phenomenon of love in a 
later section but here we can recall that fellow-feeling depends on 
identification and note that 
Love calls explicitly for an understanding entry into the in- 
dividuality of another person distinct in character from the 
entering self, by him-accepted as such and coupled indeed with 
a warm and whole-hearted endorsement of "his" reality as an 
individual, and "his" being what he is. (51) 
Scheler's "love" combines much of what I mean by the stance of 
openness, the non-manipulative attitude and goodwill. Its essence 
is'the "giving and receiving of freedom, independence and individ- 
uality". It is therefore in love that we identify with'the other and 
... in love as it gradually re-emerges 
from the state of 
identification, there is built up within the phenomenon it- 
self, a clean-cut consciousness o two distinct persons. (52) 
We thus have the following process at work in sympathy: 
organic consciousness quiescent sensory and 
of the world spiritual levels of 
ii of being 
love unconscious identification . Ir- 
14 
givenness of givenness of 
own feelings other's feelings 
consciousness 
of separateness SYMPATHY 
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Before looking at the second question we must remind ourselves that 
it does not follow from his or her particular act of identification 
that a person will be moved to sympathise with the other (any more 
than an empathic relation will necessarily develop out of the self's 
attempt to enter into one). Scheler himself points out that there 
are different levels of sympathy depending on the depth of love pre- 
ceding it. Where no love for the particular individual exists, say 
for a superior by a subordinate, "sympathy" for the former on the 
occasion of his or her forthcoming marriage will often take the form 
of a conventional gesture, if the subordinate does anything at all. 
Or pity for someone who has hit hard times may take the form of con- 
descension, a chilling demonstration of the "sympathiser's" superi-, 
ority and (contemptuous) generosity. In either case some form of id- 
entification is necessary in order for the "sympathiser" to be able 
to grasp the other's situation as one calling for sympathy (i. e. the 
"sympathiser" must minimally apprehend the other's feelings). Yet 
although these examples (cited by Scheler or very similar to his) 
conform to his criteria of sympathy I find it difficult to use this 
term to describe either situation. 
Turning to the second question it asks, in effect, whether we exper- 
ience the givenness of our own feelings in identification in the 
same way as we grasp the other's feelings. Scheler points out that 
self-knowledge is more difficult to acquire than knowledge of others 
just because we are so close to ourselves. We feel that our special 
intimacy with our personal history in all its convolutions gives us 
a privileged view, a seat in the front stalls of our own private 
drama. But this is not a sufficient reason for supposing that self- 
perception is any different from other-perception; the givenness of 
real world phenomena (including ourselves) occurs only in certain 
conditions. For Scheler this includes the quiescence of the sensory 
and spiritual levels of being (the twin locations of personal iden- 
tity) and the function of vital consciousness where alone identific- 
ation with another is possible. Since we cannot identify with our- 
selves (for each of us is a single centre of consciousness irrespec- 
tive of the level of being of which we are conscious) it seems to 
follow that self-knowledge is only possible when identifying with 
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another. In the quiescent and other conditions of Scheler or in my 
attitude of openness towards, and non-manipulative acceptance of, 
the other, the twin experiences of self and other are separate, or 
rather the feelings of self and other are grasped and intuitively 
understood as separate phenomena in the single experience of the 
givenness of the Self-Other relationship which includes the context 
and relevant prehistory. Scheler quotes Schiller: 
If you would know yourself, take heed of the practice of others; 
If you would understand others, look to your own heart within you. 
It seems hardly necessary to draw attention to the differences be- 
tween Scheler's sympathy and my empathy. In empathy the similarities 
and differences between the participants, grasped intuitively in 
passive consciousness, form the basis of further exploration in 
deliberate identification which may ultimately lead to joint Action 
in pursuit of a shared common goal or ideal. Deliberate identificat- 
ion plays-no part in sympathy. Moreover, although concern for the 
other is a consequence rather than an element of sympathy, joint 
action is an essential element of empathy as I construe it; it is in 
this Joint action phase that differences are resolved (as"far as 
they can ever be), personhoods are established and ideally mutual 
love created leading to a regeneration of the whole cycle as previ- 
ously described. 
The third question I' shall not attempt for to do so would involve me 
in a critical study of Scheler's whole philosophical scheme. The 
four levels of being are related to his hierarchical innate system 
of values (the "ordo amoris") which in turn constitutes one of the 
cornerstones of his philosophical edifice. I pose the question be- 
cause I think the articulation of the vital level of being with the 
sensory (the lowest level) on the one hand, and with the spiritual 
level (the highest level) on the other, is problematical. The level 
of spirit is the region of the person and is therefore the locus of 
action since a person is a focus of actions within a single psycho- 
physical individual. It is persons who love, who have (genuine) 
fellow-feeling; yet it is at the level of vital consciousness, the 
organic level where individuals may identify with one another, with 
other living things and, in certain circumstances, with the inanim- 
ate universe. 
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One point of articulation is love for in love, as we have seen, we 
become aware of our separateness from the other even when fusing 
with him or her in unconscious identification. While consciousness 
of our unique beingness resides in the highest and lowest levels, 
our sense of unity with others lies at the organic or vital, inter-, 
mediate level. It is as though the sphere of our psychic life rolled 
from its place at the vital centre of our being sometimes towards, 
the sensory, bodily level of consciousness and sometimes towards the 
spiritual, on an emotional see-saw pivoted on the fulcrum of love. 
In summary we can say that, for the purpose of the study of empathy, 
Scheler's emotional identification counts among its predisposing 
conditions: 
(a) the suspension of activity at the levels of biological 
mechanism and of person; 
(b) a world view which recognises and acknowledges a continu- ity among all living things and by analogy, among the 
non-living also in terms of their intrinsic beingness; 
(c) a spontaneous act of love in which the sympathiser is 
moved to reach out to the other. 
Identification is spontaneous, unconscious and necessary for symp- 
athy to occur; it is through identification that we experience the 
other's givenness and our own but always within the framework of a 
specific situation involving the two (or more) participants. In 
Scheler's account it seems that although the 'sympathiser' first 
identifies with the other and experiences the other's and his or her 
own givenness the self also grasps the givenness of the whole situ- 
ation, i. e. is able to apprehend the dynamic pattern involving self, 
other, and their respective states and feelings. From the point of 
view of the theory of empathy presented here the outcome of uncons- 
cious identification (comparable to the outcome of my 'givenness of 
the other in passive consciousness') could as well be a move towards 
the development of empathy as to an act of sympathy. (rut we would, 
have to exclude those superficial and condescending forms that 
Scheler counts as sympathy, because they reflect attitudes in the 
self that are antipathetic to openness, respect, and non-manipulat- 
ive regard for the other. ) 
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2.35 Attraction 
It is a common enough experience for one human being to feel attrac- 
ted towards (or repelled by) another. It is chacteristic of this ex- 
perience that it occurs on first acquaintance (though it can also 
develop later in the relationship) and is usually immediate in its 
impact; we take an instant like or dislike to someone at our first 
meeting. In the former case there often follows a willigness or 
readiness (given that the other offers signs of encouragement or, 
at the very least, no obvious signs of discouragement) to reach 
out, or move towards the other, to, want to get to know him or her 
better. This urge may persist even in the face of the other's indif- 
ference, resistance, or resentment. 
Attraction is not inconsistent with the empathic relation and may 
well follow from the self's attitude of openness towards the other 
and the self's spontaneous experience of the other's givenness in 
passive consciousness. In such a way may the self be drawn to the 
other through recognising the characteristics they share although 
differences will also be grasped, but not resolved, at this stage. 
Stewart-in his account of empathy invokes Freud's notion of posit- 
ive transference which resembles the phenomenon of attraction. ' In 
Freudian theory positive transference refers to a spontaneous af- 
fection for another, an urge to bask in the warmth of the other's 
support,. to find in the other security and safety. It is essent- 
ially, a dependency relation, in which one person spontaneously and 
unconsciously identifies with another. in the sense of wanting to do 
whatever will maintain the other's protective warmth. Negative 
transference, in contrast, refers to the experience of the other's 
rejection or hostility which is felt as a diminution of the self, a 
devaluation of'the self's worth. Transference in either sense may 
not 'accurately reflect the state of the real-world. A self may perc- 
eive another incorrectly as warm (or hostile); the self may be mis- 
led by his or her own distorting tendencies, desires, and so forth, 
or by the other's manipulative skills and wiles. - Nevertheless the 
experience is real enough as are its felt consequences. Whilst it is 
obvious that a person in positive transference is attracted to the 
other, alternative explanations for this reaching out come to mind, 
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each with a different theoretical base. One centres on the empathic 
relation as described in this dissertation and as briefly illustrat- 
ed at the beginning of this paragraph. Although Stewart's theory of 
empathy(53) includes an unconscious stage (involving Freud's notion 
of transference) my own does not. Only a prior non-manipulative 
openness to the world is necessary in order to promote or-facilitate 
the occurrence of the givenness of the other in passive conscious- 
ness. 
Another alternative draws on the nature of the power relation in 
which a self sees in the other that which he or she wants and which 
sufficiently motivates the self to get to know the other better in 
order to satisfy his or her desires. An obvious example is sexual 
attraction but many of the relations which Ferne(54) discusses in 
his study of the "games people play" depend on the perceived attrac- 
tiveness of others as sources of the satisfaction of one's own . 
wants. We may feel drawn to another because the other has instrumen- 
tal value for us. I am not suggesting that all sexual attraction is 
accounted for in terms of an incipient power relation. Love (as_I 
conceptualise it and Scheler also) is at least as likely a source of 
the other's sexual attractiveness. 
Similarly a self may feel repelled by another either because the 
other appears to be unable or unwilling to satisfy the self's wants 
or because the other adopts a manipulative approach towards the 
self. The other may be genuinely hostile or the self may misperceive 
the other either through genuine misunderstanding or because of the 
other's social ineptness or because of the self's own personal inad- 
equacies which tend to distort his or her perception of others. 
It follows from these and similar considerations that the accurate 
perception of others is one determinant of the quality of the attr- 
action that one self may feel for, another, which in turn will affect 
the depth of the relations entered into. At one extreme the per- 
ceived similarities and differences are superficial; or they may be 
rather more than skin-deep in the sense that a self's perceptions 
penetrate beneath the other's "surface"; or, at the other extreme, a 
self profoundly grasps the other. In the context of the theory of 
empathy presented in these pages the last may be a function of the 
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empathic relation since in empathy differences are explored and 
hence the personhoods of both members of the relation are grasped 
and understood in both passive and active consciousness. As a con- 
sequence the likenesses and differences are grasped in depth to the 
enhancement of'both members. Perception of little more than surface 
similarities suggests an impersonal relation, in which the other is 
an object-, of interest in relation to a self's wants; only those 
aspects of the other which have an instrumental value to the self 
merit. attention. It may also signal an incipient power relation 
though; it-is questionable how far power relations can be-maintained 
(in the absence of coercion) with only a superficial understanding 
of the_pther. The.. depthrto, which the likenesses and differences are 
explored may range from superficial to deep depending on the manipu- 
lator's perception of the other's value, to him or her. According to 
the-present theory, in the absence of, goodwill and openness towards 
the other's nature, it seerns.. unlikely that a self will perceive the 
other's givenness much beyond the obvious. Moreover in the power 
relation the manipulator's self-interest will tend to have a distor- 
ting effect an such experience of the other's givenness as he or she 
does have. 
2.36 Freud's view of identification 
Freud very clearly differentiated between identification and object- 
cathexis though they have a superficial resemblance and both proces- 
ses form profoundly influential emotional ties with others: 
(Identification) is a very important form of attachment to 
someone else, probably the very first, and not the same thing 
as the choice of an object. The difference between the two can 
be expressed in some such way as this. If a boy identifies him- 
self with his, father, he wants to be like his father; if he 
makes him the object of his choice, he wants to have him, to 
. possess 
him. (55) 1 
The distinction between "having" and "being" he never explored again 
though there is a diary entry which shows that much later in his 
life the issue still concerned him: 
July 12. "Having" and "being" in children. Children like exp- 
ressing an object-relation, by an identification: "I am the obj- 
ect". "Having" is the later of the two; after loss of the obj- 
ect it relapses into "being". Example: the breast. "The breast 
is part of me, I am the breast. " Only later: "I have it" - that is, "I am not it"... (56) 
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Identification in the first passage is to be understood as "the ass- 
imilation of one ego by another", that is to say, the process of 
"coming to resemble another", "becoming another". The outcome of 
this process is that: 
.. the first ego behaves like the second in certain respects, imitates it and in a sense takes it up into itself. ( 7) 
In this passage Freud's and Scheler's conception of the term seem 
very much alike. The sense of emotional unity between the two per- 
sons (and possibly between one person and an animal or thing) is 
very strong in both accounts. Freud goes so far as to liken identif- 
ication to "oral, cannibalistic incorporation of the other person". 
Assimilation cannot be more intimate than for one individual to be- 
come the flesh and blood of another. However, in this same passage 
he refers to modelling: 
In the first case (i. e. identification) his eqo is altered on 
the model of his father; in the second case (i. e. object- 
choice) that is not necessary. Identification and object-choice 
are to a large extent independent of each other; it is however 
possible to identify oneself with someone whom, for instance, 
one has taken as a sexual object, and to alter one's ego on his 
model. (58) 
Freud considers another case: homosexuality. The young male homosex- 
ual has identified with (become) his mother who formerly was his 
object-choice. Now he must alter his ego to be like her and so, for 
example, love boys like himself in the same way as his mother loved- 
him: 
The boy represses his love for his mother: he puts himself in 
her place, identifies with her, and takes his own person as a 
model in whose likeness he chooses the new objects of his 
love... the boys whom he loves as he grows up are after all only 
substitutive figures and revivals of himself in childhood - boys whom he loves in the way in which his mother loved him... {59). 
Modelling oneself on another and incorporating or assimilating an- 
other into oneself seem to be entirely different metaphors, refer- 
ring to quite different phenomena, despite the fact that they never- 
theless arrive at. the same end: "to make the same". That Freud used 
both metaphors suggests that he perceived the difference and felt 
that both form part of the process he called identification. It is 
possible that "having" and "being" on the one hand and assimilation 
and modelling on the other are somehow related. Let us explore this 
possibility. 
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Freud mentions a strange property of the ego. Having pointed to the 
distinction between identification and object-choice (wanting "to 
be" someone or something and wanting "to have" that person or thing) 
he goes on: 
., the distinction, that is, depends upon whether the tie attaches to the subject or to the object of the ego. (60) 
There cannot be a subject of the ego unless we invent a transcendent- 
al "I", a quest which preoccupied Husserl all his life. As Schutz 
(61) has remarked it-is difficult to see how such an entity could 
ever be discovered. -Be 
that as it may it is doubtful whether Freud 
had such a notion in mind. A few lines further on he seems to admit 
as much: "It is much more difficult to give a clear metapsychologic- 
al representation of the distinction". The simplest meaning one can 
attach to the idea is to say that the ego (the executive institution 
of personality) is intelligible only as a subject "I" standing be- 
fore a predicate. The predicate may refer to an action or a state; 
chief among these are "have" and "be" respectively. ' Such a far- 
ranging interpretation of "have" enables us to include all actions 
under this-single term by imagining that every action implies mast- 
ery over what is acted upon. To be master or mistress of something 
is to possess it. In this case the emotional tie to an object both 
confirms and expresses that feeling of mastery, of possession., What 
I possess I love. Thus the object of "having" is also the object of 
the ego possessing it. The ego is tied to the object. In the case 
of-"I am" (and similarly for "become") the meaning is unclear with- 
out a further reference to the subject "I" through a complement, 
e. g. "I am father"; -"I am mother". The subject "I" and the comple- 
ment are one and the same. Therefore the emotional tie is to the 
"I" (the ego as subject) because it is tied to its complement', that 
which is sought after and which is assimilated by the ego. 
Arguing along these linguistic lines we might try to test the relev- 
ance of the idea of modelling which Freud introduces in the next 
sentence: "We can only see that identification endeavours to mould a 
person's ego after the fashion of the one that has been taken as a 
model". In his examples only a single trait or characteristic is 
taken over by the identifying ego. Partial identifications appear to 
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be typical though in the evolution of the superego the source of the 
ideal, and therefore the ideal itself, seem to be taken over comp- 
letely. In this case too Freud uses the analogy of modelling. It 
seems to me that Freud's distinction between "having" and "being" is 
the distinction between wanting to be like someone (perhaps because 
that person stands in a certain relationship with another that the 
desiring ego would like to enjoy) and wanting to have certain prop- 
erties of another person (because that person obtains certain advan- 
tages through his possession of them which the desiring ego would 
like to enjoy). In other words the distinction rests on what is de- 
sired: the whole person and his relationship with another, or selec- 
ted attributes of a person and the power or advantages that they 
confer. "To be strong like father" is not at all the same as "to be 
like father". In the first case one merely wishes to possess what 
father has whereas in the second case one wants to be father in his 
entirety, in short to supplant him but in a fashion which father 
will accept and possibly admire and praise. (62) The notion of model- 
ling might be useful in the former case perhaps by the simple device 
of imitating the desired trait whereas the second calls for nothing 
less than total or near total assimilation. Scheler appears to me to 
be right in assigning this aspect of Freud's conception of the iden- 
tification process-to emotional infection in its purest form: emot 
ional unity with someone. The idea of modelling appears not only in- 
appropriate but irrelevant. However, when and if the identification 
process becomes conscious then modelling must surely play a part for 
the simpler process of imitation is quite inadequate to explain the 
subtleties and complexities of this more elaborate and directive 
form of identification. Stewart makes much of conscious identifica- 
tion (and even uses the term "re-identification") in his account of 
the empathic process. 
In my account of empathy unconscious identification plays no part, 
its place being taken by the experience of the other's givenness in 




Love is construed here as an effortless, spontaneous act or movement 
towards the loved object. It is centred on the beingness of the 
loved object (the personhood in the case of human beings). It is 
accepting, non-judgemental, non-manipulative and cannot be explained 
in terms of reasons. One just loves the loved object for and in it- 
self, for and in its unique beingness and livingness. Love has noth- 
ing to do with physical or psychological properties of the loved 
person except to the extent that it is through them that the expres- 
siveness of-the loved one is made manifest. What is grasped in love 
is the loved one's unique nature (i. e. his or her personal ident- 
ity). ---` 
To perceive and focus on a particular physical trait (e. g. blue eyes) 
or a set of physical characteristics (a well-proportioned and finely 
shaped face) or to give special attention to psychological traits 
(eager, stubborn, quick-witted, compassionate) even if these should 
display themselves as persistent tendencies, is to fragment, typify 
and label a complex individual in terms of contingent properties, 
however stable. Is this individual always eager, compassionate, etc? 
Is the whole of the person expressed in the finely wrought face? And 
do these features never change, according to mood for instance? Even 
if we could list a million traits our position would be no better. 
In fact if anything our plight would be worse since the variablity 
we know to be characteristic of all living beings would overwhelm 
our ability to grasp. No set of characteristics, not even a totality 
of them, can possibly declare the nature of a person. 
The lover loves the loved one's whole being, faults and all (insofar 
as faults are admitted by the other him or herself or construed as 
such by the lover). In love we do not discriminate between aspects 
of the loved one's nature. Some characteristics may cause us pain 
and sorrow and we may wish that the one we love chose less self- 
limiting ways of behaving. We may actually dislike and disapprove of 
some of his or her actions and attitudes. None of this, however, de- 
tracts from our love. It is as though, in addition to loving the 
person as he or she is, we love them for what they might become. 
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Love need owe nothing to the lover's appreciation of the loved one's 
potential nor to the hope that it may be realised at some time in 
the future. 
A person evolves over time in action which necessarily involves in- 
teraction with others; thus may the nature of a person become mani- 
fest in all its fullness. We can grasp it but never describe it. De- 
scription atomises and fragments. In love description is unnecessary 
for the loved one's individual personality is in his or her express- 
iveness here and now before the lover. 
Where love is absent there can be no genuine fellow-feeling because 
without love there can be no spontaneous, non-manipulative reaching 
out towards the other which must precede any experience of the 
other's givenness. As I have said several times only persons can 
create persons for only persons can love. Persons approach others in 
a spirit of openness and with a non-manipulative attitude. To act 
thus is to love the other in the sense described above. We may 
therefore equate love as an act with the initial spontaneous move- 
ment towards another which initiates any interpersonal relation of a 
supportive or enhancing kind (sympathy or empathy). This we have 
already seen in Scheler's unconscious identification in the sense of 
emotional unity with the other, a fusion of the two in a positive 
emotional ambience such that their separate identities are for a 
moment lost. This unconscious process also precipitates the other's 
givenness in which the knower apprehends self, other and their rela- 
tion directly and immediately as a pure "perceptual" act. The sequ- 
ence thus looks like this: 
Love, an intuitive Unconscious identific- Experience of the 
move towards the ation, an emotional other's 9ivenness the other unity with the other in which self, 
other and relation 
are apprehended 
According to Scheler there can be no movement towards emotional fus- 
ion with the other without love; there can be no experience of the 
other's givenness without unconscious identification. For me the es- 
sential predisposing factor is the stance of non-manipulative open- 
ness. 
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We are now in a better position to appreciate Fromm's analysis of 
love. (63) His four elements are aspects of love. Respect (as he def- 
ines it) is a consequence of the experience of the other's given- 
ness; we perceive afresh the other as he, she, or it is, here and 
now. Likewise knowledge, responsibility and caring are consequences. 
In empathy we get to know`the loved one'not only through the process 
illustrated above but also through deliberate identification. Res- 
ponsibility (as Fromm defines it) will be that much more sensitive, 
appropriate and other-enhancing (or merely supportive in a sympa- 
thetic response) as a consequence of our love. Caring' as an action 
system is clearly a consequence of genuine fellow-feeling, either 
sympathetic or empathic. 
We may also compare the account of love given here (based substant- 
ially on Scheler but diverging from his in that I do not accept his 
innate system of values; neither, on the other hand, do I reject it) 
with Freud's notion of transference which Stewart accepts as the 
first stage in his theory of empathy: the pre-empathy phase. For 
Freud transference is a positive (or negative) bond formed with an- 
other out of a craving or need for the other's support and, emotional 
warmth. Essentially it amounts to an affection involving dependence. 
The negative form, resentment, appears to be a yearning for support 
and emotional warmth which the other frustrates by his or her off- 
putting or-even hostile response. Clearly transference is not a lov- 
ing response; in love we make no demands of the loved one. 
It will be apparent that sexual'behaviour has little to do with 
love. It is neither-a consequence of love (we can love another with- 
out any sexual involvement at all) nor is love necessary for sexual 
behaviour, an obvious, enough fact. All that we can say is that if in 
sexual intercourse two people-love each other in the senses describ- 
ed above then in addition to emotional unity they establish a phys- 
ical unity which is unique in that the emotional and physical exper- 
iences mutually reinforce each other creating a single personal exp- 
erience. Each is literally fused at all levels of being with the 
other. It is perhaps the most perfect and sublime empathic act, in 
which each is aware of his or her separateness and yet of unity with 
the other, an awareness which amplifies their mutual love. 
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Love is not a deliberate act; we cannot will to love. Either we love 
spontaneously or we do not love at all. Empathy on the other hand 
(unlike sympathy) is deliberate in its final phase. We have to work 
at it. It is our love which provides this effort; goodwill is good 
trying, as Stewart says. An essential precondition then for love is 
a willingness to accept real phenomena as they are, a readiness to 
respond to the beingness of things (their livingness in the case of. 
living entities). This is the spirit of openness which I have dis- 
cussed elsewhere. Additionally we need to cultivate a non-manipulat- 
ive approach to others. The alternative view is to suppose that we 
have an innate readiness to love, an instinct. Scheler appears to 
incline to this view. I am reluctant to appeal to instinct though I 
do accept, at least as a tentative hypothesis, that we have a ready- 
made capacity to "read" the expressiveness of others. This is cer- 
tainly true of lower animals. The wildebeest grasps instantly the 
significance of the crouching posture or lunging movements of the 
lioness. Imprinting, the freeze response of some animals in the pre- 
sence of predators, courtship rituals, and similar response systems 
offer evidence of this innate ability. Whether we call it instinct 
and notwithstanding that learning may influence actual behaviour 
(for example, predators become more adept with practice; so do their 
prey at avoiding them) it seems clear that ability to recognise and 
decode body signs is part of the healthy animal's innate repertoire. 
There is no reason to suppose that we humans are not similarly equ- 
ipped though, as Scheler remarks, we may have lost touch with our 
native gifts due to the predominant use of our intellect. 
Love has to be learned; there is much evidence to support this view. 
Those deprived of maternal love in early childhood tend to show in 
adulthood a poor or even a total lack'of loving responsiveness to 
others. Love-deprived children tend to grow into unloving, even 
cruel, parents. 
My view, as I have already shown in Chapter 1, is that persons (who 
are creations of persons) love others because they have learned love 
from those who cared for them, principally their mothers. As the 
only relation which can achieve this is empathy we can say that per- 
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sons are the creations of the empathic relation which too has to be 
learned. Empathy is the progenitor of love and personhood. Love and 
persons are the progenitors of empathy. There is little reward in 
pursuing the chicken and egg conundrum; empathy is regenerated 
through love and love creates and sustains empathy. Which we take to 
be pivotal depends solely on our specific interest: the relation or 
the emotional bond. The two are inseparable. 
One final point. Stewart claims no more than respect-as a first step 
in the process of entering into an empathic relation; if we inter- 
pret respect in the sense that Fromm does it is easy to construe 
respect as a possible first step in the learning of love. In my 
theory of empathy openness and a non-manipulative attitude create 
the goodwill necessary to reach out towards another individual and 
as a result experience the other's givenness. This engenders respect 
and ultimately love if the empathic relation is successfully estab- 
lished; love may then become mutual in mutual empathy. 
2.38 Altruism 
Derek Wright defines an action as altruistic 
when its outcome is primarily beneficial to someone else, and its performance is dictated by the desire to help another per- 
son. Faced with the choice between personal convenience or 
advantage and furthering someone else's goals, the individual 
deliberately chooses the latter. (64) 
Self-sacrifice is a problem for biologists since it apparently 
flouts the basic tenets of evolution theory but for psychologists 
the interest is not so much in its biological roots as in the nature 
and psychological significance of unselfishness for both the perfor- 
mer and the beneficiary. My interest centres on its relation to 
empathy. 
In most societies adults adopt a nurturant and protective attitude 
towards the young, especially infants, and men act protectively to- 
wards women at least in some stressful situations such as attack by 
invaders. In many societies women put their children and their men- 
folk before themselves and in all societies loyalty to friends is 
accorded high value especially in conditions of threat, hardship or 
survival. In all these cases the self-sacrificing individual has 
already formed a strong attachment to the other as a function of the 
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normal social life of the group to which he or she belongs. Insofar 
as altruistic behaviour is a consequence of an already existing 
attachment (and notwithstanding that consequences of emotional bonds 
are interesting in themselves) I shall not examine altruism further. 
The only question that needs answering in terms of the aims of this 
dissertation is whether altruism is or may be a consequence of one 
or more of the emotional bonds reviewed in this section. The obvious 
candidate is sympathy but, as I have already pointed out, empathy is 
an even better choice especially in its mutual form. However, sym- 
pathy appears to provide the minimum conditions for initiating an 
act which could be described as altruistic; the "primitive" given- 
ness of the participants and their situation, the sympathiser's 
awareness of separateness, and a genuine fellow-feeling, appear to 
me to constitute the minimum combination of objectivity and emotion- 
al impetus that will move an individual to act unselfishly. 
2.39 Friendship 
Of all the emotional bonds discussed in this chapter friendship in 
one of its forms comes very close to empathy as I construe it. Un- 
like the other bonds explored here friendship is really a member of 
a different category: the class of sociable relationships. This 
category includes kin, neighbours, work colleagues, class-mates, 
club members, etc., as well as friends. Participants in any of these 
social groupings may, from time to time, display any of the emotion- 
al bonds described in this chapter. One might argue that, by virtue 
of their membership of sociable relationships, individuals are more 
likely to create these emotional bonds than they are as a result of 
their membership of more remote and abstract groups such as second- 
ary groups, for example. Primary groups, in which members are in 
face-to-face contact and share some common fate (e. g. living in the 
same street, working on the same job, having the same sport or hobby 
interests), are more likely to generate the conditions leading to 
the facilitation, perhaps the evolution, of deeper, less transitory 
bonds than secondary groups which centre on, for example, national- 
ity, regional accent, community, occupational group, employer, gen- 
der, social class, and so forth. 
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The distinction I am-making between the differential influence of 
primary and secondary groups on the formation of strong emotional 
bonds such as love, sympathy, empathy (as I understand it), and so 
on is not as clear cut as I have perhaps implied. Many sociologists 
would argue that membership of secondary groups can have an inhib- 
iting effect, generating hostile rather than friendly feelings. For 
example, individuals who are deeply conscious of their social status 
may be unable to feel sympathy with others not, of their class. Worn- 
en, profoundly affected by their perception of men as exploiters of 
women's sexual attractiveness, may be rendered incapable of feeling 
anything but hostility towards men. 
I would argue, however, that if these negative states of affairs are 
to be remedied (apart, of course, from the obvious tactic of remov- 
ing whatever immediate and tangible causes feature in the actual 
lives of those with negative feelings such as long-term unemploy- 
ment, gender, race and class discrimination, etc. ) it will only 
come about through personal contact with more supportive others, in 
other words, through primary group membership. (I assume that dyads 
count as groups. ) There is no guarantee that belonging to such a 
group will encourage the growth of a different, more reassuring 
world view but personal contact with just one supportive person 
makes such a change possible. Even where immediate causes are not 
remedied those who suffer may draw closer to the supportive individ- 
ual despite differences, in the examples I have given, of social 
class membership or=gender or race or employment. 
This fact alone supports my claim that friendship is a different 
category of sociable relationship entirely. Friendship may or may 
not provide 
,a 
fertile soil in which empathic relations may take root. 
and eventually prosper. But it is certainly not necessary. Empathic 
relations require only that one person approach another with non- 
manipulative, non-judgemental, non-exploitative openness. The other 
may not only have excluded him or herself from the possibility of a 
friendly relationship springing up between the two; he or she may be 
positively hostile. Of course, it follows that, if an empathic rela- 
tion is eventually achieved and the participants discover interper- 
sonal harmony, they may become friends, perhaps even very close, 
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life-long friends; but again this is nat a necessary outcome for 
claiming that two individuals have achieved an empathic relation. 
Quite apart from the category distinction there are other reasons 
for distinguishing friendship and the empathic relation. Friendship 
implies a reciprocity which, incidentally, is commonly reported as 
an experiential quality of friendship. One may seek a favour from a 
friend but both tacitly accept the obligation to render a return 
favour when asked. Friends generally do not like seeking favours 
from each other if there seems little likelihood of repaying the 
gesture in the forseeable future. Part of the notion of reciprocity 
resides in the symmetry of the frienship relationship. The members 
see themselves as equals. Usually this is true in the sense that 
friends tend to have the, same interests, social class membership, 
gender, age group, and other similar personal characteristics. Re- 
search evidence supports this tendency. (65) Finally, friends know 
who their friends are-because they-are called so by them. There is, 
that is to say, an overtly expressed mutual labelling of the members 
of the friendship relationship as "friends". Reciprocity as elabor- 
ated here(66) may well emerge when an empathic relation is achieved 
but it does not necessarily follow. Neither-is it necessary in the 
initial or intermediate stages. I have tried to show that differen- 
ces can be recognised and accepted as part of life. They do not have 
to lead to divisive conduct or attitude, nor does it follow that 
empathic relations cannot come about among-individuals who differ in 
any or all of the contingent ways that society, genetic endowment or 
experience can produce. On the contrary, and despite obvious poten- 
tial difficulties, I suggest that fostering empathic relations with 
others in significant contexts provides an alternative to the more 
crequently encountered preference for developing power relations. 
Difficult implies neither impossible nor hopelessly idealistic. 
Another characteristic which differentiates friendship from the emp- 
athic relation is that the former tends to endure over time despite 
intermittent interactions. Meetings of friends are like islands of a 
special kind of sociability in a sea of generally mundane day-to-day 
life experiences, some of which may be other kinds of sociability. 
Each interaction confirms and reaffirms the friendship in a number 
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of ways including the clarification of what the friends allow by way 
of self-disclosure and interpersonal conduct. Setting and clarifying 
boundaries constitutes an important aspect of friendship. The relat- 
ionship tends to persist despite the frequent and sometimes lengthy 
absences of the members of the relationship. There are obviously 
limits to this tendency and, as is well known, friends do fall out 
or drift apart for all sorts of, reasons. Nevertheless, a degree of 
permanence and frequent separations are typical characteristics of 
friendship. 
As I understand the empathic relation, the mutual co-presence of its 
members is essential for its initiation and growth. Individuals can 
and do enter and leave the empathic relation. Since its existence 
hinges on its significance to its members, e. g. striving towards 
mutual self-help, the relation may change as members' perceptions of 
what counts as significant changes. The empathic relation is one of 
many interpersonal' relations into which people may enter throughout 
their day-to-day commerce with the world. But once individuals have 
enjoyed the sense of personal fulfilment which the empathic relation 
engenders they may come to prefer this relation over all others pro- 
vided the occasion warrants it. Thus it may happen that these indiv- 
iduals having experienced the joys of the empathic relation become 
friends. In such a case the burgeoning friendship and the preference 
for empathising as a modus vivendi whenever possible may grow in 
parallel. Even then, however, the friendship will tend to persist 
despite the friends' frequent separations whereas empathising will 
always require the co-presence of the members. 
One last difference between empathising and enjoying a friendship 
relation hinges on the notion of authenticity. I have suggested that' 
every interaction between friends permits each of them to establish 
boundaries of intimacy. Most interpersonal relations by their nat- 
ure, occasion and frequency make little demand on the other's will- 
ingness to extend these boundaries. Putting the matter another way, 
the private zone tends to be considerably larger than the public in 
most interactions with others including the more superficial types 
of friendship. Our everyday existence is patterned by a wide range 
of interactions with others. Some are fairly long-standing and rela- 
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tively informal such as those with neighbours and work colleagues. 
Others are casual such as those which may arise at parties and simi- 
lar social gatherings. Yet others are occasional and more or less 
formal such as visits to our doctor or dentist or legal adviser. 
Genuine friendships may grow out of any of these encounters but much 
more is required than a commonality of interest, frequency of cont- 
act, or even liking for one another. In particular, the label 
"friendship" is usually reserved for that special informal relation- 
ship with another in which voluntary self-disclosure is a central 
feature; this depends on the development of mutual trust which in 
turn takes time and effort on both sides (assuming a dyadic relat- 
ionship). (67) Only after a period of time will the partners in the 
relation consider extending the limits of intimacy. The closeness 
of their friendship might be signalled by their degree of trust in 
each other and by their willingness to disclose, and the extent to 
which they are prepared to reveal, their private thoughts and feel- 
ings. 
The borderline between genuine and fair weather friendship is not 
always clear to members. Often it takes a calamity to discover who 
one's real friends are. In genuine friendship help and support are 
given unstintingly if they are within the power of friends to give 
or procure. Superficial friends offer only excuses for their inabi- 
lity to help. The existence of a genuine caring relation with an- 
other is tested by observing actual caring conduct. This may take 
many forms from advice to practical assistance including, on occas- 
ion, reproof. Friends may say what others shrink from saying for 
fear of giving offence, causing pain, or embarrassing the other. 
Recognising and coping with dissembling behaviour are as difficult 
tasks in friendships as they are within empathic relations but the 
point I am making here is that authenticity is as fundamental to 
friendship as goodwill is to empathy. Both also depend on openness 
though friendship does not require a non-judgemental approach, or at 
least it seems not to suffer from a lack of it on occasion. 
Perhaps it is this caring attitude towards another that. distinguish- 
es genuine from superficial friendship. Caring is an attribute of 
love; I find it difficult to reconcile the idea of friendship with a 
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relationship devoid of love if only in its most primitive form: res- 
pect for the other. Authenticity in a relationship probably encour- 
ages the cultivation of a non-manipulative, though not necessarily a 
non-judgemental, stance towards the other. Thus, such a relationship 
may evolve into either friendship or an empathic relation depending 
primarily on the situation. If a person feels a genuine regard for 
the other and demonstrates in concrete ways a caring attitude, the 
other may respond by similar feelings of warmth and caring atti- 
tudes. The mixture of mutual liking, warmth and support remains, in 
this example, relatively unfocussed, diffuse, non-directional. This 
is not to deny the value of such a relationship nor to imply that 
it is ethically of small account in personal relationships. Perhaps 
a great many friendships are formed out of these simple elements. 
Friends seek and enjoy each other's company; they bathe in their 
mutual feelings of warmth; they care about and for each other in 
their different ways and according to their individual capacities to 
succour and nurture others. The profit to both may be considerable, 
intellectually, socially, spiritually, perhaps even physically, inc- 
luding sexually. 
The route to the empathic relation is quite different. The non- 
manipulative, non-judgemental, non-exploitative openness always pre- 
cedes (for the reasons I have given elsewhere) the move towards id- 
entification perhaps through imitation. This leads to the joint ven- 
ture in which the participants pursue a shared common goal. This is 
much more than a sharing of warmth, caringness and authentic person- 
al feelings for each other. Empathy is never diffuse, non-direction- 
al, unfocussed which is not to deny that, because of human limitat- 
ions, both partners may sometimes lose sight of where they are going 
and why. 
As I have tried to show in my earlier analysis the empathic relation 
may lead to friendship as often as friendship may encourage the 
friends to discover empathy. In either case the kind of friendship I 
am referring to is genuine and close, sometimes very close. In such 
a friendship the empathic relation would give point to the drawing 
in of boundaries of intimacy. Personal knowing in specific and sig- 
nificant contexts would underscore the intimacy of the friendship if 
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the latter already existed; the trust and mutual disclosures cher- 
ished in-the empathic relation would create it if it did not. 
Intimacy seems to me the crucial quality of genuine friendship. This 
is not the place to explore the relationship between intimacy, 
trust, self-disclosure and authentic friendship. However, I feel 
that self-disclosure is only possible within the psychological safe- 
ty of a relationship founded on mutual trust, caring about and, 
whenever necessary, for each other. In the security of such a pro- 
tective relation intimacy may grow. I imagine that it is character- 
istic of, authentic persons (persons who do not seek refuge in pret- 
ence, deceit, affectation or false emotions) to want to care about 
and for those to whom they feel drawn. To put the matter more dram- 
atically I cannot imagine insincere people developing genuine 
friendships. If they do achieve such a seemingly impossible state 
then I imagine that a rare authenticity shines like a beacon amid 
the shoals of their more customary falseness. Even the most insin- 
cere individual must be able, we might assume, to summon up the 
honesty and the will to establish an authentic relationship with at 
least one other person. Such a conjecture needs further study. Thus 
authenticity, trust and setting boundaries of intimacy are inextric- 
ably intertwined. Their interdependency is what makes genuine 
friendship very similar to the empathic relation. 
2.4 SUMMARY 
In this chapter I have developed the idea of empathy as a relation 
by examining various kinds of relation which a self may enter into 
with an other-than-self. Some relations involve other human beings 
while others centre on non-human entities both living and non- 
living. Since Iconstrue empathy as a relation in which one person 
tries to know and understand another as a person and since also I 
have tried to show that there are other ways of knowing than person- 
al knowing and other ways of construing human beings than as persons 
I decided to follow this same route in order to discover other rela- 
tions. This attempt yielded the quasi-empathic and the impersonal 
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but failed to give other known relations , e. g. formal, informal, 
power; these were added to the list. It is interesting to note that 
they tend to emphasise modes of existence rather than ways of know- 
ing. Where empathy and quasi-empathy grow out of a being mode of ex- 
istence the other relations, except the fortuitous, have an affinity 
with the having mode. The impersonal is ambivalent and may be ten- 
able in either mode. These conjectures merit further analysis but 
not within the narrow scope of this dissertation. By analogy I tried 
to show that relations with non-human entities could, at a pinch, be 
accommodated within the interpersonal set. 
Empathy is also an emotional bond between people, and between humans 
and non-humans at least in one direction. Therefore I examined other 
kinds of emotional bond. As in the case of relations there is no 
theoretical framework to help me choose a definitive set. Instead I 
relied on a general knowledge of the literature on emotional bonds. 
I do not claim that my list is exhaustive but for my purposes incom- 
pleteness does not really matter. As with relations so with emotion- 
al bonds my aim was to examine further the concept and phenomenon of 
empathy by comparing it with as many near or distant relatives as I 
could muster. The most interesting features of this second compar- 
ison derive from the interdependency of some bonds and empathy, 
e. g. love, attraction, and the close similarity of others to empa- 
thy, e. g. sympathy, community of feeling. However the differences 
too are considerable and exposing these rounds out a fuller picture 
of empathy. 
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Notes for Chapter 2 
1A recent publication (Argyle and Henderson, 1985) brings together 
much of the research evidence about the nature of human relation- 
ships and adds a number of new perspectives on this branch of psych- 
ology. The authors do not say explicitly that the work describes the 
variety of-, human relationships, their individual characters, the 
features they have in common as well as those which differentiate 
them, but without an all-embracing theoretical framework. It seems 
very likely that in this field description is still the most valu- 
able contribution to our understanding of this fundamental aspect of 
human existence. 
There are many typologies of human individuals, i. e. category sys- 
tems which classify people according to some theoretical schema. 
Most personality theories include personality or character types-as 
part of their mythology. The extent to which these theories are 
grounded (in the opinion of their authors) in physical phenomena 
determines their standing as hard or soft theories. Freudian and 
Jungian schemata are bold, speculative adventures in imagination and 
so are soft whereas Eysenck's theory, to take one example, is hard 
being based on known (and hypothesised) characteristics of the cent- 
ral nervous system. In contrast attempts to classify relations among 
individuals are rare. Behind most personality theories there is usu- 
ally an implicit (sometimes explicit) notion that one individual is 
trying to do something to another. The ego defence mechanisms of 
Freud, the parent-child-adult interactions of transactional analy- 
sis, are essentially descriptions of how people cope with one anoth- 
er; they differ only in their theoretical base. The analysis of rel- 
ations per se, however, seems to have interested very few. There are 
grounds for supposing that the attempt would be ill-conceived. Since 
part of the genesis and nurturance of a relation, it might plausibly 
be argued, is rooted in the situation in which the participants find 
themselves, and that situations are so complex and diverse that they 
defy generalisation, the task of establishing a general theory of 
interpersonal relations is a hopeless one. A counter-argument might 
be that this sentiment expresses a counsel of despair. All theories 
begin with chaotic real world phenomena; the theorist's job is to 
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reduce this chaos with the help of some well-chosen concepts which, 
whilst retaining a grip on real world phenomena, nevertheless trans- 
cend them in fruitful ways. For example, ways of knowing might prov- 
ide means for condensing the great diversity of interpersonal. situ- 
ations without distorting the real world experiences of human beings 
too much. My own speculations in the early part of this chapter 
(sections 2.1 and 2.2) constitute just such an exercise though my 
main purpose is to throw additional light on empathy. 
2 See Alexander, 1964, Appendix 1. The use to which I put Alexander's 
design process in my illustrations is my own interpretation of his 
ideas. 
3I have freely borrowed from Alexander's analysis of the design pro- 
cess which he outlines in Part 1 especially in chapters 2 and 3. 
There are many theories of the aesthetic process but Alexander's 
analysis treats design in the abstract. So often aesthetics is 
associated with the arts particularly the plastic and graphic forms. 
Although in my choice of illustrations I have tended to follow this 
tradition the basic idea of goodness of fit between form and context 
is universally applicable. Theory-building, cake-making, lesson- 
planning, running a trades union conference: all involve aesthetic 
knowing, among other forms of knowing, to some degree. 
4 As an entirely speculative aside we may wonder whether there are ter- 
ritorial claims by various art forms over the various ways of const- 
ruing human beings with, say, the plastic or graphic arts at the 
biological machine end of the row and the arts of movement, drama 
and literature (especially the novel) at the psychophysical individ- 
ual end. Obviously all may concern themselves with human beings as 
persons but it is common knowledge that certain artists concern 
themselves with situations or feelings or social attitudes rather 
than, or in addition to, flesh and blood persons coping with their 
personal world. Consider, for literary examples, the study of 
ambition in Julius Caesar and Macbeth; Ibsen's concern over the fate 
of women in society; Tolstoy's study of war; the nature of crime and 
its punishment explored by Dostoyevsky. 
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5 For example, see two recent critical accounts: Jacobs and Williams, 
1983; and Geller, 1932. 
6 Shatter, 1975. 
7 Macmurray, 1956,1961. 
8 Reason and Rowan, 1981. 
9 Harr6,1983. 
10 Elumer, 1969. 
11 Turner, 1974. 
12 Narre and Secord, 1972; Goff man, 1969a, 1969b, 1972. 
13 I have not enlarged on this aspect of practical knowing of the per- 
son because, to do so would require a critical review of the social 
skills literature (an industry with which, as will be apparent in 
these pages, I have only limited sympathy). In order to counter my 
own prejudice a thorough-going analysis of this domain would be 
essential. 
14 Acts may be described as chance, spontaneous or purposeful accord- 
ing to their volitional content. Two people colliding in the street 
because neither was looking where he or she was going is truly a 
chance encounter with no volitional content at all. The fact that 
each was purposefully engaged at the time has no bearing on the 
accidental outcome. At the other extreme_a fielder at mid-on seeing 
the ball coming his way and moving to catch or stop it is behaving 
in a way which we would describe as intentional and willed. He 
chose to act thus and so acted as he did. Spontaneous acts fall 
somewhere between the two. In order to experience the other's 
givenness I have suggested that a self needs to adopt a stance of 
non-manipulative openness towards the world; he or she must, in 
Husserl's words, allow things to speak for themselves. This predis- 
position is a matter of choice, of volition in the sense that the 
self adopts a certain way of being in the world in order that he or 
she may experience the spontaneous givenness of phenomena which 
cannot be willed. The spontaneous act is an event and so is not 
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volitional but the adoption of the necessary predisposition is. I 
hold that this is true of all spontaneous acts. 
Relations, of course, are not acts but interactions arising from 
acts. tI am using "act" here rather in the sense of Husserl's 
"intentional experience", his equivalent of Descartes's "cogito". ) 
Relations are of neccesity volitional but may be described as spon- 
taneous, chance or purposeful according-to the nature of the act 
that precipitated them. Since spontaneously and deliberately formed 
relations have purpose somewhere in their origins I group them to- 
gether and separate them from relations which arise by chance. 
15 Love and other emotional bonds are considered in section 2.3. 
16 See especially the work of Stewart, 1956,1965 briefly summarised in 
section 3.52. 
17 See Appendix I for a brief note an subjectivity. 
18 Mercer, 1972; p. 7. 
19 Scheler, 1954; p. 45. 
20 ibid. p. 14. 
21 ibid. p. 10. 
22 ibid. P. 11. 
23 ibid. p. 82. 
24 ibid. P. 8. 
25 ibid. P. 31. 
26 ibid. p. 35. 
27 ibid. p. 23. 
28 ibid. p. 48. 
29 ibid. p. 134. 
30 ibid. p. 46. 
31 ibid. P. 18. 
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32 ibid. p. 82. 
33 See the excerpt at the bottom of p. 156 
34 Mercer, `1972. 
35 Scheler, op. cit. p. 13. 
36 Stein, 1970. See section 3.51. 
37 Scheler, op. cit. pp. 37/38. 
38 ibid. pp. 15/16. 
39 ibid. p. 8. 
40 ibid. p. 25. 
41 ibid. p. 25. 
42 ibid. pp. 20/21. 
43 ibid. pp. 34/35. 
44 ibid. p. 30. 
45 ibid. p. 32. 
46 ibid. p. 33. 
47 ibid. p. 35. 
48 ibid. p. 35. 
49 ibid. P. 35. 
50 ibid. p. 67. 
51 ibid. p. 70. 
52 ibid. p. 71. 
53 See section 3.52. 
54 Berne, 1966. 
55 Freud, Standard Edition, Vol. XXII; p. 63. 
56 op. cit. Vol. XXIII; p. 299. 
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57 op. cit. Vol. XXII; p. 63. 
58 ibid. p. 63. 
59 op. cit. Vol XI; p. 100. 
60 op. cit. Vol XVIII; p. 106. 
61 Schutz, 1973. 
62 The defensive aspect of identification I will not pursue here. 
Freud himself occasionally uses the term "introjection" to stand 
for identification in particular contexts. Anna Freud (1967), 
developed the concept of ego defence mechanisms; she lists ten of 
them one of which is "identification or introjection". 
63 Fromm, 1957. 
64 Wright, 1971; p. 127. 
65 Allan, 1979 refers to several studies'; p. 45. 
66 ibid. p. 44,45. 
67 Those more or less formal dyads which come into existence primarily 
for self-disclosure, e. g. confessional and counselling relation- 
ships, are excluded. Friendships are essentially informal in char- 
acter.: 
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3. SOME EARLIER VIEWS OF EMPATHY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The variety of meanings attached to the label "empathy" almost equ- 
als the variety of workers in this area of psychology. Although 
there are a few discernible traditions, which this chapter will exp- 
lore, the general image of empathy is confusing. I propose to review 
a very small selection from the literature which seems to me to rep- 
resent the-main thematic streams which I have noticed in my reading. 
To help me in my literature search I used the computer-based ret- 
rieval systems of DIALOG and ERIC. Four trends are observable, each 
one flowing from a single source. 
The first stems from G. H. Mead's notion of role-taking ability. 
Rosalind Dymond is one of the earliest investigators in this tradit- 
ion and Hogan one of the most recent. While considering the relation 
between empathy and role-taking ability I shall also examine a few 
other students of empathy who appear to view it as an ability or 
trait though not within Mead's role-theoretic framework. In fact few 
of these researchers have developed a theoretical schema at all. 
The second tradition springs from the work of Carl Rogers who not 
only helped to shift the emphasis in psychology away from mechanist- 
ic theories towards a personal psychology; he also argued that emp- 
athy (along with some other elements) forms an essential component 
of non-manipulative interpersonal functioning. Several followers of 
Rogers have tried to operationalise his definition of empathy. Some 
of them (e. g. Carkhuff and Truax) have pursued a path which starts 
from the idea that empathy is somehow related to social skill (my 
third stream of investigation) and so they will be discussed under 
that heading. Barrett-Lennard, however, whilst striving towards an 
operational definition of empathy has preserved the essence of the 
Rogerian approach. 
As I have just said the third strand is concerned with the acquisit- 
ion and exercise of social skills. This group is bound together 
solely by the central idea of skill; they work from different theor- 
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etical foundations, some using a psychomotor model (Argyle), while 
others focus on social perception (Bronfenbrenner), or the therap- 
eutic situation (Egan, Carkhuff, Truax). 
The fourth tradition I shall call phenomenological though few psych- 
ologists will be found here. For me this is one of the most import- 
ant contributory streams to the understanding of empathy and includ- 
es Edith Stein, Scheler (though not for his comments on empathy but 
rather for his insights into the nature of fellow-feeling, a non- 
unitary concept which must include empathy), and David Stewart the 
only psychologist discussed in this section. The methods and outlook 
of the phenomenological approach are unique in the context of this 
literature review in that they offer some guide-lines for developing 
a genuine personal psychology (a psychology of persons) in which 
empathy occupies a central position. Other attempts, not all of 
them in the phenomenological tradition, are currently under way, and 
are to be found in the works of Gauld and Shotter, Harre, Georges 
Thines, Paul Ricoeur and the Dusquesne group represented by Valle 
and King, but in none of them does empathy seem to feature. 
3.2 EMPATHY AS ABILITY 
3.21 Chapin 
Years ago Thorndike introduced the notion of social intelligence (to 
set beside abstract-and mechanical intelligence) in order to account 
for individual differences in interpersonal competence. Social in- 
telligence (or ability as he called it) has two factors: the ability 
to understand others, and the ability to act wisely in social situ- 
ations. Chapin,. primarily concerned with the second of these two 
factors, hypothesised "that social intelligence is a form of social 
insight"(1). The term insight here refers to a psychological phenom- 
enon quite different from that encountered in the literature on 
problem-solving, for example. Later he expressed the relationship 
more subtly. Not only is social insight "not the same as the "abili- 
ty to get along with people", often used as a definition of social 
intelligence"(2), but also: 
199 
. the scale to measure social insight differs from the scales, that measure social attitudes, social behaviour, and social in- 
telligence in that it attempts to measure the ability to define 
(i. e. by classifying, diagnosing, inferring causes, or predict- 
ing) a given social situation in terms of the behaviour imputed 
to others present, rather than in terms of the individual's own 
feelings about the others. (3) 
This reminds us of GH Mead's-Tole-taking ability, which formed the 
main inspiration for Rosalind Dyrnond's investigation and attempted 
measurement of what she called empathic ability(4). During this 
period social insight, role-taking ability and empathic ability seem 
to be construed as a capacity to see and interpret the other from 
the other's-point of view, an ability which is viewed as a quality 
of persons (rather than as a property of relations between persons)- 
in much the same way as some psychologists construe reasoning or 
verbal ability in the abstract sphere of intelligence or manual dex- 
terity in the mechanical. Since I have adopted the view that empathy 
is a relation between at least one person and another human being I 
hold that the quality of relations between the participants is im- 
portant in any account of empathy. This aspect seems to have been 
totally ignored by those who see empathy as an ability. 
Chapin shows some facility in giving this aspect of social intellig- 
ence an operational definition: 
Social insight is the ability to recognise in principle in a 
given situation: (1) the existence and operation of specific 
substitute responses such as projection, rationalization, re- 
gression, sublimation, transference, etc., and (2) the need of 
some specific stimulus to adjust group conflicts or tensions, 
such as a humorous remark to relax a dangerous intensity, a 
suggested compromise to attain temporary agreement, a face- 
saving remark to avoid embarrassment and to preserve status (to leave a loop hole, a wa out, etc. ), or to discover the missing 
part required to complete a pattern of thought (the right form- 
ula), etc. (5) 
Chapin was careful to point out that there might well be much more to 
social insight than these suggested elements but in the absence of a 
stronger theoretical framework than that implied by Thorndike's con- 
cept of social intelligence it is difficult to see how he could have 
developed the idea-much further. 
3.22 Dymond 
In contrast, Dymond did have a strong theoretical basis for her con- 
cepts of insight and empathic ability which stem from the role- 
200 
theoretic ideas current at that time. She sees empathy as an "abili- 
ty to feel and describe the feelings and thoughts of others". (6) 
Later she refined this to: "... the imaginative transposing of one- 
self into the thinking, feeling and action of another and so struc- 
turing the world as he does. "(7) 
For her empathic ability may be a mechanism underlying insight which 
she construes as the better understanding of the relationships one 
has with others. More specifically she sees insight as the: 
.. understanding of the self-other patterns or-roles which the individual has incorporated and which form the basis of his ex- 
pectations of others his structuring of his life situations 
and the place he feels he occupies in them. (8) 
Clearly insight here means social insight but her theoretical subs- 
trate differentiates her concept from Chapin's: 
... when human organisms respond to each other over a period of time, the activity of each becomes a stimulus pattern for a 
more or less stabilised response pattern in the other providing 
the motivational component remains essentially unchanged. In 
any social interaction the acts of the other as well as those 
of the self are incorporated by each party to the interact as 
each sees them. Such an internalized interact is known as a 
self-other pattern. In incorporating the response patterns of 
others to him the individual evolves a picture of himself as a 
distinct personality. His personality is, therefore, an aggreg- 
ate of self-other patterns which have been internalized from 
his previous interactions with others. These provide him with a 
series of expectation. response patterns which he brings to new 
and ambiguous situations. In these he acts in terms of his def- 
inition of the situation and the position he feels he occupies 
in it, the particular pattern chosen being a function also of 
the needs operating at the time and the patterns available to 
him. (9) 
Thus she arrives at her definition of insight and, incidentally, of 
personality. Her interest in the 1948 paper was to discover whether 
insight might be developed in people and if so how. A first step, 
therefore, was to analyse its constituents which meant, as we have 
just seen, investigating the appropriate self-other patterns. Her 
data suggested to her a number of relations between her conceptions 
of insight and empathy: 
... the ability to feel and describe the thoughts and feelings of others, (empathy) is accompanied by a bet er-. understanding of 
a relationship one has with others, (insight). Conversely, those 
who are less able to take the role of the other... seem also to 
lack insight into their own interpersonal relations... lack of 
insight into one's own self-other patterns is based on a lack of 
empathic ability. (10) 
Coupled with other trends in her data suggesting "... that empathy is 
a necessary mechanism for the building of self-other patterns which 
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are well developed"(11) and that empathic ability is in part a func- 
tion of the type of family atmosphere surrounding the growing child 
Dymond concluded "... that empathy may be one of the underlying mech- 
anisms on which insight is based. "(12) 
In a later paper Dymond teases out a further element of (social) in- 
sight. Here she examines related terms such as sympathy, identifica- 
tion and projection as well as taking another look at insight it- 
self. 
Insight may be thought of as a product of the empathic process. 
Insight into oneself seems to require the ability to stand off 
and look at oneself from the point of view of others. In order 
to see ourselves as others see us, we need to structure the 
situation from their perspective or transpose ourselves into 
their, thinking. (13) 
The new idea in this excerpt is that since the object of other's 
consciousness can be one's self, the empathic ability is a prerequi- 
site for self-knowledge or self-understanding. (It is assumed that 
other's view of one's self does add to one's understanding of self. ) 
This idea raises the question of how one evaluates other kinds of 
self-knowledge (e. g. introspection, psychoanalysis, etc. ) as bases 
for action in the world. If, for example, "personality is a popula- 
tion of self-other patterns and their interpersonal organisation" 
(14), then there can be no independent selves in the same way that, 
say, our bodies are independent, self-sustaining entities. Our so- 
called real selves, and even ideal selves, exist only through and 
because of, other selves. Chapters 1 and 2 have in several places 
touched upon the relation between persons and selves and the relat- 
ion of both to the experience of personal identity. (15) Personality 
as Dymond understands it has something in common with my notion of 
personhood. 
For the present let us return to Dymond's study of insight. In the 
1950 research she compared subjects' own judgements about themselves 
with judgements others made about them using agreements as a basis 
for computing an insight index. This was correlated with empathy 
scores obtained by computing the accuracy of subjects in predicting 
others' ratings of themselves on the same personality dimensions. 
This yielded a coefficient of +0.65 which, she felt, supported her 
view that insight "seemed to be highly related to the ability 
to 
take the role of the other (empathy)... "(16). We may feel that she 
is right, therefore, to assert that: "In order to see ourselves as 
others see us, we need to structure the situation from their per- 
spective or transpose ourselves into their thinking and feeling. " 
(17) 
Dymond's research methodology has been shown to have serious flaws. 
Here I only want to draw attention to an aspect which has not att- 
racted comment. How are we to understand the idea of self-judgement? 
What are these judgements we make about ourselves? Are they not ref- 
lections of innumerable encounters with others in which we have seen 
ourselves mirrored in their reactions? In what sense can we say that 
we make, or can make, independent objective judgements of our 
selves? Could not differences between scores on measures of self- 
judgements and the judgements of self made by others as readily be 
construed as an indication of the self's distortions of these ref- 
lections from the mirrors of others? 
3.23 Dymond and Chapin compared 
Clearly Dymond and Chapin differ in their conceptions of social in- 
sight'. The latter is concerned in part with the perception of the 
other form the other's point of view whereas the former focusses on 
self-other relationships which moreover are tentatively held to be 
essential for seeing the world with the other's eyes. Thus Chapin's 
social insight has much in common with Dymond's empathic ability. On 
the other hand Dymond's (social) insight has something of the qual- 
ity of the second element (the ability to get along with people) in 
Chapin's construal of social intelligence; both centre on'self-other 
relationships and appear to be essentially self-oriented. Other 
workers at this time seem to have interpreted (social) insight in 
terms of empathy; Watson, for example, says: "To have correct in- 
sight is to share the feeling of him you are observing, to attach 
the significances appropriate to his part in events. "(18) 
In view of Chapin's choice of psychoanalytic descriptors as part of 
his understanding of social insight he may have read Watson's paper 
(19); in any event his use of Freudian terminology is interesting in 
the light of later studiesof empathy. But another distinctive slant 
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patterns with which a person 
structures his life situations 
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this context refers to that kind of manipulative conduct often ass- 
ociated, perhaps mistakenly, with salesmen, politicians and workers 
in similar interpersonal occupations whose main charateristic is in- 
fluencing others. Chapin's social insight seems to be in part a soc- 
ial skill comparable to that exercised by accomplished diplomats. 
3.24 Hagan 
Hogan(20) took up, like Dymond, Mead's idea of role-taking ability. 
Mead held that this ability was essential for social and moral dev- 
elopment. Empathic disposition, social sensitivity and role-taking 
ability are equivalent terms for Hogan(21) but his analysis is much 
subtler than any we have studied so far. 
His argument, following Mead, goes like this. Empathy is a basic 
process in all social interactions and is probably substantially 
genetically determined in the same way as the "g" component of in- 
tellectual abilities. Putting oneself in another's place and adjust- 
ing one's conduct accordingly is an important element of moral 
growth. Moreover, adopting a moral point of view implies accepting 
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the responsibility for one's own actions so far as they may affect 
the welfare of others. This also implies a consciousness of what 
Mead called the generalised other. If empathy is the ability to 
adopt a moral point of view and to take into account the effect our 
conduct may have on others it-is important to conceptualise clearly 
what we mean by moral conduct and moral development. In this respect 
Hogan follows McDougall who "explicitly linked social sensitivity, 
empathy and moral conduct. "(22) 
Moral conduct can be defined as behaviour carried out with ref- 
erence to the norms rules, and expectations that apply in a 
given social context... and moral development can be regarded as 
the process by which one comes to take these into account. (23) 
Furthermore 
... moral development can be-conceptualised and moral conduct explained in terms of five dimensions (moral knowledge, social- 
isation, empathy, autonomy. and a dimension of moral judgement) 
... (24) 
Finally, Hogan argues that "the emergence of socialisation, empathy 
and autonomy represents separate stages of moral development... "(25) 
3.25 Hogan and Dymond compared 
Dymond and Hogan are similar in that both have a well developed 
theory to underpin their particular views of empathy and both take 
their lead from Mead's notion of role-taking ability. However, their 
subsequent paths diverge substantially both in the devlopment of the 
concept and, predictably, in their attempts to measure it. Dymond 
ultimately abandoned her approach altogether but Hogan went much 
further along his chosen route. 
In the 1963 paper(26), written under her new name with Barbara 
Lerner, Dymond makes no reference to role-taking ability. They ex- 
plore some possible relations between three variables: patient's 
recognised need to change, therapist's level of experience and three 
characteristics of patient-therapist pairs (therapist's distancing 
from the patient, similarity of patient's and therapists's gender, 
and the therapist's empathy). Empathy is here defined as an "ability 
to understand the patient in his or her (i. e. the patient's) own 
terms". This has the flavour of the definition of empathy proposed 
by Carl Rogers under whose influence Dymond came and with whom she 
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worked in the early '50s. Moreover these authours used Kelly's Rep- 
ertory Grid Technique as one of their main research instruments 
which meant that each patient (and therapist) had a unique self- 
referenced yardstick against which changes could be observed and 
compared. In short she has (in this paper) moved towards a personal 
psychology which focusses on the dynamic properties of a mental life 
economy. Finally, in evaluating their hypotheses they explore poss- 
ible relations between the patient and his or her therapist in a 
manner which anticipates at least one aspect of Barrett-Lennard's 
cyclical model of empathy. (27) For example, they write: 
Perhaps the relation between high posttherapy empathy and imp- 
rovement is not the obvious one, that the therapist coming to 
understand his patient's own view of himself contributes to 
more or better therapeutic work being done. Perhaps instead of 
the therapist coming to understand the patient, the patient is 
adopting his therapist's view of him. (23) 
In fact their data did not support this hypothesis but the point of 
interest is their suggestion of what Barrett-Lennard calls received 
empathy (or rather something like it). The idea that the patients 
are active members of a relation is very far from Dymond's earlier 
treatment of empathy as an ability, perhaps a component of social 
intelligence, an idea which her mentor Cottrell supported and encour- 
aged her to investigate. 
In his 1969 paper Hogan stated that "Internalizing social prohibit- 
ions and learning to take the moral point of view are seen as two 
independent stages in moral development. "(29) It is possible that a 
person could fail to internalise his parents' value schemata yet not 
become delinquent. By taking a moral point of view "a person is said 
to consider the consequences of his actions for the welfare of 
others"(30), which presupposes some such notion as Mead's taking the 
role of the generalised other. However, he was unimpressed with both 
Dymond's and Chapin's attempts to measure empathy (or social in- 
sight) and so he developed an instrument of his own. Among other 
things he sought to compare socialisation scores (on the CPI Social- 
isation scale) with empathy ratings obtained on his empathy scale 
which, 'he assumed, reflected ability to take a moral point of view 
in everyday affairs. Hogan's results suggested that the two factors: 
socialisation and empathy, are independent dimensions of social be- 
haviour. The relation between empathy and moral behaviour was more 
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ambiguous though his data was suggestive and encouraging. Empathic 
ability as measured by his scale "seems to be at least one require- 
ment for taking the moral point of view. "(31) The 1973 paper(32) 
describes the refinement of his scale and further develops a typo- 
logy of the character structure of individuals in terms of high and 
low scores on the two dimensions. In the 1975 paper he draws atten- 
tion to the relation between a role-theoretical perspective and "a 
consistent psychological (as contrasted with a sociological) view- 
point. "(33) Dymond and Chapin worked within a sociological frame- 
work. 
He cites two motivational assumptions underlying his quest: 
... that people need (1) positive, friendly attention (and dread social disapproval; and (2) structure and order in their every- 
day lives. These assumptions imply that people are in some 
sense driven to seek social interaction, but always within a 
rule-governed framework. (34) 
From this position he speculates about the typical empathic "actor" 
and empathic "audience", it being understood that interacting per- 
sons alternate between the two roles. He further argues that there 
are two psychic structures underlying "personality": 
The first, role structure, is the set of roles or self-present- 
ations that each of us evolves in order to interact effectively 
with our peers and associates in everyday life... Character 
structure is the residue of accommodations that each of. us has 
made to the demands and expectations of our family and culture 
in childhood. (35) 
The first of these structures is conscious, plastic and moulded by 
situational factors. The second is unconscious, stable and relat- 
ively insensitive to these factors. Hogan proposes that moral devel- 
opment involves three stages: compliance, in which social conduct is 
regulated by rules which must be obeyed, empathy, and finally auto- 
nomy. The first stage has the effect of inducing in the child an 
authoritarian attitude which must somehow be outgrown. Empathy is 
the-path to moral (or at least socialized) conduct; it prevents 
those who show little respect for the rules (i. e. the non-conform- 
ists) from being delinquent. As Hogan puts it 
.. an empathic disposition facilitates a relativistic perspect- ive that softens and humanizes a child's early authoritarian 
conscience. On the other hand, an empathic disposition engend- 
ers a sensitivity to the expectations of others that promotes 
socialized conduct and compensates for a child's lack of res- 
pect for the rules themselves. (36) 
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Hogan investigated the differences between four "character" types. 







. cavalier attitude to heroin addcts social conventions; mildly 
sociopathic; (e. g. marij- 
uana smokers) 
rigid rule foil- moral maturity; comfortable 
owers (e. g. pol- with social conventions but 
High icemen) tolerant of transgressors 
(e. g. effective counsellors) 
A problem which Hogan faced concerns the status of empathy. Is it a 
trait variable (and so genetically determined, as Mead suggested, 
forming the essence of social intelligence) or is it a state vari- 
able which an individual can take on, so to speak, because the situ- 
ation warrants it? Whether some people are naturally more empathic 
than others is an important issue for any theory of empathy but 
answers must reflect the compexity of the phenomenon itself and the 
idea of a unitary ability or trait, though undoubtedly attractive, 
is questionable. Mental and physical intelligence have proved to be 
more complex than simple notions such as "g" would suggest. The 
state view of empathy recalls the inherently manipulative character 
of social skills as interpreted by the great majority of theorists 
in this field. It is difficult to reconcile empathy thus understood 
with either moral development (leading to genuine autonomy, i. e. 
freedom to choose one way or the other) or with authentic concern 
for others. (37) 
Apart from MacDougall whom he cites and Stewart whom he does not 
Hogan is unique in the empathy literature for his exploration of its 
possible connection with moral conduct. It is very likely that he 
was unaware of the work of Stewart. 
3.26 Other approaches to empathy viewed as ability 
Leaving the role-taking tradition but staying within the conception 
of empathy as an ability we now turn to Kagan and his fellow workers 
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who have investigated affective sensitivity which they equate with 
ernpathy(38). 
.. affective sensitivity or what might 
be termed generically, 
empathy .. is conceptualised as the ability 
to detect and des- 
cribe the immediate affective state of another, or in terms of 
communication theory the ability to receive and decode affect- 
ive communication. (. 
A) 
Their conception of empathy is patently very different from any we 
have seen up to now. In fact, we are hard put to see empathy here at 
all if the earlier accounts serve as the baseline for comparative 
purposes. As to its status the Kagan group is quite unequivocal: 
.. affective sensitivity 
is a psychological trait which is 
measurable, that individuals have this trait in varying degrees 
and that this degree is subject to change through training pro- 
cedures. (40) 
What is new in the thinking of the Kagan team is firstly a concern 
with non-verbal behaviour as a source of information for interested 
observers of others (e. g. counsellors, therapists), and secondly, by 
invoking communication theory they imply that empathy is an inter- 
active process rather than a trait or ability. Kagan and his co- 
workers seem not to have noticed this so not surprisingly they have 
not disentangled these two strands. 
Discussing the behaviour of the person low in affective sensitivity 
they came to this conclusion: 
The person low in affective sensitivity either does not accu- 
rately perceive affective states in others or he somehow dist- 
orts them in the identification process. Iý the first is true, 
it means that the person has not learned through experience 
what the various cues mean. Except in a few cases this seems 
unlikely. More likely, he does accurately perceive the cues, 
but his defense mechanisms change the perception and the result 
is a distorted identification. The process assumes two states 
of perception, a sensory and an interpretive or labelling one. 
A strong feeling is perceived (sensed) but identified (labell- 
ed) as something milder or different. (41) 
Thus affective sensitivity is an intervening variable mediating the 
client-counsellor relationship; it affects the response orientation 
of the therapist to the client. Had Kagan and his colleagues been 
familiar with, say, the work of Dymond they might have reconsidered 
both-their data and the theoretical implications thereof and have 
concluded that, whatever the status of affective sensitivity, emp- 
athy was not at all the same thing and that an interactive model 
(which they had implicitly in mind when evaluating the client- 
counsellor relationship) may have provided a more helpful starting 
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point for their investigation. Nevertheless the highlighting of the 
importance of affective sensitivity in the interpersonl professions 
and its contribution to effective performance therein is a valuable 
contribution. The T-group technique of sensitivity training owes its 
appeal to the relationship between effective interpersonal function- 
ing and affective sensitivity. 
One final contribution to the view of empathy as ability introduces 
the idea of prediction. Kerr and Speroff assert that: 
. the ability to put yourself in the other person's position, 
establish rapport, and anticipate his reactions feelings, and 
behaviours... is recognizable as empathy except 
that the past 
accepted definitions of empathy seem somewhat inadequate since 
they stress mere identity of feeling and omit the practical el- 
ement of prediction of the other's behaviour. (42) 
On the subject of prediction they are technically right; definitions 
of empathy did not include reference to anticipating the "reactions, 
feelings, and behaviours" of others. On the other hand the measuring 
instruments devised by Dymond and many other workers in this field 
attempted to measure what has since come to be called predictive em- 
pathy. For example, empathy was assumed to exist if a person guessed 
correctly how another would rate him or herself on a set of person- 
ality scales, a procedure used by Dymond. The critical evaluation of 
this and other practices by Cronbach(43) among others virtually 
brought empathy research to a halt for a time. 
Kerr and Speroff extended the boundaries of the practical importance 
of empathy by relating it to performance in non-counselling fields. 
They cite, for example, "natural" leaders, salesmen, management and 
labour leaders as instances and in the case of all but the first 
refer to similar research reports by other investigators. 
However, unlike the other researchers mentioned in this section, all 
of whom developed and evaluated instruments for measuring "empathy" 
(as uniquely defined and labelled in each case) Kerr and_Speroff de- 
signed a procedure which in effect refers to a generalised rather 
than a particular other. This distinction between the particular and 
the generalised other is central to the idea of trait or. ability but 
further confusion accrues in the case of empathy because as a con- 
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cept it is interpreted either as referring to the perception of 
specific individuals or as a mental image of a representative of a 
class of individuals. As Gage and Cronbach put it: 
A generalized trait such as "empathic ability" may profitably 
be used as a construct if changes in the individual s behaviour 
from situation to situation are small compared to differences 
between individuals in the same situation. (44) 
Every individual is a member of many classes of which he or she may 
be regarded, perhaps mistakenly, as typical. For example, the other 
may be female, middle-aged, shabbily dressed, blue-eyed, dark-skin- 
ned, a professional person and have a cockney accent. Each of these 
traits marks her as a representative of the classes of individuals 
possessing these traits. An individual's empathic ability (however 
conceptualised and measured) must refer either to that person's corn- 
petence in dealing with a particular person or with the general type 
which, in the empathiser's view, possibly held unconsciously, the 
other represents. Suppose now that a therapist's score on some scale 
of empathy is consistent across a range of patients. Does this mean 
that the therapist is demonstrating a consistent trait (compared 
with other therapists; for example, who may be "better" or "worse" 
than he or she is) or does it mean that the therapist has somehow 
lumped all or many of his or her patients into a class, e. g. 'the 
kind of person who consults psychotherapists? 
Before concluding this section, which is concentrating on empathy 
viewed as an ability, that is, as a property or quality of persons, 
let us briefly look at another trait which lies within the field of 
person perception. This is best described as the ability to judge 
people. Although this is not to be equated with empathy it is held 
to be, in some respects, similar to it. Bender and Hastorf, for 
example, claim that: "In everyday situations we depend necessarily 
on our capacity, to perceive and predict the behaviour, thoughts and 
feelings of the other person". (45) They argue that such an ability 
is basic to the socialisation process; referring to Cantril(46) they 
later add that "it would be very helpful to have a measure of this 
"capacity to perceive and be aware of the purpose" of other per- 
sons"(47), a task to which they address themselves in their paper. 
Bronfenbrenner quotes Taft(48) who examined the question as to 
whether there is a general trait to judge others: 
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The ability to judge others has been considered as a personal- 
ity trait... The contradictions found between the studies may be 
due partly to the low reliability of the measures used, and 
partly to the effect of specific factors... This problem of 
specificity arises with all traits, but it seems to be partic- 
ularly marked in the case of the ability to judge others; nev- 
ertheless there does seem to be sufficient generality to this 
ability to justify describing at least some judges as "good" or 
"poor". (49) 
Eronfenbrenner then examines the problems attending the measurement 
of predictive accuracy, having first distinguished sensitivity to 
the generalised other from sensitivity to individual differences or 
what he calls interpersonal sensitivity. Thus we meet again the pos- 
sibility that empathic ability is not a unitary phenomenon. Eronfen- 
brenner, however, develops his arguments in terms of skills in soc- 
ial perception. Empathy viewed as a social skill is our next main 
theme. 
3.3 EMPATHY AS SKILL 
In order to carry out any action whatsoever an agent must call on 
resources which make its fulfilment possible. These fall into two 
different but mutually supportive classes: cognitive processes in 
which intentions are formulated or clarified and possible means 
selected for their competent achievement; and productive processes 
with which agents convert capacities into coordinated action sequ- 
ences. Skill may be defined as the achievement of a desired goal to 
a specified set of criteria and with the minimum expenditure of time 
and effort. Skilled performance is thus a special kind of action 
sequence in which both cognitive and productive resources optimally 
interact and create a particular degree of coordination. Cognitive 
and productive resources are often called abilities or capacities or 
competencies; they empower and guide action. The notion of compet- 
ence on the other hand is linked to the quality of performance so 
that high or low level of skill is equated with a high or low level 
of availability of the necessary resources. There is thus a depend- 
ency relation in every skill between degree of competence and the 
abilities or capacities of performers to carry them out. This relat- 
ion hinges on the availability of both cognitive and productive com- 
petencies. 
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To think through and solve a problem requires an ability or capacity 
to engage in that kind of activity called problem-solving. Competent 
problem-solving depends on a set of cognitive and productive resour- 
ces: discrimination, analysis, inference, evaluation, divergent 
thinking, etc., any or all of which may be wholly or partly a func- 
tion of natural endowment or of acquisition through experience, or 
some cornb'ination of the two. In either case maturation may play a 
major part as the work of Piaget and his fellow researchers has 
shown. Thus we may view the trait or ability approach to empathy as 
concerned with the resource end of action. However, the idea of 
skill is never far away as we saw in Chapin's view of social in- 
sight. Here the emphasis is on the coordinated action sequences but 
with an implicit expectation of high level performance. Obviously it 
is but a short step to the idea of degrees of competence (Taft's 
"good" or "poor" judges, for instance), which may or may not be re- 
lated to degrees of inherited or acquired capacity, or maturation. 
Chapin's reference to "... a humorous remark to relax a dangerous 
intensity, a suggested compromise to attain temporary agreement, a 
face-saving remark to avoid embarrassment... " clearly implies that 
range of skills familiar to accomplished politicians, diplomats, 
negotiators, chairpersons, and the like. Presumably Chapin and oth- 
ers concerned with social skills feel that "diplomacy" is essential 
for successfully coping with difficult social situations. Chapin's 
illustrations point to an unfortunate orientation which is typical 
of the social skills approach to empathy (and to interpersonal rela- 
tions generally). Implicit in their thinking is the idea that social 
life is a kind of game in which the "players" try to score points 
off one another or to defend themselves against such tactics. Suc- 
cess in social affairs from this point of view depends on knowing 
when to attack and when to defend and when to do nothing while nev- 
ertheless keeping the other in play. Moreover, it is believed that 
the finest players can judge with an unbelievable subtlety how far 
to press their attack or defence so as to maintain from moment to 
moment a state of dynamic equilibrium that sustains a regime of 
pregnant possibilities without at the same time straining relations 
with others who are viewed as in some way essential for advancing 
one's own position. The classic model for this manipulative conduct 
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is the professional diplomat. On this ground alone a social skills 
model of empathy is untenable as I have tried to show in my discus- 
sion of the antithesis between the power relation and empathy. 
The idea of skill (i. e. that particular coordinated set of action- 
sequences which a performer musters in order to achieve a specified 
goal with the minimum expenditure of time and effort) is implicit in 
much of the thinking of those who have espoused the ability approach 
to empathy; examples include Dyrnond's (Mead's) role-taking theory, 
Kagan's theory of affective communication, and Bronfenbrenner's 
theory of social perception. 
3.31 Eronf enbrenner 
Bronfenbrenner and his colleagues distinguished two types of ability 
in social perception: sensitivity to the generalised other (a con- 
cept they borrowed from Mead) and sensitivity to individual differ- 
ences or what they called interpersonal sensitivity. "It is altoge- 
ther possible, " they say, "for a person to excel in one of these 
skills but not the other. "(50) They lay no foundations for their as- 
sertion that empathic ability (social sensitivity) is a skill which, 
considering that the literature they review concentrates for the 
most part on the idea of ability (though probably not explicitly 
understood as resource or capacity), is strange. However, this team 
had been concerned with the development of skill in social percep- 
tion (i. e. the perception of persons) and in so doing had followed 
an already established tradition. (51) Cottrell(52) had already set 
the scene by indicating the main issues: is empathy a general or a 
specific skill? What are its determinants? What are its social con- 
sequences? Can it be developed? Presumably the trend of enquiries 
into the nature of social perception thereafter accepted the basic 
idea that it was a skill in the same way as object perception was so 
regarded, or, to be more accurate, that it consisted of a number of 
interdependent skills. 
Fronfenbrenner and his associates bring to the fore in their paper a 
well-known human characteristic: a tendency to make judgements about 
classes of people in the conviction that they are true or typical of 
all members of that class. Thus a person may generalise about work- 
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ing-class mothers, D-stream students in a comprehensive school, punk 
and funk, British Rail workers, and so on. We freely make statements 
about politicians, local councillors, the unemployed, the poor, 
foreigners, policemen, drug addicts, and many other "types" of peo- 
ple. One of the questions which Bronfenbrenner's group addresses is: 
do some judges sense the unique characteristics of a group or class 
more accurately than others? Putting the question like this raises a 
whole cluster of problems: what counts as a class? Do individuals 
vary in their discriminability (i. e. do they vary in their "category 
width" for classes of people)? What are people sensitive to? How are 
the characteristics which define the class arrived at? These and 
similar questions point to the futility of invoking empathy as an 
explanatory device in order to account for "facts" such as the suc- 
cessful prediction of a ballot, or being able to sense the views of 
members about the leadership of their trades union by asking one or 
two of them. However much we may empathise with individual members 
of a class the extrapolation from these individual experiences to a 
general assessment of the class to which we have allotted them (i. e. 
to which we believe they belong) is automatically to discount those 
properties which uniquely mark each individual as the person he or 
she is (and which, in Bronfenbrenner's terms, depends on interper- 
sonal sensitivity). Thus he and his co-workers are certainly right 
to say that two distinctly different skills are involved because 
different processes are involved. If empathy refers to interpersonal 
sensitivity it cannot also refer to sensitivity to the generalised 
other. Thus it seems to me that Bronfenbrenner must not only justify 
the notion of this second type of sensitivity and show how it is 
related to the human inclination towards stereotypy; he must also 
demonstrate what is the relationship between the two sensitivities. 
Dronfenbrenner and his team in their 12-fold classification (see 
Table 1) summarise their efforts to deal with these tasks but they 
never question the "reality" of the various generalised others they 
introduce. The fictional nature of generalised others, however con- 
ceptually and functionally real they may appear to be in everyday 
use, the authors do not discuss at all. People can so easily persu- 
ade themselves that esprit de corps, stupid students, unfeeling bos- 
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ists to look rather more closely at this phenomenon especially when 
they are proposing techniques for measuring it. Their table shows 
how they construe social sensitivity. The two types already mention- 
ed (sensitivity to the generalised other and sensitivity to individ- 
ual differences) form the poles of one of the dimensions: the social 
object. The other dimension is the referent: the kinds of sensitiv- 
ity involved. 
The virtue of their analysis is that it clearly demonstrates the 
non-unitary character of social sensitivity (only one aspect of 
which, interpersonal sensitivity, can be likened to empathy) and pro- 
vides a framework for further research and conceptual analysis. 
3.32 Argyle 
Another worker in the skills tradition is Argyle who, rarely and 
then only briefly, refers to empathy; nevertheless he has over many 
years concerned himself with social competence in which empathy-like 
properties seem to have their place. For example, he examines the 
components of social competence: perceptual sensitivity (perceptions 
of other's behaviour and expressiveness), warmth and rapport, a wide 
range of social techniques, a degree of flexibility, energy, and 
smooth response patterns. (53) The first two are aspects of empathy 
as interpreted by some other workers; perceptual sensitivity may be 
construed as an element of Eronfenbrenner's social sensitivity (a 
necessary pre-requisite), while warmth and rapport are both claimed 
by Rogers and his followers as essential for any creative and sup- 
portive interpersonal relationship. (54) The other components are not 
invariably related to empathy. 
The interest of Argyle's approach is his use of a model based on 
psychomotor skills(55) for conducting his analysis of interpersonal 
behaviour. This not only introduces an apparently rigorous operat- 
ional model of empathy but also provides a set of ready-made con- 
cepts for interpreting social behaviour whether empathic or not. One 
major consequence of the skills approach is the prospect of training 
people to develop their social skills. Argyle in particular has made 
his name in this area with practical applications in the training of 
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managers, interviewers, teachers, salesmen, nurses, negotiators, and 
others in the interpersonal professions. 
3.33 The clinical setting 
The implicit assumption that skill is involved in empathic under- 
standing appears to permeate much of the counselling literature in 
both clinical and non-clinical fields. Few of the workers actually 
refer to skill yet it is difficult to see how individual differences 
are to be explained solely on the basis of differences in empathic 
ability (capacity). The fact that many workers have used instruments 
such as Carkhuff's Scale of Empathic Understanding or the Truax 
Scale of Accurate Empathy to evaluate counsellor/therapist perform- 
ance suggests a wide-spread belief that variability in competent 
performance is related to a (usually unspecified) set of sub-skills. 
Furthermore, the gist of much of this literature is that, whatever 
empathy may be, it can be learned and improved by training and sup- 
ervised practice. One example from a non-clinical context illustrat- 
es this point. Aspy and Roebuck(56) investigated teachers' skills in 
understanding their students' perceptions of their own experiences 
using a scale developed by Aspy(57) on the Truax and Carkhuff model. 
(58) Voice quality, language, communication skills, discrimination 
skills, etc., are the elements to be rated by judges. 
Performance on this revised empathy scale served as a basis for com- 
paring high and low scorers in terms of their ratings on Flanders 
Interaction Analysis. (59) This instrument is designed to measure, in 
effect, the student- or teacher-centredness of teachers, i. e. it 
provides an indirect measure of the teacher's concern for, and con- 
sideration of, the student as a person whose feelings, points of 
view, interests, and so forth merit attention in the teacher-student 
relationship. High scorers on the Aspy Empathy Scale were signific- 
antly more student-centred (more inclined to accept students' feel- 
ings, gave more encouragement, criticised less, experienced more 
student-initiated activity, had fewer instances of silence or confu- 
sion) during their lessons, than low scorers. Although the authors 
do not say that, since empathy and at least one aspect of classroom 
life are related, it is therefore a good thing they do say that 
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their results "are consistent with the hypothesis that the teacher's 
provision of high levels of Understanding of Meaning to the student 
(=ernpathy as measured by Aspy) is a critical factor in increasing 
student involvement. "(60) Since this last is viewed as a "good 
thing" by many psychologists and educationists the implicit sugges- 
tion is that we need empathic teachers. It is a central tenet of all 
who follow in the wake of Truax and Carkhuff that empathy (as under- 
stood among this group) can be learned and that training programmes 
can be and have been used extensively in many contexts. In fact the 
bulk of the literature in what I have called the social skills app- 
roach to empathy is concerned with the design and evaluation of such 
training programmes though not all inspired by Truax or Carkhuff. 
Similar arguments apply in the case of psychotherapy. Egan(61) is 
one of the few exceptions among psychotherapists who specifically 
adopts a skills approach. Carkhuff and his associates are, if any- 
thing, even more enthusiastic supporters of the skills approach to 
therapy as we shall see in a moment. However, the relation between 
the concept of empathy and the concept of social skill cannot be 
said to have been worked out by any of the exponents of social 
skills. Most have shown the need for a conceptual framework within 
which to develop a practical approach to learning and teaching soc- 
ial skills but the empathic relation does not feature much in their 
theoretical apparatus. 
3.34 Carkhuff 
In his early Rogerian days Carkhuff had already expressed dissatis- 
faction with the outcome of much psychotherapy regardless of the 
theoretical origins of individual therapies. Citing Rogers et al. 
(62) and Truax and Carkhuff(63), Carkhuff refers to evidence that 
"professional counselling and psychotherapy may be "for better or 
for worse". "(64) This led him and his associates to move away from 
the earlier assumptions about the relationships between helper 
skills and helpee outcomes and towards a more sophisticated skills- 
based model. 
It is interesting to trace the evolution of this model for the light 
it throws on the view of empathy held by his group. Rogers hypothes- 
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iced that the helper's empathy (E) inspired the client's progress 
towards therapeutic personality change (TPC). He later added uncon- 
ditional positive regard (UPR), a kind of non-critical permissive- 
ness, and congruence (Cg), a "responsive genuineness" which, as we 
shall see later, formed part of "the necessary and sufficient condi- 
tions for therapeutic personality change". 
During this early period a number of Rogers' followers (especially 
Carkhuff and Truax) developed measures of these variables (and some 
others) and added measures of the client's own perceptions of his or 
her therapeutic experiences (Ex). Armed with these instruments they 
investigated the relationship between the three sets of variables. 
By the mid-60s the relationship between the variables could be sum- 
marised as follows: 
Helper Helping Helpee 
Skills Process Outcome 
E+ UFR + Cg Ex TPC 
Thus the outcome of therapy was thought to be largely a function of 
helper competence and so could indeed be for better or for worse. 
This discovery seems to have been the turning point for Carkhuff. He 
directed his attention more closely to helper skills isolating a 
number of new ones such as helper self-disclosure, concreteness or 
specificity of expression, confrontation, and immediacy of experi- 
ence. 
Towards the end of the '60s Carkhuff refined empathy (which now be- 
came accurate empathy) and defined it operationally 
. in terms of the helper's ability to make responses that were interchangeable with the feeling and the meaning expressed by 
the helpee. Unconditional positive regard was expanded to emph- 
asize respect which allowed for unconditional regard at the 
lowest level and differential regard at the highest level. 
Also, congruence was modified to emphasize externalised genu- 
ineness rather than an internalised convergence of experiencing 
and behaviour. (65) 
Computing the variance of scores on the measures used and also by 
factor analysing his data Carkhuff isolated two main helper factors: 
responsiveness (R), which subsumed empathy, and respect (the former 
accounting for most of the variance of the latter); and initiative 
(I) which incorporated confrontation and immediacy of experience. 
Finally, genuineness and concreteness loaded on both responsiveness 
and initiative. Thus E+ UPR + Cg first expanded into a much longer 
expression and then contracted to just two terms: R+I. 
However, Carkhuff also found that preliminary and transitional 
skills were needed, the former consisting of attending skills (A), 
which therefore preceded R, and the latter consisting of personalis- 
ing skills (P). The helper skills now had the form A+R+P+I; 
empathy lies buried as one element of responsiveness. 
At the same time the orientation to therapy took a new turn; the 
helpee was now viewed from the perspective of human resource dev- 
elopment (HRD) rather than the TPC of Rogers. People must be helped 
to become what they are capable of becoming if only competent help- 
ers are available to aid this process. The dimensions of development 
are physical, emotional, and intellectual (Ph +E+ Int) which app- 
lied also to the helpers and which determines the criteria for sel- 
ecting and training them. 
The helping process, too, began to look more complex. The original 
notion of the helpee's exploration was felt to be inadequate. There 
has to be action (Act) but effective action. Therefore there must 
also be understanding (U) of the helpee's own world. So by the early 
'70s the basic model had become: 
Helper Helping Helpee 
Skills Process Outcome 
A+R+P+I Ex +U+ Act HDR (E + Ph +I nt ) 
This is not merely a skills model; it is a schema for designing 
training programmes for helpers and helpees alike. It forms the 
basis of the Carkhuff approach to human resource development in 
whatever field of practical application one may choose: teaching, 
nursing, management, industrial relations. Empathy as a process has 
become an element in a set of interpersonal skills. Whilst we cannot 
argue with Carkhuff's general belief that whatever can be done can 
be done well or badly and that in interpersonal relations we cannot 
afford (and perhaps from a moral point of view cannot allow) helpers 
to perform badly and that training is an obvious cure for bad per- 
formance, we may yet wonder what has happened to the fundamental 
quality of all creative human associations: unconditional and spon- 
taneous love, which alone can initiate that bond between persons 
that leads to personal growth. As with all skills models there is 
the ever present danger of the "expert" dominating the helpee and 
creating an ideology of personal development rather than fostering a 
community of persons; of building a divisive relation rather than an 
empathic one. 
It is somewhat chilling to discover that the Carkhuff approach has 
acquired the dubious soubriquet of Militant Humanism. Has expertise 
become an ideological substitute for interpersonal sensitivity? 
3.4 EMPATHY AS A ROUTE TO PERSONAL BEING 
3.41 Carl Rogers 
The idea that empathy is best understood as a process which leads to 
genuine personal growth (as distinct from mere acquisition of 
skills) begins with Rogers(66). In his original paper(67) Rogers 
outlined the theoretical foundations of his practice of client-cent- 
red therapy. His fundamental theory of therapy suggested that if 
certain conditions prevailed then a certain therapy process could 
get under way which in turn became the if-clause for a set of out- 
comes in personality change. From this central theory he evolved 
other theories, e. g. a theory of personality, of the fully function- 
ing person, of interpersonal relationships; and various theories of 
application: family life, education and learning, group leadership, 
and group tension and conflict. Though speculative and tentative, 
Rogers' first account is imaginative, suggestive, and laid the 
foundation of a school of therapy which has had repercussions far 
beyond the boundaries of psychotherapy and has formed a major plank 
in the fabric of humanistic psychology. The later paper concentrates 
on the sufficient and necessary conditions for therapeutic personal- 
ity change, of which there are six. The first lays down the minimal 
character of the relationship: that "two people are to some degree 
in contact, that each makes some perceived difference in the experi- 
ential field of the other". (68) Thus does he construe the psycholog- 
ical contract between the two persons. The remaining conditions 
"define the characteristics of the relationship which are regarded as 
essential to defining the characteristics of each person in the 
relationship". (69) Two of these involve empathy: 
5. The therapist experiences an empathic understanding of the 
client's internal frame of reference and endeavours to com- 
municate this experience to the client. 
6. The communication to the client of the therapist's empathic 
understanding and unconditional positive regard is to a min- 
imal extent achieved. (70) 
Unconditional positive regard is the subject of condition 4. For 
Rogers empathy is "to sense the client's private world as if it were 
your own but without ever losing the "as if" quality". (71) 
Two points need to be made. Empathic understanding stands in cont- 
rast to intellectual or analytical understanding. Empathy is not an 
analytical process. Secondly, it is to be assumed that only certain 
essential features of the client's private world will interest the 
empathiser though these may vary from one therapeutic situation to 
another. That the ernpahasis is on the person rather than on abilit- 
ies or skills is suggested by the fact that the five conditions af- 
ter the first are qualities of a relationship (exemplified by the 
first condition) even though they are expressed in terms of charac- 
teristics of the participants. This becomes even clearer when he 
refers to the central role of experience: 
Conditions 3,4 and 5 which apply especially to the therapist, 
are qualities oý experience, not intellectual information. If 
they are to be acquired, they must, in my opinion, be acquired 
through experiential training . (72) 
Rogers talks of moving about freely in the world of the other, and 
living and sensing the client's experience and ultimately commun- 
icating its meaning to the client, a meaning of which the client may 
have been unaware. Thus empathy is one aspect of a state of being 
centred on the client-therapist relationship; to acquire this state 
of being involves at least the opportunity to "tune into" one's ex- 
perience of the relationship, perhaps in terms of the characteris- 
tics set out in conditions 3,4 and 5. This approach is reminiscent 
of the phenomenological viewpoint which will be considered in the 
next section but here it is worth noting that Rogers is describing 
an asymmetrical relationship. Of course this follows from his choice 
of topic; it is the patient's personality that is assumed to be in 
need of change. However, even if this is a reasonable aim of therapy 
it is nevertheless quite feasible to consider the patient's empathy 
with the therapist, or better still, to think of empathy as the pro- 
cess whereby the two get to know and understand one another by exp- 
loring each other's world with positive gain for both of them, 
though arguably more for the client who sought therapy in the first 
place. Asymmetrical relationships abound in typical interactive sys- 
tems: warder-prisoner, doctor-patient, teacher-student, manager- 
subordinate, clergy-laity, to name some obvious examples. Note that 
while asymmetrical relationships centre on a dominance relation they 
do not have to involve a power relation. Teacher-student, parent- 
child are common instances of dominance relations which nevertheless 
leave open the possibility that empathy rather than power may pre- 
vail. 
The is nothing unethical about an imbalance in interpersonal rela- 
tions unless manipulation, exploitation or oppression is the source 
or outcome of the asymmetry. Teachers, for example, usually have 
knowledge and skills which their students lack and want; patients 
consult and trust their doctors to the extent that they believe that 
they can cure them. Similarly, managers and administrators may scan 
a wider horizon than subordinates for judging the value of decisions 
they impose on others. Even so the acceptance of asymmetry in a rel- 
ationship has to be justified and not merely taken for granted as a 
feature of a hypothesised natural order. Few nowadays would question 
that children, even those as yet unborn, have rights as much as 
their parents; women and wives as much as men and husbands. All 
merit respect (at least) and unconditional recognition and accept- 
ance. Even if children (or adults) make mistakes, as they assuredly 
will, their correction should be carried out with the same uncon- 
ditional regard and respect; that is to say, correction does not 
imply or call for apportionment of blame or denigration of their 
personhoods. Rogers would doubtless agree and many would say that 
client-centred therapy is grounded in such attitudes. And so it is. 
Nevertheless the theoretical arguments of his 1957 and 1959 papers 
do not overtly recognise that patients may empathise with their 
therapists and perhaps should be encouraged to do so. In fact some 
therapists point out that, at least in some states of mental disord- 
er, empathy is impossible by virtue of the patient's condition. 
Schizophrenia and psychopathy are much quoted examples. Even so, the 
possibility that both partners in the relationship (be it counsel- 
ling, therapeutic or just conversational) might enjoy and develop an 
empathic understanding of each other should be explored without pre- 
judice, regardless of current practice and ideology. 
3.42 Barrett-Lennard 
The first person to do this systematically appears to be Stewart(73) 
but, although he is firmly in the tradition of the quest for the 
development of personal being, I examine his contribution to our 
understanding of empathy in the next section. Here let us look 
briefly at some of Rogers' followers. Barrett-Lennard(74) and 
Halkides(75), both doctoral students at the University of Chicago 
(where Rogers taught at the time), were the first to attempt to test 
his theory; they operationalised the therapy process(76) though in 
quite different ways. 
Barrett-Lennard departs significantly from all previous approaches 
to the study of the therapeutic process when he asserts that "the 
client's experience of his therapist's response is the primary locus 
of therapeutic influence in their relationship". (77) The client is 
most affected by his or her own perceptions of the experienced rela- 
tionship and therefore these perceptions "will be the most crucially 
related to the outcome of therapy". (78) Although Barrett-Lennard 
does not say so and may have been unaware of the possibility at this 
time it seems clear that if empathy (i. e. empathic understanding) 
"is concerned with experiencing the process or content of another's 
awareness in all its aspects"(79) then clients must presumably gain 
their impressions of how the therapist sees them (i. e. is experienc- 
ing them) through the same process of empathic undestanding. His 
later work, however, does incorporate this idea. In his 1981 paper 
(80) he develops a cyclical model of empathy which describes how two 
people may enter into an empathic relationship. 
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mark peaks of impact/arousal/involvement in hearing or 
being heard empathically; solid lines represent principal 
communicative expression; dotted arc refers to feedback 
or follow-through communication. 
In the first step the empathiser is attending to the other "with an 
empathic set"; the other is expressing his or her own experience at 
this moment and "expecting, hoping or trusting" that the empathiser 
is receptive. In this preliminary stage both participants are act- 
ively engaged in the relationship but only one is in an empathic 
frame of mind. (This may be compared with my one-sided empathic rel- 
ation and the predisposing and necessary condition of non-manipulat- 
ive openness towards the other for the relation to develop at all. ) 
(81) Step 2, the first phase of empathy, finds the empathiser read- 
ing the other's expressiveness (in both its direct and indirect 
forms) and resonating to the other's experience so that it becomes 
"experientially alive, vivid and known" to the empathiser. This step 
is similar to my stage 1 in which the empathiser spontaneously ex- 
periences the other's givenness. (82) In step 3, the second phase`of 
empathy, the empathiser somehow expresses the fact that he or she 
has grasped something of the other's experiencing. Step 4 finds the 
other experiencing the empathiser's receptiveness and may feel the 
extent to which the empathiser understands him or her here and now. 
This is phase 3 empathy. There is no equivalent to steps 3 and 4 in 
my account since I have argued that the experience of givenness is 
but a necessary first step towards deliberate identification with 
the other. It is at this stage in my theory that clarification of 
differences may lead to understanding, an understanding which may be 
shared. Step 4 in Earrett-Lennard's model is in fact a step I for 
the other in which the other is resonating to the empathiser's empa- 
thic attitude. He is here confusing two different situations: the 
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one-sided relation with which he began and the mutual case. Obviously 
the second may grow out of the first but then there must be inter- 
mediate stages covering the transition which he does not discuss. 
Alternatively, if we construe the one-sided relation as, in fact, one 
of mutual empathy then presumably his first stage would be differ- 
ent. 
Step 5 is a combination of a repeat of step 1 and feedback, the lat- 
ter taking two forms: the confirming or corrective feedback through 
which the empathiser discovers the accuracy of his or her understan- 
ding of the other's experiencing; and the informative feedback 
through which the ernpathiser appreciates the other's perception of 
the burgeoning (empathic) relation. 
In summary 
Phase 1, empathic resonation, refers to "the inner process of 
empathic listening, resonation and personal understanding"; 
Phase 2, expressed empathy centres on "communication or (more 
accurately) expressed empathic understanding"; 
Phase 3 focusses on "received empathy, or empathy based on the 
experience of the person empathised with". (83) 
Earrett-Lennard's paper is concerned as much as anything with clari- 
fying the complexity of empathy and showing that therefore'different 
instruments and different methods will be necessary for evaluating 
"empathy" according to the phase under study. I am not concerned 
with the evaluation of empathy, only with its description. Barrett- 
Lennard's contribution is interesting in that he develops an inter- 
active model which allows for the possibility of mutual empathy 
emerging and perhaps prospering. In fact he did not consider this 
possibility; had he done so he would surely have become aware of the 
inconsistency his steps 3 and 4 introduce into his theory. Another 
important element in his analysis (at least from my point of view) 
is his constant reference to personal understanding of the other as 
the essential outcome of the empathic process. Earlier in the 1981 
paper in commenting on Lipps' view of empathy he writes: 
Implied is an apprehension of personal qualities or individual- 
ity of the otherI not from a detached external view but from a 
position as participant-observer. Not yet explicit however 
was the idea of knowing through entering into, the 
lived 
worlds 
of others, with felt awareness of their experience. ($4) 
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Had he taken up this notion of personal knowing and understanding 
and explored how participants might get to know one another as per- 
sons he might well have reconsidered the Rogerian emphasis on enter- 
ing other people's worlds and developed a different model, perhaps 
one more like Stewart's or my own. 
Another of Barrett-Lennard's innovations was to analyse the concept 
of empathic understanding which he saw as 
... an active process of desiring to know the full present and 
changing awareness of another person, of reaching out to re- 
ceive his communication and meaning, and of translating his 
words and signs into experienced meaning that matches at least 
those aspects of his awareness that are most important to him 
at the moment. It is an experiencing of the consciousness "be- 
hind" another's outward communication, but with continuous 
awareness that the consciousness is originating and proceeding 
in the other. (85) 
There are thus two distinct elements. Empathic recognition refers to 
the "experiential recognition of perceptions and feelings that the 
other has directly symbolised and communicated"; empathic inference 
refers to the "aspect of sensing or inferring the implied or direct- 
ly expressed content of the other's awareness". (86) 
Finally, Barrett-Lennard moves tentatively towards a genetic theory 
of empathy when he links A's empathic understanding of B with 
(i) A's ability to discriminate and (ii) A's ability to allow in his 
or her total awareness all that B experiences as directly or indir- 
ectly conveyed by B's expressiveness. This in turn implies a non- 
defensive and personally integrated A. As Barrett-Lennard puts it 
(negatively): 
To the extent that A identifies with B's feelings, or uncons- 
ciously projects feelings of his own into his perception of B's 
experiences, or in any other way confuses B's experiences with 
experiences which originate in himself, his empathic understan- 
ding of B will be reduced. (87) 
The processes of identification, projection, and other ego defence 
mechanisms have an ambiguous standing in accounts of empathy; never- 
theless here we see how empathy may grow out of one person's non- 
critical, non-judgemental acceptance of another, through the twin 
processes of recognition and inference. 
Other disciples in the Rogerian tradition are Truax and Carkhuff and 
their many co-workers(°Ü); they have designed measuring instruments 
and methods, and have developed research techniques for investigat- 
ing empathy especially in relation to the outcome of therapy, based 
on Rogers' 1957 paper. As we have seen they too have operationalised 
Rogers' effective therapy though in different ways. We have also 
seen how this group has charted a new and idiosyncratic path as a 
result of their dissatisfaction with the poor quality of all forms 
of therapy including client-centred therapy. 
3.5 THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH 
3.51 Edith Stein 
I shall take Edith Stein's "On the Problem of Empathy" as represen- 
tative of this point of view. Following Husserl (whose student and 
later assistant she was) she adopted the phenomenological reduction 
in which the pure description of a phenomenon in consciousness is 
sought divorced from all knowledge, experience, and even essence 
which an investigator might bring to the enquiry. Until one has 
reached the limits of pure description of a phenomenal object, she 
asks, how can one grasp its essence, that is, look into the phenom- 
enon and its tendencies and discover what the phenomenon itself act- 
ually is? It is in this spirit that Edith Stein explores the nature 
of empathy. Whilst we may be deceived as to the knowledge of "for- 
eign psychic life" we cannot doubt the phenomenon itself. The task 
she sets herself is to explore the nature of the givenness and gras- 
ping of foreign mental life. These acts she calls empathy. She exam- 
ines similarities and differences between acts of empathy and those 
of memory, expectation and fancy (fantasy). The last three are anal- 
ogous-to the first. 
... in all the cases of the representation of experiences con- 
sidered there are three grades or modalities of accomplishment 
even if in a concrete case people do not always go through all 
grades but are often satisfied with one of the lower ones. 
These are 
(1) the emergence of the experience, 
(2) the fulfilling explication: and 
(3) the comprehensive objectification of the explained exper- 
ience. (19) 
In (1) I grasp the other's joy or sadness directly ("it faces me as 
an object"); in (2) 1 explore its tendencies and am drawn into the 
other's experience as though in the other's place. In this way I ex- 
plore the other's experience and clarify it. Finally in (3) I am 
able to face once again the other's joy or sadness as an object (as 
I did in (i)) but now clarified and possibly explained and under- 
stood. 
The essential difference between empathy and the analogous acts of 
memory, expectation and fantasy is that in the latter the "I" of the 
experiences (e. g. the "I" remembering and the "I" remembered) is the 
same in both; in empathy the empathising "I" and the "I" whose exp- 
erience is grasped in empathy are different. In stages (1) and (3) 
"the representation exhibits the non-primordial parallel to percep- 
tion", i. e. I do not confuse my grasping of the other's experience 
with his; stage (2) "exhibits the non-primordial parallel to the 
having of the experience", i. e. I do not confuse my experience with 
the other' s. (90) 
Empathy for Edith Stein is like an "act of perception sui generis". 
Let Io and Is represent the "I" of other and self respectively and X 
and Y their experiences of an event Z in which, say, they experience 
feelings of joy. Then IoXZ means: the other experiences joy (attrib- 
utable to event Z) and IsYZ stands for the similar response of self 
to the same event. The underlined letters thus represent a relation 
between two entities, in this case between a human subject and a 
phenomenal object, an event. I will not pursue the difficulties imp- 
licit in the expression "the same event" but will assume that Z is 
definable objectively in ways acceptable to participants and indep- 
endent observers alike. Thus we have: Io's primordial joy over Z, 
IoXZ, and Is's joy over Z, IsYZ. 
Now let us assume that self sees the other in a joyful frame of mind 
but is ignorant of event Z. In empathy Is grasps the joyful other 
primordially: IsG(IoXZ), i. e. (IoXZ) is the object whose givenness 
is grasped. The other's joy over event Z, XZ, is grasped non-primor- 
dially. If now we represent Is's joy over the other's experience we 
get IsY(IoXZ). Here Y has its source in (IoXZ), not Z, the event 
which made Io joyful. We may make a further contrast; suppose Is 
reflected (R) on his or her empathic grasping of Io's joy. We would 
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write IsR(IsG(IoXZ)). The primordial experience of the reflecting 
self is his or her recollected experience, the act of empathy 
(IsG(IoXZ)). Both Io, the joyful other, and XZ, the other's experi- 
ence of joy are non-primordial. It is worth noting that Z, the oc- 
casion of the original experience for'Io, is of no consequence to Is 
as far as the act of empathy or its recollection is concerned. It is 
interesting to gather together in tabular form a number of hypothet- 
cal experiences of the participants: 
Other's primordial joy over Z 
Self's 
to 
I 11 if 11 
empathy with the other 
Other's 10 11 " self 
Self's primordial joy over other's joy 




recollection of own empathy 









Is, Io can be interpreted variously as: "is existentially in", "is 
living in", "is directly aware of", and similar expressions. We may 
thus say that in empathy Is experiences the, joyful other (IoXZ) pri- 
mordially, i. e. the experience is a direct, here-and-now event for 
Is, but "is living in" the other's joy non-primordially. In recol- 
lection Is may experience his or her own act of empathy (IsG(IoXZ)) 
primordially (i. e. the recollection is a here-and-now experience), 
but the other's experience of joy non-primordially. Edith Stein imp- 
lies a clear separateness between the "perceptual" act and the ex- 
periencing of the two "I"s in empathy. Moreover empathy for her is a 
cognitive event not an emotional one. It corresponds to Scheler's 
Nachgefuehl or reproduced feeling: 
In reproduced feeling we sense the quality of the other's feel- 
ing without it being transmitted to us, or"evoking a similar 
real emotion in us. (91) 
Empathy "as the experience of foreign consciousness can only be the 
non-primordial experience which announces a primordial one". (92) My 
non-primordial ernpathic, experience announces the other's primordial 
joy. If my emotions, do correspond to those of the other, even if my 
empathy also persists, then my joy is a primordial act, a fellow- 
feeling with the other. It is this which Stein designates sympathy 
and thus neatly contrasts it with empathy (as she understands it). 
231 
This differs from Scheler's view of sympathy; it more closely resem- 
bles his "community of feeling". (93) 
Another feature of empathy is the experience of oneness which others 
have claimed as characteristic. Stein makes an important distinction 
between two senses in which this unity of persons may be construed. 
Lipps held that in certain conditions the subjects of an empathic 
experience lose their separateness. For example, the spectator is at 
one with the acrobat because the former innerly experiences the Tat- 
ter's movements. However, Lipps fails to draw a distinction between 
the spectator's non-primordial "sensing" of the acrobat's movements 
and the latter's primordial actions. As always in empathy the spec- 
tator experiences the acrobat's performance primordially but the 
acrobat's feelings non-primordially (which, to the acrobat, are pri- 
mordial). Following the earlier symbolism we may write Ia, Is to 
represent the I's of the acrobat and spectator respectively; E and F 
their separate experiences (perceptions) of the acrobat's movements 
(M) during his performance; and U, V the feelings aroused in Ia, Is 
by their experiences. We thus get a series of expressions such as: 
the acrobat's experience of his movements: IaEM 
spectator's 11 " these 01 IsFM 
" acrobat's feelings about this experience: IaU(IaEM) 
11 
spectator's 11 If if 11 
$I Is 
IsV(IsFM) 
empathy with the acrobat: IsG(IaEM) or 
IsG(IaU(IaEM)) 
The last line has two expressions according to whether Is grasps the 
givenness of the acrobat's experience of his own performance or the 
feelings stirred in him by the movements he is carrying out. The 
spectator's primordial experience of the acrobat's performance 
(IsFM), which is obviously very different from the acrobat's own 
experience, can be compared with both the spectator's primordial 
feelings (IsV(IsFM)) aroused by his or her experiences, and the 
non-primordial experience of the acrobat's feelings in empathy: 
IsG(IaU(IaEM)). In this example the spectator grasps how the acrobat 
feels about his performance. This in turn might be compared with the 
non-primordial experience in empathy of the acrobat's experience it- 
self: IsG(IaEM). 
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Empathy is not equivalent to a feeling of unity in this case. Never- 
theless there is a sense in which the experience of unity or oneness 
with the other may be genuine. It is when two or more people experi- 
ence the same emotion over the same event and in so doing enhance 
each other's experience. For example, one participant may in the 
explication stage reveal to the others an aspect of the initiating 
event which they had missed, thus enhancing their empathic experi- 
ence. In this situation I suggest that the members are in Mutual 
empathy. 
If the same thing happens to the others we empathically enrich 
our feeling so that "we" now feel a different joy from 'I", 
"you", and "he" in isolation. But "I", "you", and "he" are 
retained in "we". A "we", not an "I", is the subject of the 
empathising. Not through the feeling of oneness, but through 
empathizing, do we experience others. The feeling of oneness 
and the enrichmnent of our own experience become possible 
through empathy. (94) 
I would have said: through mutual empathy. Notice also that in unity 
the separateness of the participants is preserved. Mutual empathy 
simultaneously unites and asserts the separateness of the members of 
the experience. 
From a phenomenological point of view Stein feels that it is import- 
ant to clarify the status of empathy (still in pure description). 
She poses three questions: 
(1) Are empathized experiences primordial or not? 
(2) Are foreign experiences objectively given as something fac- 
ing me or given experientially? 
(3) Are they intuitively or non-intuitively given (and if intu- 
itively, in the character of perception or representation)? 
(95) 
We now know that the answer to the first question is that they are 
not but the second poses problems. There is no doubt that foreign 
experience is "out there" and the explication stage frequently leads 
to the clarification of possibly vague presentiments, surely a move 
towards objective givenness. On the other hand the over-against rel- 
ation is inconsistent with the notion of empathy which rests on an 
initial grasping of the other's givenness directly, i. e. non-analyt- 
ically. Stein's own position appears unequivocal: empathy is one 
experience anouncing another (in which the subjects of the two ex- 
periences are different people). Is it a case of neither objective 
nor experiential givenness? Or is it both? I have suggested in Chap- 
ter 2 that in certain circumstances the latter is at least an argu- 
able hypothesis. (96) 
The third question is even more problematical. We can obviously know 
the other's feelings by being told rather than ourselves experien- 
cing his or her givenness but the "knowledge" so gained is very dif- 
ferent if for no better reason than that in the former condition the 
other's expressiveness need form no part of the "knowledge"; in the 
second case it is essential. Not only is the "knowledge" different; 
so is the phenomenal object itself. Recalling the comparison of emp- 
athy with sympathy in Chapter 2 we can say that indirectly gained 
information about another may excite our sympathy but never estab- 
lish, of itself, our empathic relation with him or her. Only person- 
al contact and goodwill can initiate empathy. Similarly the other's 
expressiveness is not a phenomenon which is subjected to intellec- 
tual analysis the results of which enable us to know and understand 
the other's feelings. This seems to me to constitute the Archilles' 
heel of the social skills industry in which it is assumed that mere 
knowledge of non-verbal skills (including their use) is a sure way 
into the hearts and minds of those whom we wish to know and under- 
stand. 
As to the choice of perception or representation as a suitable model 
for understanding empathy we can say that perceptual experience is 
very different from empathy. While the object of empathy (or quasi- 
empathy) and that of perception may be physically before us here and 
now, there is all the world of difference between perceiving a human 
being and grasping his or her givenness in empathy. To recognise the 
shape approaching us as Fred, the man next door, depends on the mar- 
ker-recognition process in which we come to know and remember the 
sets of properties (markers) and their interrelations as Fred (and 
which we call the perception of Fred). In empathy, as Stein desc- 
ribes it, we grasp instantly in an intuitive act, Fred's givenness 
at a specific moment (e. g. he's going to ask us to lend him a fiver) 
through his expressiveness. Perception usually involves an interpre- 
tative activity; empathy, in its initial phase leads to an immedi- 
ate, non-analytical apprehension that such-and-such is the case. 
Both convey meaning but by very different routes or processes. On 
the other hand they are obviously related in some way since the sen- 
sorium appears to be involved in both and both lead to action (or 
may do so). Comparing the two like this exposes the difficulty of 
deciding between them; we need to know far more about the nature of 
both and the possible relations between them. 
Representation is likewise different from empathy yet we must accept 
that grasping another's expressiveness implies some kind of ability 
to "read" the other which in turn suggests some kind of representa- 
tion. What does representation mean in this case? In general how is 
our experience made known (represented) to us? Stein concludes that 
the last question is unresolvable within the existing psychological 
categories of her day; I think this is still true. 
At this juncture we can make a number of observations about Edith 
Stein's account. Empathy must involve all three stages. Although she 
says that individuals may rest content with lower grades the full 
experience of empathy depends on passing through all three grades. 
Although she does not say so there is always the possibility of the 
various stages being imperfectly carried out. The emergence of the 
experience may be marked by vagueness, the explication may be incom- 
plete and hence the final objectification stage less than adequate 
for grasping the other's experience, i. e. understanding it, fully. 
Empathy must be an iterative process, a constant re-experiencing of 
the other's foreignness, and so a repetition of all the stages until 
the other is understood. This can surely only be done cooperatively, 
i. e. in mutual empathy, where the participants strive to understand 
each other. But then why should they do this unless they also coop- 
erate in some shared venture and do so on a basis which both have 
accepted and agreed to? Edith Stein's account of empathy has a one- 
way ring to it. 
Her review of the (then current) psychogenetic explanations of emp- 
athy focusses on two questions: 
(1) what psychological mechanism functions in the experience of 
empathy? 
(2) how has the individual acquired this mechanism in the 
course of his or her development? 
She considers and rejects theories of imitation, association and 
inference from analogy. She also dismisses Scheler's arguments fair- 
ly exhaustively. I will not take up her attacks but will bear in 
mind her two questions. They provide a good basis for evaluating my 
own contribution. 
3.52 David Stewart 
Although Stewart does not explicitly claim a phenomenological bias 
in his approach to unravelling empathy, either as a concept or as a 
phenomenon, there is much in his account which is at least sympath- 
etic to a phenomenological viewpoint. He is certainly closer to 
Edith Stein than to any other theorist. Firstly, his analysis turns 
on concepts such as person, action (and hence agency), and personal 
knowing. He points towards and explores a personal psychology. 
A personal psychology then, a basic psychology of personal 
knowing in its highest form the act of empathy, is what we 
have to develop if we wish o solve the problem of knowing and 
being... (97) 
The basic concept is person, not mind, not body, not mental 
states, not sense data. (98) 
Central to Stewart's notion of person is the idea of identity (what 
I have called personhood as does Stewart from time to time) and its 
developmental dependence on others. It is through empathy (the high- 
est form of personal knowing) which is defined as "deliberate ident- 
ification with another, accompanied by growing insight into oneself 
and the other"(99) that we become persons. 
Stewart's first formal definition conveys something of the flavour 
of his thinking which, considering the date of publication (1956), 
vividly contrasts with the more pedestrian views of most psycholog- 
ists working in this field then or since. 
Empathy is deliberate identification with another promoting 
one's knowledge of the other as well as of oneself in striving to understand what is now foreign but which one may imagine, 
curbed by the other's responses, to be something similar to 
one's own experience. Empathy is therefore both a process of intuition and the basis of dynamic inference. (100) 
The various points which I have highlighted and which this defini- 
tion sharpens form the subject matter of the discussion which fol- 
lows. -Three things need to be said first however. One is that 
Stewart drew on a Freudian theoretical framework though he was not 
slavishly addicted to it. Secondly, he was concerned with the epis- 
temological dilemmas involved in developing a personal psychology as 
compared with a mechanistic, i. e. a scientific, psychology. 
If it is person, as distinct from object whom you wish to know 
it is essential to identify with him, before you can say any- 
thing scientific about him if you do not go beyond the scien- 
tific phase, you cannot say that you know a person. At best, 
you may say that you have a scientific knowledge about a human 
ein?, a living creature, a biological entity. -. Scientific 
knowledge of persons, or rather a knowledge of persons in their 
role as human beings, or as biologocal entities, lies between 
initial identification and the deliberate re-identification 
which enables you to say, when you can, that you know a person. 
(101) 
The distinctions and epistemological problems Stewart airs in this 
excerpt are familiar enough nowadays to readers of modern writers 
such as Gauld and Shotter, Harre, and Thines but he is unique_in the 
empathy literature both in being aware of them and in attempting 
some kind of resolution. 
Thirdly, the dynamic thread underlying his notion of empathy is 
goodwill which for him is a given, an irreducible phenomenon, char- 
acteristic of human existence; 
... empathy presupposes good trying. 
In the case of knowing 
persons good trying appears to be what is commonly known as 
good-will( sic)... There are natural sources within any person 
which constitute the basic material of good-will. These deep- 
rooted sources are intuitive. (102) 
As a guide to the following analysis of Stewart's position we can 
summarise his theory in the form of a table: 
PRE-EMPATHIC PHASE 
first stage: transference and unconscious identification 
leading to resistance (both false and genuine) 
second stage: unconscious imitation followed by conscious 
imitation (free and imposed) 
EMPATHY PROPER 
first stage: deliberate ie. conscious identification in 
which similarities are explored 
second stage: encountering the foreign in the other and the 
exploration of differences 
POST-EMPATHY PHASE joint action in pursuit of a shared common goal 
or ideal (leading to good fellowship and inter- 
personal harmony) 
Two footnotes in Freud's writings impressed Stewart. The first 
points to the aim of therapy: "to give the patient's ego freedom to 
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choose one way or the other". (103) The second comes from Group Psy- 
chology and the Ego: 
a path leads from identification by way of imitation to emp- 
athy, that is, to the comprehension of the mechanism by means 
of which we are enabled to take up any attitude at all towards 
another mental life... (identifications) result among other things in a person limiting his a ressiveness towards those 
with whom he had identified himself, and in his sparing them 
and giving them help. (104) 
Stewart interprets these statements as saying that since identifica- 
tion is likely to initiate (the conscious manifestation of) goodwill 
the patient, through the empathiser's (or therapist's) goodwill, is 
encouraged or inspired freely to choose one way or the other. For 
Stewart freedom in the sense implied is the goal of empathy and 
goodwill the means for reaching it, although he does admit that the 
proposition could as well be expressed the other way round. 
3.5 21 The pre-empathy phase (first stage) 
Borrowing Freud's idea of transference (which, he points out, does 
not commit us to accepting his psychosexual theory) Stewart claims 
that all interpersonal relations stem from this tendency among hum- 
ans to form emotional attachments to others. 
The universal phenomenon of transference is an illustration of 
a downright natural process arising spontaneously in any human 
relationship. Thus it is a priori because while instances of it 
must arise in experience, it is the basis of all interpersonal 
experiences... When the value of transference is noted as a 
means to interpersonal knowledge it can only be promoted by 
good-will - the conscious manifestation of that which unconsci- 
ously and spontaneously is the very ground of the transference 
process. (105) 
Naturally Stewart is here talking of positive transference, an 
affectionate bond with the other. But 
Let there be either ignorance of the means by which transfer- 
ence is fostered, or a lack of finesse in a pplying the means, and resistance will arrest the process and 
the 
transference 
will be negative... (106) 
It seems to me that Stewart might have explored more than he did the 
possibility of negative bonds being formed as I have tried to do in 
presenting separately the various potentially empathic relations 
that can be met in the real world. His failure to do likewise weak- 
ens his theoretical position since coping with a hostile or negative 
or indifferent other presents theoretical difficulties not encoun- 
tered in the more positive instances. I have gone to some trouble to 
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show this in Chapter 1. In all that follows the reader must assume 
that the empathiser has established a positive bond with the other 
who may initially resent this gesture of goodwill but who eventually 
tries to move closer to the empathiser. The point for Stewart is 
that goodwill is not a matter of choice; we all have it to some ex- 
tent though some appear to be more naturally well-disposed to their 
fellow humans than others. The conscious form of goodwill develops 
through the spontaneous identification and resistance process. 
In unconscious identification one individual perceives a common qua- 
lity shared with another "who is-not an object of sexual instinct. " 
(107) Freud held that there is a positive correlation between the 
perceived importance to the identifier of this common quality and 
the strength of his or her resulting identification with the other. 
This spontaneous, undisciplined act leads to resistance which may 
take various forms. For example, one may "perceive" a trait in the 
other which is, in fact, a characteristic of one's own. Stewart 
cites as an instance the shock which a person may experience on 
learning that his companion beats his wife or neglects his children. 
Then the first person remembers occasions when he similarly caused 
suffering to his own family and learns (later, in empathy) not to 
blame the other for something he has been guilty of himself. Alter- 
natively the identifier may over-idealise himself or the other. A 
person may see himself as generous and so impute meanness to the 
other by comparison. The truth may be that the first person is far 
from generous (a fact which in empathy may eventually come to 
light); the injustice to the other is a kind of compensation for 
one's own inadequacy. 
Where these two kinds of resistance betray a false identification 
the third kind is genuine. Here "one identifies one's own insecurity 
and fear with that confronted in the other and thus magnifies them". 
(108) The outcome of later exploration (in empathy) is the discovery 
of "those features of one's own life which are forever unfathomable 
and beyond one's control, and yet a necessary part of one's life. " 
(109) A chronic gambler may see in an alcoholic the same defects of 
immaturity: impulsiveness, grandiosity, and wishful thinking that he 
recognises in himself. He learns to accept them as part of his nat- 
ure and gradually learns with the other in empathy how to control 
their effects. 
3.522 Stage two of the pre-empathy stage 
The identification-resistance process leads to what Stewart calls 
transitional imitation in which "there is a grasping for unity as 
though the vaguely defined imitator were seeking his own identity in 
the person or persons imitated. "(110) This imitation takes the form 
of crude mimicry of gestures and the like. Stewart cites as examp- 
les the boy who mimics his father's smoking or the punished child 
who smacks a doll. Fear leads to placatory behaviour which neverthe- 
less exhibits at least a primitive form of trying. This form of im- 
itation, however, fails to lead to a genuine sense of identity. One 
must "be oneself before it makes sense to say one knows another. " 
(111) That is to say, one's own intentions and purposes must become 
clearer and form the basis of one's own actions and these processes 
can only occur if imitation becomes conscious. However, this may be 
expressed in two forms: imposed or free. In the former case the self 
may be imposed upon or impose on others. 
At this stage the importance of goodwill can scarcely be overstress- 
ed. It shapes the trend towards free imitation and ultimately to de- 
liberate identification (the first stage of the empathic process it- 
self). Goodwill is "that which fosters both unity with others and 
one's difference from others. "(112) One's own identity is not to be 
purchased at the cost of a loss of unity with others but at the same 
time this effort towards unity must not sacrifice one's self-identi- 
ty. As Stewart puts it, "the organism is striving for traffic with 
others and at the same time for self-assertion. "(113) 
Stewart is at pains to remind us that there is nothing miraculous or 
mysterious about this struggle for unity in separateness (or separ- 
ateness in unity). The blind striving-trying-conscious effort sequ- 
ence may be hidden as to its inner workings but the "struggle to 
know" is recognisable enough in everyday affairs. So also is the un- 
certainty of its course and the frequent waywardness of its develop- 
ment. We make mistakes, impose on others, submit to their imposi- 
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tions, and so on; but if goodwill informs our efforts these errors 
will tend to diminish both in their frequency and in their effect. 
Knowin how one is both like and unlike others, knowing one's 
identity and respecting others - the empathic process in its 
ideal form - is not a situation immaculately conceived. It has to be struggled for as long as we live. (1147 
And the first positive step towards this ideal form of mutual empa- 
thy is free imitation: 
... the seeing of authentic differences depends on the exhaust- ing of common traits. It is therefore free imitation, imitation 
free of impositions from without which promotes goodwill. (115) 
Stewart's own therapeutic practice with alcoholics and drug addicts 
provided him with plenty of material to support these hypotheses. 
The alcoholic who tries to attain sobriety by following the exhort- 
ations of his friends, relatives, employer may succeed in "staying 
on the wagon" for a time and even severely censure others like him- 
self who fall by the wayside. Eventually the strain of adopting and 
following an ideal (sobriety) which is not his and with which he 
cannot really identify prove too much and a minor incident is enough 
to trigger off yet another bender. He rebels in the only way he can. 
But 
When imitation leads to empathy the imitator is well disposed 
towards his exemplar and wants ppersonally to imitate him. He 
becomes the other because he likes him. But because he likes 
the other, he wants the other to be himself... In free imitation 
roles are willingly exchanged between persons, each enhancing 
his own identity in the process. (116) 
, 
So already Stewart is talking about a process between persons though 
he does introduce in somewhat randon fashion other terms such as in- 
dividual and organism. Our knowledge of ourselves and of the world 
. will be found in a form of identification of resistance, and perhaps of a form of them together. But this knowledge will 
come from a form created by persons in community, not from hum- 
an organisms in isolation. (117) 
This theme will be taken up again later. Resistance is met once 
again after the free imitation stage en route to empathy. It is dur- 
ing this final resistance that we discover the nature of the origin- 
al resistance as mistaken (if it was) and confine ourselves to the 
third genuine type. 
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3.523 Empathy 
In the first stage of empathy a self explores consciously what he or 
she has in common with another. In the process I may also discover 
things in myself which I do not much care for and so generate self- 
resistance but I will also encounter the genuinely foreign in the 
other. This is where the stage of deliberate identification (cons- 
cious exploration of similarities) gradually gives way to the second 
stage; the conscious exploration of differences. For Stewart this 
involves the use of imagination and analogy. An addictive gambler 
may identify with a confirmed alcoholic and perceive their common 
qualities, the immature characteristics referred to earlier. In exp- 
loring their differences, however, (i. e. in striving to understand 
the foreign in the other he tries to find parallels to the other's 
addiction to alcohol in his own gambling behaviour and its attendant 
feelings and attitudes. The thrill of winning and the hope of riches 
and the transformations they will bring to the gambler's life- 
chances may be analogous to the alcoholic's joy in the relief from 
fear which he seeks through drinking. In imaginative exploration of 
his analogy the gambler can reach towards the other's feelings. The 
foreignness of the other's experiences is at least partially penet- 
rated by the combined use of imagination and analogy; the underlying 
similarity of the problems each experiences is at least partially 
revealed. 
Stewart distinguishes the two states of affairs in this phase of 
empathy proper: 
But even where two alcoholics are concerned, excluding the 
problem of their differences on countless grounds other than their drinking problem, the feeling of oneness-with will accom- 
pany the feeling of respect for the other as different from 
oneself. This may be expressed as a distinction within the em- 
ppathic pprocess corresponding to Einsfuhlung and Einfuhlung. In Einsfuhlung - being at one with another - we do not differen- tiate. We live in and with the feelings of the other. Practic- 
ally speaking we completely agree on the meaning of certain ex- 
periences... In Einfuhlung each implicitly confers on the other his identity by imagining the other to be what he is, after 
comparing some item of the other's behaviour with behaviour of 
one s own. In Einfuhlung, therefore, the other gets his person- 
al identity - insofar as he gets it, outside himself from me. (111) '' 
In empathy, the, fear or resentment of the other's foreignness gives 
way to respect for the other. Perception of difference is transform- 
ed into acceptance of not only the other's uniqueness but also of 
one's own. Once again the role of goodwill is manifest; not only ef- 
fort but well-disposed (as opposed to well-meaning) effort is essen- 
tial. Unlike Freud's concept of identification, which appears to re- 
fer to a process that limits the growing individual's range of act- 
ion, Stewart sees his own interpretation as one which emphasises 
liberation. Once individuals recognise and accept how alike and dif- 
ferent they are they implicitly acknowledge their own and the oth- 
ther's identity. Each confirms and reaffirms the other's uniqueness 
thus enhancing his own as well as the other's identity. 
It seems to me that Stewart's claim that identification is liberat- 
ing is just. I think that his notion of deliberate identification is 
one of his most important contributions to the explication of empa- 
thy. It brings into a single focus several ideas and processes cent- 
ral to our understanding of empathy: agent, action and goodwill; 
person and intention; the social origin of persons. 
3.524 Post-empathy stage 
Once again Stewart is inspired by Freud. In the first excerpt below 
Freud points to a relation between identification and the idea of 
ethical action: 
The Church requires that the position of the libido which is 
9iven by a group formation should be supplemented. Identifica- 
tion has to be added where object-choice has taken place and 
object-love where there is identification. This addition evid- 
ently goes beyond the constitution of the group. This further 
development in the distribution of libido in the group is prob- 
ably the factor upon which Christianity bases its claim to have 
reached a higher ethical level. (119) 
Couple this with one of Freud's references to leaderless groups: 
We should above all be concerned with the distinction between 
groups which have a leader and leaderless groups. We should 
consider whether groups with leaders may not be the more primi- 
tive and complete whether in others an idea an abstraction, 
may not be substituted for the leader (a state of things in 
which religious groups with their invisible head: form a tran- 
sition state), and whether a common tendency, a wish in which a 
number of people can have a share, may not in the same way 
serve as a substitute. (120) 
Finally, one of Freud's many interpretations of identification: 
Identification... rnay arise with every new perception of a com- 
mon quality shared with some other person who is not an object 
of sexual instinct. (121) 
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Bringing all these together we might, with Stewart, imagine that any 
specific community is held together through the members' identifica- 
tion with a shared common ideal which that community thus embodies. 
Stewart examines Alcoholics Anonymous from this perspective. It is a 
leaderless community in which alcoholics seek sobriety and identify 
eventually with their sponsors: recovered alcoholics (object- 
choice). In time the alcoholic reaches out to others like himself 
(object-love) and shows concern for them. The learning process is 
not straightforward and many mishaps occur on the way but the under- 
lying goodwill of sponsors and fellow alcoholics leads to his delib- 
erate identification with sponsors and his willingness to sponsor 
new members himself. This is empathy in action in a real world set- 
ting which Stewart knows well. (122) It typifies the emergence of 
personhood though Stewart's terminology and process description are 
different from mine. The whole empathic cycle focusses on action 
(i. e. conscious deliberate choice) though action is not always evi- 
dent and sometimes fails to achieve its objective. The finale, how- 
ever, leaves no doubt about the potential for a successful outcome. 
If we translate "ethical" into "that which promotes the rejection of 
self-limiting conduct and attitudes" we can say that individuals who 
identify with one another in terms of a shared common goal (e. g. the 
adoption of self-liberating conduct and attitudes) will be moved to 
act in concert to pursue that goal or ideal and in the process will 
not only achieve personhood (personal identity) but will also dis- 
cover and respect the foreignness of others and thus accord to them 
their personal identities. The result in community is the growth of 
interpersonal harmony or good fellowship. "The concept of brother- 
hood, of fellowship, is sound in any group united by a strong common 
tendency and goal, and by the ethical theme at work in deliberate 
striving for the goal. "(123) 
A number of points in Stewart's account still need attention. He 
stresses, for example, the importance for individuals that they re- 
cognise a power greater than themselves: 
To dignify one's effort to become "a person", to preserve the feeling of fellowship as against the feeling of being mastered, to stimulate open-mindedness and humility, is to generate and increase the communication which brings insight. To be a per- 
son, or to try to be, is to recognise a sense of incompleteness 
which needs to be compensated in fellowship. And fellowship, 
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fostering respect for the other as for oneself, seems to flour- 
ish best in the mutual recognition of a power greater than any 
or all of the group rnembers. (124) 
For Stewart this greater power, though entitled to be called a reli- 
gious belief (so long as no dogma or doctrine is implied), is not 
something absolute but merely "a belief basic to the sense of incom- 
pleteness defining a person... " Stewart insists that this belief is 
freely adopted in the course of the empathic process. People will 
vary as to what they bring to the relation and whatever they bring 
there is always more to discover. 
... in any relation of one person to another person, or thing, in interpersonal relations or in science, an open-minded atti- 
tude is necessary. This attitude always allows the possibility 
of something still to be known and respected. (12 ) 
This is reminiscent of my own concept of non-manipulative openness 
but Stewart seems to have discovered it late in the empathic process 
and does not seem to accord it the importance or attention it mer- 
its. Considering the tenor of his approach to empathy this is sur- 
prising. 
A second point which he stresses is that Alcoholics Anonymous does 
not demand recognition of a greater power but merely points to its 
value, by virtue of its way of working as briefly described above, 
in terms of self-liberation (in the correction of self-limiting cop- 
ing strategies, for example), and of acknowledging that the ideal 
sought by all members transcends them individually and collectively. 
Freedom to choose is as essential to recovery as goodwill enshrined 
in identification. "The dignity of"person" which gives him a meaning 
different from human being, is a dignity arising from his capacity 
to choose, to deliberate, to imagine, to identify - in a word, to 
empathize. "(126) And this dignity cannot be conferred by but rather 
through another which is made clear to him by the other's "initial 
identification in transference which becomes an act of empathy in 
fellowship". (127) Part of being a person in community with other 
persons is thus a consciousness of incompleteness which can only be 
remedied with the help of others but non-manipulatively and in a 
spirit of open-mindedness. And this can only happen in that process 
we call empathy.. 
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There is one last point about Stewart's approach to empathy which in 
fact is implied in the above observations. The empathic relation is 
essentially non-judgemental. One's emergence to personhood cannot be 
externally evaluated for only the individual knows where he or she 
stands at any particular moment in the process which is by nature 
dynamic. There is no prescribed target which determines or could de- 
termine measures of progress. The ideal or goal is a general aim but 
the day-to-day actions are part of an individual biography in inter- 
action with others who are similarly engaged and which reflect the 
degree of abandonment of self-limiting strategies in favour of self- 
liberating ones. Progress is measured by personal experience of pos- 
itive achievement as seen by the agent in terms of his or her own 
actions and to the extent that the agent perceives hirn or herself to 
be in self-control. 
3.525 Stewart's second thoughts 
A decade after Preface to Empathy notions of self-control featured 
much more prominently in his thinking but his approach to empathy 
also took a new direction. In the later paper(128) he is far more 
concerned with the contrasting modes of experiencing ourselves in 
our world: the modes of having and being. For him empathy centres on 
the latter and is a corrective of disorders arising out of the form- 
er: 
Empathy requires of me genuine contact with you, recognition of 
you, and acquaintance with you in a feeling of goodwill. To be 
empathic I must put myself in your place so that I can be at 
one with you and at the same time know that each of us is him- 
self. I come to respect that which is foreign in you if I can- 
not recognize in myself what I encounter in you. In striving to 
understand you I may well reduce much of what I had regarded 
as strange if 
I 
allow you to be yourself, and equally, if you 
allow me to be myself. The interpersonal encounter is discip- 
lined by the free give-and-take of our revelations to one an- 
other. (129) 
The "new" elements are genuine contact, recognition and acquaintance 
which lead to empathy. Their newness lies in their new guise. Gone 
is all reference to identification, whether spontaneous or deliber- 
ate. In fact in a footnote he laments "that empathy is not yet well- 
defined, and is often mistaken for equally confusing terms; e. g. id- 
entification, projection. "(130) Imitation, however, survives: tran- 
sitional, imposed and free; only the latter "paved by contact and 
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recognition, is a phase of acquaintance, one step short of empathy". 
(131) In that next step we meet the paradox of empathy: the separ- 
ateness of personal identity and unity with the other. 
The experience of being distinguishes the act of empathy in two 
phases at once - being oneself, and being at one with the 
other. (132) 
Imposed imitation leads to defensive strategies such as "projection 
of blame, over-expectancy, and fear of the foreign. "(133) They have 
their source in the influence of the having mode of existence. They 
can only be cured through empathy in which the sufferer strives for 
the detachment of the empathiser. Thus does the recovered alcoholic 
understand (feel for) the addict before hirn in his desperate long- 
ing for freedom from addiction. This is only possible in empathy 
which "is the capacity to relive vicariously in myself your state, 
as yours, other than mine, without thereby becoming what you are. " 
(134) This reminds us of Scheler's sympathy and of Carl Rogers' def- 
inition of empathy. 
Stewart still grapples with the relationship between personal and 
scientific knowing as he did in the earlier work but no more convin- 
cingly, I feel, because he does not distinguish clearly enough the 
nature of the objects of scientific knowing. Whilst he says that it 
cannot be the person he appears less sure of how best to construe a 
scientific study of human beings. His treatment of the contact- 
recognition-acquaintance sequence shows the influence of Macmurray 
who stressed that knowledge of another as a person was only possible 
through action which by its nature led to contact with the other and 
hence to the experience of the other's resistance. In empathy, act- 
ion (and the agent) is free but in defensive conduct (in pseudo- 
action) the agent is not free. Neither is he a "whole" person; he is 
a crippled person, afflicted with one or more of the ailments refer- 
red to earlier: holding others to blame for his defects, over-expec- 
tancy from self and others, and perhaps most significantly of all, 
the self-sufficiency myth often expressed as fear of the foreign. 
All of these are substantially self-imposed deficiencies and have 
their roots in the having mode of living. 
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In contrast Stewart sees healthy actions as manifestations of the 
ideals of being: personal freedom, creative effort, and fellowship. 
To attain personal freedom 
I must therefore abandon the priority of my human will, which 
urges me to use you as an instrument of self-enhancement be- 
cause you, as a person, make it clear that you, too, want to be 
yourself and that my using you merely as an instrument will 
destroy your personhood and my own as well. You have to regard 
me in the same way. You and I then see that we must be disposed 
towards one another in a common bond of goodwill. (135) 
It is during this process of fostering goodwill that the defensive 
manoeuvres give way to acceptance of what Stewart calls the three 
losses: loss of support, loss of control, and loss of love. We must 
throw away the prop of blaming others and accept responsibility for 
our own conduct; we must accept control of ourselves and abandon the 
having/being had outlook; and we must turn to loving rather than ad- 
hering to a dependence on being loved, to nurturing others instead 
of being'preoccupied with self-concern. So long as we do not cling 
to, or fall back on to, an illusion of self-sufficiency this shift 
from being loved to loving (which at first sight may feel like a 
rejection) will cause us no harm. On the contrary it will greatly 
extend our personal identity. 
The capacity to love is usually shown in goodwill which thera- 
peutically, means much more than a comfortable feeling 
towards 
those easy to like. It extends to persons who differ from us 
and whom we may even dislike. (136) 
Because there are no rules or techniques for promoting personal 
freedom we must find our own way as best we can. This is more likely 
to succeed if we join with others with a similar wish for personal 
freedom. In community with others there is a greater chance of crea- 
tive effort emerging just because the members are striving intelli- 
gently, conscientiously, to attain, in empathy, authentic freedom, 
i. e. their personhoods. Thus the ideal of fellowship is really imp- 
licit in the other two losses. All three, of course, occur in action 
in the real world. There is nothing magical or mysterious or elusive 
about these ideals. They stem from real world experience. What mat- 
ters is the predisposing goodwill and the empathic process which it 
energises. The rest follows often painfully and fitfully but in time 
more or less successfully. 
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I make no apologies for presenting Stewart's two accounts at length 
for his view of empathy is obviously the progenitor of my own. But 
apart from this his treatment is unique in that it seems closer to 
real world phenomena than any other which I have come across, inclu- 
ding Edith Stein's. Her analysis is in many respects equally penet- 
rating and far more impressive in describing a real world phenomenon 
than those which followed her. Stewart's revised version is an imp- 
rovement on the original in my view in that he has laid aside Freud- 
ian theory especially in accounting for the earlier phases of empa- 
thy. His apparent abandonment of deliberate identification is a loss 
although he retains nevertheless the process of exploring similarit- 
ies and differences. His form of non-manipulative openness is not 
well articulated into his empathic process and goodwill, a crucial 
element in it, is rather vague. In my own account I combine the two 
with the notion of love which sterns from respect (which he does not 
clarify and which I interpret in the manner of Fromm). Likewise his 
introduction of the contrast between the having and being modes of 
living and their relationship to empathy is an improvement but they 
really call for fuller treatment. Above all there is the phenomeno- 
logical spirit which pervades both accounts and which with Stein 
separates hire from the majority of workers in this area. 
3.6 SUMMARY 
It is difficult to summarise this chapter without repeating myself. 
It might help to recall Edith Stein's criteria for evaluating psych- 
ogenetic explanations of empathy: 
(1) what psychological mechanism functions in the experience of 
empathy. 
(2) how has the individual acquired this mechanism in the 
course of his or her development? 
Consider first the views of those who construe empathy as some func- 
tion of role-taking ability (or more generally those who see empathy 
as a trait). For them the psychological mechanisms centre on the 
notion of personality trait though whether this is to be understood 
as innate or learned or some mixture of both they do not say. Chapin 
may have considered the possibility that social insight, being an 
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aspect of social intelligence, had properties like 'g' of general 
intelligence and was therefore substantially innate (the currently 
held view in psychological circles at the time though not necessar- 
ily shared by sociologists) but aided by experience throughout life. 
Dymond, in her original thoughts on empathy, appears to stress the 
learned aspects of role-taking as part of her theory of personality 
development. In her account, however, empathy is a precursor to soc- 
ial insight which in turn enables an individual to exploit the self- 
other patterns which he or she has internalised from experience of 
interactions with others. A by-product of this internalising process 
in the evolution of the individual is "a picture of himself as a 
distinct personality". Since empathic ability is presumably part of 
this distinct personality we appear to have a circular argument: 
social insight 
interaction ; a-`=internal 
with others self-other 
patterns 
empathy 
(is element of) 
personality 
One way out of this closed system is to separate the innate element 
from the learned. Clearly for Dymond personality is acquired; empa- 
thy must therefore be innate. 
Hogan is unambiguous. Empathy is genetically determined and is con- 
ceptually equivalent to both role-taking ability and social sensiti- 
vity. As we have seen he made a deliberate effort to unmask the char- 
acter of empathy firstly in terms of two roles: the empathic actor 
and the empathic audience; and secondly, in terms of two psychical 
structures of personality: role structure and character structure. 
The first is learned; the second is (presumably) innate and corres- 
ponds to social intelligence. 
Kagan and his co-workers equate empathy with affective sensitivity 
which "is a psychological trait which is measurable... " Moreover, it 
is a trait associated with person perception and is vulnerable to 
the depredations of unconscious defence mechanisms. They do not 
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claim so but the element of empathy associated with person percep- 
tion might be innate (along with other perceptual mechanisms). In 
contrast, the actual exercise of empathy is learned though the inf- 
luence of the defence mechanisms, has its origins in both nature 
(Freud's instinct) and nurture (the individual's own experiences). 
These conjectures are mine, not Kagan's, but I offer them as sug- 
gestions which might have occurred to him and his team. 
Kerr and Speroff construed empathy as an ability to generalise about 
others in order to be able to anticipate their "reactions, feelings 
and behaviours". They overtly refer to the predictive character of 
empathy which other researchers, Dymond for instance, only implied 
in the design of their measuring instruments. Whether Kerr and 
Speroff held that this ability is predominantly innate or learned is 
difficult to judge. Many of those working in the field of person 
perception seem to treat "sensitive" perception (judgement) of oth- 
ers as though it were an innate ability, a trait like any other, 
which of course may profit from experience. 
Though different workers use different labels (social insight, soc- 
ial sensitivity, affective sensitivity, empathic ability, predictive 
ability) they all appear to be exploring a single idea: there exists 
an act in which one individual somehow grasps the thoughts, reac- 
tions, feelings of another as the property of that other. It is true 
that each investigator tends to emphasise one aspect rather than 
another, a tendency which is partially reflected in the name each 
chooses to identify the phenomenon. All, however, are faced with the 
problem of saying how ability to acquire and execute this act is to 
be understood. How does it arise? What is its dynamic character in 
psychological terms? How does it evolve over time? Only Hogan seems 
to have tried to answer these questions or rather has moved in a 
direction which perhaps increases the likelihood of finding answers. 
Thus empathy viewed as ability has led to a single though seldom ex- 
plicitly expressed concept: a host of names for it but only one at- 
tempt to give it psychological meaning. What kind of perceptual act 
is it? How does it differ from other kinds of perceptual act? How 
are its innate and learned properties to be conceptualised and dis- 
tinguished? What situational factors aid or hinder its growth? What 
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is the nature of this growth process? These and many other questions 
are ignored by workers in this tradition. Even Hogan, perhaps be- 
cause of his greater interest in moral development, does not concern 
himself with them. 
If we turn now to empathy viewed as a skill (a notion which, as we 
have seen, is often buried in the ability approach) we find a very 
similar situation. Bronfenbrenner and his colleagues distinguish 
various categories of social sensitivity (their name for empathy) in 
terms of social object: the generalised other, group differences, 
and interpersonal sensitivity; and referrent: non-personal, first, 
second and third person sensitivities. But how do we recognise these 
types? How do we come to believe in these categories? Why do we be- 
lieve in them? How does interpersonal sensitivity differ psychologi- 
cally from perception of group differences and generalised others? 
How do we develop these "skills"? What is their psychological 
nature? 
Argyle chose a psychomotor skills model to provide a theoretical 
framework within which to explicate social skills. He has been much 
concerned with non-verbal interactions and the training of people in 
the development and use of non-verbal techniques of communication. 
Whilst he has not concerned himself specifically with empathy he 
does have a lot to say about the practical consequences of social 
skills training. Perhaps for him psychological explanations of phen- 
omena are less important than proven success in teaching sales 
staff, managers and other interpersonal professional workers how to 
cope successfully with other people. One benefit of Argyle's work 
for students of empathy is his list of indicators of human expres- 
siveness: eye contact, facial movements, body posture, gestures, 
limb movements, and so on. He has developed ways of observing and 
recording all of these in a variety of settings in order to discover 
their informational significance. 
In the clinical setting various workers have conducted systematic 
analyses of both the nature of the skills required for successful 
performance and their natural development as a single superskill: 
counselling, therapy, interviewing, and so forth. Most of these re- 
searchers are interested in the counselling or therapy process rath- 
er than the psychological mechanisms underlying it. Their business 
is very largely a matter of isolating sets of subskills, naming them 
and describing their contribution to the total enterprise. This is a 
valuable addition to our knowledge but still leaves undone the de- 
lineation of the psychological mechanisms responsible and an account 
of how they come into being and develop. This is perhaps understand- 
able in the empathy-as-skill tradition because of the greater inter- 
est in training and the greater value attached to high levels of 
therapist performance than to psychological explanations. 
Although implicit (and sometimes explicit) in the thinking of work- 
ers in this tradition, the part played by some kind of perceptual 
act is implemented by the even greater role of action, often inter- 
ventionist, towards the object of empathy. This is certainly true of 
Carkhuff and his group and is generally true of those concerned with 
therapy and its outcomes. There is little sign of any interest in 
the psychological mechanisms which may be at work here, either in 
the empathising agent or in his or her client. Change is regarded as 
a desirable thing, however construed, and justifications are expres- 
sed in terms of the researcher's preferred theory of psychotherapy. 
Empathy, however, where it survives at all as a concept (which does 
not appear to be the case with Carkhuff and his associates), is not 
elaborated. In the two traditions we have overviewed so far empathy 
seems to be a perceptual mechanism somewhere in the background enab- 
ling people to grasp the inner, feelings, and so on, of others and 
possibly encouraging the empathiser to act in appropriate ways to- 
wards them. 
The third tradition, stemming from Carl Rogers' 1957 and 1959 papers 
breaks new ground in that the focus is on the notion of personal 
being. The person, not the psychophysical individual or the organ- 
ism, is the object of study and empathy is viewed as one of the nec- 
essary conditions for approaching another human being as a person. 
Rogers himself never probed empathy but several of his students did. 
Barret-Lennard conceptualised empathy as a cyclical process which is 
reiterated throughout an interpersonal relationship. He isolates a 
number of the psychological mechanisms involved: empathic set, reso- 
nation to the other's expressiveness, expression of empathy, receiv- 
ing of empathy by the other (i. e. the other's resonation to the emp- 
athiser's expressiveness), and various kinds of feedback which re- 
start the whole process or sustain it in modified form. Empathy (or 
empathic understanding as Barrett-Lennard calls it) is a function of 
two elements: empathic recognition and empathic inference. Once 
again the peculiar perceptual act reappears but augmented now by an 
interpretative element: inference. It must be said in all fairness 
that the other two traditions imply some kind of interpretation but 
this aspect seems to be subsumed under the general concept of the 
special perceptual experience. Barrett-Lennard distinguishes the two 
and goes on to argue that the two abilities appear to be necessary 
for empathic understanding: an ability to discriminate and a non- 
manipulative acceptance of the other as he or she "comes across". 
Hence he suggests that empathisers need to be non-defensive and 
well-integrated persons. Here is a set of ideas which provide the 
basis for a psychogenetic explanation of empathy. He has attempted 
to answer the first of Edith Stein's two questions, though he does 
not elaborate on the nature of these hypothesised psychological 
mechanisms. As to her second question Barrett-Lennard puts forward a 
dynamic process but does not say how it arises nor how the process 
evolves. Nevertheless as a description of empathy his account seems 
to me to fit actual experience more closely than those of his empir- 
ically orientated predecessors. (He seems to have been unaware of 
Stewart's analysis. ) I have already presented my own misgivings 
about his cyclical model so will not repeat them here. 
The phenornenologists form the fourth tradition in my selection from 
the empathy literature. Of Edith Stein and Max Scheler I shall say 
no more here but the work of Stewart, on which I have partly based 
my own analysis, approaches much closer to an outline of the psycho- 
genesis of empathy than do any of the other psychological studies we 
have met. In his original account the psychological mechanisms are 
drawn from Freudian theory: positive (and negative) transference, 
unconscious identification, imitation (though more elaborately 
treated than Freud's concept), and the idea of a goal or ideal which 
somehow transcends individuals and serves as a substitute for the 
leader in a leaderless group (or dyad). To these he added two new 
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ideas: love (not to be confused with Freud's object-love and object- 
cathexis although Stewart quotes Freud and uses his terms in justif- 
ying his own analysis) and deliberate identification, a kind of con- 
scious re-identification. Moreover the evolution of empathy mediated 
by these psychological mechanisms is couched in the language of 
Freudian psychodynamics but only up to a point, owing nothing to 
Freud's bias towards psychosexual development. Stewart's treatment 
of love and respect is sketchy despite their importance in the de- 
velopment of empathy. He never quite makes up his mind whether empa- 
thy is a process dependent on inherent abilities of the empathises 
or whether it is a particular kind of relation. The difficulty, as 
always with Freudian theory, is accepting a theoretical framework 
which is inherently untestable. Perhaps it was considerations of 
this sort that led Stewart to abandon the Freudian scaffolding and 
opt for an existentialist position founded on the notion of relinqu- 
ishing (falsely conceived) independence. The belief in and pursuit 
of self-sufficiency is illusory. Through others we may come to ac- 
cept responsibility for our own conduct instead of leaning on oth- 
ers, accept self-control in place of exploiting or manipulating 
others, love them rather than crave their love. Whilst his revised 
view of empathy has the authenticity of a poetic imagination it is 
less easy to see the underlying psychological mechanisms; the evolu- 
tionary process has likewise become somewhat blurred compared with 
his earlier account. Nevertheless his achievement is considerable 
not only in terms of Edith Stein's two criteria but in his bold exp- 
loration of the epistemological and ontological foundations of psy- 
chology which he construed as the study of persons and personal 
knowing. He anticipates Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow (often cited 
as the apostles of the humanist movement in psychology thus reveal- 
ing, in my view, a misunderstanding of both humanism and the contri- 
bution of these two psychologists to the growth of our science) and 
seems to me to be the first to attempt, however sketchily, an out- 
line of a psychology of personal being. 
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4A SUMMING UP 
4.1 CRITERIA OF SCIENTIFIC THEORIES 
How does my treatment of empathy compare with that of others review- 
ed in the preceding pages? I shall use Edith Stein's criteria but 
augmented by a test which centres on the desiderata of scientific 
theories in general. There are four: explicitness, objectivity, sim- 
plicity and cornpleteness. (1) 
4.11 Explicitness 
Is my outline theory of empathy clear for all to see? In particular 
are my claims as to what is or is not the case clearly set out, un- 
ambiguously expressed with no loose ends or mysterious entities left 
unresolved? I have employed four presentation methods: 
(a) a reasonably clear statement of the characteristics which 
distin wish the empathic from other relations a detailed 
exposition of the terms appearing in my set o proposi- 
tions, and a careful analysis of the processes which, I 
suggest, are involved; 
(b) an analysis of the various kinds of empathic relation (both 
genuine and mistaken) together with a detailed analysis of 
my terms and hypothesised processes; 
(c) an account of the sufficient and necessary conditions for 
empathy; 
(d) a comparison between empathy and (i) some other interper- 
sonal relations, and (ii) some other emotional bonds, with 
distinctions and reasons for making them clearly made. 
Each contribution to the argument either adds something new or rein- 
forces in a particularly dramatic way features that have already 
been sketched in. 
Naturally I am not claiming that every term is clearly defined (e. g. 
I have only touched in lightly the difference between person and 
self) or that every process is unambiguously described. Doubtless, 
too, stylistic imperfections will mar the effect which I am striving 
for. Nevertheless I maintain that my outline probably merits 7 out 
of 10 on an imaginary scale of explicitness. 
4.12 Objectivity 
Apart from occasional references to the literature from time to time 
and a number of apposite and illustrative anecdotes there is not 
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much that qualifies as objective support (as understood in orthodox 
scientific communities) for my theory. If objectivity is represented 
by the over-against relation in which the observer deliberately 
tries to separate himself from that which he is observing then it 
must be admitted that my account lacks objectivity. If on the other 
hand we accept that objectivity, if it is to have any meaning at 
all, must be construed as a condition of being in and with one's own 
experience; if we argue, that is to say, that the observer and the 
observed are one, and that the observer grasps both his unity with 
and separateness from the world, then, I maintain, the essential 
nature of objectivity is preserved. 
This is not the place to comment on the nature of the scientific 
attitude but it is clear to me that a genuine scientific enterprise 
has no need of the myth of objectivity since such a condition as 
understood in orthodox science is impossible. The best way to app- 
roach this state is to embrace the world in the empathic or the 
quasi-empathic relation, to approach it from the stance of non-man- 
ipulative openness in which the observer may grasp its givenness as 
it is at that moment. This state cannot be willed but can be pre- 
pared for as I have suggested in earlier pages. 
On a scale of objectivity I award myself 6 marks out of 10 which 
might be somewhat on the mean side. Others may accuse me of manic 
optimism. 
4.13 Simplicity 
In order to account for the complex character of empathy: its sever- 
al stages, its to-ing and fro-ing nature, human fallibility, the 
fact that people may not go through all stages, and so on, the dyna- 
mic quality of empathy must be represented in any truthful descrip- 
tion. I believe that my outline theory is both simple and consistent 
with the richness of the phenomena as encountered in the real world. 
There must always be a trade-off between the compexity of the pheno- 
mena and the simplicity of its description as every teacher or writ- 
er of text-books quickly discovers. One cannot tell the whole truth 
(assuming that "whole truth" is a useful concept) all at once since 
in order to explicate one idea other as yet unexplained ideas are 
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sometimes essential. However, within the constraints of one's skill 
in organising material, maintaining a balance between the explained 
and the as yet unexplained and in retaining a firm conceptual grip 
on the subject under discussion, it is possible to present to a rea- 
der a unified, readily grasped description of quite complex phenom- 
ena. I think my own theory stands up reasonably well to this critic- 
al test and I rate myself on my imaginary simplicity scale 7 out of 
10. 
4.14 Completeness 
It would be a bold person indeed who claimed that he or she had 
fully explained some phenomenon and that henceforth others could 
seek fresh pastures to explore there being nothing more to do in 
this one. 
I have several times linked my investigation to the larger one of 
securing a proper foundation for a scientific psychology which seeks 
to know and understand persons, a psychology of personal being. In 
this larger context there are many questions which I have not con- 
sidered; doubtless there are many I have not even imagined. There 
are some to which I have made brief reference here and there. The 
point is that from the perspective of this larger enquiry empathy as 
a phenomenon looks quite different. This is what Stewart may have 
meant when he wrote that "a basic psychology of personal knowing in 
its highest form, the act of empathy, is what we have to develop... " 
(2) A study of empathy is. or can become a study of the epistemolog- 
ical foundations of psychology. Since I deliberately chose to ignore 
these wider implications I clearly have not presented a complete ac- 
count of empathy. Within the narrow, self-imposed viewpoint which I 
have adopted, however, I have striven to give as complete and accur- 
ate a description of empathy as lies within my power. I am obviously 
a victim of my own limitations as a thinker, a theorist, a knower of 
the world and its ways. 
Finally I have already admitted to a shortage of "objective" data. 
This too must count as a mark of incompleteness. On the other hand I 
must agree with Leech who somewhat ruefully remarks that "... the 
more explicit formulations become, the less data the investigator 
seems able to cover. "(3) Thus one would expect an inverse relation- 
ship between explicitness and completeness, even if I did have the 
data to back me up. All in all I give myself 5 out of 10 on the 
completeness criterion. 
4.15 Summary 
25 out of 40 or 63% seems to me a fairly presentable score for an 
outline theory of anything especially in view of the problematical 
relationship between data and explicitness and between data and com- 
pleteness. To-arrive at a final opinion, however, let us return to 
Stein's criteria. (4) The psychological mechanisms in my theory inc- 
lude the stance of non-manipulative openness, the spontaneous exper- 
ience of the world's givenness, love (part of which is non-manipul- 
ative openness; in company with the innate urge to grow, to know 
others, it leads to goodwill), deliberate identification, imitation 
and a shared common goal or ideal. There is a strong resemblance to 
Stewart's theory. Mine differs from his in that I associate non- 
manipulative openness with a being mode of existence; moreover I 
hold that non-manipulative openness is a necessary precursor to emp- 
athy where Stewart relies on transference to initiate it. We both 
accept the innate urge to reach out to others. Hence for me the 
notion of authentic independence (my equivalent of his three "los- 
ses") is anticipated in the prior requirement of non-manipulative 
openness. 
My treatment of love (and respect, one of its elements) is more tho- 
rough than is Stewart's; also I link love to the initiating condi- 
tion and to the spontaneous experience of givenness. Both of us dis- 
tinguish between events and actions, things which happen and things 
which agents intentionally bring about. Here again I link events 
(relevant to empathy) to the stance of non-manipulative openness and 
the experience of the givenness of the world, including those exper- 
iences attendant on our acting on and in the world. Stewart does not 
deal with events so firmly or systematically. Of course we differ 
over the use of Freudian concepts. I do not use them at all. Finally 
I consider different types of empathic relation and different grades 
of empathy (to use Edith Stein's term) and extend my investigation 
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to include quasi-empathy (the "empathic" relation with non-human en- 
tities). Nevertheless our theoretical orientations towards empathy 
are very similar. 
I cannot claim to have described these psychological mechanisms in 
any great detail from a psychological point of view. Neither do I 
have a theoretically secure psychological explication of the evolu- 
tion of the empathic relation. There are good reasons for this 
shortcoming-which I have already hinted at several times. These psy- 
chological considerations depend for their investigation on the 
availablity not only of methods but also of an established body of 
knowledge relevant to such an investigation. A psychology of person- 
al being has yet to be formulated; to use the current orthodoxies, 
whether Freudian or neo-Freudian, behaviouristic or neo-behaviouris- 
tic, cognitivist or whatever, would obfuscate rather than clarify 
the problems needing attention. How am I to understand the notion of 
non-manipulative openness, for example, or love, or the idea of 
authentic freedom, autonomy, independence through sharing experience 
with others, within any of the existing "models of humankind"? Even 
though my outline theory of empathy fails to meet Edith Stein's sec- 
ond criterion and only partially satisfies her first I nevertheless 
feel that within a psychology of personal being both deficiencies 
would be remedied. It seems to me that it is in this connection that 
the value of the high degree of explicitness and a high level of 
simplicity becomes apparent. Despite the defects, the shortcomings, 
the limitations due to blemishes of expression, or organisation, 
even of inadequate understanding, perhaps the theory as it stands 
provides a useful springboard for the more difficult and thorough- 
going enterprise: the delineation of a psychology of persons, of 
personal being, of personal knowing. 
Notes to Chapter 4 
1 Leech, 1974. 
2 Stewart, 1956; p. 2. 
3 op. cit. p. 70. 
4 see p. 235. 
267 
EPILOGUE 
Where do we go from here? How might I put my ideas to the test? A 
number of points must be made at the outset. Suggestions that focus 
on operationalising the concepts described in the preceding pages 
have to be treated with caution. I hold that to empathise is to form 
an empathic relation through a process which, following Stewart and 
Stein and Barrett-Lennard, I conceive as a sequence of stages. Noth- 
ing is certain. Individuals may and do falter in their efforts; re- 
gression is just as common as progression especially in the early 
stages and among the inexperienced. One cannot operationalise per- 
sons or processes or personal problems (often the basis for trying 
to form an empathic relation with another as in the case of Stew- 
art's alcoholics and drug addicts) and preserve their lived vivid- 
ness. One takes people as one finds them. At best one may attempt to 
facilitate some kind of change which an individual wishes to bring 
about. Change cannot be imposed but must be sought by those desiring 
it. The only fit metaphor to borrow from research methods currently 
in use is that of action research. One approach might take the form 
of providing opportunities for those who wish to overcome their 
problems to work with facilitators who are able to enter into empa- 
thic relations with others and who are also able to help them form 
empathic relations among themselves. In effect this approach follows 
the methods Stewart used in his work, the only difference being per- 
haps that the implicit model is different and would therefore have 
to be examined and modified according to indications from the con- 
duct and progress of the participants. The "experimenter" in such a 
situation acts as the facilitator. To the extent that the facilitat- 
or takes an active part in the work it is as a member of the 
empathic relation and not as a participant-observer. His or her 
involvement is part of the research and cannot be separated from it 
without loss of authenticity in the relations which the undertaking 
is designed to create, encourage and sustain. The facilitator may 
set up training programmes but they will be far removed from the 
sort of activities which are commonly encountered in orthodox social 
skills training. Paper and pencil tests, questionnaires, personality 
inventories, Dymond-type methods, and so on are irrelevant to the 
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likh, 
tasks which face those trying to develop ability to form empathic 
relations with others. 
The principal components of Stewart's method are fairly easy to 
describe. A patient is paired with one who has successfully thrown 
off the addiction. Of course the patient must want to change and 
most do. Given a positive if fragile urge to change and a recovered 
person who is supportive the journey towards freedom from addiction 
to self-limiting strategies can begin. The empathic process can get 
under way. The person with the problem must be free to talk or not 
as he or she chooses; moreover the patient's'ally must not by word 
or gesture convey any hint of approval or disapproval but must ack- 
nowledge and accept the other as a person deserving respect and will 
show genuine fellow-feeling towards the other. The initiative lies 
always with the person with the problem. Whatever the patient says 
or does becomes an occasion for sharing experiences, exploring their 
meaning and so leading to some inkling of how each is alike yet dif- 
ferent from the other. This stage requires patience from the suppor- 
tive member and persistence from the client. There will often be 
failures; successes may be slight and short-lived. So long as the 
client rediscovers his or her urge to be free of the problem and 
senses the non-judgemental support of the mentor the pair will grad- 
ually create a bond of trust and so lay a foundation for the next 
stage, which again must arise spontaneously from the client's urge 
to be free. This is the stage of deliberate identification possibly 
preceded by imitation which I have described in chapter 1. Important 
throughout the empathic process is the right of both partners to 
exercise their freedom to choose how to act. The supportive member 
will always strive to earn the other's trust but the client will 
sometimes choose to revert to his or her self-limiting ways. Such 
individuals are prone to bouts of self-pity and occasionally acts of 
aggression against their helpers. Such choices will obviously have 
unfortunate consequences. These too the members will have to accept 
which of course does not mean condone. The path for both partners is 
thorny indeed but unless the supportive member can retain his or her 
non-manipulative, non-judgemental, open stance towards the patient 
and unless the latter can gradually learn to accept responsibility 
for his or her own conduct no progress towards autonomy and maturity 
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is possible. To intervene in the client's decisions is to perpetuate 
his or her infantile conduct by acting as a substitute parent or 
other "superior" adult thus depriving the client of self-respect and 
any hope of a genuine independence. To be free is to be free to 
choose and to accept in full the consequences of the choices one 
makes. 
Stewart's methodology (which involved far more than I have briefly 
touched on here) combined action research with a case study app- 
roach. From his point of view his patient's self-chosen path to 
permanent sobriety was his criterion of success. There were no 
impositions of "healthy" or "civilised" or "respectable" behaviour; 
no offer of rewards or punishments; no exhortatioons or "good" 
advice. Backslidings and small conquests formed part of the reality 
which mentor and patient shared. (1) 
Other kinds of personal problems may well be amenable to Stewart's 
methodology. Those with severe motivational problems, disabling 
learning difficulties, poor self-image or lack of self-confidence; 
people who are fearful or prone to depression; those afflicted with 
habits which worry them and which they would rather do without; 
these and many others in which persons are forced to go through life 
in a psychologically impoverished state might respond provided they 
genuinely want to be free of their handicap and are willing to work 
at the task. 
The methodology does have its difficulties not the least of which is 
finding mentors who have suffered from such crippling complaints in 
the past but who somehow have managed to conquer it or have learned 
to live with it without experiencing stress. An alternative is to 
rely an individuals who are able to work successfully towards build- 
ing empathic relations with others even though they have not endured 
the particular problem affecting their proteges. It is certain that 
most of us have had problems which we have learned to handle with 
varying degrees of success. Ultimately the empathic relation depends 
on our deepening awareness that we share a common fate: having to 
cope with life's many difficulties including our frequent failures. 
The sensitive awareness that we are all making the same journey and 
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experiencing similar sufferings and joys, though in different ways 
and to varying degrees, is what finally enables us to help one 
another. The fundamental "research" problem may therefore be re- 
stated as discovering how to launch a mutual self-help programme 
which centres on personal knowing in an atmosphere of non-manipulat- 
ive, non-exploitative, non-judgemental openness. Adapting Stewart's 
methodology and calling on suitably modified forms of some of the 
procedures already used in various group therapies are worthwhile 
options. 
As an example, consider the possibility of inviting individuals with 
personal problems to join a mutual self-help group. Any one group 
might have to be restricted to one type of problem. Members are put 
through a training programme-which aims at developing a spirit of 
openness to the world especially to other people and at encouraging 
a non-judgemental, non-manipulative, non-exploitative approach to 
others. The literature on creativity is full of suggestions. The 
practice of an art form would also help; all art relies on intuit- 
ive perception to a high degree. Engaging seriously in one of the 
arts and studying the work and methods of accomplished performers 
will provide insights not obtainable in any other way. None of these 
approaches will guarantee the development of the stance of openness 
but with goodwill and perseverance they are more likely to be suc- 
cessful than not. The level and seriousness of commitment are 
determining factors. Members of the mutual self-help group might be 
asked to declare their seriousness in wanting to break free of the 
tyranny which their personal problem inflicts upon them. A first 
step might be to consider the possibility of settling for less, say 
learning to live with their disabilities. In the latter event the 
problem may remain but at least they will no longer be so incapacit- 
ated by it. In the end they may, with persistence, overcome the 
problem itself. 
The next stage of the training programme centres on the development 
of mutual trust between the members of the dyads which group members 
form among themselves. Thereafter the programme conforms to Stew- 
art's methodology. Such then is another type of action research 
project which might be initiated. This is not the place to explore 
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actual strategies but where the conventional experimental approach 
might be useful is in evaluating the various strategies employed in 
achieving the aims of the training programmes referred to above. 
Even here, however, the measurement of these variables poses serious 
problems. The non-manipulative, non-exploitative, non-judgemental 
stance and the spirit of openness may both be viewed as consistent 
ways of acting in and on the world. The object of study in both 
cases is a style of human action, a way of relating to the world. 
Just as I can say "Harry acted intelligently" or "Harry made an 
intelligent choice" so a novelist might write "Elsa embraced her son 
seeing in him a man in anguish rather than a killer on the run from 
justice. His crime distressed her yet she saw only his suffering. " 
Elsa is expressing both aspects of goodwill. She is open to the 
experience of her child, here and now, a man in torment. That she 
deplores his crime in no way interferes with her perception of his 
suffering nor with her spontaneous gesture of comfort, an act of 
love. This dramatic incident serves to illustrate the problem of 
measurement in the type of research being considered here. The ad- 
ministration of a Earrett-Lennard type of scale to participants in 
order to evaluate their experiences, feelings, etc., would constit- 
ute a most unnatural intrusion into such a situation. Scenes as full 
of feeling, stress and love would occur very often in mutual self- 
help groups. Stewart provides real-life examples in his work with 
alcoholics. (2) 
Self-report is a possible research tool. A spoken or written descr- 
iption of one person's experience of another can be a valuable and 
valued source of data though variability in expressive and percep- 
tual skills would have to be taken into account. Neither pose in- 
superable difficulties. Self-reports from the members of a dyad 
allow comparisons to be made. Discrepancies might be resolved 
through discussion between the partners though some disagreements 
might remain intractable. These irreducible differences form essent- 
ial elements of their shared reality. 
Both the experimental method adopted and the instruments used must 
capture or attempt to capture the lived experience of the partici- 
pants. Laboratory type exercises and conventional standardised pro- 
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cedures will not meet this need. It would be a pity to allow a 
narrow conception of the scientific enterprise to inhibit the use of 
more open-ended approaches to investigation. This is not the place 
to examine the nature of scientific explanation but it seems to me 
to be rather limiting to restrict scientific enquiry only to those 
problems which depend on quantification and statistical treatment 
before interpretation of data can begin. 'Other ways are valid and 
are in use. 
I have not attempted an experimental study myself for the reason 
that I have already given: one must have a clear idea of the phenom- 
enon one proposes to study before one can plan, design and implement 
an investigation of it, experimentally or otherwise. So many resear- 
chers into empathy have failed (a) to clarify the nature of empathy; 
or (b) to adopt a consistent stance towards empathy (perhaps because 
of their insecure grasp of the phenomenon; and finally (c) to show 
how their chosen. method and instruments for investigating empathy 
are relevant to their task. Clearly the first is the critical con- 
dition. 
I do not despair that a scientific study of the empathic relation is 
possible nor that training programmes can be designed to foster its 
growth. These are the next steps. 
Notes to the Epilogue 
1 See also Lederman, 1984. 
2 Stewart, 1960. 
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Subjectivity has three sources. First there are the specific per- 
ceptual and motor capacities that set limits on what members of a 
species may experience as inputs and outputs in their commerce with 
the real world. How individuals of any species constitute their 
world is determined in part by their capacity to experience the 
givenness of phenomena and by their range of possible actions within 
that world. Humans have certain clear advantages over other species 
in that they can to some extent circumvent their limitations with 
the help of instruments, tools, machines and other products of soph- 
isticated technologies. Even so they cannot move about freely in 
water like fish, nor fly like birds, nor detect magnetic fields or 
ultra-violet or infra-red radiation directly (so far as we know). 
They cannot survive very high or very low temperatures as can some 
viruses. The list of constraints is virtually endless. Constitutive 
faculties, however, are not solely genetically determined. Learning 
can refine the inherited potential. Peoples who lead what to western 
eyes are primitive lives in rain forests or deserts or permafrost 
conditions have developed specific perceptual and motor skills which 
greatly outstrip those of their apparently more accomplished fellow 
humans. Their eyes and ears are more sharply attuned to their envir- 
onments; they are more accomplished in practical crafts of self sup- 
port and show a greater range of motor performance in surviving in 
their usually harsher worlds than their more civilized brethren. 
They also seem closer to their world than we to ours, a point Sche- 
ler was fond of emphasising. Primitive living seems to be much more 
first-hand, direct, involved, committed than ours which tends to be 
second-hand, either because we intellectualise it through vicarious- 
ly experiencing it in film or television programmes or reading; or 
because we prefer analysis to intuitive knowledge based on actual, 
i. e. lived, experience. I am not of course suggesting that we should 
or could return to a primitive mode of existence any more than Sche- 
ler did but we might attempt to recover some of the primitive's 
skills which we have lost. High on the list would be the spirit of 
openness and a non-manipulative approach to the world as I have sug- 
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gested in earlier pages. If some of the limitations of our percep- 
tual and motor capacities are culturally determined (as they surely 
are) then we must strive to understand and overcome them. 
The second aspect of subjectivity centres on the notion of inten- 
sionality. In part this term refers to the logical necessity for 
psychological functions, e. g. feeling, thinking, perceiving, fear- 
ing, imagining, hoping, and so on to have an object. We must think 
about, fear, imagine, perceive something. There is no meaning to the 
words otherwise. We do not, so to speak, have a state of perception 
waiting to be filled with content, the objects of perception. The 
perceiving and the perceived are but two inseparable aspects of a 
single perceptual act. Intensionality is thus not only a logical re- 
lation between certain kinds of mental life and the phenomenal world 
to which they relate; it is also an expression of the unity of the 
inner and outer worlds of experience which characterise psychical 
life. It combines the separate ideas of directedness, consciousness 
and the unity of experience into a single term. We are conscious of 
something in a specific way and in a specific context. We see a 
friend approaching us; we are fearful of the menacing posture of the 
neighbour's dog; we day-dream about the the holiday we have planned 
for later in the year. In all these cases and in many more that we 
can easily conjure up we are conscious of the specific experiences 
to the extent that we actually do see, fear, and phantasise about 
the specific phenomenal objects named. There is not something called 
consciousness seeking content to fill its emptiness. It is true that 
throughout this dissertation I have used expressions such as "in 
passive consciousness" as though I had just such a meaning in mind. 
This is certainly not the case as my examples and my discussion of 
them has surely demonstrated. We must, however, notice and preserve 
the distinction between the experience of perceiving, fearing, day- 
dreaming and the experience of the phenomenal objects lying at the 
heart of these psychological functions. Experiences, unlike sensa- 
tions, are not physical but mental events. Intensionality is a 
property of mental life. It was thus that Brentano distinguished 
physical from psychical phenomena. Internsionality plays no part in 
the former. 
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Intensionality is the phenomenological analogue of the Cartesian 
cogito. Descartes gave pride of place to thinking and reason in his 
construal of the relation between human beings and their knowledge 
of the world although there is implicit in his use of the term 
cogito all psychic experience, not just thinking. Nevertheless he 
gave preeminence to analysis and reason (i. e. ideal world phenomena) 
rather than to the intuitive grasping of the givenness of experien- 
ced, lived, real world phenomena. 
The third element of subjectivity is meaning and significance. If we 
assume that a real world does exist independently of our own 
conscious experience of it, that it is accessible directly (through 
the experience of its givenness in passive consciousness as I have 
tried to show) we can construe our grasping or apprehension of it as 
the experience of non-attributive distinctions since we nevertheless 
accept the constraints of our human perceptual (and motor) capabili- 
ties which necessarily implies distinctions such as figure-ground, 
light and dark, moving and static, and so forth. The experience of 
the givenness of the world in passive consciousness is non-attribut- 
ive just because it is an experience in passive consciousness. It is 
in this experience that we can transcend, never completely but to 
some degree, our historical nature, our personal biography and all 
its cultural trappings. The difficulty is, perhaps for the reasons 
Scheler suggested (that we are dominated by intellectualism, ration- 
alism, a preference for analytical thought), that the experience of 
givenness is typically very short-lived and that the directness, the 
transcendental quality of the givenness is swamped by recollections, 
associations, thought habits, and the like which the event precipit- 
ating the experience brings to consciousness (or possibly stirs 
below consciousness). As I have tried to show the experience of 
givenness cannot be willed or striven for. Either it happens or it 
does not; the best we can do is to try and cultivate the non- 
manipulative stance of openness towards the real world. 
It is through the concept of subjectivity that I think the hermen- 
eutical and the phenomenological approaches to psychology find 
common ground. Despite their very different starting points, in the 
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domain of subjectivity they meet and use a similar language. It is 
here too that we become aware of differences. 
One modern phenomenological movement is trying to establish a 
genuine scientific psychology rooted in biology; since the person 
exists in the real world as a living agent the lived body is the 
centre of experience. Hence the significance of experience to the 
person derives not only from his or her livingness but also from the 
fact that the agent is an embodied one. The lived body is quite dif- 
ferent from the empirical one; the inner experience of facing the 
world intensionally (and intentionally) is not the same as that felt 
in the over-against relation between observer and observed when they 
are both combined in a single self. Phenomenologically speaking, the 
lived body may be a different object of consciousness than the per- 
son. If the focus of a particular observer's interest is, say, an 
organism, i. e. a biological mechanism coping with its environment, 
then concern with the inner world of the experiencing organism gives 
way to an over-against relation between the observer and the obser- 
ved. On the other hand if the main interest centres on a person then 
the other's livingness must be approached through experiencing his 
or her givenness as a person, i. e. through the other's expressive- 
ness which can only be conveyed through his or her body which of 
necessity includes its livingness. The lived body is not an object 
of study for biologists doing biology unless biology (or at least 
human biology) is so transformed that the name seems scarcely appro- 
priate. The living body in contrast is very much in the purview of 
biology. 
If these modern phenomenologists seem not to have resolved the rela- 
tionship between various ways of construing human beings and hence 
have not really settled the issue concerning the proper methods to 
use in their investigations, the hermeneutical psychologists seem to 
have forgotten that persons also inhabit their lived bodies. 
Intentions certainly typify persons and agents (since, as Gauld and 
Shotter(1) point out, intentions are intentions to act and so the 
notion of intentions in the absence of actions, at least in poten- 
tia, are as meaningless as actions without intentions) but persons 
are embodied and part of their subjectivity is in their emobodied- 
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ness as I have tried to show above. Thus it seems to me hermeneutics 
and phenomenology might with mutual benefit join forces in an explo- 
ration of subjectivity and from this common meeting place map out a 
psychology more in keeping with a human being construed now from a 
shared point of view which recognises that not only are there 
'several ways of construing human beings but also that we have yet to 
explain how these different construals are related. 
Notes to Appendix 1 
1 Gauld and Shatter, 1977. 
Appendix 2 
PHENOMENOLOGY 
Here I am only concerned with showing how phenomenology contributes 
to my account of empathy. Many issues arise which cannot be explored 
in this brief note. Although phenomenology as a philosophical system 
has acquired (since Brentano) a unique cachet which clearly disting- 
uishes it, both in content and method, from earlier systems it is 
misleading to write of the phenomenological approach as though there 
were a consensus as to the nature of phenomenology and how it con- 
ducts its business. We need to qualify our reference, perhaps by 
citing Husserl or Scheler or Merleau-Ponty or Schutz or the Dusqu- 
esne school of existentialist phenomenologists(1) or the modern bio- 
logically-based movement centred on the work of some western Europe- 
an researchers which has flourished over the last 20 years. Thines 
gives a good account of their work and orientation. 
For Husserl phenomenology was concerned with discovering the essen- 
tial nature of real world phenomena as a first step towards building 
a scientific philosophy. Striving for essence is a two stage pro- 
cess. The first step is to unmask the kind of reality which charac- 
terises a particular phenomenon. What kind of thing are we dealing 
with and what are the appropriate methods for investigating it? The 
second stage centres on the experience of the knower: how (i. e. by 
what acts of consciousness) does an individual constitute the phen- 
omenon? In seeking answers to both types of question Husserl felt 
that we must somehow bypass our existing knowledge; the phenomenon, 
he said, must be allowed to speak for itself if we are to grasp its 
real nature, its essence. This process of temporarily laying aside 
our knowledge is known as reduction. The first stage in Husserl's 
phenomenological method is called the eidetic reduction because the 
essential point of view or perspective or form of reality (eidos) is 
revealed by it. This is an intuitive process and cannot be brought 
about by a volitional effort; somehow we grasp the givenness of the 
phenomenon. Thus, in Husserlian terms, I construe empathy as a rela- 
tion between persons; this is the kind of reality to which the phen- 
omenon of empathy belongs. The world of relations includes other 
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phenomena than empathy and the relations may hold between other than 
persons. Moreover, since emotional bonds are relations (though the 
reverse is not necessarily true) a study of empathy invites a study 
of emotional bonds. Hence the study of empathy focusses on persons 
and significant non-persons (e. g, biological mechanisms, organisms, 
and psychophysical individuals), and on relations and emotional 
bonds. This content also suggests the methods for investigating 
empathy by, in effect, pointing to questions such as: how do we 
investigate persons, relations, emotional bonds? How do persons dif- 
fer from non-persons? What properties do empathic relations have 
that other relations lack? And so on. 
The second step is the transcendental reduction in which the main 
problem is to discover how an individual comes to know the world. 
The individual here is not seen as an empirical subject but as an 
active agent constituting the world through his or her own experi- 
ence with specific phenomena and within specific contexts of mean- 
ing and action. In my discussion of empathy the corresponding elem- 
ents at this stage centre on personal and other ways of knowing. 
This led to a consideration of the non-manipulative stance of open- 
ness, goodwill, the spontaneous experience of givenness (in passive 
consciousness, in which similarities with others are grasped but in 
which the first intimations of differences are also apprehended), 
the process of deliberate identification and the eventual engagement 
of the participants in joint action in pursuit of a shared common 
goal or ideal. These are the acts of consciousness by means of which 
individuals get to know and understand each other as persons (i. e. 
grasp or constitute each other's subjectivity and thus their mutual 
intersubjectivity) and in so doing create and regenerate the empath- 
ic relation. 
I did not, as a matter of fact, proceed along these Husserlian lines 
in setting about my own study of empathy any more than I followed 
Scheler whose phenomenology is quite different. For Scheler it is 
characteristic for all living things to strive, to drive towards 
realization of being, to become whatever is in their nature to be- 
come. The urge to strive, however, meets with resistance from the 
real world. It is in this way that sentient living creatures experi- 
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ence the givenness of the world; givenness of real world phenomena 
is thus a function of the living entity's striving and its experi- 
ence of resistance from the world so generated. This for Scheler is 
what being-in-the-world means. It is how he arrives at the notion of 
the individual's constitution of reality, of subjectivity. Moreover 
this apprehension of the real world is prior to perception of the 
things giving rise to the experience. For Scheler, like Husserl, the 
process of getting to the heart of the phenomenon under study is in- 
tuitive; the resistance of the world is, so to speak, suspended in 
order to allow the phenomenon to reveal its nature, to show its pure 
essence. Scheler's phenomenology lays to one side any attempt to 
seek analytical knowledge (i. e. to apply reason to the study of the 
phenomenon). His study of sympathy and the subtle distinctions he 
makes in separating sympathy from feelings that look similar and are 
often confused with it is a brilliant example of his method. So is 
his study of love and 'ressentiment'. Although I have certainly bor- 
rowed Scheler's notions of striving and resistance and could as 
easily show how I might have used his technique there would be 
little point in doing so since that is not how I proceeded. 
The third group which I shall briefly comment on because they are 
relevant to this dissertation is represented by Thins; they seek a 
phenomenological psychology rooted in biology. Thins agrees with 
much of Husserl's phenomenology but places more emphasis on the cul- 
tural character of the human natural world than did Husserl. This is 
important in a comparative psychology. If animals are to be under- 
stood in ways similar to the human case, e. g. in explicating the 
notion of their consciousness of their natural worlds, we need to 
appreciate the full significance of the fact that animals are embcd- 
ied entities; their livingness resides in, and is mediated by, their 
bodies whatever other processes might be at work, just as with hum- 
ans. Thins asserts that the starting point of a genuine phenomenol- 
ogical psychology must be 
sought in the direct study of the living organism in his adap- 
tive relations with his world. This last sentence should how- 
ever, be understood in a sense which differs profoundly 
#rom 
well-known existentially implied definitions of the subject as 'being-in-the-world' (2) 
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Though he agrees that this notion is still hard to find in modern 
psychology it is also undefined. Predictably for Thins the specifi- 
cation of 'being-in-the-world' in order that it conform to his not- 
ion of organism must draw on some of the recent trends in the life 
sciences especially in the work of some ethologists. 
Insofar as ethology defines itself as the biology of behaviour, 
it would be illogical to dissociate its rejection of mechanist- 
ic Behaviourism from phenomenological attempts at graspi»g the 
significant relations of the organism to its specific natural 
world (Umwelt) (3) (This whole passage is set in italics). 
It is obvious that Thins' construal of organism differs from mine. 
For him subjectivity is an essential feature of the concept organism 
but this poses problems for me in interpreting the notion of being- 
in-the-world. Ethologists and students of the mechanisms of animal 
behaviour such as Tinbergen, von Frisch, Lorenz, Eibl-Eibesfeldt and 
Euytendijk have helped to clarify this idea but my difficulty is re- 
conciling the notion of subjectivity (which belongs to the domain of 
the personal or its non-human equivalent) and the idea of organism 
(which does not). 
The forgoing comments partly explain why phenomenology plays, direc- 
tly or indirectly, such a large part in my account of empathy. One 
might ask, even if a case can be made for letting things speak for 
themselves, whether it follows that phenomenology in one or other of 
its forms offers the only route for investigating the nature of emp- 
athy. One might carry out a conceptual analysis teasing out, for ex- 
ample, the derivation of the concept from other concepts thus arriv- 
ing at a conceptual map of the territory labelled empathy. Or one 
might attempt a linguistic analysis by observing how different 
people use the word "empathy" and exploring the meanings they attri- 
bute to it either explicitly or implicitly. One thing is quite 
clear. Empirical studies are quite inappropriate for, as Stein some- 
what caustically remarked of psychogenetic theories of empathy cur- 
rent in her day: "Before one can delineate the genesis of something, 
one must know what it is". (4) Similarly before one can investigate 
something empirically one must clarify it sufficiently to know what 
sort of questions it makes sense to ask and to specify suitable 
methods for attempting to answer them. 
Whilst both conceptual and linguistic analyses are useful tools and 
have their place in studies such as this one they cannot help us get 
directly to the phenomenon itself. Language reflects the cultural 
tradition of its user so that at best this type of analysis can only 
define some characteristics of a particular culture or sub-culture 
involving the concept labelled by the word under study. Though this 
can be extremely interesting and informative it does not itself 
reveal the phenomenon which, so to speak, lies behind the language 
used to express it. Because concepts are conveyed by language con- 
ceptual analysis becomes a form of linguistic analysis in which rel- 
ations between and among concepts are sought rather than usage and 
meaning per se. The conceptual network reveals an aspect of meaning 
which goes beyond the cultural tradition reflected in the linguistic 
use of the major terms being investigated. Logical relations repres- 
ent the most important part of conceptual analysis which therefore 
leads to the explication of a knowledge domain centred on the major 
term. 
Notes to Appendix 2 
1A sample of this viewpoint is to be found in Valle and King, 1978. 
2 Thines, 1977; p. 108. 
3 ibid. p. 145. 
4 Stein, 1970; p. 26. 
Appendix 3 
S Natale's "An Experiment in Empathy" 
Natale's research, published by the National Foundation for Educat- 
ional Research in 1972, demonstrates some of the difficulties in 
evaluating empathy research. I originally came across this work 
while investigating critical thinking. At that time I had no special 
interest in empathy and knew very little about the studies which had 
been carried out, mainly in America. 
Natale accepts Rogers' definition of empathy: "the ability to sense 
the client's private world as if it were your own but without ever 
losing the "as if" quality". From my own view of empathy (i. e. the 
empathic process) I can agree that Rogers has pointed to one poss- 
ible outcome of achieving an empathic relation with someone. Are we 
born with this quality? If not, how do we acquire it? If learned, 
does it come all at once as is sometimes hypothesised in one-trial 
learning studies? As I try to show in my review of Rogers' contrib- 
ution to our understanding of empathy he appears to envisage a proc- 
ess at work though he is far from clear in his writings about its 
nature. Some of his students, however, settled for treating empathy 
as an ability and held that, as with other abilities, people possess 
it in measurable quantities. All assert that empathy can be learned. 
Truax, Carkhuff, Natale, Eerenson and many others in this tradition 
accept without question that empathy is what Rogers said it was; 
they see their job as finding ways of measuring it, nurturing it 
with appropriate sensitivity training programmes and subsequently 
reassessing it. 
Empathy presents Natale with his first problem: the choice of inst- 
ruments. He found four ready-made ones: 
1 for predicting others' responses: a test similar to that used 
by Dymond; 
2 for studying the other's responses to the "empathiser": the 
Earrett-Lennard Relationship Inventory; 
3 for studying empathy in process: 
(a) the Truax Accurate Empathy Scale; and 
(b) the Kerr and Speroff Empathy test. 
Natale offers no critique of any of these procedures although at 
least two of them are suspect (the Dymond test and the Kerr and 
Speroff Empathy test), and a third, the Truax Accurate Empathy 
Scale, has some very odd features considering the importance of em- 
pathy for the helping relation claimed by Carkhuff, Truax, Natale 
and like-minded fellow workers. 
The Kerr and Speroff Test is perhaps the most remarkable of the 
four. It consists of three parts. Subjects are asked to rank order 
14 types of music according to the assumed listening preferences of 
either a factory worker or an office worker. Next they are asked to 
rank 15 different types of (American) magazine in order of the pref- 
erences of an average American. Finally, they have to put a list of 
10 annoying experiences in the order in which they imagine an aver- 
age 25-39 year-old would rank them. Natale does not explain how his 
subjects were able to put themselves "in the other person's posit- 
ion, establish rapport, and anticipate his reactions, feelings and 
behaviours" when the other person is a fictional character, or 
rather several fictional characters, entirely of the subject's own 
invention. It is all the more surprising, therefore, that he wrote: 
"This test... is the only standardized test available to measure emp- 
athy... The test assumes that individuals who are more empathic are 
superior in understanding and anticipating the reactions of 
others. "(1) Perhaps the Empathy Test has potential for predicting 
the likely success of budding writers of fiction. Natale uses it to 
measure what he calls predictive empathy of the generalized other. 
I have commented on this logically and conceptually dubious concept 
elsewhere. (2) 
One form of the Truax Accurate Empathy Scale consists of short films 
of "psychotherapeutic interviews based on real transcripts but play- 
ed by professional actors. "(3) Additionally, subjects are given some 
excerpts from fiction. In both cases the subject has to write down 
his or her helping response (Natale's sample included only 1 woman) 
to the situation featured in the stimulus material. The responses 
are rated on a 9-point scale of empathy by trained judges. The scale 
ranges from "seems completely unaware of even the most conspicuous 
of the client's statements" to "an unerring response to the client's 
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full range of feelings in their exact intensity". As with the Kerr 
and Speroff test subjects have no direct contact with actual people 
and in the case of the film excerpts they do not see the persons 
needing help but instead the actors playing their parts. Apart from 
Truax's incredible choice of the epither "accurate" to describe this 
scale Natale, even more unbelievably, uses it to measure what he 
calls interactive empathy. Perhaps this scale could be used to 
predict the likely success of budding actors. I find it 
extraordinary that such a procedure is so widely accepted and used 
as a valid detector of accurate empathy, or of any other kind for 
that matter. 
The relationship between these two tests and the measurement of 
empathy in process is not explained. Natale apparently did not feel 
the need to expand this aspect of his research which, considering 
its theoretical importance for the claim he makes, is surprising. 
The Dymond Test of Predictive Empathy is potentially much more 
interesting and worth serious study despite its serious flaws which 
attracted much criticism in the mid-50s. The procedure involves 
selecting a small sub-set of 50 items from the Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory (MMPI) which is then used by two people to 
rate both themselves and each other and also to imagine how each 
rates both self and the other. Thus the pattern of ratings of two 
individuals, A and B, is shown in the table overleaf. 
The second and last columns refer to the four tasks for A and B 
respectively listed in the first part. Level I summarises the two 
sets of direct judgements, for example, A's rating of self, A(A), 
and of other, A(B), and similarly B's rating of self, B(B), and of 
other, B(A). Level 2 represents A's and B's attempts to imagine how 
the other rates bath self and the other. Thus A(B(B)) stands for A's 
guess about B's self-rating, B(B); and B(A(B)) represents B's guess 
about A's judgement of self, A(B). The judgements in all cases refer 
to one item from the shortened version of the MMPI which Dymond used 
for deriving her measure of empathy. This procedure is repeated 50 
times to cover the whole sub-set. 
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For A: (Al) A rates self 
(A2) A rates B 
(A3) A records how B will rate self (B) 
(A4) A records how B will rate A 
For B: (Dl) B rates self 
(B2) E rates A 
(E3) B records how A will rate self (A) 
(E4) B records how A will rate E 
There are two significant ornrnissions in Dymond's procedure. The 
first concerns the nature of the task which each individual is 
performing: rating an individual on an MMPI item. Dymond assumes 
that everyone will construe each item in the same way. This may be 
true but cannot be assumed. Each person is making a judgement (or 
rather 50 judgements) within the context of his or her own world. 
We might represent these tasks is a rather more informative manner: 
A's world B's world 
Level 1 (Al) A(A) B(B) (El) 
own direct 
judgements (A2) A(E) E(A) (E2) 
Leve12 (A3) A(B(E)) B(A(A)) (E3) 
Guesses about 
other's (A4) A(B(A)) B(A(B)) (E4) 
judgements 
Everyone attaches meaning to a statement according to personal know- 
ledge, belief, feelings at the time, and many other factors. Test 
design procedures aim to minimise variability in personal interpret- 
ations of items but nevertheless cannot guarantee unanimity of 
agreement about what a particular item means on a specific occasion 
of use. Judgements are made in private so uncertainty always exists 
on this point. Thus the above table ought to be rewritten with the 
task represented in a way which stresses the rater's viewpoint, 
perhaps by placing /Ia or /Ib after each entry on A's and B's side 
respectively. For example, A(A)/Ia and B(B)/Ib refer to A's and B's 
judgements of themselves on an item interpreted by each of them 
uniquely (which, of course, might be identically). 
The second ommission concerns the need for a third level: A's and 
B's guesses about level 2. (4) For example, "How, in A's opinion, 
does B think A has rated B? " Here A is guessing about how B imagines 
that A has rated self, i. e. B. This can be represented by 
A(B(A(B))/Ia. Note that although B(A(B)) comes from B's side of 
level 2, Ia is used to represent the item because A is operating in 
his or her own world. The reason for the third level emerges from a 
consideration of the comparisons which can be made using this new 
table. Let us start with A's self-rating, A(A)/Ia. B's "best guess" 
for this is given by B(A(A))/Ib. Once again note that E's guess is 
expressed in terms of B's understanding of the item, Ib. Finally A's 
"best guess" about E's "best guess" is given by A(B(A(A))/Ia. Hence 
one person's judgements at each of two levels, i and 2, are matched 
by corresponding guesses by the other which are recorded at levels 2 
and 
As an illustration two comparisons are shown by dotted lines in a 
new table below. They represent: 
(1) A's self-rating at level 1 and B's guess or prediction 
about it at level 2; 
(2) B's prediction about A's self-rating at level 2 and A's 
guess about this prediction at level 
Beyond level 3 the task becomes meaningless for most people. In any 
event no new information is likely to be revealed even if the task 
were possible. 
A's world E's world 
Level 1 (Al) A(A)/Ia. B(E)/Ib (E1) 
Direct 
judgement (A2) A(P) /Ia B(A) /Ib (P2) 
Level 2 (A3) A(B(B))/Ia E(A(A))/Ib (E3) 
Guess about / 
level 1 (A4) A(E(A))/Ia i B(A(B))/Ib (P4) 
Level 3 (A5) A(E(A(A)))/Ia B(A(B(E)))/Ib (P5) 
Guess about 
level 2 (A6) A(B(A(B)))/Ia B(A(B(A)))/Ib (P6) 
From the point of view of empathy research, agreements between cor- 
responding points on A's and B's side at the various levels provide 
a measure of similarity between A and B. However, this must assume 
that Ia and Ib are practically the same and as I have pointed out 
this can never be determined with certainty. On the other hand if A 
and B could discuss Ia and Ib and explore their own meanings and 
understandings and ultimately perhaps come to an agreement such that 
Ia and Ib were seen as equivalent alternatives, more or less, (al- 
ways provided that A and B discuss their differences non-manipulat- 
I 
ively, non-judgementally, non-exploitatively, from a stance of open- 
ness towards one another) then we might be able to use a Dymond-type 
instrument, suitably augmented to include level 3, for evaluating an 
interpersonal relation in order to determine the extent of its 
empathic character. Another proviso would be essential, however, and 
that is that participants be allowed to make conditonal agreements. 
No one is always decisive, bad-tempered, etc. It often 
depends... Neither can it be true, for example, that a person is 
usually bad-tempered, etc. and for the same reason. Perhaps some 
topics, situations, people make a particular individual bad-tempered 
except when he has had a few drinks. Then he is benign to everyone. 
On the other hand with old ladies, small children and dogs he is 
patience personified but if his wife turns up his behaviour becomes 
quite different. Life as experienced by most of us most of the time 
is variegated, a patchwork of moods, feelings, habits and so forth, 
which change subtly, sometimes dramatically, according to all manner 
of triggers which precipitate the change. Our experiences cannot be 
reduced to the bipolar dimensionality or the simple category systems 
so beloved by psychometrists. 
Natale is apparently unaware of these difficulties. Neither does he 
show any sign of having read the critiques which question the 
rationale of assumed similarity scores as a measure of empathy 
though he cites some of them in his bibliography. (5) 
One of the most serious difficulties with Natale's research is high- 
lighted in one of his conclusions. He claims, through analysis of 
the differences between mean scores of his experimental and control 
groups, that training in critical thinking increases empathic 
ability. Wilson in his preface to the book observes: 
Some may feel that more attention should also be paid to the 
possibility of some logical overlap between "empathy" and "critial thinking". For if we gave a full expansion of what was 
meant by "thinking critically about people", might this not include the notion of learning to see their worlds as they see them? Is this not what the historian and literary critic does (sic), for instance? So that it would not be at all surprising if those who improve their "critical thinking" also improved their "empath "; or rather it would be logically absurd to 
suggest that 
they 
could not improve it. (6) 
We might gloss Wilson's remarks thus: if critical thinking about 
people and empathy are construed as elements of the same cognitive 
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domain such that the first includes the second then improvement in 
the first logically entails at least some improvement in the second. 
Natale's account of both elements seems to me to support the first 
part of this proposition; I feel that Wilson thinks so too. 
Notes to Appendix 3 
1 Natale, 1972; p. 48. 
2 See section 1.54. 
3 Natale, 1976; p. 50. 
4 Laing, Phillipson and Lee, 1966, extended Dymond's method to 
include this third level. 
5 He lists Cronbach, 1955 Bender and Hastorf, 1950; Haetorf and 
Bender 1952; Gage and oronbach, 1955. None, however are referred 
to in the text. 
6 Natale, 1976; p. 11. 
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